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STATE OF ISRAEL

DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL 1950

COMPANION VOLUME

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ISRAEL STATE ARCHIVES

DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL

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FOREWORD

This volume is the fifth in the series relating to the foreign policy of Israel. It covers the period from January to December 1950. The editorial policy followed in the present volume is the same as that which governed the preparation of the previous volumes. The documents selected deal primarily with foreign policy, but a number of documents dealing with other matters closely related to the conduct of foreign policy have also been included. Among the subjects which fall under this category are immigration policy, economic assistance and relations between Israel and the Jewish diaspora.

The documents have been selected with a view towards providing extensive documentation of deliberations, discussions, the spectrum of opinions and the shaping of foreign policy. A number of documents were chosen with the aim of providing coverage on subjects which, though they cannot be classified with the major themes of foreign policy, were of some importance at the time and must not be entirely ignored. These documents also enable the reader to trace the files which hold further information on the issues in question.

A number of documents recording discussions and consultations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been included, the editors being aware of the importance of documentation relating to policy planning. It should be borne in mind, though, that questions relating to the long-range aims of foreign policy were not necessarily discussed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but rather at Government level and by the executives of political parties.

The minutes of Government meetings have not been declassified and are not available for research purposes, but information derived from them has been used by the editors in the preparation of the notes and the introduction to the volume.

The documents published in this volume derive from the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the files of Israel's missions abroad. All these files are now in the custody of the Israel State Archives.

Arrangement of the documents. The documents are arranged in chronological order. Documents composed or sent out on more than one date are placed according to the earliest date. The position of telegrams in the chronological sequence is governed by the earliest known date, in the following order: date of drafting, date of dispatch, or — if neither of these is known — date of receipt. Reports of discussions and meetings appear under the date of writing, when known. When the date of writing is not known, the chronological location of the document in question is determined on the basis of the date of the discussion or meeting (the latter date always appears in the main editorial heading).

The text. The text of the printed documents is identical with the original text except for the following editorial changes and corrections:

(a) Addresses of senders and addressees as well as dates in their original form have been deleted. In some of the reports, memoranda and minutes the original headings have also been omitted. The deleted information is incorporated in part in the editorial headings in standard form (see below) or in a note.

(b) A number of passages which have no direct relevance to foreign policy have been omitted, as have a few offensive references to individuals as well as some passages referring to subjects and names which have not been declassified. All omissions are indicated in the body of the text and as a rule are explained in footnotes.

(c) Minor errors have been corrected without comment and without indication in the body of the text. No attempt has been made beyond that to correct style, syntax or grammar.

(d) Common abbreviations and abbreviations whose meaning is not in doubt have been expanded to full form in square brackets when appearing for the first time in the document. Subsequently, the abbreviation has been retained in the text. Abbreviations of proper names have always been expanded to full form in square brackets. However, abbreviations commonly pronounced as such and acronyms (e.g., U.N., UNO, I.D.F., U.S.A.) have not been altered.

(e) Missing words have in some cases been added, either conjecturally (within square brackets and preceded by a question mark) or on the basis of a corresponding text of the same document (within square brackets and with an explanation in a footnote).

(f) English spelling has been standardized to conform with British usage except in documents originating in American institutions or written by Americans.

(g) Original punctuation and capitalization have been retained as much as possible. Corrections have been made only in cases of obvious mistakes or to avoid misunderstandings. In telegrams, where the original punctuation is partial, the editors exercised much more liberty in punctuation and capitalization.

(h) The outgoing text of telegrams has been used when extant.

Names. Israeli personalities who changed their names in the course of the period documented in this volume are referred to by their new Hebrew names in the editorial headings and in the annotation. Names appearing in the text, including signatures, have not been changed.

Signatures. Signatures appended in the writer's own hand are printed in bold type.

Editorial headings. The heading includes, *inter alia,* the file reference of the document and, in the case of telegrams, the file reference of the outgoing text. References to files of the Israel State Archives give only the reference numbers of the record group, the series, the box and the file.

References to files of other archival institutions carry the full or abbreviated name of the institution. (See list of archives and abbreviations in references below.)

The destination of a document is noted in the editorial heading except when the document is addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or another central government body.

Editorial notes provide information on important events or developments. They precede the earliest document which contains a reference to the subject or are placed at the date on which the event took place.

Footnotes. The annotation consists mainly of numbered footnotes, explanatory notes and reference notes. The references given are mainly to primary sources (including sources that have been published, mainly documents of the Department of State of the United States published in the series *Foreign Relations of the United States).* The main purpose of the footnotes is to elucidate the text where necessary and to call attention to other relevant documents. There are a few references to documents and files which have not yet been declassified but which will eventually become available to researchers.

Biographical footnotes have been provided where necessary for a proper understanding of the text. Information on most persons mentioned in the documents is included in the index. The index does not provide information on persons mentioned only in the footnotes.

Appendices. There are two appendices in the Main Volume, containing U.N. documents vital for the understanding of the documents in this volume.

Index and list of documents. A list of main subjects of the documents and editorial notes can be found at the beginning of the volume; an index of persons and subjects is at the end of the volume.

We would like to thank the following for their assistance: Mr Haim Harari of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who read the entire manuscript and made many useful comments; Mrs Nina Shpringer, who collated most of the documents in the volume and took part in the editorial work; Mr Joseph Elron, who supervised the copy-editing of the Main and Companion Volumes, translated the major part of the summaries of the Hebrew documents and notes into English and was in charge of the proof-reading; Dr Alexandra Mahler, who translated part of the summaries of the Hebrew documents; Mrs Michal Engel, who contributed to the biographical research and took part in the proof-reading; Mrs Yael Raz, who took part in the final preparation of the manuscript; Mrs Nehama Chalom, Director of the Weizmann Archives, for style-editing of the introduction and part of the Companion Volume; Mrs Henny Levij, who read the proofs of most of the Companion Volume; Professor Yehoshua Porath, for his guidance with regard to transliteration of Arabic

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We are also indebted to all those who provided us with biographical information on themselves or on persons mentioned in the documents.

INTRODUCTION

The documents published in this volume reflect Israel's foreign policy during 1950, the main thrust of which was a continued search for an understanding with the Arab states, the consolidation of Israel's international standing and the preservation of a policy of nonalignment notwithstanding the exacerbated East-West conflict in the wake of the Korean war.

Israeli statesmen's hopes that peaceful relations would follow the cessation of hostilities and the signing of armistice agreements with the Arab states had dimmed in the course of 1949. The U.N. had that year appointed a special commission — the Conciliation Commission for Palestine — charged with bridging the differences between the two sides. The Commission's intensive efforts had, however, met with no success and only served to expose the abyss dividing Israel and the Arab states. When the Commission adjourned at the end of 1949, the outstanding points of contention were the fate of the Arab refugees and the boundaries of the State of Israel. The Commission's leaning towards a compromise solution prompted it to adopt a middle-of-the-road position which Israel found totally unacceptable: the Commission recommended that Israel admit and resettle 250,000 refugees and also agree to negotiate boundary modifications. The Commission moreover disagreed with Israel's conception of its role as simply that of promoting a favourable atmosphere and coaxing the parties into direct negotiations, and contended instead that its task was to mediate and to submit peace proposals of its own. These interim conclusions were delivered in a communication from the alternate chairman of the Commission[1] to Israel in mid-November 1949. The Commission then adjourned, on the understanding that Israeli and Arab responses would be forthcoming when it reconvened at the beginning of 1950.

Israel did not give a written response, but chose to make an oral statement when the Commission resumed its sessions at the end of January 1950. The Israeli representative then reiterated — in somewhat more inflexible terms — Israel's declared policy throughout 1949: demand for direct negotiations with the Arab states; rejection of unsolicited attempts at mediation by the Commission and the request that its efforts be confined to conciliating between the parties; opposition to resettlement of the Arab refugees in Israel and retraction of the offer to repatriate 100,000 of them; renewed refusal to negotiate on boundary modifications.[2]

Israel's position ensued not only from her rejection of various aspects of the Commission's proposals, but also from an increasing realization that the Commission itself was not an effective instrument for the attainment

1. See Vol. 4, No. 414.
2. See Gideon Rafael's speech before the Conciliation Commission, 30 January 1950; No. 54.

of peace with the Arabs. In addition, there had been intimations that the United States, one of the Commission members together with France and Turkey, was not as interested in conciliation as she had been in 1949, and the Commission was thus gradually falling under the influence of the French member. The latter showed a great deal of enterprise and was lavish with proposals, but it was clear to the Israeli representatives that these emanated largely on his own initiative and did not generally enjoy the backing of his own government[3].

Israel's negative response, plus the fact that the Arabs submitted no new proposals, and that their representatives were of the second rank and unauthorized to make decisions binding on their governments, led to an early stalemate. The French representative countered with the suggestion that central issues be temporarily shelved, in order to deal with specific matters such as the unblocking of Arab refugees' frozen accounts in Israeli banks, the reunification of families, and so forth. To this end it was proposed that a number of joint subcommittees be set up on which Israel would sit together with representatives of the Arab state or states involved, as required, with the meetings chaired by a member of the Commission. This proposed procedure was submitted to all the parties in an official communication on 29 March 1950, though no mention was made that this applied only to matters of secondary importance.[4] This move did not break the impasse. While neither Israel nor the Arabs objected to the proposed procedure, the latter made their participation in the renewed negotiations conditional on Israel's prior agreement to repatriate the refugees and withdraw to the 1947 Partition Plan borders.[5] The Arab response convinced Israel that further negotiations under the Commission's auspices were pointless, and that this framework should be discarded. This opinion was shared by a number of U.N. officials, particularly General Riley, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Observers in Palestine, who hoped to enhance the standing of the Mixed Armistice Commission through assumption of the powers of the Conciliation Commission; but the idea had to be abandoned, owing to opposition by the dominant senior U.S. statesmen, who feared that the Commission's dissolution would undermine U.N. prestige.

The Conciliation Commission's final report was submitted to the U.N. Secretary-General in autumn 1950. It detailed all mediation efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict, attempted to analyse the roots of the conflict — attributing them mainly to deeply ingrained mutual fear and antagonism — and recommended that the General Assembly call on the parties to enter into direct negotiations, with priority given to the solution of the refugee problem.[6] This recommendation was the focus of the debate in the

3. See No. 86.
4. See No. 157.
5. See Nos. 188, 228.
6. See Editorial Note, p. 219.

Political Committee of the General Assembly, which concluded with a resolution calling the parties to immediate negotiations, either direct or through the Conciliation Commission, and instructing the Commission to set up an office to deal with the arrangements involved in assessing Arab refugees' property and awarding appropriate compensation. Israel was greatly put out by the words "or through the Conciliation Commission", appended at the insistence of the Chinese delegation in a move to appease the Arabs.[7]

Implicit in the Commission's instructions to concentrate mainly on the Arab refugee issue was an admission that the world community, as well as the Middle East countries themselves, had slight hopes of a speedy resolution of the Palestine conflict. As an aftermath of the debate at the Fourth Session of the General Assembly in autumn 1949, it had been resolved to establish the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees; this body was set up in mid-1950, and was immediately confronted with the welfare needs of hundreds of thousands of refugees, and with the simultaneous duty of planning for their long-term constructive rehabilitation. The Agency's projected course of action was to concentrate on rehabilitation rather than relief, and to set up for that purpose a special Reintegration Fund to be financed by the United Nations, into which would also be paid Israeli reparations for refugee property.

This idea was put to Israel on several occasions and got a favourable reaction. Israel's predisposition was rooted in the certainty that the refugee issue would likely remain on the agenda of the Assembly and provide grounds for bitter denunciations against her; in the knowledge that this issue was becoming an ever greater stumbling block in her relations with the United States and with other countries; and in the assumption that adopting the principle of refugee rehabilitation in the Arab countries would eventually take the edge off the demand for their repatriation to Israel. Following a series of deliberations, the Government of Israel formulated at the end of October 1950 its position on the refugee issue. The main points were: agreement to the establishment of the Reintegration Fund, to be partially financed by reparations to be paid by Israel; readiness to begin immediate negotiations on the reparations, with Israel submitting counterclaims of her own; and the understanding that these negotiations would constitute the first step towards a final peace agreement.[8] This last point was a considerable concession, as Israel had hitherto maintained that the solution of the refugee issue must be part of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which could not be resolved piecemeal.

The Arab refugee issue was debated by the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly during November 1950. The outcome was the adoption of the Relief and Works Agency's proposal for the establish-

7. See Editorial Note, p. 254; Appendix B, Main Volume, pp. 739–740.

8. See No. 435.

ment of the Reintegration Fund, and the start of fund raising — with a goal of $30 million for the first year. The final wording of the resolution did not entirely satisfy Israel, insofar as it directed efforts to achieve the refugees' absorption in the Middle East by "both repatriation and resettlement".[9] Though anticipated attacks on Israel during the debate did not materialize, it nevertheless became clear, from both this resolution as well as the preceding one extending the mandate of the Conciliation Commission, that the refugee issue was becoming the focal point of the entire complex of the Palestine conflict, a potentially dangerous cause of friction with the U.N. and other countries.

Throughout the Conciliation Commission's activity, and even before the establishment of that body, Israel held that the best way to arrive at a peace settlement with her neighbours was through direct negotiations with each Arab state separately. Her belief was grounded on the successful experience of the armistice negotiations and the invariable negative role Israel ascribed to the various mediators and extraneous bodies that interfered in the Israel-Arab dispute. A series of direct contacts with the Arab states put this assumption to the test in 1950.

The most protracted contact was held with the Jordanians. The initiative came from King Abdallah and the talks began back in summer 1949. A draft agreement was ready by mid-December, proposing Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem, free access to the Western Wall and Mount Scopus, and bilateral boundary modifications, particularly in the Latrun area; the Jordanians were to be given free access to the Mediterranean at Gaza by means of a narrow corridor, under full Jordanian sovereignty, extending from Hebron by way of Beth Jibrin.[10] At the beginning of 1950, a crisis arose regarding the width of the proposed corridor to Gaza: the Jordanians demanded one several kilometres wide, while Israel proposed a much narrower area. In an attempt to resolve the stalemate, the parties deflected the talks to the subject of Jerusalem; but no accord was reached on that point either, as the Jordanians reneged on their previous agreement to Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter, and consented only to free access to the Western Wall and Israeli institutions on Mount Scopus. Israel, for her part, would not concede on a point of great importance to the Jordanians — the return of Israeli-occupied Arab quarters in Jerusalem — and was willing at most to discuss payment of compensation to the former residents.

When an impasse seemed inevitable again, King Abdallah proposed substitution of the contemplated agreement for a five-year non-aggression treaty, which would also provide for territorial *status quo*, for the resumption of trade and economic relations, and for the setting up of joint commissions to discuss all outstanding issues. This draft treaty was initialled

9. See Editorial Note, pp. 251–2.

10. See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 293.

on 24 February 1950,[11] but a few days later King Abdallah announced that his government could not agree to the clause providing for the resumption of trade relations, as it contravened express Arab League resolutions. Desultory talks followed. Regular contacts, albeit in the lower echelons, resumed towards the end of 1950 and continued into 1951, as part of the "Special Committee" decreed by the Armistice Agreement, and designed to settle various outstanding issues in Jerusalem and along the common border; these talks, however, came to naught.

Parallel to the talks with Jordan, which were usually conducted outside the framework of the U.N. and often in defiance of the organization, there were also meetings with Egypt and Syria; these, though unofficial, eventuated in the context of the Conciliation Commission sessions in Geneva and of the U.N. General Assembly in New York. In Geneva, the Egyptians reiterated their demand for boundary modifications, particularly for cession by Israel of the southern Negev and Eilat. The Egyptian representative, Abd el-Mun'im Mustafa, advanced the idea of a bilateral treaty that would extend the scope of the existing armistice agreement but remain less than a full-fledged peace agreement.[12] This option was mooted again in talks during the U.N. session in New York, held through a third party — the U.S. delegation to the U.N.; the Egyptians and the Syrians at that time proposed the signing of practical agreements and non-aggression treaties. These contacts were discontinued because the Americans, who were serving as a conduit for the proposals, feared lest these in effect direct negotiations prejudice the standing of the Conciliation Commission and their own efforts to achieve a solution regarding the Arab refugees.[13]

All these talks, initiatives, obstacles and failures had a great bearing on Israeli policy makers' speculations on the probable outcome of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their impressions were, first of all, that the state of neither peace nor war and the presence of large refugee concentrations in their territories were not proving to be an unbearable pressure on the Arab states; the *status quo* could presumably be tolerated for years to come.[14] Secondly, that the antagonism towards Israel, and permanent mobilization designed to recoup the losses of the 1948 war, evolved into important factors in pan-Arab integration; an Arab state had to weigh the advantages of a settlement with Israel against those of accord and cooperation with the members of the Arab League. Thirdly, the internal factors in the Arab states were evidently not favourable to a compromise with Israel; even absolute rulers, such as King Abdallah, could not adopt a policy unpopular with the majority of their subjects. These and other considerations brought the Israeli leaders, and Sharett in particular, to the conclusion that not much was to be expected from negotiations with the Arabs, that progress would have

11. See No. 105.
12. See No. 115.
13. See Nos. 439, 480.
14. See e.g., Rafael's analysis in No. 119.

to come in easy stages, that efforts should be mainly directed at achieving something better than the armistice agreements, though not necessarily final peace, and finally that — in the worst of cases — Israel would have to learn to live in a state of constant enmity with her neighbours.[15]

Diminishing expectations led the Government to lay stress on safeguarding the system of the armistice agreements with Israel's neighbours. In the course of 1950 there was a steady rise in the frequency of violations of the armistice agreements. These incidents were usually of a local nature and in some instances had petty criminal intent — infiltration to ingather the harvest or steal; sometimes, however, they had military or political implications, such as: Jordan's complaint over the ploughing of land near Naharayim; Egypt's complaint over the expulsion of the Azazmeh bedouin and the presence of military forces at Ein Netafim in contravention of the Armistice Agreement; Jordanian restrictions on the regular convoys to Mount Scopus and blocking of the road to Eilat, and so forth. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt there was no adequate political control over the Army's activity on the borders, and that the political and propaganda implications of some military retaliatory actions had not been properly assessed.[16] Moreover, some issues bearing the seeds of future protracted conflict emerged, such as the launching of the Huleh drainage project,[17] and the dispute over free passage of goods and oil through the Suez Canal. This last point was of special importance. The Security Council pronounced in Israel's favour, but U.N. officials made it clear that the Israel-Egypt Mixed Armistice Commission charged with executing the Security Council's ruling was unable to ensure free passage in the Canal, and that the conflict could be resolved only by negotiations at the highest political level.[18]

The border incidents, provoking as they were, did not worry Israel's leaders as much as the upsurge of bellicose Arab rhetoric, the calls for a "second round", and the accelerated rearmament of the Arabs. The Security Council's resolution of 11 August 1949 terminated the cease-fire supervisory apparatus operating in Palestine since mid-July 1948, thereby lifting the embargo and arms supply to the belligerent states.[19] The Arab states then started on a course of rapid rearmament, supplied mainly by Britain — the traditional source of arms for the Middle East. With a view to neutralizing this perceived upset in the military equilibrium, Israel approached both Britain and the U.S.A. While efforts in Britain were directed at obtaining military equipment, especially modern tanks and jet-planes, activity in the U.S. was mainly confined to the diplomatic sphere,

15. See Sharett's address in the Government meeting in the course of the discussion on the draft non-aggression agreement with Jordan; Nos. 119, 129.
16. See No. 478.
17. See No. 444.
18. See Editorial Note, pp. 218–19.
19. See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 133–4.

warning against the upset balance of power, calling for a halt to arms shipments to the Middle East, and seeking assurances or guarantees for the continuation of the territorial *status quo* in the region. No immediate successes were achieved: in Britain, requests for tanks and planes met with evasive or negative answers, while the American response was to dismiss Arab threats as idle and Israel's concern as exaggerated; in the event of Arab aggression, the Americans promised to deal with it opportunely.[20]

These reassurances were meant mainly to mollify Israel; in private the British and the Americans voiced serious concern about the situation in the Middle East. They were concerned less for Israel's security — both the British and the Americans reckoned Israel to be strong enough and indeed believed her to foster aggressive and expansionist tendencies[21] — than for the future of the entire Middle East in the event of regional or international hostilities. The powers' long-range designs envisaged some sort of regional defence scheme for the Middle Eastern states, and there had in fact been feelers in that direction, especially by the British.[22] In the short range, they aimed at promoting tranquility and stability. The three-power declaration of 24 May 1950[23] was their most important political step in the area since the armistice agreements. The signatory powers — the United States, Great Britain and France — recognized the right of every Middle Eastern state to maintain a certain level of armament for its internal security and self-defence, while demanding that it renounce any aggressive designs on its neighbouring states.

The three-power declaration constituted an unquestionable success for Israeli diplomacy and a fulfilment of Israel's eagerly sought international guarantees for her existence and territorial integrity. Nevertheless, it did not fundamentally alter Israel's relations with the signatory powers, or usher in a breakthrough in negotiations for arms supply, but led instead to difficulties in relations with the Eastern European bloc.

Israel's relations with Great Britain were not wholly free of the burden of history. There were indeed some positive signs such as the successful outcome at the end of March of negotiations on the liquidation of mutual obligations deriving from the termination of the Mandate and unblocking of Israel's frozen sterling accounts; in addition, Britain announced her *de jure* recognition of Israel. These steps, however, attested to no more than Britain's willingness to accept facts; as to the upgrading from *de facto* recognition — this was part of a package deal which included British recognition of Jordan's annexation of the West Bank. In other respects, and especially the critical matter of arms supply, the response was decidedly cool, and officials at the Foreign Office made no bones of the fact that their

20. See Goldmann's Meeting with Secretary of State Acheson — No. 155.
21. See Nos. 177, 226.
22. See No. 521.
23. See No. 248.

Middle East policy would run along the traditional line of support of the Arabs.

Relations with France were not tainted by any burden from the past, but in a sense they reached a dead end in the course of 1950. Though France was a member of the Conciliation Commission and sat on the Trusteeship Council — two bodies dealing with the Palestine issue — the available documentation creates the impression that her representatives acted more out of personal motives than on directives from their government.

Of paramount concern to Israel were her relations with the United States, which during 1949 had boded ill for the future. Officials at the State Department had formed the view that the obstacles to a settlement in the Middle East stemmed from Israel's intransigence; they accordingly attempted — through their representatives on the Conciliation Commission — to compel Israel to accept mass repatriation of the refugees as well as territorial concessions. The stalemate reached by the Conciliation Commission and waning U.S. interest in the conciliation process eased the immediate pressure on Israel but did not completely relieve minds at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; numerous consultations were held in a endeavour to get to the root of the problem and find a satisfactory solution.[24] Some sources of irritation were indeed diagnosed, such as Israeli inability to conform to the American temperament; aspersions cast on the U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv by his superiours, who suspected him of excessive sympathy for Israel; the peculiar position of U.S. Jewry as a broker between Israel and the Washington administration; strong pro-British bias and perhaps latent antisemitism among State Department officials; and American concern over Israel's stand in the inter-bloc conflict. All these, however, were presumed to be of less consequence to the U.S. than its overriding view of Israel as an element of instability in the Middle East, and their eagerness to defuse and, if possible, to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This assessment by Israeli statesmen in 1950, retrospectively supported by our present knowledge of the American internal deliberations,[25] led the Israelis to redoubled efforts in negotiations with Jordan, and to attempts to involve the Americans all along. Though no breakthrough was achieved with either Jordan or any other Arab state, relations with the United States underwent a marked transformation. Reuven Shiloah, visiting the States after a long absence, found, in talks with State Department officials, "a radical change...in the character of our relations with the U.S. Government": Israel was no longer suspected of intrigues, but regarded as a loyal ally and a stabilizing factor in the Middle East.[26] This was no mere change in perceptions; there were very concrete results, such as a more favourable

24. See e.g., Nos. 62, 222.
25. See *FRUS*, 1950, V, pp. 122ff.
26. See No. 415.

response to Israel's approaches in the economic sphere, and a realistic and even sympathetic attitude in all outstanding matters relating to Israel and the U.N. — the Jerusalem question, violations of the armistice agreements and the Arab refugee problem. Only on one point the United States remained unyielding: her refusal to supply arms to the Middle East — a crucial matter to Israel.

The three-power declaration had inimical effects on Israel's relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. Israeli representatives in these countries embarked on a campaign of explanation and persuasion; they stressed that the declaration, in which Israel had no part, was a unilateral act intended to strengthen and amplify U.N. principles and resolutions on the preservation of peace, and pointed out that Israel did not subscribe to the regional defence accords contained in that declaration.[27] These diplomatic efforts were in the main futile. The Soviets and their allies had long written off Israel as being under the American sphere of influence. Though full diplomatic relations were still formally maintained, and though there were friendly encounters among members of the Israeli and Eastern delegations to the U.N., these cordial contacts had no great significance, and merely reflected Soviet isolation at the U.N. and their belief that Israel had access to reliable sources of information that could be tapped.

For Israel, relations with the Eastern bloc centered on maintaining a love contact with the Jewish communities there and on bringing to Israel as many Jews as possible. These endeavours met with partial success in the course of 1950. Immigration from Poland, begun in 1949, proceeded at the rate of a few hundred a month; Rumania, which had formerly placed a strict ban on emigration, unexpectedly opened its gates to the extent of several thousand departures monthly. On the other hand, the large Jewish community in Hungary was left with almost no possibilities of emigration. Israeli representatives conducted protracted negotiations for the release of 3,000 exit permits, promised since 1949, but further permits were unobtainable.

The case of the Jews in the Soviet Union was altogether different. Israel had previously desisted from pressing demands for free Jewish immigration from Russia, in the belief that restraint on this point might facilitate the emigration of Jews from the satellite states, which were not yet as inflexible as the Soviet regime. This concept was revised in 1950, after numerous reports on the plight of Russia's Jews and on deportations and oppression dictated the need for a more forceful tackling of the problem.[28] A suitable opportunity presented itself at a meeting between Sharett and Vyshinsky, the Soviet Foreign Minister, during the U.N. General Assembly. Vyshinsky's response, however, was adamantly negative; he explained that free emigration went against basic Soviet domestic concepts.[29] This

27. See Nos. 254, 275.
28. See Nos. 133, 378.
29. See No. 443.

statement effectively stymied further Israeli efforts in this respect for a number of years.

Stabilization and consolidation marked Israel's relations with other countries in 1950, attached to the development of closer relations with Asian countries, and Israel extended recognition to Communist China and to Indonesia; these countries, however, did not reciprocate. India recognized Israel in September 1950, yet resolutely withheld exchange of diplomatic representatives, claiming budgetary limitations[30]; Israel had, however, reason to believe that India was unwilling to maintain relations with Israel and that her belated and half-hearted recognition had only been grudgingly extended.

Relations with Iran were similarly unusual. This Middle Eastern country, which, though Muslim, was not a member of the Arab League and allowed transit of Jewish emigrants from Iraq, was of immense interest to Israel. The Iranians, eager to safeguard their economic interests in Israel, unilaterally announced dispatch of a representative; they only extended official recognition to Israel after becoming convinced that their representative would not otherwise be acknowledged.[31] The ensuing negotiations on the appointment of an Israeli representative to Teheran were still inconclusive at the close of 1950.

In contrast to the intense interest and assiduity with which Israel pursued relations with Asian countries, marked cautiousness was the rule with respect to Franco's Spain and the two German states emerging under the Allied occupation. In search of international legitimacy, Spain also made overtures to Israel, where opinions on mutual recognition were divided owing to Franco's support of Mussolini's and Hitler's totalitarian regimes, on one extreme, and the significant help extended by Spain during the war to Jewish refugees, on the other. After lengthy debate it was resolved to reject Spain's proffered recognition and to continue opposing her rehabilitation at the U.N. though this might entail jeopardizing relations with some Latin American countries.[32]

The problem of relations with Germany was emotionally charged and much more complicated. Israel's policy was to avoid contact with the two Germanies and to ignore any approach by their official representatives.[33] It nevertheless became increasingly clear that the German republic emerging in the Western Zone of occupation was destined to play a major economic and political role in Europe, and it would only be detrimental to Israel's interests to boycott it. Moreover, a helter-skelter of negotiations on reparations and restitution of Jewish property was being conducted by a large number of Jewish bodies with various authorities in Germany, perniciously affecting the Jewish cause. Out of numerous discussions on

30. See Editorial Note, p. 201.
31. See Nos. 21, 132.
32. See Nos. 348, 393.
33. See No. 362.

this subject at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in various inter-departmental forums, the consensus emerged that relations with Germany or with the occupation authorities should be limited to the business of restitution and reparations, and not a single voice was raised for rehabilitation of the German people or normalization in diplomatic relations. It was also concluded that it was imperative to concentrate all activities relating to restitution and reparations under one authority, to be set up by the Government of Israel in cooperation with various Jewish bodies; and that an official Israeli mission should be attached to the Allied High Commissioners in Germany.[34] This decision, taken at the bureaucratic level, lacked endorsement by the Government, which was reluctant to pronounce on an issue certain to arouse a political storm on the domestic front. A decision was ultimately hastened by the Western powers' move to normalize relations with West Germany in view of the cold war, and their announcement to Israel on 23 October that they had ended their state of war with Germany and hoped that Israel would proceed similarly.[35] The Government consequently resolved on 3 January 1951 that "representatives of Israel will approach the Governments of the occupation powers with the aim of ensuring the payment of reparations and the restitution of Jewish property by Germany". The Foreign Ministry went further and proposed dispatch of a delegation to the occupation authorities in Germany, but this proposal was rejected by the Government.[36]

Similarly unsettled at the end of 1950 were relations with the Catholic Church and the Vatican. The main impediment was the U.N. resolution of December 1949 calling again for the internationalization of Jerusalem. Israel's major foreign policy challenge in the first half of 1950 was to neutralize this resolution. As an alternative, Israel proposed U.N. supervision of the Holy Places or, at best, extraterritorial status for the principal Christian Holy Places. Israel's closest ally in this endeavour was Jordan, which was even more resolutely opposed to internationalization than was Israel. Hopes that this shared objective would lead the way to an overall political settlement proved forlorn. As the year proceeded, it became clear to Israel that not only was the U.N. resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem unenforceable, but it did not even enjoy the unqualified support of any of the powers. The Soviet Union retracted its original support for the proposal when it became clear that implementation of the plan would involve the imposition of foreign rule on Jerusalem's unwilling inhabitants. France, the traditional champion of Christian interests in the East, manoeuvred a great deal but did not take any initiative. The United States and Great Britain had opposed the scheme from the beginning. Thus the Fifth Session of the General Assembly of the U.N. adjourned in autumn

34. See No. 366.
35. See No. 423.
36. See M. Keren to M. Sharett, 13 January 1951, 93.01/2207/12.

1950 without taking any steps towards implementation of the plan, and the 1949 resolution remained a dead letter. Israel had thus emerged unscathed from her first serious confrontation at the U.N.

To sum up, Israel's international standing consolidated in the course of 1950, mainly as a result of the relative political and military calm obtaining in the Middle East, the confirmed soundness of the country's regime, and its demonstrably democratic character during the first year of its existence. The country's stability was the more noteworthy against the backdrop of the social and political ferment besetting Israel's neighbours, the inter-bloc conflict, and the cold war which culminated in the Korean crisis.

Israel's policy *vis-à-vis* East-West rivalry had been formulated by Ben-Gurion in 1949. Basically, it held that while the State of Israel was neither indifferent nor neutral with respect to the world-wide controversy, and that its own regime was democratic and anti-communist, Israel could nevertheless not align herself with the West given the vital interests in immigration and security that bound her to Eastern Europe, and because no involvement of hers would contribute in any measure to world peace. According to Ben-Gurion, Israel's future position was contingent on the world situation.[37] In the course of 1950, when the conflict between the blocs intensified and there was imminent danger of an outbreak in hostilities, some Israeli diplomats, particularly those posted in the West, pressed for abandonment of the nonalignment formula and overt identification with the Western bloc.[38] They argued that no benefits were accruing to Israel in either military aid or Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe notwithstanding her scrupulously observed nonalignment, nor was any substantial aid forthcoming from the Western camp — precisely because of this uncommitted policy.

Differences within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, to a certain extent, in the country generally were settled by the outbreak of the Korean war. The decision taken by the United States and other Western countries to intervene in Korea with the U.N. expeditionary forces by virtue of U.N. resolutions afforded Israel the opportunity to ally herself to the Western camp while simultaneously stressing that she was merely fulfilling her obligations to the U.N. organization. But even after her declaration of support for the Security Council's resolution of military intervention in Korea, Israel kept to her own independent line, mainly geared to efforts at containing the conflict and restoring peace between the warring sides,[39] and her contribution to the U.N. force was of a purely humanitarian nature. Israel's independent stand was also manifested in her support of Communist China's admission to the U.N., in opposition to the line taken by the United States.

* * *

37. See Vol. 4, No. 292.
38. See e.g., Nos. 263, 302, 360.
39. See Nos. 498, 500.

The year 1950 is somewhat unique in Israel's history, as perhaps the only time when the country was not confronted with fateful choices. The war with the Arab states was over, and though no formal peace treaties were signed, the armistice agreements were considered satisfactory and seemed to fulfill their function; relations with the Arab states had not yet reached an absolute deadlock and there was the occasional likelihood of achieving a more lasting arrangement than the extant armistice agreements; relations with the world powers were normal and, notwithstanding grave misgivings concerning the Jewish communities in Russia and Eastern Europe, dialogue with these countries continued and a significant number of Jews were still emigrating to Israel.

This state of affairs lulled some Israeli leaders and statesmen into assuming that Israel had become a nation like any other, and it may well have inspired the then-raging controversy over Israel's international "orientation" — as if all options were equally valid and the country had freedom of choice. In truth, some future drawbacks to Israel's presumptively independent foreign policy were already becoming evident in 1950 — mainly the country's growing dependence on external financial aid, in particular the United States', as well as the multiplying number of border incidents which would necessitate focusing attention on current security at the expense of long-range planning.

Be that as it may, the outlook appeared bright at the close of 1950, with the State of Israel serenely and confidently absorbing the Jewish diaspora, repairing the ravages of war, and participating, as a worthy member of the international community, in world events.

Yehoshua Freundlich

List of Documents, Editorial Notes, Appendices, and Main Subjects

13. 8 January **W. Eytan to E. Elath** (Telegram)
Sasson's meeting with Yalcin, Turkish representative on the Conciliation Commission: Turkey aims at active mediation by the Commission and at direct negotiation between the parties.

14. 8 January **W. Eytan to A. Eban** (Telegram, Hebrew)
The Argentine position on Jerusalem in the Trusteeship Council.

15. 9 January **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Suggestions for Israel's tactics in the Jerusalem matter.

16. 10 January **M. Sharett to W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
Improvement of relations between the State of Israel and Catholic institutions in Israel.

17. 10 January **W. Eytan to the Israel Missions Abroad** (Telegram)
Resumé of events and positions in the Jerusalem matter.

18. 10 January **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Meeting with Garreau: timetable and procedure of the Jerusalem debate.

19. 10 January **W. Eytan to the Israel Embassy in Washington** (Telegram)
Israel's recognition of the People's Republic of China.

20. 11 January **Y. Shimoni to W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
Israel-Japan relations.

21. 11 January **A. Eban to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Iran.

22. 13 January **Meeting of the Israel Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly** (Hebrew)
Garreau plan for the solution of the Jerusalem question; Israel's stand with respect to Franco's regime in Spain.

23. 13 January **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Meeting with Ross of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations: the American position on Jerusalem.

24. 13 January **M. Keren to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
U.S. Secretary of State's statement on Arab rearmament.

25. 13 January **Meeting: M.R. Kidron — J.G.T. Sheringham**
Question of Jerusalem; future of Syria; change of Government in Egypt; British supply of arms to Israel.

26. 13 January **Meeting: E. Sasson — S. Günaltay** (Hebrew)
Relations between Israel and Turkey; situation in the Middle East; the Jerusalem issue.

27. 15/19 January **G. Rafael to A. Eban** (Hebrew)
Egyptian peace feelers; Israel's political line on Jerusalem question.

28. 15/16 January **W. Eytan to E. Elath** (Telegram)
Details of arms supply to Arab countries.

29. 16 January **M. Keren to R. Shiloah** (Hebrew)
Criticism of Israel's foreign policy: pays too much attention to the Jerusalem question at the expense of the problem of Arab rearmament.

48. 26/27 January **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram, Hebrew)
American-Israeli relations; Prime Minister's visit to the United States; Arab rearmament.

49. 26 January **Meeting: M. Eliash — M. Wright**
Oil supply to Haifa by way of the Iraqi pipeline; change of government in Egypt and its influence on the relations between Egypt and Israel; negotiations between Israel and Jordan; arms supply by Britain to Israel.

50. 27 January **E. Elath to T. Kollek** (Telegram)
Requests Israel's reaction to the Survey Group's report.

51. 28 January **G. Rafael to W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
Meeting with Garreau: Israel's position on Jerusalem; meeting with Munoz of the Argentine delegation to the Trusteeship Council: Argentine position on Jerusalem.

52. 28 January **G. Rafael to W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
Meetings with members of the Trusteeship Council on procedure and substance of the Council's deliberations.

53. 29 January **Y. Shimoni to W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
Establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Israel.

54. 30 January **Statement by G. Rafael before the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine**
Israel's position on the resumption of the Commission's activity.

55. 30 January **Meeting: R. Shiloah and M. Dayan — S. al-Rifai and F. al-Mulqi** (Hebrew)
Israel-Jordan agreement on Jerusalem.

56. 30 January **United States Division to E. Elath** (Telegram)
Instructions before a meeting with Secretary of State Acheson: arms supply from the United States.

57. 30 January **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Economic aid and arms supply from the U.S.A.

58. 30 January **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Prime Minister's visit to the U.S.A.

59. 30 January **E. Elath to the United States Division** (Telegram)
American assistance under Point 4; Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaty between Israel and U.S.A.

60. 30 January **M. Comay to the Israel Legation in London** (Telegram)
Arms supply from Britain.

61. 30 January **G. Avner to W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
Suggested settlement of the problem of Jerusalem and the Holy Places.

62. [31 January] **Consultation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** (Hebrew)
American-Israel relations.

63. 31 January **G. Rafael to W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
Survey of positions and attitudes at the commencement of the Trusteeship Council debate on Jerusalem.

64. 31 January **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Meeting with Acheson: Arab rearmament and arms supply to Israel.

140. 16 March **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Intervention of international organizations in the emigration of Iraq's Jews.

141. 17 March **G. Landauer to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Israel's claims on Germany.

142. 19 March **M. Sharett to E. Kaplan** (Hebrew)
Consolidation of Israel's position in Eilat.

143. 19 March **M. Sharett to E. Elath** (Hebrew)
Relations between Israel and India.

144. 21 March **A. Eban to M. Sharett and W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
Summation of developments in the Trusteeship Council and in the Conciliation Commission and further plans of the delegation of Israel.

145. 21 March **C. de Boisanger to G. Rafael**
Israel-Egypt negotiations on practical settlements in the Gaza Strip.

146. 23 March **G. Rafael to C. de Boisanger**
Israel-Egypt negotiations on practical settlements in the Gaza Strip.

147. 23 March **M.R. Kidron to M. Comay** (Telegram)
Meeting with Strang of the Foreign Office: arms supply to Israel.

148. 26 March **D. Horowitz to E. Kaplan and M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Financial agreement between Israel and Britain.

149. 27 March **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Approaches to Trusteeship Council member states concerning the influence of the Jerusalem Statute on the city's future.

150. 27 March **The Israel Legation in Buenos Aires to A. Lourie** (Telegram)
Meeting with Peron: Argentina's position on the Jerusalem issue.

151. 27 March **M. Keren to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Immigration of Iraq's Jews.

152. 28 March **M. Sharett to A. Eban** (Telegram)
Invitation of Trusteeship Council's representatives to visit Jerusalem.

153. 28 March **A. Eban to A. Lourie and E. Elath** (Telegram)
Attempt to change U.S. position in the Trusteeship Council.

154. 28 March **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Meeting with Bunche: the Jerusalem issue, U.S.A. position in the Conciliation Commission.

155. 28 March **Meeting: N. Goldmann — D. Acheson**
Arab rearmament; relations between the Jewish Agency and the Government of Israel; the Jerusalem issue.

156. 29 March **G. Rafael to W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
Delivery of a memorandum by the Conciliation Commission.

157. 29 March **Memorandum of the United States Conciliation Commission for Palestine**
Suggestion for a new procedure in Arab-Israel negotiations.

158. 29 March **C. de Boisanger to G. Rafael**
Israel-Egypt negotiations.

227.	5 May	**E. Najar to W. Eytan** (Telegram, Hebrew) Meeting with Garreau: solution of the Jerusalem problem.
228.	6 May	**M. Sharett to the Chairman of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine** Israel's readiness to negotiate with the Arabs.
229.	7 May	**S. Rosenne to M. Sharett** (Hebrew) Free passage in the Suez Canal.
230.	9 May	**United States Division to the Israel Embassy in Washington** Immigration of Iraq's Jews.
231.	10 May	**A. Eban and G. Rafael to M. Sharett** (Telegram) Arms supply from the United States.
232.	11 May	**United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to the Government of Israel** Israel-Arab negotiations.
233.	11 May	**E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram, Hebrew) Arms supply from the U.S.A.
234.	12 May	**M. Sharett to Y. Yadin** (Hebrew) Arms supply from the U.S.A.
235.	12 May	**E. Elath to the United States Division** (Telegram) Meeting with McGhee: American policy in the Middle East.
236.	13 May	**M. Sharett to R. Shiloah** (Telegram, Hebrew) Continued activity of the Conciliation Commission.
237.	14 May	**M. Sharett to M. Amir** (Hebrew) Israel's international orientation.
238.	16 May	**M. Sharett to A. Eban** (Telegram) Arms supply from the U.S.A.
239.	16 May	**M.R. Kidron to M. Comay** Relations between Israel and Britain and British policy in the Middle East.
240.	17 May	**A. Biran to M. Sharett** (Hebrew) Cease-fire violations in the no-man's land Latrun sector.
241.	17 May	**E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram) Rumours of an Anglo-American agreement on the Middle East.
242.	19 May	**M. Sharett to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine** (Telegram) Negotiations between Israel and the Arab states.
243.	19 May	**A. Eban to W.R. Austin** Suggested solution by Israel to the Jerusalem question.
244.	19 May	**M. Keren to the United States Division** (Telegram) Immigration of Iraq's Jews.
245.	21 May	**M. Sharett to E. Elath** (Telegram) Israel's claims on Germany.
246.	23 May	**M. Sharett to M.R. Kidron** (Telegram) British arms supply to the Arabs.
247.	24 May	**M.R. Kidron to M. Comay** (Telegram) Meeting with Furlonge of the British Foreign Office: arms supply to Israel, Britain's attitude to Israel-Jordan negotiations.

APPENDICES

LIST OF ARCHIVES AND ABBREVIATIONS IN REFERENCES

Israel State Archives

93. *Record Group: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Missions Abroad*
    - 93.01 Coded telegrams
    - 93.02 Paris
    - 93.03 New York
    - 93.04 London
    - 93.08 Washington
    - 93.10 Budapest
    - 93.18 Ankara
    - 93.24 Stockholm

130. *Record Group: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head Office*
    - 130.02 Offices of Minister and Director-General
    - 130.03 International Organisations Division
    - 130.09 Coded telegrams
    - 130.10 West European Division
    - 130.11 East European Division
    - 130.13 British Commonwealth Division
    - 130.15 Middle East Division
    - 130.16 Armistice Affairs Division
    - 130.20 United States Division

Weizmann Archives (Abbreviated reference: **W.A.**)

Abbreviations in Editorial Headings and References

Inc.	Incoming text
Orig.	Original
Outg.	Outgoing text
Recd	Received
Tel.	Telegram

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS IN REFERENCES

Note: The list includes only books and publications mentioned in the annotation.

A. *General*

Divrei Ha'Knesset [Knesset Reports], Second Session of the First Knesset, 1949–1950, Vol. III [Hebrew]

Divrei Ha'Knesset [Knesset Reports], Second Session of the First Knesset, 1949–1950, Vol IV [Hebrew]

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VII, Washington 1969
(Abbreviated reference: *FRUS*, 1946, VII)

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. VI, Washington 1977
(Abbreviated reference: *FRUS*, 1949, VI)

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. V, Washington 1978
(Abbreviated reference: *FRUS*, 1949, V)

Horowitz, David. *State in the Making*, New York 1953

The Jewish Agency's Digest of Press and Events, Vol. III, September 1950–December 1951.

State of Israel, Israel State Archives/World Zionist Organization, Central Zionist Archives. *Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947–May 1948*, Jerusalem 1979
(Abbreviated reference: Documents, December 1947–May 1948)

State of Israel, Israel State Archives. *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, Vol. I, May–September 1948*, Jerusalem 1981
(Abbreviated reference: Vol. I)

State of Israel, Israel State Archives. *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, Vol. 2, October 1948–April 1949*, Jerusalem 1984
(Abbreviated reference: Vol. 2)

State of Israel, Israel State Archives. *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, Vol. 3, Armistice Negotiations with the Arab States, December 1948–July 1949*, Jerusalem 1983
(Abbreviated reference: Vol. 3)

State of Israel, Israel State Archives. *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, Vol. 4, May–December 1949*, Jerusalem 1986
(Abbreviated reference: Vol. 4)

B. *United Nations Publications*

United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, 28 December 1949

(U.N. Document A/AC.25/6)

United Nations, *Security Council Official Records, Fifth Year*

(Abbreviated reference: *SCOR, Fifth Year*)

United Nations, *Security Council Official Records, Fifth Year, Supplement for June, July and August 1950*

(Abbreviated reference: *SCOR, Fifth Year, Supplement*)

United Nations, *Security Council Official Records, Fifth Year, Resolutions and Decisions* [1950]

(Abbreviated reference: *SCOR, Fifth Year, Resolutions and Decisions*)

United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Verbatim Records of Meetings*, Vol. I, 19 September — 15 December [1950]

(Abbreviated reference: *GAOR, Fifth Session, Plenary*)

United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Sixth Committee, Legal Questions, Summary Records of Meetings*, 20 September — 4 December [1950]

(Abbreviated reference: *GAOR, Fifth Session, Sixth Committee*)

United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee,* [...] *Summary Records of Meetings*, 20 September - 18 December [1950]

(Abbreviated reference: *GAOR, Fifth Session, First Committee*)

United Nations, *Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Sixth Session*, 19 January–4 April 1950

(Abbreviated reference: *TCOR, Fourth Year, Sixth Session*)

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950

NOTES
AND SUMMARIES OF
HEBREW DOCUMENTS

All summaries of Hebrew documents and all notes are arranged chronologically, i.e. according to the numbers of the documents in the Main Volume. The notes are translated in full, even those pertaining to passages which are omitted in the summaries; in this case, the index numbers to notes are also omitted in the summaries.
Editorial headings of Hebrew documents are reproduced in full, while headings to translations of notes to documents in English or French are given in a shortened version. Where no notes are appended, the English and French documents are represented by headings alone. Editorial Notes are given in the same order as in the Main Volume, preceding the relevant document.

1. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 1 January 1950

Notes

1. Moshe Sharett, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2. James G. McDonald, the U.S. Ambassador to Israel.
3. Abdallah ibn Hussein, King of Jordan. In Autumn 1949, contacts began between Jordan and Israel against the background of their shared opposition to the internationalization of Jerusalem. An agreement in outline was formulated, the main points of which were: partition of the Old City of Jerusalem between Israel and Jordan, Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter, free access to Mount Scopus, modifications in the boundary lines to benefit both sides, and free access to the sea for Jordan by way of a corridor to Gaza under Jordanian sovereignty. A stalemate was then reached on the width of the proposed corridor, the Jordanians demanding a width of several kilometres while Israel spoke of some 50 to 100 metres. (See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 293.)
5. Since Husni al-Zaim's deposition in August 1949, Syria was in a state of unrest. General Hinawi, Zaim's successor, strove for union with Iraq. On 19 December Hinawi was in turn deposed by Colonel Adib Shishakli, which development led to rumours of possible Jordanian and Iraqi military intervention in Syria. (See Vol. 4, No. 519 and n. 1 *ibid.*)
6. Faruq ibn Fuad, King of Egypt.

2. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in London. 3 January 1950

Notes

1. Michael S. Comay, Director, British Commonwealth Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Sir Alexander Knox Helm, the British Minister to Israel.
3. Reuven Shiloah, Adviser on Special Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4. See No. 1.
5. See Vol. 4, No. 509.
6. See No. 1.

3. President Weizmann (Rehovoth) to President Truman (Washington). 3 January 1950

Notes

1. Chaim Weizmann, President of Israel.
2. Harry S. Truman, President of the United States.
3. Oscar Ewing, Director of the U.S. Federal Security Agency.
4. See President Weizmann to Ewing, letter of 2 January 1985, 130.02/2403/18.
5. See also No. 65 and n. 4 *ibid.*

Editorial Note

United Nations Resolution on an International Regime in Jerusalem and the Compromise Plan of R. Garreau

The Jerusalem issue reappeared on the U.N. agenda during the Fourth Session of the General Assembly. Following lengthy debates, a resolution sponsored by Australia was adopted endorsing the 1947 resolution on internationalization and instructing the Trusteeship Council to formulate a statute for Jerusalem on the lines resolved on in 1947 and in accordance with the changes which had taken place in the city in the meantime. The Council was also directed to take immediate steps towards the implementation of the said statute. Israel, the U.S. and Britain were among the few countries opposing the resolution, while Jordan, which at that time had not yet been admitted to membership in the United Nations, also announced her opposition to the plan.

Subsequently, Roger Garreau, the President of the Trusteeship Council, put forward a compromise proposal which would preserve the principle of internationalization but would limit it to a more circumscribed territory consisting mainly of the Christian and Jewish Quarters of the Old City and including certain areas beyond the walls — Mount Scopus, the Mount of Olives, the former High Commissioner's Residence, and others. Authority within this enclave would be vested in a commissioner appointed by the U.N. and aided by a council of representatives of the three religions. The commissioner's powers outside the enclave would be limited to ensuring freedom of access to and ritual in the various Holy Places, while all other authority would be vested in Israel and Jordan — each in the area she controlled at present. The entire area of the city of Jerusalem would be demilitarized and declared neutral territory.

Garreau's plan was discussed by the Cabinet on 3 January 1950. Eban had recommended rejecting the proposal but doing so in a manner which would leave the way open for negotiating to reduce the proposed international enclave and to augment the sovereignty of both Jordan and Israel in Jerusalem. Sharett spoke in support of Eban's recommendation, but the

majority of the Cabinet, led by Ben-Gurion, decided to reject the plan totally and to announce that U.N. supervision of the Holy Places was the most Israel would agree to.

4. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 4 January 1950

Notes

1. Abba (Aubrey) Eban, Israel's Permanent Representative at the U.N.
2. See Vol. 4, Nos. 522 and 525.
3. David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.
4. Eban replied he fully agreed with Sharett's line; he thought Israel should not abandon the previously held idea of an enclave just when it was beginning to gain public support (see Eban to Sharett, telegram X898, 5 January 1950, 130.09/2329/18).

5. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 4 January 1950

Notes

1. Eliahu Elath, Israel's Ambassador to the U.S.
2. Roger Garreau, the French Representative on the Trusteeship Council and the Council's President.
3. Dean Rusk, U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State.
4. See Editorial Note, p. 4.
5. Cardinal Francis Joseph Spellman, Archbishop of New York; President of the Catholic Near East Welfare Association.
6. Henri Bonnet, the French Ambassador to the U.S.
7. Sharett remarked that he was wholly in agreement with this conclusion, but he thought that also important Protestant interests in the U.S.A. and the Church of England were behind the Garreau plan (see Sharett to Elath, telegram IW385, 9 January 1950, 130.09/2308/5).
8. Sharett agreed to Elath's speaking with Bonnet on those lines.
9. Maurice Fischer, Israel's Minister to France.

6. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 4 January 1950

Notes

1. John Ross, U.S. Alternate Representative at the U.N. General Assembly.
2. Gideon Rafael, Counsellor, Israeli delegation to the U.N.
3. See No. 5.
4. See No. 1.

7. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 5 January 1950

Notes

1. Ralph Bunche, Director of the Trusteeship Division in the U.N. Secretariat.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 4.

8. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 5 January 1950

Notes

1. See No. 7.
2. James H. Griffiths, American Catholic bishop, Cardinal Spellman's assistant.
3. Venue of the forthcoming meeting of the Trusteeship Council.
4. The problem of the political future of Somalia, formerly part of Italian East Africa and under British occupation during World War II, was on the agenda of the Trusteeship Council together with the Jerusalem issue.
5. Sharett replied in the affirmative (see Eytan to Eban, telegram MH7418, 8 January 1950, 130.09/2328/8).

9. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 5 January 1950

Notes

1. Jacob Herzog, Director of the Department of Christian Communities in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. On his activities in Rome, see Vol. 4, No. 434.
2. Presumably refers to Sharett's remark in a private conversation with Spellman. Sharett later stated that his remark was intended to describe the attitude of Cardinal Tisserant, Secretary of the Congregazione Orientale at the Vatican, rather than that of Cardinal Spellman. (See Sharett to Eban, telegram Y620, 10 January 1950, 93.01/2202/6.)

10. A. Ukhmani[1] (Warsaw) to I. Barzilai[2] and S. Eliashiv.[3] 5 January 1950

Coded Tel. BI121; Recd: 6 January; Inc.: 130.09/2306/4.

Summary

1. Ukhmani reports on the *aliya* situation in Poland. It appears that the Polish authorities decided that as of 29 December they would not issue more than 50–60 passports per day, and these first and foremost for Zionist activists. Other Jews would be put off for the time being. Only after the holiday will it be possible to find out whether they intend to change this regulation. In December 5811 new applications were received and 1721 passports issued.
2. The Joint Distribution Committee has been closed and its director has left Poland. The authorities did not permit the Committee's archives to be taken out of the country. They appointed a supervisory committee to be in charge of the property left behind by the J.D.C.
3. The Zionist parties, which have been dissolved, have handed over their archives to the Jewish Historical Institute. The authorities will permit the flags to be taken to Israel.
4. On 1 January there was a considerable increase in the price of food, wool products and metal, while salaries were raised by only 5%.

Notes

1. Azriel Ukhmani, Counsellor in the Israel Legation in Warsaw.
2. Israel Barzilai, Israel's Minister to Poland, at the time back in Israel on a business visit.
3. Shmuel Eliashiv (Friedman), Director of the East European Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4. Jewish emigration from Poland to Israel was only a trickle until August 1949, when the Polish Government adopted the policy of bringing about the liquidation of the Zionist organizations by permitting rapid and organized emigration of Zionist activists, in cooperation with the Jewish community bodies in Poland. See also Vol. 4, No. 409.

11. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 6 January 1950

Notes

1. See No. 1.
2. Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League.
3. See No. 27.

Editorial Note

Consultation on the Subject of Jerusalem

A consultation on the Jerusalem issue took place at the Foreign Ministry on 6 January 1950, with the participation of the Foreign Minister, the Secretary-General and senior officials of the Ministry, and Jacob Herzog, Director of the Christian Communities Division in the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

The Foreign Minister reviewed the developments in the Jerusalem issue and in particular the latest, namely the Garreau plan (see Editorial Note, pp. 4–5). He observed that if Israel had been offered retention of her present control in the New City, the Old City to be divided among the Christians, the Jews and the Moslems, he would have accepted such an arrangement and would even have agreed to add to the Christian enclave the Dormition Abbey on Mount Zion — this being in effect the only Christian Holy Place in Israeli territory. Be that as it may, Israel was meanwhile constrained by the negotiations with King Abdallah to keep to her present line, namely, the partition of Jerusalem between Israel and Jordan — Israel holding to the New City, and consent to U.N. supervision of the Holy Places. Israel will not take any initiative on Jerusalem until the Trusteeship Council convenes in Geneva; only then, when the difficulties in the way of implementation of the U.N. resolution become manifest, will it be possible to discuss compromise proposals — *inter alia,* with the Vatican.

Sharett then defined the tasks of the Foreign Ministry in the matter of Jerusalem:

(1) To urge the members of the Trusteeship Council, through diplo-

matic channels, to retreat from support of the U.N. resolution. Britain and the U.S. had never been enthusiastic about it, and now there were signs that the Soviet Union was having second thoughts.

(2) To present Israel's viewpoint in all the capitals in preparation for the resumption of the debate at the General Assembly.

(3) To plan in detail Israel's appearance before the Trusteeship Council and the Conciliation Commission in Geneva. The aim should be to keep to the minimum the contacts with both these bodies, not going, however, as far as boycotting them. On the other hand, preparations should be made for direct contacts with the Egyptians.

In the ensuing discussion details of the operative plans for Geneva and for the U.N. Assembly were debated, particular attention being paid to the tactics to be adopted versus the Vatican — the consensus having been that this was Israel's most determined adversary in the Jerusalem issue.

(See stenographic minutes of the consultations on Jerusalem, 6 January 1950, 130.02/2443/5.)

12. M. Fischer (Paris) to A. Eban (New York). 7 January 1950

Notes

1. See No. 2.

13. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 8 January 1950

Notes

1. Eliahu Sasson, Israel's Minister to Turkey.
2. Hüseyin Çahit Yalçin, Turkey's Representative on the Conciliation Commission.
3. For a full report of the conversation see: E. Sasson, Meeting with Yalçin, member of the Conciliation Commission, 4 January 1950, 130.02/2441/2.
4. No. 11.
5. Elath replied that he had put the idea to Berry, Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, who promised to bring it to the attention of McGhee, Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of Near Eastern and African affairs (see Elath to Eytan, telegram W630, 10 January 1950, 130.09/2308/16).

14. W. Eytan[1] (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 8 January 1950

Coded Tel. S559; Outg.: 130.09/2335/13

Summary

Tsur[2] reports on his meeting with Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister Zamboni,[3] at which Argentina's position at the Trusteeship Council was discussed. Zamboni declared that Argentina's support of the internationa-

lization resolution was due to pressure and that Argentina considered it more as a principle than a practical solution; they were now seeking a dignified way out. He proposed the following: (1) to return the resolution to the U.N.; (2) to establish a sub-committee to negotiate with the governments involved; (3) to maintain the principle of a *Corpus Separatum* but to turn over the administration to Israel and Jordan; he requested practical proposals from Israel which would not, however, constitute a complete break with the U.N. resolution. Tsur notes that he is not convinced this statement should be taken at face value, but he thinks such proposals should in any case be formulated. It has come to his attention that Argentina will be represented in Geneva by Muñoz,[4] while Remorino[5] will replace Arce[6] temporarily or perhaps permanently.

Notes

1. Walter Eytan, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Jacob Tsur, Israel's Minister to Argentina, Uruguay and Chile.
3. Carlos Zamboni, Argentine Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.
4. Rudolfo Muñoz, member of the Argentine delegation to the U.N., Alternate Representative on the Trusteeship Council.
5. Geronimo Remorino, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the U.N., head of the Argentine Delegation to the Fifth U.N. General Assembly, Argentine Representative on the Trusteeship Council.
6. Jose Arce, Argentine Permanent Representative at the U.N.

15. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 9 January 1950

16. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan. 10 January 1950

Memorandum: 130.02/2393/23

Summary

Relations with the Catholic Church in all matters relating to the Church's property and its rights in Israel must be urgently improved. Sharett has discussed the problem with the advisers and division heads but practical steps must now be taken, in view of the dispute over Jerusalem and also the coming Holy Year and the many pilgrims expected. He proposes to hold an immediate inter-departmental consultation on this issue with the participation of Herzog, Palmon,[1] Biran,[2] and whoever else is concerned, in order to prepare a comprehensive list of grievances and propose steps to remedy them. Sharett requests a progress report and also to be apprised of any difficulties encountered which could be resolved only by a special government resolution.

Notes

1. Yehoshua Palmon, Adviser on Arab Affairs in the Prime Minister's Office.
2. Abraham Biran (Bergman), District Commissioner for Jerusalem; Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem.

17. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 10 January 1950

Notes

1. See No. 9.

18. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 10 January 1950

Notes

1. See No. 8 and n. 4 *ibid.*
2. Telegram from Eytan to Eban, in which the former recommends adopting the procedure suggested by Argentina to conduct the talks with the parties in a sub-committee (see No. 14, paragraph (b)). Eytan pointed out that, firstly, this procedure would ensure a certain delay, secondly, it would imply a shift from the December 9 resolution, and finally — it would constitute an explicit admission that any settlement will depend on the parties' attitude. (See telegram S562, 9 January 1950, 130.09/2335/13.)

19. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 10 January 1950

Notes

1. Elath had heard on the radio that Israel was about to recognize Communist China. His opinion was that such hasty recognition would have unfavourable repercussions in friendly circles in the U.S., whose aid was essential in the Jerusalem and arms supply issues (see Sharett to Chou En-lai, 9 January 1950, 130.02/2391/32).
2. Israel recognized Indonesia on 9 January 1950 (see Sharett to Mohammad Hatta, Indonesian Prime Minister, telegram of 9 January 1950, 130.02/2391/36).
3. See No. 53.

20. Y. Shimoni[1] [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan. 11 January 1950

Memorandum: 130.02/2413/32

Summary

The question of relations between Israel and Japan has come up again in connection with Japan's application to become a member of the International Wheat Council, and it may soon re-emerge in connection with other events.

Shimoni understands that the Foreign Minister's instructions were to abstain in the voting in the present case, and he assumes that this directive is valid also for future occasions. In his opinion this policy merits revision.

Japan in the period following the war is totally different from what it was during the war. The present Government and Parliament admit Japan's guilt in the war and are now occupied with transforming Japanese society and abolishing the imperialist and fascist elements. In this respect Japan resembles Italy, Austria, Bulgaria and Rumania, and totally differs from Spain. From the Jewish aspect, Israel has nothing in particular against Japan. Japan was not anti-Semitic even during the war, and as far as is known, Jews were not discriminated against.

If Israel is not opposed to Japan's readmission to the family of nations — neither from the anti-fascist nor from the Jewish aspect — then it should be possible to give positive instructions on our attitude towards Japan. This shift will be in accordance with the principle of universality of membership in international organizations which Israel usually abides by. In addition, since Israel recently recognized the People's Republic of China, it is advisable, for the sake of balance, to make a positive move towards Japan.

In effect Shimoni proposes that the Foreign Minister review his instructions on abstention. It will not be a tragedy, of course, if Israel abstains in the forthcoming actual case and additional occasions in the near future, but the option should remain for a positive vote; it would also be advisable to coordinate Israel's policy with states such as Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, India, and others.[2]

Notes

1. Yaaqov Shimoni, Director of the Asian Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. The Director of the International Organizations Division, to whom this memorandum was referred, stated that he was entirely in accord with the Asian Division's estimation of the character of post-war Japan, but that one should take into account that support of Japan's admission to international bodies could serve as a precedent to similar applications by Germany. In the particular case of Japan's application for admission to the International Wheat Council, which had on its agenda a similar application by West Germany, it was decided to abstain on Japan and to oppose on Germany. (See E. Gordon to W. Eytan, 16 January 1950, 130.02/2413/32.)

21. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 11 January 1950

Notes

1. Nasrollah Entezam, Iran's Representative at the U.N.
2. Eytan instructed Eban to inform Entezam that Israel would agree to Safinia's appointment either as a diplomatic envoy or as a consular agent, according to the nature of the credential letters he submits. (See Eytan to Eban, telegram MH7531, 15 January 1950, 130.09/2328/8.)

22. Meeting of the Israel Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (New York, 13 January 1950)

Minutes: 93.03/89/1

Summary

Eban reviews the developments in the Jerusalem issue. Garreau's plan has caused a decisive change in Israel's position. The Vatican apparently supports the plan, and it is clear that the idea of an enclave is important to it and serves as the minimum demand beyond which it is not prepared to retreat. The idea of functional internationalization is *passé*. Garreau's plan has diverted the main criticism from Israel to Jordan and perhaps this is the reason why the Americans and the British are not enthusiastic about the plan. The Americans, together with Bunche, are at this moment striving towards a situation in which the Trusteeship Council will continue to draft the Jerusalem Statute in accordance with the Assembly's resolution, and this plan will presumably be rejected by both sides. It is clear that they are not acting out of concern for Israel but out of opposition to any plan whose burden would fall mainly on the Arabs. The Americans aim at arriving at a tripartite agreement: Jordan, Israel and the Vatican. Israel has till now refrained from negotiating on Garreau's plan for fear of affecting the current negotiations with Jordan. Proposals of a special session of the U.N. Assembly should be discouraged on the grounds that in the interval until September it will be possible to reach a negotiated settlement between the two parties.

Elath wishes to emphasize that the U.S. position on internationalization during the Assembly's session was more tactical than fundamental. Israel is aware that both the President and the Secretary of State — the former due to internal and the latter due to external considerations — were not prepared to support Israel's proposal, though they rejected the internationalization plan because it had not been accepted by both parties.

It is thus evident that Israel cannot rely too much on the State Department when it comes to the Jerusalem topic. Normal relations should be maintained with the U.S.S.R. — despite its having voted against Israel — as a means of strengthening Israel's position *vis-à-vis* the State Department. Nor does Elath believe that an agreement with Jordan would solve Israel's problem at the U.N., since the third party — the Vatican — is the factor which determines the position of most of the delegations to the U.N. Negotiations with Jordan or with the Vatican should be carried out cautiously in order not to affect relations with the other of the two parties.

Eban remarks that the Government is apparently puzzling over how to avoid deciding between Jordan and the Vatican, and the inclination seems to be to continue with the *status quo* as long as possible.

Tov[1] believes that the idea of a special session of the Assembly concerns less Jerusalem and more the boycott on Franco[2] and perhaps also the

China problem. As for the Franco issue, Israel's position is very difficult. The Spanish Foreign Ministry published a memorandum claiming that Franco's government helped the Jews during the war even more than did Britain.[3]

Robinson[4] confirms this fact and points out that Franco's regime is in many respects better for the Jews than the existing regimes in Hungary or Rumania which Israel recognizes, and also that the position of the Jews in Spanish Morocco is better than of those in French Morocco.

Israel's line of propaganda is also discussed. **Kenen**[5] asks whether the line favouring functional internationalization should be continued. Eban replies that those who inquire should be referred to Israel's speeches at the Assembly, supporting functional internationalization and also an enclave limited to the Holy Places.

Notes

1. Moshe Tov (Toff), member of Israel's delegation to the U.N., in charge of Latin American affairs.
2. In December 1946 the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution expelling Spain from all international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations, recommending that all member states recall their diplomatic envoys from Madrid, and requiring the Security Council to take necessary steps if a democratic regime is not set up in Spain within a reasonable time. During 1948 and 1949 attempts were made, on one side, to implement the 1946 resolution, and on the other — to have it revoked, but none of these attained the requisite two-thirds majority. Israel voted throughout against normalization of relations with Spain.
3. Reference is perhaps to the publication entitled "España y los Judios" issued in Madrid by the Office of Diplomatic Information (filed under 130.12/2578/11).
4. Jacob Robinson, Legal Adviser to the Israeli delegation to the U.N.
5. Isaiah L. Kenen, head of the Press Section in Israel's delegation to the U.N.

23. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 13 January 1950

Notes

1. See No. 6.
2. See No. 11.
3. Sharett had expressed the fear that the Americans, and especially Bunche, were intending to defeat the proposals before the Trusteeship Council on an international regime in Jerusalem, by demonstrating these were illogical and unrealizable — as a ploy designed to reaffirm the U.N. resolution of 9 December 1949 and later to demand a high price for its repeal. (See Sharett to Eban, 10 January 1950, 93.01/2202/6.)
4. See No. 8.

24. M. Keren (Washington) to W. Eytan. 13 January 1950

Notes

1. Moshe Keren, Counsellor in the Israel Embassy in Washington.

No. 24 – Notes (continued)

2. Jacob K. Javits, Member of the U.S. House of Representatives and of its Foreign Relations Committee, had advised Acheson that he had learned during his visits to Israel and Britain that the British had renewed extensive shipments of high quality munitions to the Arab states. They justify this by stating they had to fulfil contracts signed in the past and by the need to strengthen the Arabs so that they could withstand Soviet expansionism. Javits told Acheson he thought these arms would serve the Arabs for a "second round" against Israel and asked him to clarify the United States' position on arms shipments to the Arabs and on the significance he attached to them in the context of keeping peace and security in the Middle East. (See Javits to Acheson, 28 December 1949, 130.20/2475/8.)
3. For the full text of Acheson's reply to Javits of 16 January 1950, see file 93.08/366/12.
4. See Nos. 28 and 30.

25. Meeting: M.R. Kidron — J.G.T. Sheringham (London, 12 January 1950, Document dated 13 January 1950)

Notes

1. Mordecai R. Kidron, First Secretary in the Israel Legation in London.
2. John Sheringham, official in the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office in charge of Palestinian affairs.
3. Husni al-Zaim, President of Syria, March–August 1949.
4. The Wafd Party came into power in Egypt as a result of the elections held on 3 January 1950. Mustafa Nahas, leader of the party, formed a new government on 12 January 1950.
6. Rashid Ali al-Kilani, ruler of Iraq April–May 1941, headed the rebellion against the British rule.
7. See Kidron to Comay, LI296, 12 January 1950, 130.09/2318/6.
8. The last paragraph, dealing with new appointments in the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office and in the U.S. Department of State, has been omitted here.

26. Meeting: E. Sasson — S. Günaltay[1]. (Ankara, 13 January 1950)

Report: 130.02/2382/1

Summary

This was Sasson's first official interview with the Turkish Prime Minister, Günaltay. After a short exchange on the origin and distribution of the Sasson family,[2] the conversation turned to a discussion of political problems.

The Prime Minister said that his country was interested in tranquility, stability and peace in the Middle East and he would like to hope that Israel's policy was also based on these three principles. He also wished to hope that the present dispute between Israel and its neighbours would not be long-lasting and that a solution would soon be found. Turkey would be willing to contribute to that aim, if so requested.

After this short declaratory preface, the Prime Minister posed a number of questions. First, he inquired about the relations between Israel and Egypt, to which Sasson replied that hopes existed that the new government there, headed by the Wafd, would be more realistic. The Prime Minister

commented on this, saying that Egyptian policy was determined by the King and not by his governments. The King's prestige was hurt as a result of defeat in the war with Israel and he was unlikely to seek conciliation in the near future.

Günaltay then inquired about the political situation in Syria. From the conversation on this topic Sasson would not draw any conclusions on Turkey's position on the various plans of the Hashemites: "Greater Syria", "The Fertile Crescent", etc., but he did not feel that the Prime Minister entertained the slightest sympathy for King Abdallah.

The conversation turned to the Arab refugees issue. In Günaltay's opinion, Israel's obstinate refusal to accept the refugees constituted an obstacle to peace. Sasson proffered the usual replies on this subject and added that, as regarded refugee property, Israel would be prepared to find a solution in the course of the negotiations for a final peace. He remarked that a country such as Turkey, which had suffered from minority problems, should realize that it was best that there should be no Arab minority in Israel or Jewish minorities in Arab countries. Sasson felt that this point made a deep impression on the Prime Minister.

The latter then inquired about Israel's immigration policy. Sasson explained that within the next 10–15 years, Israel would be capable of absorbing some 3–4 million immigrants. To the question whether this would not force Israel to expand, Sasson gave the usual replies, and dwelt on the Negev's importance for Israel's development. He summarized what he had said to President Inönü,[3] i.e., that the guarantee for durable peace between Israel and the Arabs was a large, strong and independent Israel.

The conversation ended with a discussion on Jerusalem. Sasson expressed his appreciation of Turkey's vote against internationalization. The Prime Minister inquired whether Israel and Jordan had discussed the possibility of partition, and whether there were prospects of a direct agreement between Israel and Jordan satisfactory to both parties and not to be construed as open defiance of the U.N. Sasson gave a positive reply. The Prime Minister concluded the talk by saying that there was a basis for political cooperation between Israel and Turkey. Turkey's recognition of Israel was neither fortuitous nor the result of pressure, but came about after long deliberation. From the talk with Sasson he learned that Turkey was not mistaken in her decision and he hoped that future developments would further strengthen this conviction.

Notes

1. Semsettin Günaltay, Turkish Prime Minister from January 1949 to May 1950.
2. The first part of the conversation, consisting mainly of exchange of courtesies and reminiscences, has been omitted here.
3. Ismet Inönü, President of Turkey from November 1938 to May 1950. For the talk with Inönü see Sasson's report of 10 January 1950, 130.10/2536/12.

27. G. Rafael (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 15/19 January 1950

Orig.: 93.03/64/7

Summary

Rafael relates that he arrived in Israel without any hitches,[1] and shortly thereupon a meeting was held with the participation of Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Reuven Shiloah, Walter Eytan and Zalman Liff[3].

One of the topics was the Egyptian peace feelers[4] in which connection Abd al-Mun'im[5] was about to leave for Geneva. The initiative for these probes apparently lay with court circles but it can be assumed that Mun'im will not enter upon actual talks without having received his Government's instructions. Some of those present showed enthusiasm for the Egyptian initiative while others had misgivings. Rafael belonged to the second group and he reminded those present of the previous year's unsuccessful experience,[7] of Mun'im's views as expressed by him at the closing of the Assembly, and of the fear that the Egyptian initiative was intended to sabotage the talks with the Jordanians. It was decided to make a new attempt to meet the King in order to try and break the stalemate.[8] Gideon Rafael himself will try to meet Mulqi,[9] if the latter is willing. After an attempt is made to resume the talks with Abdallah, Reuven Shiloah will leave for Europe for a short time to meet Mun'im.

A lively discussion developed in regard to Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion was opposed to the idea of a territorial foothold. In his opinion the Catholic Church is opposed to any Jewish rule in Jerusalem and would – if it could – drive Israel out of New Jerusalem as well; the dispute with the Vatican should cause no panic and Israel should maintain her declared stand of functional internationalization.

Rafael resumes on 19 January, having been ill. The internal dispute over Jerusalem ended and under the pressure of Sharett, Rafael and others, Ben-Gurion agreed to the following line: negotiations with the Jordanians will continue; until an agreement is reached, Israel will not enter upon negotiations with the Vatican. If at a later stage the Vatican turns to Israel with a concrete territorial proposal with respect to internationalization of the Holy Sepulchre and the churches on Mt. Zion, Israel will review her stand and consider the proposal in the light of developments. For the time being, Israel will assure all those interested that any agreement with the Jordanians will include guarantees for Christianity's religious interests.

In the meantime there has been more sounding out of the Jordanians. Shiloah approached Samir Rifa'i[10] and he hopes to receive a reply shortly. Rafael has approached Mulqi with a proposal for a meeting.

No final decision has been taken regarding Israel's appearance in Geneva, though the possibility of Rafael and Eban going there was discussed. In any event, Sharett is opposed to Israel's making an official appearance before the Trusteeship Council.

Notes

1. Alludes to a malfunction in Sharett's plane on taking off from New York on 21 December.
2. Mrs. Eban was expecting
3. Zalman Liff, adviser on territorial and development matters in the Prime Minister's Office.
4. See No. 11.
5. Muhammad Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa, head of Egypt's delegation to the talks with the Conciliation Commission.
6. See No. 1.
7. See Vol. 4, No. 163.
8. See No. 1.
9. Fawzi al-Mulqi, the Jordanian Minister of Defence, head of Jordan's delegation to the talks with the Conciliation Commission.
10. Samir al-Rifa'i, Jordan's Prime Minister.
11. Of the U.N. General Assembly.

28. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 15/16 January 1950

Notes

1. See Nos. 24 and 30.
2. Efraim Ben-Arzi, Military Attaché in Washington.

29. M. Keren [Washington] to R. Shiloah. 16 January 1950

Copy: 130.20/2460/5

Summary

Keren questions the general concept of Israel's foreign policy, which is focused predominantly on the Jerusalem issue. He does not belittle the importance of this issue, but thinks it is now being overemphasized. No one believes, either in Israel or abroad, that there is any real threat to Israel's rule in Jerusalem. In time a solution will presumably be found to the complicated situation created by the U.N. resolution. Even if the controversy continues for a long time, it cannot affect the standing and security of the State of Israel.

On the other hand, there is a very real danger to the State in the process of Arab rearmament, and especially that of Egypt, and it is just in this sphere that Israel is not making a response fitting the gravity of the situation. When Sharett spoke with Acheson, this topic was the last point on the agenda and the talk was cut short before it could be raised[1]. Keren's proposal to launch a public campaign on this issue in the U.S. was not approved. Such a campaign may not have succeeded in changing Acheson's stand – as defined in his reply to Senator Javitz[2] – but the fact remains that the attempt was not made and now it will be difficult to move Acheson from the position he has taken.

Keren may be taking the wrong view – and if so, he asks to be corrected – but if he is right then the proper conclusions should be drawn and the same

political and public activity should be directed to the problem of Arab rearmament as that devoted in the past to issues debated at the U.N.

Notes

1. For more details on this talk, see Vol. 4, No. 463; *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1524–7.
2. See No. 24.

30. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 16 January 1950

Notes

1. See No. 24.
2. No. 28. On 23 January 1950 Eytan cabled details on the arms deal with Italy: Israel had acquired 41 tanks from the U.S. Army surpluses in Italy; after the deal had been concluded and the goods paid for, the Italians held up the shipment on instructions from the Americans. (The telegram is in file 130.09/2308/5.)
3. See No. 24.
4. See No. 44.
5. Herbert B. Elliston, Editor of the *Washington Post*.

31. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 17 January 1950

Notes

1. Telegram of 6 January 1950 from Elath to Sharett, conveying information from internal U.S. sources on the position of the President and the Department of State on Jerusalem. According to these sources, the Americans consider it vital that effective agreements be reached between Israel, Jordan and the Vatican, and therefore will act to slow down the Geneva talks until such agreements are attained. In the absence of an agreement, the U.S. will formally adhere to the U.N. resolution on Jerusalem but will oppose it passively. (The telegram is in file 93.01/2202/6.)
2. David K. Niles, Administrative Assistant to the President of the U.S.A.

32. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 18 January 1950

Notes

1. Sharett replied that he agreed with Eban's line of thought and his suggestions on the composition of the delegation to Geneva, but that it was essential that Eban come home for consultations before leaving for Geneva. As to paragraph 6 of Eban's telegram, the concept of the enclave was still under consideration and Eban's presence could hasten a decision. (See Sharett to Eban, Y641, 20 January 1950, 93.01/2202/6.)

33. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 18 January 1950

Notes

1. Pablo Manguel, the Argentine Minister to Israel.
2. Juan Domingo Perón, President of Argentina.
3. Cf. No. 14.

No. 33 – Notes (continued)

4. Roland de Margerie, Director of the Africa-Levant Department in the French Foreign Ministry.
5. See Fischer to Sharett, F17, F18, 17–18 January 1950, 130.09/2344/06.

34. E. Elath (Washington) to W. Eytan. 18 January 1950

Notes

1. On 28 December the Conciliation Commission published the final report of its Survey Mission for the Middle East. At the head of the mission stood Gordon Clapp, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Tennessey Valley Authority; Sidney Sherwood, Secretary of the Export–Import Bank of Washington, was one of the mission's financial advisers. The general conclusions of the mission were as follows: peace and security in the Middle East depend on raising the standard of living of the inhabitants; that would have to be a lengthy process, the first stages of which will consist of planning projects of irrigation and soil improvement. The mission pointed out a number of agricultural projects which should be implemented: utilizing the water of the Litani river in the Lebanon, utilizing the flood waters of Wadi Zerqa and Wadi Qilt in Jordan, and drainage and improvement works in the Ghab marshes in Syria. (See United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, U.N. Document A/AC.25/6.)
2. Moshe Witkon, Economic Adviser in the Israel Embassy in Washington.
3. Oscar Gass, Economic Adviser to the Israel Embassy in Washington.
4. In his inaugural address for his second term, President Truman presented a four-point plan for bettering the state of the world. Point Four in this programme sketched out a permanent world plan for self-improvement by backward countries through their participation in the technical, scientific and industrial know-how of the United States.
5. See also No. 50.

35. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 19 January 1950

Notes

1. Jean Chauvel, the French Permanent Representative at the U.N.

36. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 19 January 1950

Notes

1. Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British Permanent Representative at the U.N. until the end of March 1950.
2. Mordecai Eliash, Israel's Minister to Britain.

37. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 19 January 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2405/3

Summary

Eban raises the question of Israel's support of Czechoslovakia for the

vacant Security Council seat.[1] According to the Israeli press, Sharett justified Israel's vote by her wish to leave to the major blocs the decision of how they are to be represented in the various organs of the U.N. Eban queries this principle. If Israel adheres to it consistently then two far-reaching conclusions should be drawn: (1) that Israel must not support Yugoslavia for any function or committee in the U.N. as long as that country is in conflict with the Cominform bloc: this is not a sound line as viewed by the principles of abstract justice, and it may cause Israel to be identified as supporting the Cominform; (2) that the Arab countries have the right to close to Israel the doors of all the international institutions with regional representation, since the Middle East bloc cannot be denied the right accorded to the Eastern European bloc. Eban requests Sharett's reaction to these reflections.[2]

Notes

1. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia competed for the seat on the Security Council allotted to an East European country and about to be vacated by the Ukraine. At the vote taken on 20 October 1949 Yugoslavia was elected with the support of the United States, most of the Latin American countries, and the Arab states. Czechoslovakia received the votes of the Eastern bloc, Britain, the Scandinavian countries, most of the members of the British Commonwealth and Israel. See also Vol. 4, No. 519.
2. Sharett admitted that it would have been preferable, when voting for Czechoslovakia, to add a proviso to the effect that Israel was opposed to the unconditional application of the principle of regional representation on the basis of a regional majority. In the special case of Czechoslovakia, Israel preferred to go along with the large regional majority. Moreover, Israel owed a debt of gratitude to Czechoslovakia, but not to Yugoslavia. (See Sharett to Eban, 27 January 1950, 130.02/2405/3.)

38. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 19 January 1950.

Orig.: 130.02/2411/7

Summary

Eytan conveys to the Foreign Minister the conclusions adopted at the comprehensive consultation held at the Foreign Ministry on the relations between Israel and Rumania. Reuven Rubin[1] and Moshe Agami[2] participated in the consultation together with Foreign Ministry officials.

The consensus was that Israel's only interest in Rumania was to ensure *aliya* from that country. There are some 350,000 Jews in Rumania of which some 200,000 would emigrate to Israel if permitted to do so. The Rumanian Government is opposed to Jewish emigration and the only way in which it could be influenced is through commercial relations. Everything possible must be done in order to encourage trade relations between Israel and Rumania. This means, in effect, increasing Israel's purchases

from that country through channels which could provide Israel with political advantages. Therefore, despite the fact that Israel practises a free economy, all the commercial transactions with Rumania must be concentrated in the hands of the commercial attaché in Bucharest. A small committee should be formed with representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Jewish Agency, the Joint Distribution Committee and the Haganah Immigration Organization with the task of making every possible effort to save Rumanian Jewry. This committee should be chaired by the Director of the East European Division and a special official should be appointed in this Division to be in charge of Rumanian affairs and of nothing else until this problem is solved. A new minister should be dispatched to Rumania without delay.

All present were convinced that ultimately the Rumanian Government's attitude would be decided by Rumanian Jewry itself, whose resentment and rebelliousness would in all likelihood force the Rumanians to adopt a more lenient emigration policy. Therefore, all efforts must be made to encourage and strengthen the spirit of the Rumanian Jews and, *inter alia,* to broadcast to them a daily programme in the Rumanian language.

In addition to these conclusions, several recommendations of secondary importance were made:

1. If *aliya* is permitted, priority should be given to veteran Zionists because, among other reasons, they are the ones in constant danger.

2. [.....][3]

3. Personages from other countries who have any sort of influence on the Rumanian Government should be approached to make efforts on Israel's behalf. Communist leaders in Italy and France and sympathizers in other countries were mentioned.

4. The Israeli press should be required not to make personal attacks on Rumanian leaders such as those directed against Ana Pauker,[4] but at the same time to publish articles critical of the situation in Rumania and to attack Rumanian emigration policy.

5. Communications with the Israel Legation in Bucharest should be improved; if necessary, a special courier [.....][5] should be employed.

Eytan requests Sharett's opinion on these recommendations.

Notes

1. Reuven Rubin, Israel Minister to Rumania from December 1948 to December 1949. See also Vol. 4, No. 456 and n. 2 *ibid.*
2. Moshe Agami, Counsellor in the Israel Legation in Bucharest from December 1948 to December 1949.
3. Paragraph (2) has been omitted here.
4. Ana Pauker, the Rumanian Foreign Minister. See Vol. 4, No. 393.
5. Two sentences have been omitted here.

39. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 22 January 1950

Notes

1. Henry Morgenthau, Chairman of the United Jewish Appeal in the United States, was invited by the Prime Minister to visit Israel, with the object of holding consultations on Israel's financial and economic problems. Morgenthau also made political declarations, calling for greater identification of Israel with the United States and for a defensive treaty in the Middle East, with Israel's participation, as a barrier against communist expansionism. These political declarations aroused a storm in the public and in the Knesset. The Maki and Mapam M.K.'s demanded a debate on Morgenthau's declarations, while Ben-Gurion contended that they were an expression of Morgenthau's personal opinions and thus no subject for a political debate. The motion for a debate was defeated by a large majority. (See *Divrei Ha'Knesset* [Knesset Reports], Second Session of the First Knesset, 24.1.1950, Vol. III, pp. 634–7.) See also No. 71.
2. William Green, President of the A.F.L.
3. Philip Murray, President of the C.I.O.
4. Sharett at first suggested that Ben-Gurion be invited by the U.J.A. to come to the United States and in the course of his visit request a meeting with President Truman, but owing to Ben-Gurion's opposition withdrew his suggestion. (See Sharett to Elath, telegrams IW414, 22 January 1950; IW417, 23 January 1950, 93.01/2202/6.) See also No. 48.

40. Meeting: M. Dayan[1] and R. Shiloah — F. al-Mulqi (Shune, 24[2] January 1950)

Report:[3] 130.02/2453/2

Summary

The Israeli representatives commenced by proposing that the problems connected with Jerusalem should be discussed first, in the hope that during the negotiations on Jerusalem all the outstanding issues between Israel and Jordan would be broached. A previous attempt to discuss the issues *in toto* from the very beginning led, as may be recalled, to a dead end.[4]

Dayan explained that, theoretically, an agreement on Jerusalem could be reached immediately. The present arrangement based on the armistice agreement was not adequate. Only peace could give a firm guarantee and relieve the apprehensions of those concerned about the well-being and security of the Holy Places. He pointed out that the partition of Jerusalem would be tantamount to Israel's recognizing the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine to the Jordanian Kingdom. If the Government of Israel takes such a step, it and the people of Israel will want to know what they will receive in return.

Mulqi did not agree with this assumption. First, the Holy Places should be excluded from the points at issue between Jordan and Israel, and then all the other problems could be solved within the framework of Article 8 of the armistice agreement.[5]

The Israeli representatives replied that Dayan had not overlooked this possibility. At one time Israel also believed that peace must come about gradually, step by step; now Israel was prepared to discuss the Jerusalem

issue. However, it should be clear that the impression made by such a limited agreement would be far smaller than that made by a comprehensive settlement. What was the Jordanians' actual proposal regarding Jerusalem?

Mulqi referred to Israel's having agreed to the borders as defined in the Assembly's November 1947 resolution, as noted in the protocol signed in Lausanne on 12 May 1946.[6] Shiloah immediately interrupted him, pointing out that Mulqi was aware that Israel had never agreed to those borders. He proposed to dispense with diplomatic sparring and to get down to negotiating. Mulqi appeared embarrassed and was saved only by the entrance of a servant announcing that dinner was served.

After the meal Dayan outlined Israel's stand on the partition of Jerusalem. He stressed that the cease-fire line should serve as the point of departure, but that it should be rectified to guarantee the vital interests of both parties. These are, for Israel: (1) the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall in the Old City; (2) Mt. Scopus.

The Israeli representatives asserted that such had also been Rifa'i's stand all along, and that there had manifestly been no dispute in respect of the Wall and the Jewish Quarter, while the opening of the roads to Mt. Scopus and to Bethlehem were presented by Israel as equivalent concessions. Rifa'i confirmed this but added that since in the meantime a new road had been built to Bethlehem, the one in Israeli hands was not so important any more to the Jordanians. The Israeli representatives remarked that the road to Jerusalem through Latrun was also less important now to Israel, since the opening of the new by-pass.

At this point Mulqi raised the question of the Arab quarters in the western part of the city. Shiloah replied that there was no point in discussing their return to Jordan and that Israel was willing at most to discuss compensation and the building of new quarters in their place in the area held by Jordan.

Notes

1. Colonel Moshe Dayan, O.C. Southern Command; till October 1949 — General Staff Coordinator of negotiations with U.N. agencies and of the Mixed Armistice Commissions.
2. Original has in error "23 January".
3. The original report is missing. This document is a copy, with certain omissions, made several years later at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4. See No. 1.
5. Article 8 of the Armistice Agreement with Jordan deals with the setting up of a special commission, composed of representatives of the two parties, with the task of expanding, amplifying and formulating those sections of the Armistice Agreement dealing with points still at issue, among them free access to the Holy Places. (See Vol. 3, Appendix H, p. 717.)
6. See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 20–21.

41. Meeting: E. Herlitz[1] — J.G. McDonald (Tel Aviv, 23 January 1950, Document dated 24 January 1950)

Report: 130.20/2490/1

Summary

Herlitz was invited to tea at the McDonald residence to meet Gibson, the new U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem. Burdett,[2] the outgoing Consul General, was also present. At McDonald's initiative, the formal conversation soon turned into a serious political talk. The essence of his statement is as follows:

The Israelis, he argued, do not as a rule understand what the Americans tell them, particularly not as regards Jerusalem. Although the latter were opposed to the Australian proposal,[3] they are not in one mind with Israel on the Jerusalem issue. The Americans have not given up on the internationalization plan, more or less on the lines proposed by the Conciliation Commission. When the Asssembly was in session they did not act to foil the Australian proposal even though they were able to do so, since the issue did not appear essential to them, as far as U.S. interests were concerned. They had no incentive in making a diplomatic effort such as the Vatican's, nor one against the Vatican. McDonald considers Eban's optimism during the Assembly, as expressed in his talks with the Americans and with others, rather odd. The Foreign Minister, he argued, had not understood what Acheson tried to explain to him in Washington.[4] In his opinion, Acheson's words contained a veiled warning and it seemed to him that Israel had misled the State Department (1) by creating the impression that she was able to reach an agreement with the Vatican when actually the talks had been held only with low echelon clergy;[5] (2) by creating the impression that an agreement with Transjordan was imminent.

At this point Burdett joined in and argued that Israel should have understood in advance what the conditions of the agreement with Transjordan would be and that there was no essential difference between the King's views and those of Samir Rifa'i.

McDonald reiterated that the root of the misunderstanding was in the reports of the Israeli representatives in the U.S. In his opinion, the Americans' advice to reach an agreement with the Vatican and with Abdallah stemmed from the misleading information submitted by the Israelis.

There was an element of "schadenfreude" in what McDonald said — "at last you too have failed — . . .". It is not clear whether he had intentionally directed the conversation to this serious channel or whether it was fortuitous. His story of how Eytan had appealed to him, as the senior member of the Diplomatic Corps, to apprise him of the residential needs of the Diplomatic Corps in Jerusalem, served as the starting-point. He had referred to Washington in this matter, asking whether he should call for a meeting of

the Diplomatic Corps.[6] It was evident throughout the meeting that McDonald was concerned about the relations between the U.S. and Israel.

Notes

1. Esther Herlitz, Assistant Director of the United States Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. William Burdett, U.S. Consul in Jerusalem.
3. The U.N. General Assembly resolution on Jerusalem of 9 December 1949.
4. For this conversation, see Vol. 4, No. 463; *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1524–7.
5. For J. Herzog's talks in Rome, see Vol. 4, No. 434.
6. Following Israel's announcement on the transfer of the government offices to Jerusalem, the American diplomatic representatives received explicit instructions on their behaviour in the future. These stated that the U.S. did not recognize Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, that it adhered to the principle of internationalization of the city along the lines proposed by the Palestine Conciliation Commission, and that the U.S. diplomatic representatives were required to refrain as far as possible from visiting Jerusalem and to do their best to meet the Israeli government officials in other venues. (See: The U.S. Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel, 4 January 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, V, pp. 667–8.)

42. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in London. 24 January 1950

Notes

1. J.M. Quimper, U.N. official, Representative of the Palestine Conciliation Commission in Jerusalem.
2. See No. 40.

43. P. Naphtali[1] (Jerusalem) to M. Sharett. 24 January 1950

Memorandum: 130.10/2543/1

Summary

It is herein proposed that the Government resolve as follows:[2]

1. Even though the question of maintaining diplomatic relations with or recognition of the German Government is not on the agenda, — the Cabinet approves direct contacts with the West and East German authorities for the purpose of meeting claims for the restoration of Jewish property in Germany (of individual plaintiffs and of property without inheritors) and for reparations.

The purpose of the negotiations through direct contact with the German authorities is:

(a) to expedite the procedure involved in obtaining the claimed property;

(b) to examine the possibility of a global settlement of the claims, and first and foremost those concerning heirless property;

(c) to examine the possibility of transferring Jewish property from Germany to Israel, particularly in the form of purchase of German goods.

In that connection it is necessary to clarify the content and intention of the statement made by the West German Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer.[3]

2. Without making an estimate of the absolute sums concerned, it should be taken into consideration that during the first year it will be possible to transfer at least DM50 million ($10 million). If the efforts to attain a global settlement of the claims and the implementation of new laws in the various occupation zones prove successful this year, we can hope to receive within the next two or three years a sum double or triple the above amount.

The principal German industrial wares we shall be able to import are iron and steel products, including irrigation pipes, agricultural and industrial machinery, hand tools, electrical appliances, timber, equipment for transport industries — for trains and ships, sanitary installations, pharmaceutical products and so on.

3. The purchase of goods by means of the above property transfer is intended in the first place to satisfy the needs of the Government or of the Jewish Agency, and secondly, to enable Israel to obtain foreign currency by selling the goods in various foreign countries, such as America and Switzerland.

4. Since final endorsement of the financial transactions connected with the property transfer is in the hands of the occupation powers, necessary political steps must be taken without delay in order to guarantee approval in Washington, London and Paris.[4]

Notes

1. Peretz Naphtali, Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister.
2. These proposals were formulated following a meeting of the committee on transfer of monies and goods from Germany, which took place on 6 January 1950. (See minutes of the meeting, 6 January 1950, 130.02/2417/1.)
3. On 24 November a Jewish periodical in Düsseldorf quoted Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on Germany's intention to award reparations to Israel in the form of goods to the sum of 10 million marks.
4. The Government did not discuss these proposals and the question of Israel–German relations was raised in the Government only in the autumn of 1950 — see No. 366.

44. Press Release by the Spokesman of the Government of Israel (Tel Aviv, 25 January 1950)

Summary

The far-reaching implications of the Dean Acheson letter to Mr. Javits are such as to cause the Government of Israel grave concern. Mr. Acheson defends the shipment of British arms to the Arab states on the ground that they are being supplied under treaty obligations and intended merely for the maintenance of internal law and order in those states and for meeting reasonable requirements of self-defence. This explanation is hardly borne

out by the types of arms which have recently been supplied to the Arab states.

It is difficult to assert that for the purpose of maintaining internal law and order the Egyptian Government requires destroyers, submarines, dozens of Vampire and Meteor jet planes, large quantities of the heaviest types of tanks and artillery, as well as many tens of thousands of automatic rifles — much of this from American war surpluses in Europe.

Nor can the establishment of highly mobile mechanized formations of considerable striking power, or the purchase of large armament plants from Germany, France, Sweden and Italy be motivated by considerations of internal order and security. These heavy armaments can clearly be intended only for use in external war.

It is equally évident, on the other hand, that in case of any attack by a major power, these arms would be entirely inadequate to defend Egypt. Thus they are ruled out by the circumstances of the case from serving the two purposes indicated in Mr. Acheson's statement.

As against this, possession of these comparatively large quantities of modern arms may clearly facilitate renewed aggression against Israel. This danger is all the greater in the light of the numerous statements which have appeared in the Egyptian and the Arab press generally indicating a scarcely veiled intention of resuming hostilities against Israel whenever circumstances are favourable for that course.

Hardly a week passes without some new threat of the coming "second round" being uttered in the Arab press or radio, and these threats come from by no means negligible quarters. It requires little imagination to picture the effect which the arrival of these large consignments of modern arms must have on these hotheads. If, in addition, they now see the responsible head of American foreign policy giving his blessing to this large-scale rearmament, the consequences may be serious to a degree.

This seems hardly the way to prevent a renewal of hostilities between the Arab states and Israel, which Mr. Dean Acheson rightly declared would be a tragic development.

For Israel, the statement of the American Secretary of State is fraught with grave consequences. He assures us that should a resumption of hostilities be threatened, the United States Government would use all its influence to prevent such a tragic eventuality. The experience of the Arab war of aggression against Israel offers conclusive evidence that Israel cannot rely for its defence on the moral influence of other powers. Indeed, conditions in this respect are liable to be even worse in future than they were then, because the ability of the United States Government to exercise such moral pressure may have been gravely jeopardized by its having assented to the large-scale rearming of countries which make no secret of their intention to resume the fight.

The situation created by this statement is very unfortunate. The heavy rearmament of the Arab states will clearly leave Israel no choice but to

increase its own defensive capacity to the maximum of its ability. One can only hope that the American Secretary of State may not have been fully aware of all the facts and implications of this matter and that further consideration may lead him to revise his attitude and to take action to prevent this calamitous arms race.

Notes

1. See No. 24.

45. A. Eban (New York) to E. Elath (Washington). 25 January 1950

Notes

1. See Vol. 4, No. 483.

46. M. Namir[1] (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 25 January 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2383/29

Summary

Namir refers to report No. 4 dispatched by the Military Attaché, *Aluf* Barnea,[2] to his superiors. In the attaché's opinion, his stay in Moscow, like that of other Western military attachés, is of no practical value. Apart from participation in official ceremonies and a courtesy visist to General Saraev[3] upon an attaché's arrival in Moscow (the Israeli attaché was exceptionally — at his own request — accorded an additional visit),[4] there is no contact whatever with the Soviet Army. Accordingly, and in view of the large expense involved in maintaining a military mission, Barnea proposes to abolish the post of military attaché and to let him return to Israel.

Namir cannot approve the attaché's proposal. It is true that from the professional military aspect the part of military attaché in Moscow is of no value, but this was known to Barnea, prior to his appointment, from what the previous Attaché, Y. Ratner,[5] had told him. The importance of the post lies in its political implications: (1) Israel should not leave the whole of Eastern Europe without a military attaché, in view of the reinforcement of her military mission in the U.S. and in view of the trumped-up accusations of her having organized the I.D.F. on the U.S. model and with the technical aid of "American generals"; (2) it can do no harm to introduce a modicum of tension in the relations with the West by making them secretly apprehensive of the military relations maintained between Israel and the U.S.S.R. These two arguments suffice to justify the existence of the post of military attaché. From the same point of view, it was a grave political error for Israel to have completely discontinued buying from the U.S.S.R. on the grounds of not having been granted trade credit.

Generally speaking, in view of the atmosphere prevalent in the world it would perhaps seem best to sever completely diplomatic relations between East and West, but the truth is there is nothing more fluid than foreign relations. Accordingly, steps which appear logical and expedient one day and which may turn out to have been mistaken and even harmful on the morrow, should be avoided. This rule applies to Israel with particular strictness. Although there is no basis for excessive optimism regarding the future of relations with the East, Israel must not initiate any move, in the absence of extreme necessity, which could be interpreted as worsening her relations with the Russians. Israel must hold fast to the *status quo* of "friendly relations" with the East, even though it is clear that they are nothing but a hollow shell.

The episode of the relations between Israel and Rumania is instructive in this connection. The recall of the Rumanian Minister from Tel Aviv[6] did not strengthen Israel's standing even in the eyes of the Western countries. At the time Namir recommended to Eliashiv to be particularly friendly towards the Rumanian Minister, not to recall the Israeli Minister from Rumania, to evince patience and to see how relations develop in the future. Additional deterioration in the relations should be prevented and efforts should be made to mend them as soon as possible.[7]

In Israel's relations with the East in general, it is necessary to practise endless patience and forbearance. The only exceptions should be matters of the most vital interest for Israel. The relations with the East are of a different nature from those with the West, where the diplomats may even level criticism, attempt to avail themselves of a sympathetic public opinion opposed to the government's line, or develop relations with an internal opposition party which may come to replace the ruling party. In the East conditions are different and therefore any affront to an Eastern government or its authorized representatives is construed as an affront to the State. There can be no relations with the East except through the government.

In conclusion, Namir returns to Barnea's proposal and stresses that he does not contend that the post of military attaché should be maintained under any circumstances whatsoever. He is aware of the fact that the previous attaché, Ratner, was invited to the Armed Forces Ministry several times for talks which at the time raised hopes of obtaining certain types of arms — hopes which ultimately came to nought. He believes that if the attaché's second year in Moscow is also spent in professional idleness, the function's *raison d'être* will have to be reconsidered. Cancelling the post at this time may be used by the Russians against Israel. Furthermore, there is a danger that diplomatic relations with the East will be completely severed, due to intensification of the cold war, the Russians starting with the military attachés; it is therefore advisable that Israel follow in this matter the Western countries. Namir proposes that the attaché's post be retained for the time being, and that the matter be reconsidered in May–June — after

Israel's Independence Day and the Soviets' military parade on the 1st of May.

Notes

1. Mordecai Namir, the Israeli Minister to the Soviet Union.
2. Only a summary of this report can be found in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (file 130.11/2495/13); the summary is dated 26 March 1950.
3. General Saraev (spelling uncertain), Director of the Foreign Affairs Department in the Soviet Ministry of the Armed Forces.
4. See summary of report — n. 2 above.
5. Yohanan Ratner, the Israeli Military Attaché in Moscow from September 1948 to May 1949.
6. The Rumanian Minister to Israel, Nicolae Cioroiu, had been recalled to Bucharest in January 1950, following the recall of the Israeli Minister from Bucharest — see No. 38.
7. Cf. also No. 38.

47. W. Eytan to the Israel Missions Abroad. 26 January 1950

48. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 26/27 January 1950

Coded Tel. WIA46; Recd: 27/28 January 1950; Outg.: 93.01/2207/4

Summary

Elath refers to Sharett's telegrams No. IW411, IW414, IW417,[1] and submits his conclusions following consultations with Felix Frankfurter,[2] David Niles, and other friends:

1. There is no factual basis for Morgenthau's appraisal of Israel's current situation, stemming as it does from his ignorance of what is going on in the White House and in the State Department and the lack of personal esteem in which he is held by Acheson. Elath assumes that Morgenthau's statements are based on an incidental impression received during conversations with Rockwell[3] and other second-echelon officials.

2. That does not mean that Israel's situation is normal and immune to a crisis in the relations with the U.S. administration, but meticulous analysis of the data does not justify comparison with the situation in Summer 1949 during the crisis over the refugee issue.

3. Elath believes that the present state of the relations with the U.S. stems mainly from the fact that Israel has not yet reached a peace settlement with the Arabs. Israel's neutrality does not constitute a problem for the Americans, although in general it is not to the liking of the State Department officials, particularly since it affects Israel's voting at the U.N.; however, it does not worry them more than, say, India's stand.

Acheson's policy is contrary to the propaganda being waged by Morgenthau in Israel for the establishment of a bloc of Middle Eastern countries. Acheson is aiming at guaranteeing the independence of those countries which do not belong to the Soviet or the American bloc so that they do not

fall under Soviet hegemony, but Truman and his cabinet are not prepared to undertake new commitments by forming additional blocs besides the Atlantic bloc. Point 4 shuns direct political and military programmes and aims at utilization of private American capital and U.N. bodies in the U.S.'s constructive war against communism.

4. Although Truman's friendship for Israel is not in question, the majority of State Department officials have always been hostile; and a minority have been non-sympathizers. Their stand has been determined by [.....][4] pro-British attitudes and concern for American interests in Arab countries. Their attitude is unlikely to change in the near future, not even in the most normal circumstances. This situation is counterbalanced by personal loyalty to the President, by Israel's friends in Congress and by sympathetic public opinion, which force Acheson, who is not hostile to Israel but also not actively sympathetic, to see to it that the Lovett affair[5] does not recur and that the policy towards Israel is not determined solely by the Department's officials. Elath believes that, under these circumstances, there is no basis for Morgenthau's fear of a sudden contretemps as long as relations with the President remain unchanged. Since concern for security and stability in the Near East is now stronger than any other trend in U.S. foreign policy, the State Department's attitude towards Israel may become less hostile once peace is achieved between Israel and at least one Arab country. This has been demonstrated by the prospects of an agreement between Israel and Jordan. Elath knows that, almost from the start, the State Department took a positive stand in this matter, even more so than Truman himself, who is under pressure of Catholic public opinion in the U.S. Continuation of U.S. help in the Jerusalem issue can be expected only if the solution is connected with an agreement between Israel and Jordan, and even more so if the Vatican joins in. Peace with an Arab country would enhance Israel's image in Truman's eyes and in those of the American public and would force the State Department to be more cautious in its relations with Israel. However, Truman's faith in Acheson, which augments the State Department's influence on the line towards Israel, must be kept in mind. There is no room for the hope that, as happened in the past, Israel would gain from a conflict between the White House and the State Department.

5. The Prime Minister's visit to Washington is important for strengthening the bonds with the President and Acheson and explaining the Government's policy to them. However, the visit will not have immediate results and will not bring about a radical change in the relations with the U.S.: firstly, because Acheson will continue to attach weight to the opinions of his advisers in the Department, who will oppose manifestations of support for Israel as long as peace had not been achieved with the Arabs, so as not to bolster overmuch Israel's self-confidence; they will also remind him that the U.S. should appear before the world and the Arabs as sympathetic to both sides, and not to Israel alone.

6. In Elath's opinion, Acheson's support of the Arab rearmament[6] is based on the following reasons: (a) suspicion of Israel's expansionism; (b) the desire to demonstrate U.S. support of Great Britain before the start of the negotiations for renewal of her agreements with Egypt and Iraq; (c) the wish to utilize for purposes of propaganda U.S. concern for the security of the Arab nations. Israel must persist in explaining that Arab rearmament will increase the danger of renewal of hostilities; U.S. aid in purchasing arms for defensive purposes should be solicited. An intensive public campaign should be mounted on this topic, no less than on the Jerusalem issue, especially in Congress, but Elath does not expect a significant change in Acheson's stand as his suspicion of Israel's expansionism is not alleviated.

7. Elath opposes Morgenthau's advice to utilise Murray's and Green's services in obtaining the invitation for the Prime Minister. The President will presumably consult Acheson, who opposes the invitation unless it is offset by inviting also the heads of the Arab governments, or at least one of them, as was the case with Nehru's[7] and the Pakistani Prime Minister's[8] visits.

8. Elath can see two possible ways of arranging the visit: (a) to propose officially through McDonald or through the Israel Embassy in Washington that Ben-Gurion visit the U.S.; in order to clarify the relations between Israel and the U.S., in this event it will be necessary to determine in advance the topics for discussion, such as a new loan, acquisition of arms, etc.; or (b) that the Prime Minister come at the invitation of the United Jewish Appeal and that the meetings with the President and with Acheson be less formally arranged. This is the more certain way, since an official request could be turned down; it is also more acceptable to Elath because it is less binding on both parties. The visit will be of a special value if by then an agreement with Abdallah is reached. If such an agreement is in the offing, it would be advisable to postpone the visit until after it has been signed.[9]

Notes

1. No. 39 and n. 4 *ibid.*
2. Felix Frankfurter, U.S. Supreme Court Justice.
3. Stuart Rockwell, official in the Office of the Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, in charge of Israel and Jordan affairs.
4. One sentence has been omitted here.
5. Robert Lovett, U.S. Under Secretary of State from July 1947 to January 1949.
6. See No. 24.
7. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs.
8. The Pakistani Prime Minister was invited to the United States following Nehru's visit there.
9. Already prior to the arrival of Elath's telegram, Sharett had formulated a final directive concerning the Prime Minister's proposed visit to the United States: the Government will not resort to intermediaries and will not solicit an invitation from the White House; on the contrary — Elath is to explain to the White House that the Prime Minister has been approached to come to the States and confer with the leaders of American Jewry under U.J.A. auspices on future financial effort.

No. 48 – Notes (continued)

The Prime Minister is anxious to know whether he would have the chance of a good talk with the President on the whole issue of U.S. — Israel relations. Sharett wishes to know whether the approach can be made directly to the President or whether it should be channelled through the Department of State. (See Sharett to Elath, HK35, 27 January 1950, 130.09/2377/1.)

49. Meeting: M. Eliash — M. Wright (London, 26 January 1950)

Notes

1. Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
2. William Strang, British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
3. See Vol. 4, No. 509.
4. Hector McNeil, Minister of State in the British Foreign Office. The oil issue is not referred to in the report on the conversation, which took place on 12 January. (See Minutes of Interview with Sir Hector McNeil ... January 12 ..., 93.04/36/14.)
5. Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary.
6. Mustafa Nahas Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister, 1950–52.
7. Maurice Richard Bridgman, oil expert, formerly Principal Assistant Secretary of the Petroleum Division of the Ministry of Fuel and Power.
8. On his arrival at Geneva on 25.1.1950, Garreau held a press conference. He sounded optimistic, saying it would be possible to find within the framework of the General Assembly's resolution a formula which would satisfy the basic demands of Trans-Jordan and Israel. (See: Expose de M. Roger Garreau ... fait à la presse le 24 janvier 1950, 130.03/2015/9.)
9. See No. 44.
10. See also No. 25.
11. Paul Gray Hoffman, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration, was staying then in Paris for consultation with European officials.
12. David Horowitz, Director-General of the Ministry of Finance was at that time in Britain for negotiations on mutual financial claims stemming from the termination of the Mandate, on the release of frozen sterling balances accumulated to the credit of Palestine, and on securing the supply of crude oil for Israel.
13. Sir William Fraser, Chairman of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Notes from p. 24 to 31.

50. E Elath (Washington) to T. Kollek. 27 January 1950

Notes

1. See No. 34.
2. Arthur H. Sulzberger, publisher of the *New York Times*.
3. See No. 96.
4. Eliezer Kaplan, Minister of Finance.

51. G. Rafael (Geneva) to W. Eytan. 28 January 1950

Orig.: 130.03/2015/9

Summary

On his arrival in Geneva, Rafael invited Garreau to dinner. Garreau asked about Israel's reaction to his plan. Rafael replied that Israel was prepared

to cooperate with him in finding a solution but not one based on the Assembly's resolution of 9 December. If Israel is invited to the Trusteeship Council's plenum, it will become a stage for accusations and counter-accusations over the entire history of the Palestine conflict with no progress in the Jerusalem issue. In reply to Rafael's question as to what procedure he would follow, Garreau replied that he intended, first of all, to present his plan, following which, or even prior to that, the U.S. Representative will propose to invite Israel and Jordan to participate in the Council's discussions.

Rafael explained that this procedure could lead to a sterile debate both on the manner in which Israel should be invited and on Garreau's plan. He proposed to transfer the debate on the plan to a sub-committee to which representatives of the parties would be invited and their comments heard. After much hesitation Garreau accepted Rafael's proposal, but pointed to the difficulty involved since, as Chairman of the Trusteeship Council, he could not head the sub-committee. In the course of the conversation, the idea became more and more to his liking and he thought of procedural arrangements which would enable him to chair the sub-committee.

Garreau proposed that the sub-committee comprise six members, including three representatives of trustee countries, which would be perforce Great Britain, France and the U.S. Rafael proposed the three other countries: the Philippines, Argentina and New Zealand. It was agreed that Rafael would request the Argentine Representative to submit to the Council the proposal for a sub-committee. Rafael hinted that the proposed arrangement would also facilitate obtaining Jordan's cooperation.

The conversation turned to Jordan's participation in the discussions. Garreau appeared greatly incensed with the Jordanians, and it was only with difficulty that Rafael succeeded in convincing him to meet them. Rafael hopes that the meeting will take place over the weekend and prior to the Israelis' next meeting with the Jordanians, since the meeting with Garreau will have a positive influence on the Jordanians' stand in the current bilateral negotiations.

Garreau had hoped to receive a substantive answer from Israel in respect of his plan; Rafael, however, had been cautious and had countered Garreau's questions with his own queries. He learned from the replies that Garreau did not win any support for his plan from the Vatican's ruling circles. Cardinal Tardini,[3] who is the key figure in the Vatican, insists on full implementation of the Assembly's resolution. He does not believe in the long-term independent existence of an international enclave, and should it prove impossible to implement the Assembly's resolution, he would prefer Abdallah's rule, which is actually British rule, to any other arrangement. Rafael remarks that Garreau's report on Tardini's views should be treated with great caution. As opposed to Tardini, Cardinal Tisserant[4] is in favour of the plan, but his influence is slight.

Garreau hinted that he had not obtained his own Government's support.

On the contrary, the French press was instructed not to write a word about his plan, and thus there has not appeared even one line on the press conference he had held in Geneva.[5] Rafael clarified that Israel's readiness to cooperate with Garreau did not mean support of his plan: Israel was prepared to consider a form of extraterritoriality solely for the Holy Places. Garreau replied that he himself would willingly accept this as a basis for negotiations, but it was not up to him; Abdallah must receive some sort of compensation and the only way this can be done is by adding secular sections of the Israeli zone to the international enclave. Rafael received the impression that Garreau was not at all convinced that he would find support for his plan, and that he feared being attacked on that issue. Iraq's Jamali had already attacked him and apparently the Belgian Representative will also do so. He is also concerned about the Vatican which has been seeking an opportunity for a show-down with him.

After the meal Garreau gave Rafael the draft of the statement he will make in the Trusteeship Council. Rafael went over the statement superficially but found that Garreau had gone into details, particularly regarding the borders of the international enclave. Rafael suggested that he limit himself to a general outline, while stressing that the Old City and the New City, excepting the Christian Holy Places, would remain under Israeli and Jordanian rule. Garreau promised to take Rafael's comments into consideration.

If the Council decides to summon the parties and to transfer the debate to the sub-committee, it will then turn to other matters on the agenda until it receives a reply from the parties summoned and until their representatives appear. Since the British Representative is interested in an immediate debate on Tanganyika, and this should take approximately a fortnight, there is no urgency in dispatching Israel's representatives to Geneva, particularly in view of the fact that Israel is interested in postponing the debate as long as possible in order to prevent convention of a special session of the General Assembly.

Talk with Muñoz of the Argentine delegation

Rafael explained to the Argentine Representative Israel's attitude, which is similar to that of Argentina, according to information received from the Israeli Minister in Buenos Aires.[6] Muñoz confirmed that this was Argentina's position, but added that they would agree to such a subcommittee only if it were clear that it would function within the framework of the 9 December resolution. He promised to bring Rafael's proposal to the knowledge of Ambassador Remorino, the head of their delegation, and to inform Rafael of their decision prior to the Council's convention on 30 January.

Notes

1. Menahem Kahany, the Israel Representative at the European Office of the U.N. in Geneva.

No. 51 – Notes (continued)

2. Muhammad Fadil Jamali, the Iraqi Permanent Representative at the U.N. and Representative on the Trusteeship Council.
3. Cardinal Domenico Tardini, Acting Secretary of State of the Vatican.
4. Cardinal Eugenio Tisserant, Secretary of the Congregazione Orientale at the Vatican, expert on Middle Eastern affairs.
5. See No. 49 and n. 8 *ibid.*
6. See No. 14.
7. The last sentence was added by hand.

52. G. Rafael (Geneva) to W. Eytan. 28 January 1950

Copy: 130.02/2447/9

Summary

Rafael reports on his meeting with Palmer[1] and Barco[2] of the Conciliation Commission. Rafael began by saying that Israel considered, as in the past, that indirect negotiations through the Commission's mediation were useless and that there would be no progress as long as there was no clear evidence on the Arabs' part that they seek peace. If the Arabs were willing to sit down for direct negotiations, Israel would view this as an indication that they are indeed interested in peace. The decision is up to the Arabs, but it is also dependent to a great extent on the stand the Commission takes. If this time the Arabs again reject direct negotiations, prospects of peace will be put off for a long time. In such an event Israel would have sufficient inner strength and fortitude to continue with her constructive enterprise even without formal peace, while establishing facts of cooperation in various spheres, until ultimately a state of *de facto* peace is created.

Rafael also reported on the renewal of contacts between Israel and Jordan, which had not been known to Palmer and Barco and which they warmly welcomed. Rafael stressed that the talks were based on the mutual assumption that both parties were interested in real peace, though the talks might nevertheless last for a long period of time — weeks and perhaps even months.

Rafael asserted that independent initiative on the part of the Conciliation Commission, by submission of compromise proposals to the parties, could prove only harmful at this stage. As Israel sees it, her main task is to create a climate conducive to contact between the parties. The Commission itself cannot implement its proposals — this can be done only by the two parties.

Palmer said he was grateful for the open and constructive presentation of the matters. The State Department's position was that the Commission should take a careful line and refrain from putting forward compromise proposals at this stage, but should concentrate on attempting to bring the parties together for direct negotiations. His impression from his meetings

with the Arab delegations was, that there were grounds for a certain optimism, but, considering the special sensitivities of the Arabs, it is impossible to forecast anything until the very last.

Palmer raised the question of negotiations on technical problems, such as compensation for the refugees, blocked accounts, etc. Rafael replied that Israel was willing to clarify these issues with the Commission in accordance with its concept of a gradual and protracted process of building up peace.

Palmer went on to say that the Arabs were again raising the refugee question. Rafael replied with a short survey of the issue's handling by the Conciliation Commission and added that the latter must first convince the Arabs to desist from using the refugees as a pawn in the political game. The Arab statesmen have not yet proved that they are touched by the refugees' plight. Israel, as a nation which has endured a great deal of suffering, understands well the refugees' distress, and last summer agreed to the repatriation of 100,000 refugees in the hope that this proposal would move the Arabs to open serious peace negotiations. The Arabs, however, did not respond to this gesture. In the meantime, conditions have changed and the situation forces Israel to reconsider her entire stand on this issue. Obviously Israel would be willing to discuss the refugee problems with the Arabs within the framework of direct peace negotiations.

Rafael informed Palmer that it has been decided not to respond in writing to the Conciliation Commission's last letter to the Government of Israel,[4] as a written reply would only evoke a long and useless controversy. Instead, he will refer to their letter in general terms in a statement he will make at his first appearane before the Commission.[5] This procedure seemed acceptable to Palmer. He encouraged Rafael to speak in general lines before the Commission, in the same spirit in which the present talk was being held. Barco enquired whether Israel's intention was to hold direct talks with each Arab state separately. Rafael answered in the affirmative, and Barco agreed that this indeed seemed to them the only useful procedure.

Talk with de Azcárate[6]

Azcárate commenced by dwelling on the changed frame of mind among the Arabs. They had come to realize that there was no prospect of Israel's imminent economic collapse. On the contrary, they were impressed by the fact that Israel has succeeded in surmounting the difficulties and is becoming stronger from month to month. On the other hand, the Arab League is progressively disintegrating and each Arab country makes its own calculations. There are indications that this time the Commission will succeed in bringing the parties together, but excessive optimism should be avoided. Azcárate also believes that submission of proposals by the Commission itself may be of harm at this stage. He hinted that the tendency towards direct negotiations was conspicuous mainly within the Egyptian delega-

tion. Azcárate concluded by returning to his pet subject — blocked accounts, and urged Rafael to move his Government to soften its stand and agree to release a sum of IL100 from each Arab deposit. He proposed a plan of capital transfer, the main point of which would be maintenance of the unblocked assets in a closed fund until the signing of the peace agreements, advance payments to be made meanwhile by the Arab countries to those eligible. Rafael agreed to discuss the details with Servoise[7] and to continue direct negotiations with the sub-committee on settlement of the blocked accounts.[8]

Talk with de Boisanger

De Boisanger also believes that the prospects of direct negotiations have improved considerably. He received this impression from the talks he held with Abd al-Mun'im and with the Lebanese Representative. In his opinion, the Arabs' victory at the U.N. in the Jerusalem issue changed their attitude towards the international organization. Now they can more readily explain to their public that cooperation with the U.N. can bring them success. He requested that Israel refrain from discussing past history with the Commission, in order to add to the Commission's prestige. He also agreed with Israel's decision not to respond in writing to the Commission's last letter.

Rafael presented Israel's arguments against the submission of proposals by the Commission. Boisanger agreed that at this stage the Commission should indeed concentrate on bringing the parties together, but added that Israel must not delude herself that direct meetings by themselves would solve the problems and bring about the signing of the peace agreements. Israel will still require the Commission's mediation and will ultimately come to see that the Commission's mediation was to her benefit. Rafael replied that he preferred the freedom of negotiations to be left to the parties. The most dangerous thing would be to create the illusion among the Arabs that they would be able to obtain better terms through the Commission.

The conversation turned to the Jerusalem issue. Boisanger said that Garreau had not yet received the Commission's endorsement of his plan, nor had the French Government authorized him to submit such a detailed scheme. Boisanger believes that overmuch detail may cause the plan to be rejected. Rafael replied that he too had advised Garreau to present his plan in a more general form. De Boisanger promised to speak that same day with Garreau and try to convince him to that end.

Notes

1. Ely Palmer, U.S. Representative on the Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
2. James William Barco, member of the U.S. delegation to the Conciliation Commission.
3. Claude de Boisanger, French Representative on the Conciliation Commission.
4. See Vol. 4, No. 414.
5. See No. 54 and n. 1 *ibid.*

No. 52 – Notes (continued)

6. Pablo de Azcárate, Principal Secretary of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
7. Rene Servoise, Economic Adviser on the Mixed Experts Commission of the Conciliation Commission on the issue of blocked accounts.
8. The sub-committee on blocked accounts convened on 15 February 1950. The parties eventually agreed on provisional payments of IL100 to the owners of the blocked accounts.

53. Y. Shimoni (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan. 29 January 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2385/31

Summary

Shimoni refers to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Premier's reply to Israel's telegram of recognition was polite but avoided touching upon the establishment of diplomatic relations.[1] Israel has two alternatives: to leave the *status quo* as is and await developments; or, to take the initiative and approach the Chinese Government with a direct proposal to establish relations. Shimoni believes that China's present status, which undoubtedly will become even stronger in the future, obligates Israel to take the initiative and to propose the establishment of relations, even at the level of a full legation. If it is decided that the time is not yet ripe for establishing a legation, then at least a consulate or an honorary consulate in Shanghai should be established to handle matters pertaining to *aliya* and property. The matter is not so urgent as to require a telegram, and it would be best to present it to the Chinese in a detailed letter, to be dispatched after the return of the Chinese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister from his visit to Moscow. In the mean time Israel's intentions can be discussed and clarified.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 19. The Chinese Prime Minister's reply has not been traced.
2. Sharett issued instructions not to hurry in the initiation of direct contacts with China but to propose dealings through the respective diplomatic missions in Moscow. (See Sharett to Eytan, 29 January 1950, 130.02/2385/31.) See also No. 80.

54. Statement by G. Rafael before the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (Geneva, 30 January 1950)

Notes

1. This address was given at the first meeting of the Conciliation Commission on the resumption of its sessions in Geneva. The main points had been formulated in Eytan's undispatched letter to de Boisanger — see No. 50. Eytan's letter, dated 25 January 1950, is in file 130.02/2441/2.
2. See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 20–21.

55. Meeting: R. Shiloah and M. Dayan — S. al-Rifa'i and F. al-Mulqi (Shune, 30 January 1950)

Report: 130.02/2453/2[1]

Summary

... Israel's representatives clarified their position by saying that only the armistice line could serve as a basis for the settlement, modifications in it to be made to satisfy the vital needs of both parties. Israel has two essential demands: adequate access to Mt. Scopus; territorial continuity with the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall. Israel's representatives explained that no Israeli Government would be able to sign a peace agreement while the place it holds most sacred is in foreign hands a few hundred metres from the border.

This proposal too was rejected by the Israeli representatives who declared that Israel would agree to a final solution of the Jerusalem issue only on the basis of one of the following three courses:

1. A far-reaching exchange of territory, i.e. the return of all the Arab quarters in the southern part of the city in exchange for an area of equal size, even if not built-up, in the northern part of the city in order to obtain territorial continuity with Mt. Scopus.

2. Financial compensation by Israel for these Arab neighbourhoods, without this being connected in any way with the mutual financial counter-claims between the parties.

3. Limited territorial compensation by Israel in exchange for the Jewish Quarter and for an adequate access to Mt. Scopus, so that the issue of financial compensation in Jerusalem would constitute only a part of the overall negotiations concerning mutual financial claims.

The Israeli representatives repeatedly stressed that, in each of these possible solutions, transfer of the Jewish Quarter up to the Western Wall and an agreement regarding access to Mt. Scopus constitute a *sine qua non*.

It should be noted that the Jordanians expressed their opposition to an extensive exchange of territory only after they had received the "advisers'" opinion. Rifa'i inquired whether the Israeli Government would agree to a combination of the two latter alternatives, i.e. territorial exchange in addition to financial compensation for those neighbourhoods which would not be returned by Israel. The Israeli representatives rejected the proposal.

Notes

1. . The original report has not been traced. This document is a copy with omissions made at the Foreign Ministry several years later.

56. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 30 January 1950

Notes

1. See No. 48.
2. At a meeting with Shiloah and Kollek, McDonald read out to them a cable from the State Department briefing him on the supply of arms to the Middle East: "Department believes arms shipments Israel Arabs to be limited requirements internal security and reasonable self-defense. Department undesires arms race, will not permit shipments Near East from U.S. which likely affect peace security. Department unaware information leading conclusions Egypt or other Arabs immediately breach peace. Israel is to be assured U.S. Government watching arms development closely and if convinced anyone preparing renew hostilities will not delay use its influence to forestall it." (See United States Division to Elath, HK37, 27 January, 130.09/2377/1.)
3. No. 28.
4. Shaul Avigur, Deputy Minister of Defence.

57. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 30 January 1950

Notes

1. This was the size of the first loan to Israel authorized in January 1949 — see Vol. 2, Editorial Note, p. 384.
2. Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Export–Import Bank, Washington.
3. Witkon had sent a report on his meeting with Emanuel Neumann. The latter had recommended that Israel become a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of the International Monetary Fund — which might assure her of additional financial sources, besides the Export–Import Bank. (See Witkon to Sharett, 16 January 1950, 130.09/2308/16.)
4. See No. 56 and n. 2 *ibid.*
5. No. 48.

58. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 30 January 1950

Notes

1. See No. 48 and n. 9 *ibid.*
2. Matthew Connelly, Secretary to the President of the United States.
3. James F. Byrnes, U.S. Secretary of State from July 1945 to January 1947.
4. George C. Marshall, U.S. Secretary of State from January 1947; Secretary of Defense from September 1950.
5. Elath's telegram to Sharett (27 January, 130.09/2308/16) in which the former advises to defer the Prime Minister's visit to the States until the storm raised during Morgenthau's visit to Israel abates (see No. 39 and n. 1 *ibid.*), so that the visit will not be construed as connected to the "Morgenthau Plan".
6. No. 48. Further to this and other messages from Elath, Sharett advised him that the whole idea of Ben-Gurion's visit to the States was now under reconsideration in connection with, among other factors, the results of Elath's forthcoming meeting with Acheson (see No. 64). In the mean time Elath should go no further with any preparations for the visit. (See Sharett to Elath, HK53, 2 February 1950, 130.09/2377/1.)

59. E. Elath (Washington) to the United States Division. 30 January 1950

Notes

1. See No. 34 and n. 4 *ibid.*
2. The U.S. had contracted treaties of "Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" with many countries, with the object of securing equality and reciprocity in the spheres of personal status, unrestricted travel, unhampered navigation and trade relations between the signatories.
3. In mid-April, the Israel Embassy in Washington was informed by the Department of State of the decision to enter on negotiations preliminary to the signing of a Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between the two countries. In order to avoid an undesirable reaction on the part of the Soviet Union, the Government of Israel decided to initiate such treaties also with other countries, for instance — Italy. (See telegram IW578, 11 April 1950, 93.01/2202/9.)

60. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in London. 30 January 1950

Notes

1. See Nos. 49 and 56.
2. The second part of the telegram, dealing with details of the requested arms supplies, has been omitted here.

61. G. Avner[1] [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan. 30 January 1950

Copy: 130.10/2550/5

Summary

Avner comments on Ginossar's[2] memorandum on Jerusalem and the Holy Places.[3]

1. Avner agrees that till now Israel has not used accurate terminology at the U.N. to differentiate between the Holy Places proper and religious institutions which are not holy places. This is most pronounced in regard to the institutions in Nazareth and other places outside Jerusalem. He believes it is necessary to formulate the Government's stand and instruct the Israeli representatives in regard to three problems: (a) Jerusalem; (b) the extraterritorial status of one or two institutions in Nazareth; (c) the Government's responsibility for those religious institutions which are not especially sacred.

A special treaty should be proposed between Israel and the U.N. to solve mainly the issues in (b) and (c).

2. Avner believes that Israel must take into consideration Christendom's concern for the future of Christianity in the Holy Land. Even Israel's own experience shows that there is some ground for concern. Therefore, a well-defined plan, providing real guarantees, should be presented to the Christian world. Israel's proposals should be formulated so that they convey the impression that the State will fulfil its commitments under all circumstances, irrespective of changes of government.

3. Continued efforts should be made to reduce to a minimum the area Israel is to contribute to the international enclave.

4. Avner advises to refrain from ideological arguments over curtailment of sovereignty. The historical fact must be accepted that Israel is located in a country holy to three faiths and this must of necessity lead to certain limitations in the State's sovereignty in respect of holy places and religious institutions.

5. Ginossar's memorandum was written before he was informed of the Government's decision regarding extraterritoriality.[4] This resolution and the fact that Israel is prepared to accord special privileges to other institutions on the model of those awarded to the French institutions,[5] constitute a step forward and will facilitate negotiations.

6. Avner agrees with Ginossar's appraisal of public opinion in Israel. As far as Jerusalem is concerned, as indeed in other issues, the public does not recognize the existence of a point of view other than its own. This is a general problem which goes beyond the Jerusalem issue, and he is entirely in favour of strenuous and well-planned efforts to effect a change of values in this sphere. In conclusion, he believes that all plans concerning the Jerusalem issue require fuller and more explicit definition and formulation. It is clear that Israel must avoid any tone of constant negativism in the mode of presentation and demonstrate a positive approach and formulation.

Notes

1. Gershon Avner, Director of the West European Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Shlomo Ginossar, the Israeli Minister in Rome.
3. See: S. Ginossar, Some Reflections on Our Position in the Matter of Jerusalem and the Holy Places, 23 January 1950, 130.10/2550/5.
4. See No. 47.
5. See Vol. 2, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 180–1.

62. Consultation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jerusalem, 31 January 1950)

Stenographical minutes: 130.02/2479/8

Summary

Teddy Kollek[1] opens by saying that the purpose of the discussion is to summarize the state of the relations with the U.S. and to suggest ways to improving them.

The **Foreign Minister** defines the matters at issue:

(a) The overall political relations between the two governments, with the problem facing Israel being how — without changing for the time being her own international orientation — to bring the U.S. to closer cooperation and to understanding that, in her grasp of democracy, Israel belongs to the Western camp. The discussion should relate also to the Prime Minister's

trip[2] to the U.S. and to the replacement of the U.S. Ambassador to Israel. [.....][3]

(b) Economic and military aid by the U.S.

(c) Propaganda in the U.S.

Abba Eban asserts that the problem in the relations with the U.S. does not stem from Israel's global policy or the principle of non-alignment to which she adheres, but from her status in the Middle East. Israel is a foreign body in the region and is not accepted by the other countries. In such a situation, any act of friendship towards Israel on the part of the U.S. is interpreted by the Arabs as a provocation. This situation is similar to the state of relations between Great Britain and the Zionists in 1939. The State Department's principle is that Israel must constitute an integral part of the region and merge in it and Israel must prove that she is striving towards that end.

Two points of dispute have lately been added to this problem: (1) the clash with the U.N.; (2) the clash with the Vatican and the Catholic Church in general. The Americans view Israel as in conflict with three bodies and any support of Israel is interpreted as a provocation, or at least lack of consideration of these three bodies. In this context, one rule which governs American policy should be borne in mind: consistent support of the U.N. and a constant struggle to bolster its authority. If the U.S. is faced with the alternative of supporting Israel or supporting the U.N. there is no doubt that it will not decide against the U.N. The fact that Israel's opposition to the U.N. may impair the relations between Israel and the U.S. should always be taken into consideration. The same is true as regards the Vatican. The Catholic community in the U.S. is a minority, but a large one (30 million) and well organized. Israel has too extensive areas of confrontation and she must strive to limit them. It is difficult to believe that Israel will be able to perpetuate the triple crisis without becoming involved in a crisis with the U.S.

[.....][5]

The **Foreign Minister** summarizes the debate: It is clear that Israel was not always in the right and the situation could be improved in two respects: (1) prevention of vandalism in the churches; (2) provision of better accommodation for the foreign missions. It is particularly in this second connection that bad relations have resulted with both the Americans and Russians. As for the issue of personal relations with the Americans, he has to admit that he, too, has a problem in this respect, but this does not lessen the need to make efforts to improve relations. Special briefings should be organized for the missions abroad, the staff of the Israel Embassy in Washington must be reinforced and the information services must be improved. On the whole, Sharett thinks that the relations with the U.S. are less problematic than those with Great Britain, as they lack the residuals of past relations with Great Britain and the Middle East countries. The U.S. is a relatively new factor in the region, less involved and capable of a more flex-

ible policy: on the one hand they accept Israel as a *fait accompli;* on the other hand, they are attempting to contain and restrict her.

Sharett joins in the warning heard against any false hopes for a forthcoming peace. Eytan demands concessions, but it is difficult to translate this into practice. An example is provided by the refugee question, which is even more difficult than the territorial issue. Sharett's support of negotiations with Transjordan is based on the fact that peace with that country would apparently not involve returning the refugees. His apprehensions concerning joint negotiations with all the Arab countries stem from the assumption that such negotiations will involve strong pressure for repatriation of refugees. When he proposed that Israel allow the return of 100,000 refugees,[8] he believed that ultimately this concession would not be implemented. Returning the refugees would mean a heavy burden on the general public, problems of housing, employment, and the necessity for humane treatment which he is not certain the public is equipped for. If in the absence of this condition, peace is not considered possible — then let there be none.

[.....][9]

U.S. Jewry has a vital role in strengthening the bonds between Israel and the U.S. This Jewry is the guarantee that such bonds will always be strong and amicable.

Notes

1. Teddy Kollek, Director of the United States Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. See No. 39.
3. One sentence of personal nature has been omitted here.
4. Several paragraphs have been omitted here.
5. Several paragraphs have been omitted here.
6. Two sentences of personal nature have been omitted here.
7. One sentence has been omitted here.
8. The proposal that Israel absorb 100,000 Arab refugees.
9. Several paragraphs have been omitted here.

63. G. Rafael (Geneva) to W. Eytan. 31 January 1950

Copy: 130.02/2443/5

Summary

1. *The Trusteeship Council:* Kahany has already dispatched a report on the proceedings there,[1] and Rafael wishes to add several preliminary comments on the positions of the various delegations:

(a) *The Philippines* are taking an ultra-extremist line in their demand to implement the resolution of 9 December. They have apparently made a deal with the Arabs. Forces must be mobilized in the U.S. and in the Philippines in order to make them toe the line.

(b) *Argentina* is taking a cautious line for the time being and apparently

her representatives have not yet received final instructions. On the other hand, they do not wish to embarrass the Israeli representatives, and they have therefore come out with their proposal regarding invitations.[2]

(c) *Australia.* Her representative, Hood,[3] has not yet received instructions, but there is no danger of an extreme position being adopted.

(d) *The United States and Britain* are not intervening for the time being. Rafael's impression is that the U.S. representatives will follow Britain's lead, and not vice versa. That is also how Sayre's[4] question should be interpreted when he inquired whether Israel would not be interested in direct negotiations outside the Council framework. They are apprehensive lest Israel agree to some amended form of the Garreau plan, to which it would be impossible to obtain Abdallah's agreement. Rafael believes that it is more important to come to a direct agreement with Abdallah than fall in with the Garreau plan. Israel will gain the full support of the U.S. on Jerusalem, if the talks with Abdallah produce positive results.

(e) *Belgium* surprised the Council by her moderation, but it is too early to draw any conclusions from this. They are considered the Vatican's representatives in the Council and it is possible that Ryckmans[5] only wanted to gain time in order to test the Vatican's reaction to the plan.

(f) Garreau fared far better during the first round than he himself had expected. The Vatican's position should become clear this week. If its aim is compromise — it will agree that the Council continue to discuss the issue, and if so there are chances that the matter will be brought before a sub-committee. In order not to encourage the extremists, Rafael advises not to adopt any position whatsoever on the Garreau plan as long as it is not clear whether the Council is willing to accept it as a basis for deliberations.[6] It should be clear that only continued discussion of the plan may defer the convening of a special session.[7] If, at its forthcoming meeting, the Council rejects the plan, it will immediately commence drafting the Statute.[8] In Rafael's opinion, time is working for Israel's benefit, therefore extreme caution should be practised.

2. *The Conciliation Commission*

Rafael appeared before the Conciliation Commission the previous day. Palmer read out the enclosed communiqué.[9] Rafael replied in accordance with the instructions he had received in the letter.[10] The reply was well received. Naturally, the statement concerning the refugees and the protocol was a bitter pill for them to swallow, but he coated it with sugar, promising collaboration. They understood of course that the emphasis was on the demand for direct negotiations. According to information from different sources, there are prospects of the Arabs agreeing to sit with Israel. This means an additional series of problems to cope with. It appears that, among the members of the Commission, at least Boisanger is thinking in terms of mediation when direct negotiations begin, and Rafael therefore stressed Israel's arguments against mediation when speaking before the

Commission. He has dispatched a report to Israel on his private meetings with members of the Commission.[11]

N.B. In Rafael's opinion, since the Americans are the only ones who can withstand the Vatican's extremism their representation on the sub-committee is vital for Israel. He requests that the matter be reconsidered.

Notes

1. See Kahany to Eytan, 31 January 1950, 130.03/2015/9.
2. The Argentine Representative had proposed that no special invitations be proffered by the Trusteeship Council to states or to religious bodies, but that requests to appear before the Council be awaited and then approved. (See, *TCOR, Sixth Sess., Verbatim Record of the 9th Meeting,* 30 January 1950, U.N. Document T/PV.211, also in file 130.03/2015/9.) See also No. 66.
3. J.D.L. Hood, the Australian Representative on the Trusteeship Council.
4. Francis B. Sayre, the U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council.
5. Pierre Ryckmans, the Belgian Representative on the Trusteeship Council.
6. See Rafael to Sharett, GN4, 30 January 1950, 130.09/2302/8.
7. Of the U.N. General Assembly.
8. The Jerusalem Statute, according to the U.N. resolution of 29 November 1947.
9. Palmer reviewed the Commission's deliberations, the proposals made by the parties, and the U.N. General Assembly's resolutions on resettlement of the refugees, compensation for the refugees, and the political future of Jerusalem, and concluded that there had been progress on all these points. However, in what concerned the territorial issue the positions of the parties were still very far apart. Palmer presented the Arabs' demand that the Commission not limit itself to conciliating between the parties but that it assume the role of a mediator and itself initiate proposals for solutions. He promised that the Commission would examine the appropriate procedures. In conclusion, Palmer stressed that the Commission preferred the parties to initiate direct contacts because it considered this to be the best way to bring their positions closer. (See: United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Summary Record of a Meeting of the Conciliation Commission and Israeli Delegation, 30 January 1950, U.N. Document SR/GM/2; also in file 130.02/2441/11.)
10. See No. 54.
11. See Nos. 51 and 52.

64. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 31 January 1950

Notes

1. No. 28.
2. See No. 30 and n. 2 *ibid.*
3. No. 56, n. 2.
4. No. 56.
5. Arabic: "the State is with us".
6. Shimon Peres, Head of the Ministry of Defence delegation to the U.S.
7. See No. 88.

65. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 1 February 1950

Notes

1. See No. 4 and n. 5 *ibid.*

No. 65 – Notes (continued)

2. Charles Brannan, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture.
3. Oscar Chapman, U.S. Secretary of the Interior.
4. Following consultations between the President's secretary and the Department of State, it was decided not to reply to President Weizmann's letter. (See *FRUS*, 1950, V, p. 661, n. 5.)
5. The line proposed by Elath was endorsed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see United States Division to Elath, IW431, 6 February 1950, 130.09/2308/5).

66. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation at Geneva. 1 February 1950

Notes

1. See Tsur to Eytan, telegrams RA49, 26 January 1950; ṘA50, 30 January 1950, 130.09/2294/3.
2. See Nos. 14 and 63.

67. M. Kahany and G. Rafael (Geneva) to W. Eytan. 1 February 1950

Notes

1. Cf. No. 63.
2. See No. 66.
3. See No. 63.
4. Eytan cabled in reply: "... sit pretty. Explain Garreau we cannot whip up support for a plan we don't accept, thereby committing ourselves implicitly to something we explicitly reject". (See Eytan to the Israel delegation in Geneva, NG9, 3 February 1950, 130.09/2302/7.)

68. M. Amir[1] (Brussels) to M. Sharett. 1 February 1950

Copy: 130.02/2382/13

Summary

Amir submits to Sharett some observations on Israel's political and security situation.

The past year had seen a number of significant political successes for Israel, the most important of which was her admission to the U.N. However, the political prognosis seems to Amir unpromising, and he thinks time is working against Israel. The Arab states, which in the past year had been beaten and thoroughly defeated, and therefore consented to sign the armistice agreements, have now rallied and reorganized, they have launched intensive rearmament programmes and their enmity towards Israel has increased rather than diminished. The hate for Israel has been for them a unifying factor, as can be seen in the case of Jerusalem: even Hashemite Iraq did not deviate from the common Arab line and acted together with the rest for the adoption of the internationalization plan. The

present policy of the Arab states shows no sign of any moderation in their attitude towards Israel, and Amir has no doubt that they will seize on the first opportunity to reopen hostilities with the aim of destroying the Jewish state.

If war breaks out again, Israel cannot expect any substantial help from the international community. The U.N. is powerless and moreover reluctant to act in such cases, nor has Israel the moral authority to demand its intervention because she has flouted its authority in the past. The state's safety will thus depend solely on its military strength, its efficient organization and the morale of its population. Amir regrets to say he is deeply worried by the general state of mind in the country and he is afraid the people have lost the spiritual strength and the willingness to make sacrifices which had characterized them in the past.

Amir's conclusion is that Israel should press for a declaration by the U.S. guaranteeing mutual non-aggression between Israel and the Arab states. Obviously, approaching the U.S. with this in mind would invite counter-pressures in the territorial and refugee issues, but Amir thinks Israel's standing in the States is strong enough to withstand such pressures. He also knows such a policy would be subject to internal ctiticism and could also create difficulties in the relations with the Soviet Union. However, the internal opposition should be ignored, and the relations with the Soviet Union have long ago lost any practical significance, this state's attitude towards Israel being mainly negative.

Notes

1. Michael Amir, Diplomatic Representative of Israel in Belgium and the Netherlands.
2. Ahmad Sa'ad Zaghlul Pasha, founder and leader of the Wafd Party; Egyptian Prime Minister from 28 January to 22 November 1924.
3. Reference is to what is known as the "Jessup formula" — see Vol. 4, No. 63 and n. 1 *ibid.*
4. See No. 24.

69. M. Namir (Moscow) to S. Eliashiv. 1 February 1950

Coded Tel. BI386; Recd: 2 February 1950; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Namir refers to Eliashiv's telegram No. 303.[1] It is impossible to determine North Korea's intentions on the spot. An affirmative vote by Israel would anger the Eastern bloc, especially China, which regards South Korea as her sworn enemy. The U.S.S.R. is particularly sensitive concerning this part of the world and Israel should preferably abstain on issues relating to this embroiled region. Israel has no vital interest in Korea which could require a deviation from the basic policy of non-intervention in any clearly inter-bloc conflict. An affirmative vote would be interpreted as paving the way for diplomatic recognition and not as a technical act, whereas abstaining

leaves an open door for changes in Israel's stand. It should be taken into consideration that it is just within these past few weeks that Israel has been attacked by the Soviet press on the Morgenthau episode,[2] the *Kol Ha'am* trial,[3] and so on; the Russians should not be provided with additional ammunition. In conclusion, Namir recommends to continue abstaining.[4]

Notes

1. Eliashiv had reported irresolution in the Ministry in the matter of voting on South Korea's admission to the International Telecommunications Union. Israel had till now abstained in all votes on South Korea, but now the tendency was to vote for, both because a two-thirds majority was necessary in this case and abstention was equivalent to opposition, and because this organization was of a technical and not a political character. (Telegrams of 29 January 1950, 130.09/2325/3.)
2. See No. 28 and n. 1 *ibid.*
3. The Legal Adviser to the Government had instituted legal proceedings against the newspaper *Kol Ha'am* for defamation of the Prime Minister. The paper had written on 4 October 1949 that, at the Hano'ar Ha'oved (Working Youth) congress, Ben-Gurion used "such rabble-rousing language as only traitors to their people have dared use".
4. In the event, Israel supported South Korea's application.
5. Arye Levavi, Counsellor in the Israeli Legation in Moscow.

70. A. Ukhmani (Warsaw) to S. Eliashiv. 1 February 1950

Coded Tel. BI130; Recd: 2 February 1950; Inc.: 130.09/2306/4

Summary

The official organ of Poland's United Workers Party,[1] *Trybuna Ludu,* published that day a long article on emigration to Israel.[2] This is the first article on this topic to appear in the Polish press. After mentioning the catastrophic economic situation, persecution of the Communist Party[3] and discrimination against the Arabs, the paper reaches a conclusion as to Zionism's anti-Soviet and anti-democratic nature. The paper then dwells on the situation of the Jewish masses in Poland and concludes: "... the Zionist activists will emigrate in accordance with their outlook, but the masses of working Jews will remain in Poland and tie their fate to that of the people's democracy which is striding towards socialism". In Ukhmani's opinion this is not just a matter of propaganda but rather evidence of a new line in emigration policy, signifying that emigration would be restricted to Zionist activists and "non-productive" elements.

Notes

1. The "United Workers' Party" — Poland's Communist Party.
2. See No. 10.
3. See No. 69, n. 3.
4. Reference is to a controversy rife at the time over the obligation of the members of the Tenu'at Hamoshavim (the Cooperative Villages Movement) to belong to the Zionist Organization. In the course of the controversy, some settler families identified with Maki (the Communist Party of Israel) were prevented from working their land and attempts were made to expel them from their villages.

71. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 2 February 1950

Notes

1. See No. 39.
2. Conference of the heads of the U.S. diplomatic missions in the Near East, held in Istanbul at the end of November 1949 to discuss American policy in that region.
3. Untraced.

72. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 2 February 1950

Notes

1. François Lefèbvre de Laboulaye, an official in the Africa-Levant Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of Jerusalem affairs.
2. Pierre de Leusse, Sub-Director of the Central Europe Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. See Fischer to Sharett, F12, 2 February 1950, 130.09/2344/6.
4. Eytan replied that, in the light of the developments at the Trusteeship Council (see No. 75), there was no need now of special French initiative (see Eytan to the Israel Legation in Paris, TP20, 3 February 1950, 130.09/2344/3).

73. Meeting: R. Shiloah and M. Dayan — F. al-Mulqi (3 February 1950)

Report:[1] 130.02/2453/3

Summary

Mulqi opened by saying that the Jordanian Government had discussed at great length the report he submitted on the last meeting.[2] The Government learnt that Israel's main claims were: sovereignty over the Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter, and adequate access to the institutions on Mt. Scopus. In order to facilitate the course of discussions, the Jordanian Government has agreed to allow Israel free and dignified access to the Western Wall, but under no circumstances could it place the Jewish Quarter under Israel's sovereignty. As for Mt. Scopus, the Government agrees to allow access and use of the institutions, on condition that the area be considered, from the territorial aspect, as part of the Jordanian State.

In response, the Israeli representatives said that what the Jordanians proposed was only one stage in the implementation of Article 8 of the Armistice Agreement. The Israeli Government greatly appreciated the Jordanians' readiness to implement this Article, but it had been certain the whole while that the negotiations were aimed at a final solution and a full settlement of all the Jerusalem issues. Only such a settlement could foil the U.N.'s intention to internationalize Jerusalem. There was no change in the Israeli position regarding internationalization and opposition to Garreau's plan, even though it should be pointed out that this plan accorded Israel more than the Jordanians offered.

Later in the discussion, it was thoroughly explained to the Jordanians that Israel was not prepared to accept, not even by implication, the assumption that the Mt. Scopus area was considered by the Jordanians to be occupied territory. Israel exerts absolute sovereignty over this area and any Jordanian encroachment upon this sovereignty would be regarded as a grave breach of the armistice which could lead to the resumption of hostilities.

Notes

1. The original report has not been traced. This document is a copy, with omissions, made at the Foreign Ministry several years later.
2. See No. 55.

74. Meeting: M. Sasson[1] — A. al-Karmi[2] (Document dated 3 February 1950)

Report: 130.15/2568/1

Summary

The talk dealt with the prospects of peace between Israel and Jordan. Al-Karmi noted that there were several factors which constituted a stumbling block to peace between the two countries: (1) The present composition of the Jordanian Government (particularly its Palestinian members); (2) the King's anxiety not to sign a peace treaty which could disappoint the refugees, some of whom wished to return to Israel, while others wanted their lands in Israeli territory in the vicinity of the "Triangle" to be annexed to Jordan, still others preferring compensation.

Al-Karmi introduced an idea which in his opinion could solve the main problem — the question of peace. His proposal contained seven points:

1. Jordan and Israel will sign a peace agreement on the basis of the *status quo*.
2. All the questions at issue will be transferred to special sub-committees, these to be set up immediately following the signing of the agreement.
3. There will be sub-committees on borders, compensations, refugees and economic questions.
4. The sub-committee on borders will convene immediately for discussions on determination of the boundaries. It will consider the special demands of the Jordanians (border modifications in the "Triangle", in Jerusalem, etc.) and the special demands of the Israelis (Mt. Scopus, the Old City, etc.).
5. The sub-committee on compensations will discuss the reparations to be paid by Israel in lieu of the property of the refugees staying in Jordan.
6. The sub-committee on refugees will discuss the possibility of repatriation, the number of returnees to be mutually agreed upon.

7. The economic sub-committee will discuss topics such as a free port or ports for Jordan within Israel's borders.

Sasson defines al-Karmi's proposal as "peace devoid of all content". It would enable Abdallah to sign a peace agreement on the spot and to postpone the difficult issues for deliberation by the sub-committees. As for the sub-committees' discussions, each of the parties will be able to advance the discussions on topics vital to it and to cause the deferment of topics that are not to its liking. This proposal is very similar to Ralph Bunche's line of thought when he steered the negotiations at Rhodes, i.e. a basic agreement between the parties and transfer of the main problems to sub-committees. In conclusion, Sasson notes that this proposal is al-Karmi's personal idea; he will submit it to King Abdallah and see which way the wind is blowing. There is no certainty that the proposal will be acceptable to the King in its present form.

Notes

1. Moshe Sasson, official in the Middle East Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Abd al-Ghani al-Karmi, a member of King Abdallah's entourage.

75. G. Rafael (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 3 February 1950

Orig.: 130.03/2015/9

Summary

Rafael adds some details to what he had reported by telephone on his talk with Sayre and Stabler[1] and on a second talk with them which took place the same day.

Yesterday he sought to clarify their position regarding the meetings of the Trusteeship Council next Monday. At first they repeated the old refrain that they were unable to take any initiative. If the motion is moved not to accept Garreau's plan as a basis for discussion, they will not be able to prevent its passing. Nor does the proposal to establish a sub-committee appear to them practical at this stage, since in the absence of a solution agreed upon by Jordan and Israel, the Council will have to take up drafting the Statute in accordance with the resolution of 9 December.

Sayre and Stabler are aware that certain circles are interested in a showdown, but they do not wish to encourage them. Rafael suggested to them the possibility of a "slow-down". Then and there they decided to speak more frankly. The U.S. official and declared position is to support any agreement reached between Israel and Jordan which would guarantee the legitimate interests of all those interested in the Holy Places. If Israel and Jordan succeed shortly in reaching an agreement on the partition of Jerusalem and the protection of the interests of the Christian world, the U.S. will be prepared to attempt to postpone the debate in the Council for a fort-

night. They of course assume that the negotiations are promising and that they are being vigorously conducted; if they receive a satisfactory reply, they will try to postpone the debate to 17 or 20 February.

Rafael replied that, as he saw the situation, it was possible that Jordan and Israel would not be able to propose more than functional internationalization in the first stage. He asked whether such a proposal would satisfy them. With surprising certainty, they replied: "Yes, absolutely! but we must always consider the third party's position and this is liable to affect our stand". Rafael suggests that it should be checked in Washington whether this reply indeed reflected the official U.S. position.[2]

Today Rafael conveyed to Sayre and Stabler Sharett's reply and they repeated what they had said the day before, although in a more formal and formulated manner. They will sound out the other delegations on the possibility of postponing the talks, but as long as the reaction is uncertain they cannot commit themselves as to Monday's procedure. Possibly a discussion would develop on Garreau's plan and, if so, they would have to modify their tactics. They said that Garreau had told them that Israel supported his plan, which surprised them. Rafael replied that Garreau had intimated to the Israelis that the U.S. supported his plan — which testified to a consistent lack of understanding on Garreau's part. They openly stated that they were concerned lest the impression be created among any of the parties that Garreau's plan was acceptable to Israel, without guarantees that it was acceptable to the Jordanians and to Christian circles outside the Catholic Church. However, they wished to emphasize that Israel should not construe this to mean that they had any information that the Catholic Church supported Garreau's plan. They thought it best at that stage for Israel not to express any official opinion regarding the Garreau plan.

Notes

1. Wells Stabler, in charge of Egyptian and Sudanese affairs in the Department of State; formerly U.S. Vice-Consul in Jerusalem and in charge of the American mission in Amman.
2. Rafael subsequently telephoned Sharett, whose reply was extremely reserved. He would not commit himself on the prospects of the negotiations with the Jordanians and only asked to inform the Americans that Israel would greatly appreciate a fortnight's grace. (See Sharett to Eytan, 4 February 1950, 130.09/2344/3.)

76. G. Rafael (Geneva) to W. Eytan. 3 February 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2447/9

Summary

Rafael discussed the work of the Conciliation Commission with Yalçin. The latter said that he had promised Eliahu Sasson, when they met in Ankara, a delay of one month to six weeks to allow Israel and Jordan to make progress in their negotiations. This promise he has faithfully kept.

Rafael informed him of the details of the negotiations and found that he was already well briefed. Yalçin stressed that Turkey wished the negotiations to succeed because she was interested in stability and peace in the Middle East and had no territorial aspirations in Syria or in any other Arab country.

The goal of Yalçin's work in Geneva was direct negotiations between the parties. He therefore wished to incorporate the negotiations between Israel and Jordan within the framework of the Commission, in order to induce other countries to follow suit. Rafael explained that, at the present stage of negotiations with Jordan, transfer of the talks to Geneva would not be helpful. On the other hand, it would make things easier if the Egyptians were to meet for direct negotiations in Geneva and they should be given priority in this respect. The opening of such negotiations in Geneva would have a beneficial effect on the Israel–Jordan parleys. Yalçin grasped this argument well and promised to influence the Arab delegations to change their intransigent attitude.

Rafael requested that, in his talks with the Arabs, Yalçin avoid creating the impression that Israel was weak and needed peace urgently. Actually, Israel feels she is quite strong and can exist even without a final settlement with the Arabs. It is therefore advisable for the Arabs to refrain from stipulating preconditions for opening the negotiations, and they should not expect concessions in advance.

Yalçin believes that the preliminary feelers before the opening of the talks will last some four weeks. As soon as the parties are ready to commence negotiating, he will demand that talks be held in Istanbul; he estimates that the talks could begin in March. Rafael was impressed that Yalçin was in earnest in expressing desire for direct negotiations although his words contained an element of expectation that Israel would make concessions.

In a conversation with Boisanger, the latter told Rafael that he had met Mun'im but had not succeeded in determining his exact stand on direct negotiations. Mun'im responded with questions and sought in particular to receive a guarantee that Israel would adopt a more conciliatory approach, complaining that even in a matter such as the blocked accounts, Israel had not evinced a conciliatory spirit. Boisanger asked for Israel to make concessions on this issue, and also in the matter of reunification of families, in order to improve the atmosphere.

In a talk with Palmer and Barco, Rafael received the impression that the American representatives were cautiously optimistic as to the possibility of direct negotiations. The problem was that Mun'im has not been accorded full authority by his Government, and as long as he does not receive such authority, or as long as the Egyptians do not send another official from the new government circles — it will be difficult to advance matters. They decided to appeal to the Egyptian Government in this matter through their ambassador in Cairo.

1. See No. 52 and n. 8 *ibid.* Rafael's telegram GN6 of 2 February 1950 is in 130.09/2302/8.

77. M. Eliash (London) to M. Comay. 3 February 1950

Notes

1. No. 60.
2. Comay to Eliash, 1 February 1950, 93.04/38/8.
3. See No. 44.
4. Geoffrey Furlonge, Head of the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office.
5. See report by Eliash, 6 February 1950, 93.04/36/14.
6. Pinhas Kozlovski (Sapir), Director-General of the Ministry of Defence.

78. M. Namir (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 3 February 1950

Copy: 130.11/2512/1

Summary

Namir refers to trade relations between Israel and the U.S.S.R. as being virtually at a standstill. It is now five months that there is no Israeli commercial attaché in Moscow[1] and Israel has not purchased anything from the U.S.S.R. since requesting formally Vyshinsky to authorize commercial credit.[2] At the moment there is no indicaton that such authorization is to be expected in the near future. Nevertheless, Namir believes that there is no justification in totally discontinuing Israeli purchases in the U.S.S.R. Such purchasing should be resumed even if it is unilateral and even if there is no purely economic justification for it. Israel is in a political situation which forces it to make certain "investments" even if these do not entail immediate profit. A nought in Israel's balance of trade with the U.S.S.R. will not improve Israel's political status. Therefore, a commercial attaché to the U.S.S.R. should be appointed as soon as possible; this office could be combined with some other function, e.g. counsellor at the Legation.

Notes

1. Moshe Bejarano, the Commercial Attaché in the Israel Legation in Moscow, had left at the end of September 1949.
2. Andrei Vyshinksy, the Soviet Foreign Minister. Israel's request for credit was delivered at Golda Meyerson and Namir's meeting with Vyshinsky in April 1949 – see Vol. 2, No. 496.
3. Haim Raday, Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry.

79. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion. 5 February 1950

Copy: 130.02/2403/18

Summary

In a conversation with the British Minister, Helm, the latter told Sharett, *inter alia*, that the reports to which Israel referred concerning Britain's supply of arms to Egypt, were inaccurate. The actual volume of the consignments was much smaller than Israel asserted and the data themselves did not relate to quantities already supplied but to the consignment process which would be protracted.

At the same meeting Sharett informed Helm that he had instructed Israel's Minister in London[1] to renew the request for sale of heavy arms to Israel, stressing the urgent need and asking that, as a provisional measure and for temporary relief, Israel be enabled to acquire the planes offered by Holland. Helm promised to refer the Holland matter to his Government, but made no explicit commitment to attach his recommendation. It is advisable that the British Commonwealth Division remind the Minister of his promise and try to sound out his attitude in the matter.[2]

Later in the conversation Helm showed great interest in whether and to what extent active communist agents on a special mission infiltrate to Israel among the immigrants from Eastern Europe.

Notes

1. See No. 60.
2. See also No. 77.

80. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 6 February 1950

Coded Tel.: P8; Outg.: 130.09/2377/1

Summary

Eytan issues directives concerning relations with the Chinese representatives. Since Israel has recognized the new Peking regime, no official relations should be maintained with representatives of Nationalist China while such relations with representatives of the People's Republic of China should not be avoided. Israel intends to gradually make of its mission in Moscow a channel for regular contact with the People's Republic of China.[1] Israel's envoys are at liberty to maintain personal relations with the representatives of the People's Republic, but it would be advisable always to be guided by the behaviour of the British and Indian envoys.

Notes

1. See No. 53.

81. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 7 February 1950

Notes

1. The idea of Murray and Green's meeting President Truman had its origin in Morgenthau's political activity and was connected with his project to have the President meet Ben-Gurion – see Nos. 39 and 71. The Israeli Embassy staff had reservations about the meeting for fear it might harm the negotiations then taking place with Secretary of State Acheson for the supply of arms to Israel (see Elath to Morgenthau, 6 February 1950, 93.08/377/2). Before the meeting took place, Ben-Gurion cabled to Morgenthau, requested that Murray and Green consult first with Elath, and listed the main subjects pending in the relations between Israel and the U.S. (see Ben-Gurion to Morgenthau, Y674, 6 February 1950, 93.01/2202/7).
2. Jacob Potofsky, U.S. labour leader, President of the United Garment Workers Union.
3. David Dubinsky, U.S. labour leader, President of the New York Ladies Garment Workers Union.
4. Sharett to Elath, 5 February 1950, 130.09/2308/5.
5. See No. 85.

82. E. Halevy[1] (Bucharest) to S. Eliashiv. 7 February 1950

Copy: 130.02/2457/19

Summary

Aliya from Rumania is continuing at the same rate.[2] In January some 1000 persons departed, and this month perhaps even a larger number is expected. From 20,000 to 25,000 exit permits have been issued till now, but many of the recipients have not yet left the country.

It is difficult to determine the Rumanian Government's exact criteria in issuing exit permits. At any rate, it seems that there are three basic guiding rules:

1. To issue as few exit permits as possible for young people.
2. To limit as far as possible the tremendous pressure of applications.
3. To practise politeness towards the body of applicants.

The authorities have been apparently surprised by the tremendous pressure of applications. They are confused and every day issue new and contradictory instructions. About a week ago there were over 4,000 persons standing and waiting in the Passport Division's courtyard and in the adjoining streets. That same day over 3,000 application forms were distributed and the following day it was announced that no more forms would be issued until April, the reason given being that too many requests had been submitted. The procedure in other Rumanian cities was similar, the intention apparently being to reduce the flow of emigrants.

The pressure by the Jews even reached as far as the Jewish Democratic Committee.[3] Feldman[4] and Leibovici's[5] offices are full of Jews who have come to ask for their intervention to hasten procurement of the passports. At the same time, the Committee's newspaper continues to publish reports

denouncing emigration. It may be assumed that the contradiction stems from the Committee's wishing to prove that it still had influence among Rumanian Jewry.

The Israel Legation's position with regard to the entire process of *aliya* is difficult and complex. From the formal aspect, the Legation has no standing in the exit process other than issuing entrance visas to Israel. This has always been the situation and it stems from the Rumanian Government's policy.

In conclusion, and taking into consideration the Legation's limited sources of information and the characteristic vagaries of the Rumanians' policy towards *aliya,* it may be anticipated that the process will run along the following lines:

1. Emigration will continue at a rate similar to the present one. The elements pressing for *aliya,* which Halevy described in his letter of 11 December 1949,[6] will continue to be active.

2. The bulk of emigrants will also in the future be relatives (parents, offspring) and the middle-aged. The percentage of young persons will be small, despite the fact that all the members of the Zionist youth movements submitted applications for *aliya.*

3. The Rumanian authorities have not yet reached a decision with respect to the exit of well-known Zionist leaders.

4. Vilifying of Zionism and the State of Israel will increase.

Notes

1. Eliezer Halevi, Chargé d'Affaires in the Israel Legation in Bucharest.
2. See No. 38, and also Vol. 4, No. 439.
3. "The Jewish Democratic Committee" — the organ of the Rumanian Communist Party within the Jewish community.
4. Bercu Feldman, Secretary-General of the Jewish Democratic Committee.
5. Şerban Leibovici, member of the Jewish Democratic Committee, member of the Rumanian National Assembly.
6. The letter, dated 10 December 1949, is in 130.02/2457/19.

83. I. Barzilai (Warsaw) to M. Sharett. 9 February 1950

Orig. 130.11/2502/10

Summary

Barzilai sums up his visit to Israel.[1] From the start he had no illusions that within such a short visit it would be possible to solve all the problems involved in absorbing the Polish immigrants. When he appeared before the Cabinet he endeavoured to present the issue of absorption in Israel not by emphasizing the moral aspect - that the Polish immigrants should be granted privileges due to their special standing in the martyrology and heroism of the Jewish people - but by stressing the practical-objective aspect,

i.e. that the manner of absorption would determine the *aliya*'s fate.[2] This explanation won the Cabinet's attention.

He maintained close contacts with the Public Committee for the Absorption of Polish Immigration and with other organizations of ex-Polish Jews. He was happy to learn that all the factions and organizations had united within a joint framework which might lead to fruitful activity.

He met with bodies and organizations dealing with the actual absorption of the Polish immigrants and also visited a camp of Polish immigrants. He does not delude himself that all the difficulties have been solved, but he hopes that several problems have been clarified and that there has been some progress.

An additional topic that he dealt with was promoting the implementation of the trade agreement with Poland. For this purpose he availed himself of Dr. Shamir's[3] help. Unfortunately, when he brought up the issue before the Cabinet, he felt some reservations on the part of Minister Dov Joseph,[4] who for some reason remarked that the agreement had been drawn up by persons who were familiar with Israel only in the theoretical aspect. Actually, extremely well-versed persons such as Meron,[5] Gruenbaum[6] and Bezner[7] had participated in drafting the agreement. The other Cabinet members, on the other hand, showed an understanding of his arguments and he was pleased to hear that the Prime Minister had assigned his aides to explore, with a positive attitude, the possibility of speeding up implementation of the trade agreement.

Concerning the situation in Poland, this was in effect the end of organized Zionism there.[9] The Zionist parties have disbanded, there is no longer any Zionist press nor national funds. The non-Zionist Jewish press is campaigning against *aliya.* Some two weeks ago a comprehensive article against Israel and *aliya* appeared in the Party's main organ.[10] At the same time a debate was held in the Sejm on tying the professional cadres to their jobs. The article and the Sejm debate caused concern among the Jewish circles which, it appeared, was justified since in January the number of exit permits decreased considerably and the first rejections also occurred.

In order to examine the situation at first hand, Barzilai met the Acting Foreign Minister, Wierblowski, and the Civil Administration Minister, Wolski. Barzilai learned from the talks that the article reflected the official position of Poland's ruling party, which considers that the place for Polish Jewry is in Poland, but *aliya* will continue and the fluctuations in number were accidental. At any rate, Barzilai was told that "the whole *aliya* business" is supposed to end in September. Concerning restrictions on professionals, it was explained that physicians were not allowed to emigrate at all, but as for other professions no final decision has been taken — although this did not mean that they all would be allowed to leave.

In a conversation with Wierblowski political issues were also discussed. Barzilai complained about Poland's support of the U.N.'s internationali-

zation resolution. Wierblowski explained that their vote was due to their basic and consistent adherence to the U.N.'s partition resolution and their opposition to partition of the city which would leave one section in the hands of Abdallah, who is under Britain's thumb, and the other section in the hands of Israel, whose political orientation is not yet clear.

Barzilai also brought up the matter of the absence of Polish diplomatic representation in Israel.[11] Wierblowski replied that this was due to lack of manpower and that there were many countries in which Poland had no ministers.

Notes

1. Barzilai was in Israel from the end of December 1949 till the middle of January 1950 to see for himself how the immigrants from Poland were being absorbed.
2. For Barzilai's opinion on how the absorption of the Polish *olim* should be carried out, see Vol. 4, No. 409.
3. Itzhak Shamir, Economic Adviser in the Israel Legation in Poland.
4. Dov (Bernard) Joseph, Minister of Supply and Rationing.
5. Gershon Meron, Director of the Economic Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
6. Heinz Gruenbaum, Director-General of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1949.
7. Itzhak Bezner, Inspector of Foreign Currency in the Ministry of Finance, until November 1949.
8. Several paragraphs, dealing with Barzilai's meetings in Israel, have been omitted here.
9. See No. 10.
10. On the article in *Trybuna Ludu*, see Niv to Eliashiv, 9 February 1950, 130.11/2502/10.
11. See Vol. 2, No. 398 and n. 15 *ibid.*
12. Several paragraphs, dealing with the monies of the Zionist funds in Poland, have been omitted here.

84. A. Eban [Geneva] to M. Sharett. 10 February 1950

Record of a Telephone Conversation: 130.03/2015/9

Summary

Eban reports that the Trusteeship Council is about to debate and vote on China's proposed resolution to commence drafting the Jerusalem Statute, according to the Assembly's resolution of 9 December. The only way of preventing this procedure is to approve a motion to invite the Jordanian and Israeli representatives to the Council's session. The American representatives are inclined to accept this course and the Israeli delegation encourages them, with a view to achieving a postponement of the discussions. If the resolution to invite the parties is approved, the most likely date for Israel to appear in Geneva is 20 February.[1]

The Foreign Minister asked whether the resolution would be in general terms or whether it would explicitly define the basis for the negotiations to which the parties would be invited.

Eban replied that the invitation would be non-specific and that the parties would be asked to convey their position on the Jerusalem issue. He himself stressed in his conversations, that Israel's acceptance would

depend on Jordan's reaction. The British are certain that the Jordanian Government will accept the invitation if it is officially tendered.

Eban had a talk with Palmer, the American Representative on the Conciliation Commission, who then informed his Government that Eban was prepared to meet the Egyptian Representative in Geneva and proposed that Washington contact Cairo to have the Egyptian Representative receive appropriate instructions. Eban recommends to await the results of the American approach before contacting the Egyptian Representative.[2]

The French Representative on the Conciliation Commission, Boisanger, proposed the establishment of sub-committees composed of representatives of the various parties and headed by the members of the Conciliation Commission.[3] The Assembly and Security Council resolutions would serve as a basis for the sub-committees' discussions. Eban objected to this basis and proposed free negotiations, not bound *a priori* by previous rulings. Boisanger replied that Israel need not commit herself in writing prior to the deliberations. Eban is convinced that this assurance is insufficient and he continues to voice objections to references to Assembly and Security Council resolutions also in the Commission's announcements.

Notes

1. Both proposals were in effect debated simultaneously and passed unanimously by the Trusteeship Council (see *TCOR, Fourth Year, Sixth Sess.*, 20th, 21 Meetings, 10–11 February 1950, pp. 148–8, 151). The representatives of Israel and Jordan appeared before the Council as scheduled on 20 February.
2. For previous reports on direct talks with the Egyptians, see Nos. 11 and 27. On 10 February 1950 Reuters reported from Cairo that the Egyptian Minister of War and the Navy had announced to the press that Egyptian and Israeli representatives would meet on 26 February for direct talks in the presence of U.N. officials. (See Reuters communication of 10.2.1950, 130.02/2410/1.) See also No. 76.
3. For Boisanger's proposal, see No. 86. Matters were cleared up in an exchange of telegrams between Sharett and Eban. Sharett explained that he was not worried about the sub-committees debating minor matters, in line with the Israeli policy of occupying the Conciliation Commission with issues of secondary importance; however, should the sub-committees take on themselves the principal pending issues between Israel and the Arabs, such as the territorial and the refugee problems, they would risk coming to a stalemate, with all its consequent dangers.

   Eban replied that one should not reject the Conciliation Commission's proposals as they constituted the first positive response on the Commission's part to Israel's demand for direct negotiations without mediation. Israel should not try to avoid coming to grips with the outstanding problems between her and the Arabs, and it is the occupation with marginal affairs that risks coming to a stalemate. Moreover, peace talks, even if they are unduly prolonged, should serve to keep out of the limelight the debates on the Jerusalem issue. Eban himself does not fear that the talks would have a detrimental effect on the negotiations with Jordan; the contrary may well be true – that Abdallah will soften up as a result. In any event, substantive talks could not take place before the end of March, and by then the agreement with the Jordanians should have been concluded. (See Sharett to Eban, NG15, 10 February 1950, 130.09/2302/7; Eban and Rafael to Sharett, GN7, 12 February 1950, 130.09/2302/8.)

85. E. Elath [Washington] to the United States Division. 10 February 1950

Notes

1. See No. 81.
2. The elections in Britain were set for 23 February 1950.

86. G. Rafael (Geneva) to W. Eytan. 10 February 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2447/9

Summary

1. *Talk with Palmer and Barco*

Eban briefed the Americans on the latest developments in the negotiations with Abdallah.[1] Israel was now trying first of all to reach an agreement on Jerusalem, which at a later date would be extended into a comprehensive settlement. Israel was prepared to carry on bilateral negotiations with any Arab country over matters of issue between Israel and that country. Israel has been informed that there is a tendency in Egypt to end the dispute[2] and Eban has his Government's authority to negotiate with the Egyptians within or outside the framework of the Conciliation Commission.

Palmer and Barco replied that they welcomed Israel's initiative, but it was not yet clear to them whether the Egyptian representative, Abd al-Mun'im, had the authority, the courage and the desire to open talks. Palmer promised to find out what Egypt's stand was. In the mean time the Commission would continue its efforts to find a comprehensive formula allowing for direct negotiations by both parties.

2. *Talk with de Boisanger*

Boisanger opened by stating that he had received a telegram from Paris on Sharett's talk with the French Ambassador to Israel, Guyon,[3] with the news that Eban was to go to Geneva to attend the Conciliation Commission's debate. He himself was attempting to convince the Arabs to open direct negotiations; he has had some success, but they still require of him proof that Israel will enter on the negotiations with good will and readiness to compromise. He is pleased that Israel followed his advice and agreed to a compromise on the blocked accounts.[5] This may serve to soften the Arabs. The Commission is seeking a formula, acceptable to both sides, which would serve as a basis for negotiations. The Arabs insist that this formulation must be the resolution of 29 November. He knows that Israel does not accept this formula and he is therefore after a more general formulation, saying that all resolutions pertaining to Palestine would serve as a basis for negotiations. The draft of his formula is enclosed with this letter.[6]

Eban and Rafael congratulated Boisanger on his initiative and on his idea to establish a basis for negotiations by means of an announcement to be issued by the Conciliation Commission and not by means of a protocol signed by the parties. However, the basis he proposes does not appear realistic. Israel considers it sufficient that the Commission note in its announcement the task imposed on it according to the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948.[7] Israel also prefers to carry on negotiations with each and every country on the entire complex of problems between it and Israel and not to split up the negotiations into separate issues such as borders, compensation, refugees, etc.

De Boisanger replied that he had intentionally used a vague formulation as the basis for negotiations in order to facilitate its acceptance by the Arabs. He was in agreement with the Israeli proposal that the subcommittees concentrate not on separate issues but on the totality of problems between Israel and each separate Arab country, although he was certain that problems might emerge which would require a discussion in technical committees. He considered his proposal to be based on the one presented by Eytan in Lausanne.[8]

In conclusion, the Israeli delegates said that they would consider de Boisanger's proposal and would give him a reasoned reply. Rafael's impression is that Boisanger is personally interested in taking an initiative in order to strengthen the Conciliation Commission's authority. He believes that the Americans are interested in slowing down the Commission's activity; this course will damage the Commission's prestige and opportunities may be lost. He therefore suggests an approach of the State Department to explain that Israel is interested in greater initiative on the Commission's part.

In Rafael's opinion, the American representatives have indeed adopted a more cautious line in the expectation of results from the negotiations between Israel and Jordan. Boisanger, on the other hand, is convinced that these negotiations need not impede the Conciliation Commission. Furthermore, Boisanger inclines towards mediation, while the Americans wish to leave the parties freedom of action. The Israeli representatives decided to curb Boisanger's excessive energy and they will take the matter up with the Americans and with the Turkish Representative.

Notes

1. See No. 73.
2. See No. 84 and n. 2 *ibid.*
3. Edouard Guyon, the French Minister to Israel.
4. See No. 63.
5. See No. 52 and n. 8 *ibid.*
6. The draft has not been appended here.
7. For the U.N. General Assembly resolution – see Vol. 4, Main Volume, Appendix A.
8. See Vol. 4, No. 95.
9. The reply is in file 130.02/2447/9, but has not been printed here.
10. The last sentence was added in the margin by hand. See also No. 92.

87. M. Namir (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 10 February 1950

Coded Tel. PI398; Recd: 12 February; Inc. 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Namir adds information to that given in his telegram No. 360.[1]

(1) There is no confirmation of a general expulsion of Jews from the vicinity of Moscow and other places. However, there is full confirmation of expulsion of individuals for reasons of Zionism, sympathy for Israel, applications for *aliya,* contacts with family members abroad, black-marketing, and "affiliation with non-productive elements". It is difficult to assess the scope of the expulsions. In many localities various persons have been denounced as criminals but only the Jews among them have been actually expelled.

(2) There are increasing dismissals of Jews from office, without grounds, particularly from administrative offices. There is also a continuous purge of the "cosmopolitans", i.e. Jews. Antisemitism is on the rise, the central government does nothing to curb it, and the local authorities support it both overtly and covertly.

(3) With regard to loyalty to the state, it is evident, as far as the Government is concerned, that the Soviet peoples are classified as follows: first, the Slavs, the most loyal element; second, the Mongols and other primitive tribes which are considered quite loyal; third, the Muslims, whose loyalty is in doubt and therefore much effort is being invested in the development of their economy and culture; fourth, the Jews, the Greeks and the Turks, and to some extent the Armenians, who certainly are suspect. The Jews are considered the most suspect element. The rationale for this attitude has been explained in previous reports.[2]

(4) In a recent article in *Voprosi Ekonomiki* it was implied that Jews were not a nation as they had no territory of their own.

Notes

1. Namir's telegram to Eliashiv, requesting that the reports on the expulsion of Jews from the Moscow area be suppressed until confirmation was received from other sources (telegram of 23 December 1949, 130.09/2325/4).
2. See Vol. 4, Nos. 324, 445.

88. E. Elath [Washington] to D. Acheson (Washington). 13 February 1950

Notes

1. See No. 64.
2. See E. Elath to the Secretary of State, 13 February 1950, 93.08/347/21.
3. See No. 117.

89. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to J.G. McDonald (Tel Aviv). 14 February 1950

Notes

1. See "Report on a Conversation with Mr. McDonald on 5.2.50", 6 February 1950, 130.20/2481/3.
2. The questions were submitted by Ya'aqov Meridor of Herut (see *Divrei Ha'Knesset* [Knesset Reports], Second Session of the First Knesset, 10 January 1950, Vol. III, p. 477).
3. In reply McDonald sent to Eytan the text of a memorandum submitted by the Egyptian Foreign Minister to the U.S. Ambassador in Cairo on 26 January 1950. The memorandum stated that Egypt had taken possession of the islands of Sanafir and Tiran with Saudi Arabia's explicit assent and that it was not her intention to interfere with innocent shipping through the straits between these islands and the Sinai coast. (See McDonald to Eytan, 21 February 1950, 130.20/2483/5.)

90. A. Eban (Geneva) to E. Elath (Washington). 14 February 1950

Notes

1. Jefferson Caffery, the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt.
2. See No. 84.

91. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 14 February 1950.

Notes

1. See No. 88 and n. 2 *ibid.*

92. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to A. Eban (Geneva). 16 February 1950

Record of a Telephone Conversation: 130.02/2441/2

Summary

Eban reported that the U.S. representatives had enquired whether the negotiations between Israel and Jordan should be considered as having failed. The Foreign Minister replied that the matter would be clarified within the next 48 hours.[1] It should be made clear to the Jordanians that they must elucidate their position so that Israel will know, on the eve of her appearance before the Trusteeship Council, whether she will appear there with or without an Israel–Jordan agreement. At all events, Israel must be prepared for the second possibility.

Eban was of the same opinion. He was apprehensive of an injurious entanglement for Israel, but Sharett reassured him and said he had the situation well in hand.

Eban then reported on the state of affairs at the Conciliation Commission: the French Representative abandoned his plan for the establishment of sub-committees on pending problems,[2] owing to Israel's refusal to accept the basis he proposed for the discussions (the Assembly's resolu-

tions and the "Protocol") and owing to the fact that the Arab delegations had not been empowered to deal directly with Israel. As far as Eban knew, the Conciliation Commission was to decide that day to settle for the time being for the Mixed Commissions set up for dealing with technical matters such as reunification of families and blocked accounts.[3]

Notes

1. Dayan and Shiloah's meeting with the Jordanians on 17 February 1950 ended with no results, and in its wake King Abdallah proposed to call off the negotiations on a peace settlement and to sign in its stead a non-aggression agreement for five years - see No. 100.
2. See No. 86.
3. See No. 86 and also No. 52 and n. 8 *ibid.*

93. A. Eban (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 16 February 1950

Notes

1. In the following telegram Eban reported that he had indeed been approached officially on this question, which would presumably become the main issue in the Trusteeship Council's debates (see Eban to Sharett, UN13, 17 February 1950, 130.09/2302/8).
2. See No. 101.

94. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Geneva). 16 February 1950

Orig.: 93.03/3061/3

Summary

Doubts have been raised lately about the true sanctity of the three sites holy to the Christians, in Israel territory - the New Cenaculum and the Dormition Church on Mt. Zion and the Church of the Annunciation in Nazareth.[1] Sharett had at one time obtained the Government's authorization to examine the possibility of coming to some arrangement with the Vatican on the basis of Israel's ceding its sovereignty over these sites. It seems doubtful whether the New Cenaculum is indeed a holy site, and in any event it is not as holy as the Old Cenaculum, over which Israel's sovereignty cannot be ceded as it has become a Jewish place of prayer. The sanctity of the Dormition Church, which at one time was considered by the French Consul, Neuville,[2] as the only holy site within Israel territory, is not greater than that of other churches within the confines of Israel, e.g. in Ein Karem. With regard to the Church of the Annunciation in Nazareth, there are in that town at least three different churches, belonging to three different sects, which lay claim to this name. Sharett therefore believes that extreme caution must be exercised in any expressions of opinion on this topic. Public and explicit voicing of Israel's readiness to yield her sovereignty over these sites may cause demands for cession of additional sites,

of no lesser, and perhaps greater, sanctity. Therefore, any remarks concerning this topic should be limited to private conversations and to intimations that Israel would be willing to single out only 2 or 3 sites for this solution and any attempt to extend it to include other sites would certainly fail.

Sharett realizes that this conclusion will put Eban in a difficult situation before the Trusteeship Council. If the status of the sites on Mt. Zion[3] were clearly defined, Eban could propose internationalization of the Old City, adding to it, as Israel's contribution, the two sites on Mt. Zion adjacent to the Old City. As it is, this simple solution cannot now be put forward.

Sharett therefore proposes that Eban call for internationalization of the main Christian and Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem, i.e. the Holy Sepulchre and the Western Wall, with effective supervision of the other holy sites by the U.N. This instruction is to be in force until the draft of Eban's speech, promised in a telegram, is received – when additional consultations will take place and Eban will be notified accordingly.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 4.
2. René Neuville, the French Consul-General in Jerusalem.
3. Original has in error: "Scopus".
4. For Eban's last instructions before his speech at the Trusteeship Council see No. 101.

95. A. Eban (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 16 February 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2447/9

Summary

Eban reports on the contacts he and Gideon Rafael had with members of the Conciliation Commission.

(1) De Boisanger's[1] proposals were in effect attempts to revive the famous Protocol of 1949. Israel's representatives made it clear to him, in writing, that they were opposed to any legal liability to be imposed on Israel as a prerequisite for opening negotiations. They also criticized several terms and expressions which reflected a tendency to emphasize the authority and initiative of the Conciliation Commission. As an alternative basis for the negotiations he proposed the paragraph in the resolution of December 11, 1948, which recommended extension of the validity of the armistice agreements as part of a process leading to peace.[2]

(2) It was understood by all the parties that the composition of the subcommittees proposed by de Boisanger would allow separate meetings to be held between Israel and each of the Arab countries. The Israeli reply therefore did not refer to this point.

(3) The Americans expressed their total sympathy with Israel's criti-

cism of the Boisanger formula. They too are convinced that sterile deliberation on the significance of the resolutions and their various paragraphs should cease and that actual topics, such as the future of Gaza, the refugees, and the northern border, should instead be discussed. They did not criticize Rafael's announcement of Israel's withdrawal of her commitment to the "Protocol" and to the repatriation of 100,000 refugees.[3]

(4) After his meeting with the Israelis, Boisanger met the Arab delegations and found that they did not want to enter upon negotiations with Israel without there being a previous commitment such as signing of the "Protocol" or a declaration in which certain decisions were accepted as a basis for the negotiations. Since Israel was determined that efforts must be made towards direct and separate negotiations, without preconditions, and in view of the fact that there was no Arab representative in Geneva who was authorized to open such negotiations, the Commission came to the conclusion that, for the time being, the Mixed Commissions would deal also with technical issues (reunification of families, blocked accounts, etc.).

(5) As far as is known, Boisanger's proposals derive from his personal initiative and do not reflect France's position.

Notes

1. See No. 86.
2. Reference is presumably to Article 2(c) of the General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1948, instructing the Conciliation Commission to undertake any of the functions that were assigned to the U.N. Mediator or to the United Nations Truce Commission - see Vol. 4, Main Volume, Appendix A.
3. See No. 52.

96. G. Rafael (Geneva) to W. Eytan. 16 February 1950

Copy: 130.02/2442/1

Summary

Rafael considers that a detailed reply must be given to the Survey Group's report.[1] He read it carefully and thought it disappointing not only because it excluded Israel from the development plans, but also because it did not at all encourage economic cooperation on regional lines, which could promote stability and peace in the Middle East. It is obvious that the members of the Group were deterred from the start from far-reaching conclusions and contented themselves with plans which could bring about quick and direct benefits to Abdallah.

Israel's response to the report may also aid the purpose of occupying the Conciliation Commission with matters of secondary importance until the time arrived to cope with the primary issues, in direct negotiations.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 34 and n. 1 *ibid.*, and also No. 50.
2. In a note to this letter Sharett remarked that he also was in favour of a substantive reply to Clapp's report, but he thought this should await Horowitz's return, the latter being the most knowledgeable concerning Israel's argumentation in this issue (see Sharett to Eytan, 10 March 1950, 130.02/2442/1).

97. G. Rafael (Geneva) to W. Eytan. 17 February 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2447/9

Summary

Stabler invited Rafael over so as to ascertain what would be Israel's position in the forthcoming meeting of the Trusteeship Council[1] and in order to explain the United States position. Rafael informed Stabler that no agreement had yet been reached with Abdallah and that, in fact, the main difficulty was not the division of the city between Jordan and Israel, but rather Abdallah's stubborn objection to any concessions benefiting Christian interests. If Israel does not reach an agreement by the time she appears before the Council, she will have to consider adopting a stand that will suit her own interests but will also take into consideration the demands of the Christian world. Israel might then express her willingness to consider *any* practical proposal that would ensure the safeguarding of the Holy Places.

Stabler advised Israel not to be discouraged. A more moderate stand on her part at the Trusteeship Council may convince King Abdallah to come to an agreement with Israel. At any rate, the United States would welcome an arrangement agreed upon between Israel and the Christian world, and not necessarily a tripartite agreement. With regard to the position of the American delegation to the Council, Stabler emphasized that although the United States was opposed to the resolution of 9 December, as loyal members of the Trusteeship Council they must collaborate in formulating the Jerusalem Statute. They will vote on each section separately but have not yet decided whether they will vote on the Statute as a whole. However, they will resist any attempt to implement the Statute by force and will support any effort to find a compromise acceptable to all parties.

Stabler advised Israel to appear before the Council in a spirit of good will and not to appear rebellious. A declaration of "accepting an international regime, particularly in regard to the safeguarding of the Holy Places", will gain her much sympathy. He personally believes that the Vatican will not agree to any arrangement that will not ensure at least the extraterritoriality of the Holy Places as well as of several important institutions.

Notes

1. Israel was to appear before the Trusteeship Council on 20 February.

98. E. Elath [Washington] to M. Sharett. 17 February 1950

Notes

1. Alger Hiss, a senior official in the Department of State, had been accused of transmitting secret documents to the Soviets, and this affair had been in the public limelight in the United States since 1948. Acheson had several times expressed himself in Hiss's support. His latest statement of 25 January, coming one day after the court had found Hiss guilty of perjury, had aroused against him a strong reaction in the Senate and in public opinion.
2. Brannan had proposed that he with Chapman would attempt to solve the arms supply problem by means of an unofficial approach to Acheson; only should this fail, would they appeal to President Truman (see Elath to Sharett, W789, 16 February 1950, 93.01/2202/7). See also No. 104 and n. 3 *ibid.*

99. E. Elath [Washington] to M. Sharett. 17 February 1950

100. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Geneva). 19 February 1950

Notes

1. Eban was due to appear before the Trusteeship Council on the morrow.
2. Shiloah and Dayan's meeting with King Abdallah and Samir al-Rifa'i, which took place in Shune on 17 February 1950.
3. See No. 105.
4. The Government discussed the draft agreement on 22 February 1950. Ben-Gurion and Sharett opened the debate by voicing a general agreement with the draft. They stipulated, however, that some of the outstanding questions between Israel and Jordan, such as the question of free access to the Wailing Wall and to Mount Scopus, should be settled by further negotiation. Sharett also pointed out that the draft agreement removed the U.N. factor from the Israeli–Jordanian relations and in this respect constituted a step further over the armistice agreement. Ben-Gurion drew the attention to some major disadvantages in the draft, such as the Israeli renunciation of part of Jerusalem and the official recognition of Jordanian rule over the West Bank; nevertheless, the proposed agreement was, in his opinion, a turning point and a landmark to similar agreements with other Arab states. The discussion terminated with a resolution which endorsed the draft agreement and requested the Israeli representatives to report to the Government on the progress of the negotiations in view of the reservations that had been voiced in the discussion. The Government would then discuss again the whole matter.
5. See Nos. 101 and 105.

101. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Geneva). 19 February 1950

Notes

1. No. 93.
2. No. 100.
3. In a following telegram, Sharett directed Eban to explain, in private conversations with supporters of the internationalization of Jerusalem, that the initiative for this should come from them: such a move on Israel's part would be construed by the Jordanians, an agreement with whom was vital, as a double-cross (see Sharett to Eban, NG26, 19 February 1950, 130.09/2302/7).

Editorial Note

Israel's Proposals Regarding the Holy Places

Abba Eban appeared for Israel before the Trusteeship Council on 20 February 1950. He reviewed the fortunes of the General Assembly's resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem, and argued that that resolution was devoid of any moral and legal basis. The U.N. Organization utterly failed in its attempts to defend Jerusalem and its Holy Places when the city was under siege and attack. After the war, Jerusalem's Jewish inhabitants became completely integrated in Israel's economy and administration. Any attempt on the U.N.'s part to disenfranchise the city's inhabitants and subject them to international rule would meet with their opposition and would be contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter. The various resolutions adopted by the United Nations show that the only aim of that organization in respect of Jerusalem was to safeguard effectively and with due responsibility the Holy Places. Israel had submitted in the course of time a number of proposals aiming at protecting the interests of the three faiths in Jerusalem. The first proposal was that international rule should be extended to that area within historic Jerusalem in which the Holy Places were situated; later she had proposed that international control should be applied to the Holy Places themselves, irrespective of the area in which they happened to be situated; finally, Israel had offered to conclude agreements and accept United Nations representation in Israel for the exercise of United Nations responsibility for the Holy Places. Israel would now be prepared to accord to such agreements legal status within the framework of a Statute for the Holy Places and would be prepared to discuss such an arrangement with the Council and with other parties concerned. Furthermore, Israel was willing, outside the question of the Holy Places, to accept binding declarations or agreements ensuring religious freedom and full liberty of religious education and the security of religious institutions. (See *TCOR, Fourth Year, Sixth Session*, 28th Meeting, 20 February 1950, pp. 201–7.)

102. A. Eban (Geneva) to E. Elath (Washington). 21 February 1950

Notes

1. Eban to Elath, 21 February 1950, 93.08/375/5. Eban had informed Elath of the gist of his speech at the Trusteeship Council (see Editorial Note above) and pointed to the approval with which the U.S. representatives on the Council had met his call for negotiations on a Statute for the Holy Places and the assumption by the U.N. of its responsibilities for the Holy Places. Eban suggested that the Department of State be immediately approached to elicit from them a response to Israel's proposal and to convince them not to support the U.N. internationalization plan.
2. See No. 110.

103. A. Eban (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 22 February 1950

Notes

1. Of the Trusteeship Council.
2. Of the U.N. General Assembly.
3. Article Two of the Jerusalem Statute dealt with the demarcation of the boundary of the international enclave.
4. Sharett endorsed Eban's proposals (see Sharett to Eban, LS974, 23 February 1950, 130.09/2302/8).

104. E. Elath [Washington] to the United States Division. 23 February 1950

Notes

1. See No. 102 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. No. 88.
3. Chapman and Brannan had met Acheson on 23 February 1950. Chapman's impression following that meeting was that Israel's requests for arms supply would be most probably at least partly met; on the other hand, the prospects were slight of the cessation of arms shipments to the Arabs by Britain, because British and American vital interests were involved here (see Elath to the United States Division, 23 February 1950, 93.01/2202/7).
4. See enumeration of grounds and arguments relating to the refugee problem and Israel–Arab relations dispatched by the United States Division to Elath (telegram 76/178, 26 February 1950, 130.09/2308/5). See also No. 111.

Editorial Note

Draft of a Non-Aggression Agreement Between Israel and Jordan

After the Government of Israel had agreed in principle to sign a non-aggression agreement with Jordan – see No. 100, n. 4, Shiloah and Dayan met King Abdallah, Samir al-Rifa'i and Defence Minister Fawzi al-Mulqi on 24 February. The participants had before them the draft which had been debated at the previous meeting, but certain amendments were made; the most important was making the agreement subject to the Israel–Jordan Cease-Fire Agreement. Following a discussion, the representatives of both parties initialled what was described as "Preliminary Headlines for a Non-Aggression Agreement". In the course of the meeting the King showed himself extremely eager to sign the agreement, while his two ministers signed "almost under duress" (see *FRUS,* 1950, V, p. 757; Sharett to Elath, IW474, 26 February 1950, 130.09/2308/5). See also No. 112.

105. Draft Agreement between Israel and Jordan.[1] 24 February 1950

Copy: 130.02/2453/3

Summary

A special agreement will be signed, pursuant to the Armistice Agreement, bound to the latter and reinforcing it. The agreement will include the following principles:

(1) Non-aggression for a period of 5 years.

(2) Maintenance of the existing armistice borders and a search for acceptable solutions for the abolishment of areas of no-man's-land by their division, wherever possible, between both parties.

(3) In order to reach a comprehensive agreement between the two parties, Special Joint Committees will be appointed to study and discuss each of the fundamental issues. These will include territorial and economic problems as well as other issues to be included in the agreement, with a view to replacing the temporary lines and arrangements comprised in the Armistice Agreement by permanent lines and arrangements, including Jerusalem and the question of a port and access to the sea for Jordan, under her full sovereignty.

(4) Measures are to be taken by both sides to safeguard the Holy Places and to ensure freedom of prayer and access, while eliminating the possibility of military disputes between the parties over those sites, and providing the U.N. authorities with satisfactory guarantees in this matter.

(5) One of the first tasks to be imposed on one of the Committees mentioned in Paragraph 3, will be to devise arrangements for payment of monetary compensation to owners of property in Jerusalem without affecting the territorial settlement in Jerusalem referred to in Paragraph 3.

(6) Measures are to be taken to grant to Jordan a free zone in the port of Haifa in order to implement the principle of commercial cooperation between the two parties for the duration of this agreement.

(7) Measures are to be discussed to settle matters pertaining to Arab property in Israel territory by allowing the owners of such property either to enter Israel themselves or to send their representatives in order to sell such property or to deal with it as they see fit. And this is in order that they will have the right, if such solutions prove difficult to implement, to authorize the parties to the agreement to resolve the difficulties. This would apply also to Jewish property in Jordanian territory.

(8) The Special Committee will discuss measures to facilitate Israeli access to the institutions on Mt. Scopus and Arab access to Bethlehem, in accordance with Article 8 of the Armistice Agreement.

Addenda to this agreement will be drawn up to determine ways and means of implementing the above resolutions.

R[euven] S[hiloah]	F[awzi al-] M[ulqi]
M[oshe] D[ayan]	S[amir al-] R[ifa'i]

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.

106. G. Rafael (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 24 January 1950

Notes

1. Reference is to a dispute between Israel and Egypt on the future of the no-man's-land in the Beit Hanun area north of the Gaza strip – see Vol. 4, No. 500, and nn. *ibid.*
2. For the full text of de Boisanger's proposal of 23 February 1950, see file 130.02/2445/1.
3. This sentence is not found in the version delivered by de Boisanger to the Israeli representatives.
4. See No. 108.

107. A. Ukhmani (Warsaw) to S. Eliashiv. 24 February 1950

Coded Tel. BI138; Recd: 25 February; Inc.: 130.09/2306/4

Summary

During the last few days issue of passports has been accelerated, but the composition of the recipients has changed: they are mostly middle-class people and merchants, some after a short wait of only 2 months, as opposed to others who have been waiting already nearly a year.[1] In a conversation with the new Deputy Minister of the Interior, it was promised that essential workers would also emigrate but this would entail a longer process; only workers indispensable to the Polish economy would be detained. The definition of "essential worker" would be determined at a higher level.

Notes

1. See Nos. 10 and 83.
2. Thus in the original.

108. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban and G. Rafael (Geneva). 27 February 1950

Notes

1. No. 106.
2. Jon Kimche, British Jewish journalist. The reference is obscure.
3. Eban stated his intention to reply to de Boisanger reiterating Israel's general stand, that is, willingness to negotiate on comprehensive peace or on any intermediate steps leading to that goal. Israel was therefore prepared to adopt any effective procedure on the model of that which had given maximal results in the solution of the Gaza no-man's-land issue. (See Eban to Sharett, UN36, 28 February 1950, 130.09/2302/7.) For Israel's reply to de Boisanger, see No. 114.

109. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 27 February 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 73.
2. See Sharett to Eban, NG37, 27 February 1950, 130.09/2302/7.

110. E. Elath (Washington) to the United States Division. 27 February 1950

Notes

1. See No. 102.
2. The General Assembly's resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem — see Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 251–2.
3. See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial note, p. 181.

111. E. Elath (Washington) to the United States Division. 27 February 1950

Notes

1. No. 109.
2. No. 110.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 73.

112. Draft of a Non-Aggression Agreement between Israel and Jordan. 28 February 1950

130.02/2449/1

Summary

As requested by the Israeli representatives, Fawzi al-Mulqi read out the text proposed by the Jordanian Government (for text, see Main Volume, pp. 146–7).[1]

The Israeli representatives started by debating each and every section, but they subsequently decided to postpone the discussion until both parties had read out their proposals.

When Mulqi had finished reading out the Jordanian text, the Israeli representatives read out theirs (for text, see Main Volume, pp. 148–52).

A harsh debate then developed between the Israeli representatives and Fawzi al-Mulqi. The former argued that whereas the Israeli proposal did not deviate from the principles proposed by the King and initialled by both

parties, the Jordanian proposal was faulty with regard to many details. In particular, there was no limitation of the duration of the agreement in their proposal, and there was no section on economic and commercial cooperation. Israel had tried to attain a definitive peace agreement, but when she realized that the time was not yet ripe for that, she agreed to sign a non-aggression pact, which is a sort of interim stage between an armistice and a peace treaty. What is proposed today is only a worse edition of the armistice agreement. Fawzi al-Mulqi claimed that Israel was mistaken in her interpretation of the Jordanian proposal. The Jordanians do indeed regard it as an interim step towards peace but they prefer that the mutual assurances concerning non-aggression not be limited in time. As for economic and commercial ties, they are interested in them but, for various reasons, do not wish to pledge themselves by written agreement.

The Israeli representatives insisted that the Jordanian proposal constituted a retrogression not only as compared with the previous initialled version, but even in comparison with the armistice agreement.

In conclusion the Jordanian representative asked for a suspension of negotiations owing to the general elections being held in Jordan.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 73 and No. 105. The present drafts were submitted at a meeting at Shune on 28 February 1950. Israel was again represented by Shiloah and Dayan while the Jordanians – by Fawzi al-Mulqi and Jamal Toukan. King Abdallah and Samir al-Rifa'i were present in part of the meeting. The meeting had been preceded by a difficult discussion in the Jordanian Cabinet. Opposition was voiced on two counts: on the necessity to sign a new agreement instead of the Israel–Jordan armistice agreement and on the renewal of the commercial relations between the two countries which was contrary to explicit resolutions of the Arab League. Both these reservations were reflected in the draft presented to the Israeli representatives. The Jordanian draft also omitted the five-year limit on the validity of the agreement and did not set a deadline to the implementation of each paragraph.

   After both drafts were read in the meeting disagreement arose. The Israeli representatives said that the new Jordanian draft constituted a set-back to previous agreements and would certainly be rejected by the Israel Government. The Jordanians claimed that the internal situation in Jordan and their position in the Arab world did not permit them to go any further. A personal intervention by the King, who admonished his ministers in the presence of the Israeli emissaries, did not break the deadlock. Finally it was decided to suspend the meeting and to reconvene on 3 March 1950. (See meeting of the Israeli Government, 1 March 1950.) See also Nos. 122, 126.
2. Original has in error: "properties".

113. A. Eban (Geneva) to A. Lourie (New York) and E. Elath (Washington). 28 February 1950

Notes

1. See No. 103.
2. The elections for the Senate and the House of Representatives scheduled for 7 November 1950.
3. An identically worded telegram was sent also to Sharett (GN27, 1 March 1950, 130.09/2308/8).

114. G. Rafael (Geneva) to the Chairman of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (Geneva). 28 February 1950

Notes

1. See No. 106 and n. 2 *ibid.* and also No. 108.
2. Boisanger replied that the Conciliation Commission already had preliminary information on the agreement between Israel and Egypt, and would examine it in detail when the full text was received. Nevertheless, the information at hand would suggest that the agreement dealt only with the first paragraph in the terms of reference proposed for the Mixed Committee, and the Conciliation Commission therefore was of the opinion that the establishment of the Mixed Committee was still necessary. (See Boisanger to Rafael, 2 March 1950, 130.02/2445/1.)

115. A. Eban (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 28 February 1950

Notes

1. For full report of the conversation, see No. 125.
2. See No. 106.
3. Sharett thought the results of the meeting were not encouraging; he also had the impression that Mun'im was *persona non grata* with the Wafd (see Sharett to Eytan, NG46, 2 March 1950, 130.09/2302/7).

116. S. Eliashiv (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 28 February 1950

Copy: 130.11/2514/1

Summary

As Eliashiv had written previously,[1] there had been a decline in the relations between the East European Division and the Soviet Legation.

In the past, in addition to the official meetings he had initiated, he used to meet members of the Legation also at non-official events, particularly at meetings of the League for Friendship with the U.S.S.R., but he has lately discontinued attending meetings of the League.

The Foreign Minister also had not had any talks with the Soviet Minister for a long time. Formerly, he used to meet the Minister rather often in order to pass on current information, and also when delicate matters were concerned. Lately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been dealing mainly with the question of Jerusalem and the negotiations with Abdallah, and it was decided, after consulting with the Prime Minister, not to provide the Russians with any information on these matters.

When the negotiations have reached a certain stage, it will probably be necessary to inform the Soviet Minister on their progress. The Soviet reaction to this can be anticipated. If Namir himself has an opportunity to discuss the matter, he would be advised to remind the Russians that they have always been opposed to outside mediators and have advocated direct negotiations. It is advisable to emphasize that the agreement is not yet a

peace treaty but only a step towards a permanent settlement and that it does not abrogate the cease-fire agreement.[2]

Notes

1. Letter of 11 November 1949, in file 130.11/2514/1.
2. Sharett met the Soviet Minister on 3 March 1950 and briefed him in detail on the talks with the Jordanians (see report in file 130.11/2513/18).

117. R. Hare (Washington) to E. Elath (Washington). 2 March 1950

Notes

1. See No. 88 and n. 2 *ibid.*
2. See No. 64.

118. A. Eban and G. Rafael (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 2 March 1950

Notes

1. No. 108.
2. On the consultation in Tiberias see No. 27. See also No. 119.
3. No. 115.

119. G. Rafael (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 2 March 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2447/9

Summary

The last exchange of telegrams with Sharett[1] dealt with the conditions of the peace negotiations with Egypt. There is no doubt that the course the Commission wished to pursue, at Boisanger's instigation, would have brought the talks to a dead end. From a discussion between Rafael, Eban and Mun'im,[2] and from what has been learned from members of the Conciliation Commission, it seems that Egypt is not very anxious to change the *status quo.* The armistice agreement affords her security and the refugee problem does not bear heavily upon her and, on the contrary, provides her with a political weapon in the war against Israel and serves as a pretext for receiving international aid.

On the other hand, it is doubtful whether Israel can afford the perpetuation of a situation in which there is an Egyptian bridgehead within Israeli territory, particularly in view of Egypt's rearmament.

Rafael believes that only two factors could convince the Egyptians to enter upon negotiations with Israel:

1. External pressure, especially on the part of the United States.

2. The desire to be free of obligations towards the refugees and of maintaining the Gaza Strip area in order to be free to deal with other problems in their country and in Africa.

This second reason was alluded to in the talk with Mun'im. When the Israeli representatives hinted that there was a possibility of negotiating for an arrangement limited in duration and scope of issues, they had the impression that he was interested in details of the proposal.

Despite all his doubts concerning the possibility of excluding the border issue and the refugee problem from the negotiations, Rafael nevertheless wishes to formulate a proposal for a limited negotiations agenda:

1. Endorsement of the existing territorial status for a limited period of time (5 years).

2. Non-aggression pact based on the armistice agreement.

3. A non-intervention pact (i.e. a guarantee on Egypt's part to abstain from intervening in Palestinian affairs).

4. A common effort to solve the refugee problem on the lines of an internationally approved and executed plan.

5. Regional economic cooperation (establishment of the U.N. Economic Commission for the Middle East).[4]

These are only general outlines and Rafael requests clarifications and instructions to enable him to guide matters within the Commission and outside it.[5]

Notes

1. See No. 118 etc.
2. See No. 125.
3. No. 115.
4. See Vol. 2, Nos. 352 and 357.
5. See No. 129.

120. A. Eban (Geneva) to A. Lourie (New York) and E. Elath (Washington). 2 March 1950

Notes

1. Benjamin Gerig, Chief of the Division of Dependent Areas Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Deputy Representative on the Trusteeship Council.

121. M. Namir (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 March 1950

Coded Tel. 411; Recd: 3 March; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Namir refers to publications in the Soviet press concerning Israel, as he had reported in telegram No. 1019.[1] The previous day Arie Levavi visited

Shchiborin, Assistant Director of the Near East Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and protested against the publications, which depicted Israel in a negative light. He dwelt in particular on Lutski's article in the periodical *Problems of Economy* and on Tishin's article in *New Times.* Shchiborin made no attempt to refute these accusations, but presented counter-charges against the Israeli press which, he claimed, was full of acrimonious anti-Soviet criticism, including false charges against personalities such as Yershov and Fedorin.[2] Levavi replied that the Israeli press, in contrast to the "Tass" Agency, does not make a point of collecting and publishing only the negative aspects; in case of particularly vehement personal attacks, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would see what could be done in the matter.

An additional anti-Israel article, by Zewyagin,[4] appeared after the meeting.

If there is no change for the better, Namir will take up the subject at his next meeting with Maksimov.[5]

Allegations of anti-Semitism in the United States have lately appeared in the local press; their denigration of Israel is presumably intended for internal consumption in order to discredit Israel in the eyes of Soviet Jewry.

Notes

1. Untraced, but from Levavi's report on his talk with Shchiborin (see n. 3 below) it would appear that the telegram dealt with reports in the Soviet press on Israel, and especially with the articles by Lutski and Tishin (spelling uncertain). Lutski's story, which had appeared in the periodical *Problems of Economy,* accused Israel of being a tool of the imperialist powers, of being about to join a Middle East pact of an aggressive character, of having included in the loan agreement with the Export–Import Bank of the United States secret articles unknown to the public and even to the Knesset, and of using this loan mainly for constructing strategic lines of communication connected with American plans of aggression. Tishin's article, which had appeared in *Novoye Vremya (New Times),* referred to the demonstrations which had taken place in Israel during Morgenthau's visit (see No. 39); Israel was described there as "neutral" in inverted commas, and was said to have demonstrated again her subservience to the imperialists.
2. Mitrofan Fedorin, Second Secretary in the Soviet Legation in Israel.
3. See Levavi's conversation with Shchiborin, 1.3.1950, 130.11/2503/12.
4. Zewyagin's (spelling uncertain) article also appeared in *Novoye Vremya.* Its theme was: the imperialistic rivalry between Britain and the United States in the Middle East. Israel was referred to in connection with the loan from the Export–Import Bank and with Morgenthau's visit. (See telegram from the Israeli Legation in Moscow to the Foreign Ministry, ZM1016, 1 March 1950, 130.11/2503/12.)
5. Maksimov, a senior officer in the Middle East Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry.

122. Bureau of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 3 March 1950

Notes

1. See No. 112, n. 1. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, the Jordanian Prime Minister, handed in his resignation to the King on 2 March 1950; several days later, after Samir al-Rifa'i had taken steps to form a government, Abu al-Huda withdrew his resignation and formed a new cabinet. See Nos. 126 and 130.

123. A. Eban (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 3 March 1950

Copy: 93.08/347/20

Summary

1. In anticipation of the second reading of the Jerusalem Statute, it is possible to appraise quite accurately the prospects of this session. The sequence of events will presumably be as follows:

(a) The Council will draft a statute in accordance with the General Assembly resolution of 9 December 1949. It considers the drafting process an explicit and unavoidable duty. After this is completed, the Council will have two alternatives: to consider the statute as a strictly technical matter, i.e. to announce that the Council fulfilled its commitment by having drafted the statute, or to accord the statute a political character, i.e. to recommend that the statute be approved and implemented. In the first instance, the approval will meet with no opposition. In the second, a vote will be held and several members, including the U.S., Britain and the Dominican Republic, will most probably abstain.

(b) After formulation and approval of the statute, the document will be submitted to interested parties, who will be requested to offer comments and proposals. The Trusteeship Council will adjourn and reconvene in New York at the beginning of June. The idea of convening a special session of the General Assembly has been dropped.

(c) In June the Council will examine Israel and Jordan's responses. Should both countries be able to draw up a joint proposal which would take into consideration religious and international claims – at least the internationalization of the Holy Places – the U.S. would take the initiative to work out a solution based on that proposal, to be submitted to the General Assembly in September. If no agreement is reached – the Trusteeship Council will refer the issue to the Assembly in September, accompanied by a statement that, due to the opposition of the governments ruling in Jerusalem, it is unable to implement the 1949 resolution.

2. The above scheme developed following consultation between the Israeli representatives and the American delegation in Geneva, which had offered their collaboration to the Israelis.[1] It is supported also by Britain, Australia, New Zealand, the two Latin American countries and Belgium, and it is certain to win a majority, even if it is opposed by the Iraqi delegation.

3. Within the framework of this scheme, two other possibilities should be considered: First, the Belgian delegate's intention to introduce an amendment to the second section of the Jerusalem Statute, which defines the borders of the international zone. Its aim – to provide an opening for the realization of limited regional internationalization, which would include the Holy Places as well as part of the Israeli city adjoining the Old City. This proposal, which draws its inspiration from the Vatican, aroused

opposition and alarm in the Arab camp, which up to now had cooperated with the Church; should it be approved, the Arab delegations will oppose the statute as a whole. Second, the proposal to appoint a "Jerusalem governor", who should attempt to cope with the problems of implementation and notify the Council of his failure to do so in view of the parties' opposition. This idea has its supporters among the French delegation, but it should not yet be regarded as official French policy.[2]

4. The Israeli delegation supports the line of postponing the decision till the June session and from there – till the General Assembly's session. It is opposed to the notion of appointing a governor since such an appointment would complicate further the already existing legal and political tangle. As for the Belgian proposal (to convert the statute to a plan for limited regional internationalization), the delegation has avoided taking up a position, mainly because the details of the plan are not known. In general, Israel is encouraging the Council to be moderate and to refrain from far-reaching political actions.

5. The Arabs are taking up positions on the two extremes. On the one hand, there is Jordan's rejection even of the principle that the U.N. be responsible for the Holy Places, and on the other hand – the other Arab countries' refusal to consider any plan that falls short of complete internationalization. Since all the members of the Council are striving for some sort of compromise between these two extremes, the Arabs' stance is not particularly popular.

6. The Arabs' extremist attitude is helping Israel to ease the tension which had accumulated against her at the General Assembly's last session. Although there is no prospect of any political gains for Israel from this session, there is a possibility of clearing the atmosphere which had been more than slightly poisoned at Lake Success. The first indications of an improved atmosphere are already evident and it is clear that Israel's decision deprived the Arab representatives of the freedom of action and influence they had enjoyed. Israel's status also improved in contrast to the Jordanians' behaviour and attitude. The latter reject the entire principle of the U.N.'s responsibility for the Holy Places, and their laconic and extremist declarations at the Council made an unfavourable impression.

7. An additional factor in improving Israel's status is the inspection in detail now having been made of the Statute's provisions. The full draft was not available to those who voted at the Assembly, but now the members of the Council have had the possibility of familiarizing themselves with the statute and discovering the extent to which it is detached from the reality in Jerusalem and from any possibility of implementation.

8. A summary of the positions of the various delegations follows:

(a) *U.S.A.* The U.S. delegation had made a commitment to Israel to implement the scheme and procedure described in section 1 above. At the Council's sessions the American representative, Sayre, refrained from taking an explicit stand on the statute and he repeatedly stressed that the U.S.

Government, notwithstanding its opposition to the Assembly's resolution, was prepared to aid the Trusteeship Council's work as far as posssible. At first the American representative was mostly silent, which made an odd impression on the audience and led to his being reproved by the Council's president. Sayre then began taking a part in the debates, but mostly on marginal or technical issues. If it were possible to bring the American representative to restate the negative position his Government took at the Assembly on internationalization, Israel's position would be immeasurably improved. However, the Israeli representatives have not so far succeeded in moving Sayre to take any initiative. America's position is compounded of two factors: total certainty that the statute will be abortive, and particular care that this failure not be laid at the door of the U.S.A.

(b) *Britain.* The British representative has adopted an even more passive attitude than the American, but in the final analysis there is total identity between the positions of the two parties. It should be noted that both the U.S. and Britain are indifferent to the plan for limited regional internationalization proposed by Garreau and the Belgian representative, the reason being their desire to protect Jordan and Abdallah's standing in the Old City. The Americans and the British would prefer a functional regime which would not abolish the existing political regime in Jerusalem, the Jordanian rule in particular.

(c) *Belgium.* The Belgian representative, Ryckmans, appears at the Council's sessions as the representative of the Catholic Church, with which he acts in full collaboration. He has devoted much effort to having Section 2 of the statute amended in order to leave an opening for the establishment of international rule in a limited zone in Jerusalem, this in an attempt to save the entire statute from outright failure.

(d) *France.* The French delegation is taking a reserved position and does not, as a rule, take part in the discussions. Their misgivings regarding the possibility of implementing the statute are known, but they do not wish to be held responsible for the expected failure. On the other hand, certain circles in the Quai d'Orsay, headed by M. Parodi, have expressed their willingness to consult with Israel on working out a solution following the statute's failure.

(e) *Australia and New Zealand.* These follow the Americans, but their representatives show impatience at the present discussions, which they consider useless. They wish to end this stage as quickly as possible in order that all the parties, as well as the Trusteeship Council, could soon enter upon a more advanced stage in seeking a solution.

(f) *Argentina and the Dominican Republic* are collaborating in the drafting of the statute but show a tendency to adopt any compromise or moderate solution which would be submitted following rejection of the statute. Both maintain that, in the given circumstances, any solution must give expression, even if to a limited degree, to the principle of regional internationalization – in order to satisfy the Vatican. The Dominican rep-

resentative has reiterated his opposition to the internationalization statute and his decision to vote against it even at the formulation stage.

(g) *The Philippine representative* identifies totally with the Arab case. From the correspondence between Eban and General Romulo it appears that his position is not based on the directives of the Philippine Government and Romulo has promised to effect the necessary shift soon.[3]

(h) *China* also supports the Arab endeavours to oppose any deviation from the Assembly's resolution. In light of the anomalous relations between Israel and this regime, there is no possibility of influencing its position.

Summary

9. In the light of the existing situation, it appears that formulation of the statute will be the only practical outcome of this session. It is clear that the discussions in Geneva helped to strengthen the Council's misgivings regarding the statute's possible implementation. Israel's appearance was helpful because it weakened the tendency to regard Israel as the cause of non-realization of the statute. The delegates realized that there were two additional and no less decisive factors: Arab extremism which, on the one hand, is opposed to any compromise, and on the other, to any internationalization, and the nature of the statute itself, as a visionary and impractical plan. Nevertheless, a clash with the U.N. will be avoided only if Israel and Jordan reach an agreed solution which will take into consideration the U.N.'s basic interests.

10. Publication of the statute, following its endorsement, should be utilized for a campaign in the press and in political circles stressing its impracticability and lack of any element of political sense.

Notes

1. See No. 120.
2. See Eban to Sharett, telegram GN19, 23 February 1950, 130.09/2302/8.
3. See Eban to Romulo, head of the Philippine delegation to the U.N., 21 February 1950, 130.02/2443/6. Following this intervention, the Philippine delegation withdrew its support of the Arabs (see Eban to Shimoni, telegram GN45, 16 March 1950, 130.09/2302/8).

124. G. Rafael (Geneva) to W. Eytan. 3 March 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2441/2

Summary

Rafael summarizes the latest developments concerning the Conciliation Commission. The Commission's visit in Paris was of no special significance. Boisanger tried unsuccessfully to arrange a meeting of the Commission with Schuman and even with President Auriol.[1] Palmer commented that it became clear in Paris that Boisanger's intense activity was at his own

personal initiative and did not reflect the French Government's position.

The Commission is still seeking a basis or topic which could facilitate the opening of direct negotiations. Boisanger had submitted to Israel the Egyptian proposals (reported in telegram GN22),[2] adding that Mun'im considered them a basis for entering upon direct negotiations. In a conversation with Mun'im,[3] it appeared that this was not the case, and that he was convinced it was possible to deal with the proposals within the framework of the Mixed Armistice Commission. Again it turned out that Boisanger's excessive energy and lack of trustworthiness were impeding the Commission's progress. The Israeli representatives brought up the issue before the Americans, who said they were interested in finding a firm basis for the negotiations and were opposed to hasty measures.

The Americans are still in doubt whether Mun'im has the authority to negotiate with Israel directly. They believe the groundwork must be laid slowly and cautiously, and therefore support the idea of holding talks on unimportant topics, such as certain concessions for the Gaza refugees, reunification of families, and the basic formulas for compensation. They are increasingly aware of the need to clear up once and for all whether Egypt, and in her wake other Arab countries, are indeed interested in peace. However, Rafael feels that the Americans will not take any decisive measures until the results of the negotiations with Abdallah are known.

The Turkish representatives also doubt whether direct negotiations with Egypt are possible before the successful conclusion of the negotiations with Jordan. They say that Turkey is following the talks with great interest and is prepared to help the parties reach an agreement.

Rafael assumes that the political truce will continue until the negotiations with the Jordanians are resolved, when the general policy towards the Commission and towards Egypt in particular will have to be re-examined in view of the resulting situation. In his letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,[4] Rafael had raised several considerations in this matter which he believes were supported by the Political Division material[5] which he had not yet seen when writing the above-mentioned letter.

In the mean time the Commission must be kept busy with minor matters, and he therefore requests a reply to his questions and approval of his requests, for example in regard to reunification of families,[6] the response to the Survey Group report[7] and the information on the blocked accounts,[8] as well as to his letter of 16 November concerning the formulas for payment of compensation.[9]

Notes

1. Vincent Auriol, President of the French Republic.
2. No. 106.
3. See Nos. 115 and 125.
4. See No. 119.
5. These documents have not been traced.

No. 124 – Notes (continued)

6. The letter is in file 93.03/3061/3.
7. See No. 96.
8. The letter is in file 130.02/2441/12.
9. See Rafael to Eytan, 16 February 1950, 130.02/2447/9; see also No. 52 and n. 8 *ibid.* The Foreign Minister replied to Rafael as follows: in the matter of reunification of Arab families – the Foreign Minister is opposed to having anything said which could raise in some people the hope that Israel might formulate a broader definition of relatives permitted to return to Israel; regarding the Survey Mission – the Economic Division in the Foreign Ministry is drafting a reply on the lines suggested by Rafael; on compensation for abandoned property and on blocked accounts – a report on these matters is due shortly. (See Engel to Rafael, 13 March 1950, 93.03/3061/3.)

125. Meeting: A. Eban and G. Rafael – Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa (Geneva, 27 February 1950, Document dated 3 March 1950)

Report: 130.02/2447/9

Summary

Eban commenced by mentioning the background of the discussions in Lausanne between Sasson and Mun'im. In these talks Mun'im explained why Egypt was not eager to reach a final arrangement with Israel. He claimed that time was working for the Egyptians; Israel, on the other hand, needed a stable peace and a final settlement. In due course, outside factors, for instance the U.S., may force Israel to make concessions on issues such as the borders and the refugees. Mun'im confirmed that this indeed had been Egypt's stand during the previous year.[1]

Eban commented that the time had come to re-examine these assumptions. The tendency to put off a final arrangement has been the guiding line of Arab policy in recent years. In September 1947, following publication of UNSCOP's recommendations, Palestine Jewry's representatives appealed to Azzam Pasha and proposed an immediate arrangement, based on the Commission's partition map. Azzam then replied that the Jewish community in Palestine was not an independent factor and that the Arab world still believed in the possibility of its elimination.[2] An additional appeal following the U.N.'s partition resolution (Sasson's letter to Azzam)[3] was again rejected. The declaration of Israel's independence included an appeal to the Arab world – which was again ignored. On 1 August 1948, the Minister of Foreign Affairs requested the U.N. Mediator to transmit a request for direct contacts, but this appeal, too, was turned down.[4] Following the rejection of Israel's renewed appeal in September 1948[5] battles took place in the Negev which resulted in Egypt's loss of her military control in that region. In short – the Arabs omitted to take advantage of good opportunities to reach an agreement on terms more favourable to them than those obtainable today.

At present the Arabs are again procrastinating – this time waiting for Israel's economic collapse. This collapse will not eventuate. Israel has pos-

sibly arrived at the nadir of her economic difficulties, and in time the economy will stabilize, the rate of immigration will be adjusted to absorption capacity, and financial possibilities will be more extensive (here Eban mentioned the Anglo–Israeli agreement in London).[6] The present situation will ultimately crystallize, the world will become accustomed to the fact of Israel's existence and any attempt to change it will seem unrealistic and ludicrous.

Egypt's other calculations are also fallacious: Israel is viewing Egypt's rearmament with concern and her response is to increase military vigilance. The hope that the Americans will exert pressure on Israel, particularly with regard to the Negev and the refugees, is also utterly unbased. Up to now, this pressure has not succeeded in slashing even one acre from or introducing even one refugee into Israeli territory. Today this pressure has faded away and the Americans refuse to identify with any Arab demands on Israel. (At this point Mun'im nodded in open sorrow.) The stalemate in the relationship between Israel and the Arabs is harmful to the entire Middle East. It prevents the receipt of foreign aid and excludes the area from America's development plans. Due to the increasingly grave international situation, the Israeli–Arab peace settlement should not be regarded as a one-sided Israeli affair, but rather as being in the interests of the region and of benefit to all the countries of the Middle East.

Mun'im replied that he agreed with most of what was said. At the time, he was among those who were opposed to the war in Palestine. This war has proved a failure and it would be best to write off the Egyptian adventure in Palestine. He defines this war as an adventure because it had no roots in Egypt's own political needs. However, even if he now agrees to abolish the state of war, the problem is how to convince the Egyptian people, who are not discommoded by the present situation, that it is both necessary and worthwhile to move towards peace. It should be determined whether Egypt and Israel have a common basis for agreement.

Rafael replied that the principles to be negotiated on should be divided into urgent practical issues, such as the common border and the refugees, and long-term issues: restoration of free traffic, commercial and industrial cooperation, and a common stand on regional matters.

Mun'im pointed out that there was a misunderstanding regarding the meaning of the word "principles". This term should be interpreted as meaning more essential issues such as the territorial continuity of the Arab world. Restoration of this continuity in the southern Negev is the main objective of Egyptian policy. He insisted on a reply as to Israel's proposals and possible concessions.

Eban and Rafael answered that Israel could not make any commitments in advance with regard to concessions. If Egypt wishes to find out the limit of Israel's concessions – she should enter upon negotiations. They emphasized, however, that as regarded the southern Negev, and Eilat in particular, no Israeli Government would agree to any territorial concession there.

If such a concession is indeed vital to the Egyptians, it would be best not to begin negotiations at all. If Egypt is truly concerned about free traffic in the Arab world, then ways should be sought to ensure this freedom, but this without affecting Israel's absolute sovereignty in the Negev. Such arrangements do exist in the world in general, as for instance in Switzerland.

Mun'im reiterated his argument that as far as Egypt was concerned, the most disturbing issue was not Gaza, but the southern Negev. Possession of the Gaza Strip is no burden for Egypt as the U.N. provides for the refugees there who are an important political card in Egypt's hands. Therefore, he emphasized, Egypt can make do for a long time with the armistice arrangements. If Israel is interested in peace, she must pay the price, the price being territorial. Here Mun'im mentioned the protocol of May 12, 1949[7] and asked whether Israel was prepared to negotiate on that basis. Eban and Rafael's reply was an absolute negative and they emphasized that whoever imagines that Israel is prepared to negotiate on the basis of the 1947 partition is deluding himself. Here Mun'im commenced discussing various U.N. Assembly resolutions, but Eban observed that it was best not to argue about often contradictory resolutions, but to talk in real terms: territory, refugees, and lines of communication. Mun'im agreed and immediately raised the question of the southern Negev; Egypt is afraid of Israel and needs a buffer zone between herself and Israel. Rafael thereupon replied that the Sinai desert fulfilled this role in the past.

The conversation also included the subject of the Conciliation Commission. Mun'im expressed doubts concerning its efficacy. Egypt is cooperating with the Commission only as duty-bound. If there exists a basis for and a prospect of an agreement between Egypt and Israel, the two countries will find the right way and the suitable procedure either within the framework of the Commission or outside it. At this point Mun'im returned to the armistice issue. Egypt was content with this agreement and should it prove impossible to progress to a comprehensive peace agreement, this agreement, he believes, should be amplified and rendered permanent. Eban replied that it might be possible to find an interim stage between armistice and peace. Mun'im appeared interested in this idea and proposed to maintain contacts on this subject in the future as well.

The problem of Jerusalem was not explicitly mentioned in the course of the conversation. Mun'im does no longer attend meetings of the Trusteeship Council. It would seem that he no longer believes that any benefit will accrue to the Arab world from this subject.

Mun'im concluded by saying that the talk should be considered as a preamble to more detailed discussions.

Notes

1. On the talks with Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa in Lausanne in Summer 1949, see Vol. 4, No. 48 etc.
2. On the talk between Eban, Horowitz and Azzam Pasha in London, see D. Horowitz, *State in the Making*, pp. 231–5.

No. 125 – Notes (continued)

3. See *Documents, December 1947–May 1948*, No. 14.
4. See Vol. I, No. 406.
5. *Ibid.*, No. 541.
6. See No. 148.
7. See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 20–21.

126. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Geneva). 5 March 1950

Notes

1. Eban had suggested "mobilizing American persuasion" to induce Jordan to sign the draft agreement with Israel. He had also informed Sharett that, according to Stabler, the Jordanian Government had accepted the draft as a "basis for disscussion". (See Eban to Sharett, GN30, 3 March 1950, 130.09/2302/8.)
2. See No. 112.
3. See No. 130.

127. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 5 March 1950

Notes

1. See No. 126.

128. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 5 March 1950

Notes

1. The exit permit was given on 9 February 1950, when the Iraqi Parliament enacted a law designed to permit emigration to those Jews who relinquished their Iraqi citizenship. Even before that, some 10,000 Jews had succeeded in leaving Iraq by way of Iran.
2. Enzo Sereni was a *Hagana* emissary in Iraq in the years 1942–3; he organized the first cells of the Jewish underground there.
3. See Vol. 4, No. 382.
4. See *ibid.*, No. 436. On 14 February 1950 the Iranian Prime Minister published a statement allowing refugees transit through his country (for the text of the statement, see file 130.15/2563/10).
5. See No. 136.

129. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban and G. Rafael (Geneva). 6 March 1950

Orig.: 93.03/3043/5

Summary

Sharett refers to the exchange of telegrams between them: telegram No. 28

from Eban and Rafael,[1] and his telegram No. 36.[2] Eban and Rafael's telegram astonished him greatly and apparently his telegram (No. 28) had not been correctly understood by them. He wishes once again to clarify his position.

He realizes that any negotiations between Israel and Egypt must touch upon the issue of the fate of the Gaza Strip and the future of the refugees. His opposition is only that negotiations with Egypt would be reduced to the question of the Gaza Strip and the refugees and this in effect was the proposal presented in Rafael's telegram (No. 22)[3] and this is what he had been opposed to and warned against in telegram No. 36. However, in this telegram he had proposed comprehensive negotiations, even if they were oriented towards an interim arrangement of less than absolute peace (as for example a non-aggression pact) and within the framework of such negotiations it would be possible to discuss also the overall question of the Gaza Strip and the refugees.

Sharett admits that at this moment he indeed does not see any possibility of reaching an arrangement with the Egyptians which would be conditional upon returning the Gaza Strip and all its refugees to Israel. Therefore any demand for negotiations on these issues only is meant to lead to a dead end. On the other hand, comprehensive negotiations may lead to progress in many areas. Therefore he asks to seize upon the consent expressed by the Egyptian representative in a conversation with Jon Kimche[4] and which he alluded to again in his talk with Eban and Rafael, and to open negotiations for a non-aggression pact as an interim stage towards peace. In such negotiations it is possible, at least theoretically, to come to an agreement about determining the borders of the Sinai peninsula or about leaving the existing *status quo* as pertains to borders until a final solution is found, as well as to reinforce the armistice agreement by an additional mutual non-aggression pact and perhaps also commence commercial and navigational ties — leaving open the question of Gaza and the refugees.

Sharett then criticizes Eban and Rafael's stand that if Israel is not prepared to accept the Strip and its refugees, then it would be advisable for her to stop calling for direct peace talks with the Egyptians. This argument is illogical. Israel insisted on and demanded direct negotiations at a time when the Arab countries stipulated different and stricter terms, such as *en masse* return of the refugees, or returning to the borders of 29 November. Notwithstanding and even though it did not occur to Israel to accept such terms, she continued to call for direct negotiations.

In addition, as understood by Eban and Rafael, there are practical difficulties involved in the possible absorption of the Gaza Strip refugees. There is no place to settle these refugees who number 210,000 and they would increase the Arab minority to 450,000, thereby jeopardizing the State of Israel. In summary, absorption of the Gaza Strip refugees is not at all feasible and it would be best not to entertain any illusions about this matter.

Notes

1. No. 118.
2. No. 108.
3. No. 106.
4. "Radak" — cryptonym for journalist Jon Kimche, based on Hebrew acronym; see No. 108 and n. 2 *ibid.*, see also No. 125.
5. See No. 125.

130. Meeting: R. Shiloah and M. Dayan – King Abdallah (Shune, 7 March 1950)

Report: 130.02/2453/2

Summary

This meeting had been postponed twice because of government crises in Jordan.[2] It was held, as in the past, at the King's palace in Shune. The Israeli representatives were received by the King and two of his ministers. The King, with solemn demeanour, opened by saying that he hoped this meeting would end in an agreement. Unfortunately, due to many obstacles, both internal and external, he was forced to slow the pace of the negotiations. This time there were no more differences of opinion between him and his Government and he asks Fawzi al-Mulqi to present the declaration.

Following is the text of Fawzi al-Mulqi's declaration:

At the last meeting I made clear to you our decision to find an arrangement that would benefit both countries. Certainly you must have observed that the plan, a copy of which I gave you at that same meeting, did not deviate either in general or in particular from what had been proposed by His Majesty, the Hashemite King, in those paragraphs, copies of which both you and we possess. The subject omitted at that time was economic and commercial cooperation, and this is because the legal situation and reality prevent its implementation at this moment, until all existing obstacles have been removed. This is our opinion, based on His Royal Highness' orders and instructions. The situation now is the same as before. However, something new has arisen, i.e. intrigues and lies our adversaries have spread around regarding our intentions and objectives. And since elections are being held at this time, we do not consider it wise or advantageous, in this atmosphere full of intrigues, to take any steps which would redound to our enemies' benefit. We believe, therefore, that the proper course would be to postpone deliberations until after the elections and to regard this respite as an intermission and not a severance. We trust that then (after the elections) there will be a renewal of contacts in the same spirit and with the same purpose as we have shown in the past, and which I now reaffirm.[3]

Notes

1. Shaul Bar-Haim, Director of the Arabic programmes in the Voice of Israel.
2. See Nos. 112 and 126.
3. See No. 134.

131. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Eliash (London). 7 March 1950

Notes

1. See No. 130.
2. A similar telegram was sent to Elath in Washington (in file 130.09/2308/16).

132. A. Lourie (New York) to M. Sharett. 7 March 1950

Notes

1. See No. 21.
2. See Entezam to Eban, 7 March 1950, 130.02/2391/4.

133. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 8 March 1950

Orig.: 130.11/2541/1

Summary

Sharett writes of the tragedy of Soviet Jewry and of Israel's inability to do anything in the matter. When he attended the U.N. Assembly in New York, he tried to meet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky, but the Russian delegation put off the meeting on various pretexts. They were apparently apprehensive that Sharett intended to attack them for their stand on the Jerusalem question. As it turned out, Vyshinsky left New York suddenly and the meeting did not take place.

[.....][1]

In the mean time Namir's report arrived from Moscow, causing consternation and frustration, particularly due to the fact that there was nothing Israel could do.[2] Even in Iraq, a backward country under despotic rule, Israel was able to act underground to arouse the local Jewry, who have now been allowed to leave.[3] In Russia there is not even the possibility of being able to follow the events with any degree of certainty.

From time to time the thought springs to mind of going to Moscow in order to meet with the Soviet Government's highest echelon. As against this notion is the gnawing doubt that the meeting will not take place, and if it does — will have no results except to worsen Israel's relations with the West.

Notes

1. Two paragraphs have been omitted here.
2. The report has not been traced, but see Vol. 4, Nos. 324 and 344; see also No. 87 in this volume.
3. See No. 128.

134. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 9 March 1950

Notes

1. See No. 130.

135. E. Elath (Washington) to the United States Division. 9 March 1950

Notes

1. No. 127.
2. Sharett to Elath, telegram of 7 March 1950, 93.01/2308/16 – identical with No. 131.
3. Sharett to Elath, 9 March 1950, 130.09/2308/12. Sharett expressed his fears that failure of the talks with Jordan would affect adversly the U.S. stand at the Trusteeship Council. There had been no differences with Jordan on the Holy Places during the talks, and towards the end the Jordanian Government had signified its readiness to accept U.N. supervision of these sites in addition to a direct accord with Israel guaranteeing their safety and free access for all. Elath should explain this to the State Department and urge them to accept this fact as the basis for the settlement of the Jerusalem issue.
4. No. 110.
5. No. 111.
6. On 7 and 8 March the Knesset continued its debate on the second reading of the Abandoned Properties Bill, 1950. Article 8 of this bill dealt with the Custodian's right to sell or to lease property in his custody. (See *Divrei Ha'Knesset* [Knesset Reports], Second Session of the First Knesset, Vol. IV, pp. 911–21.)

136. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 12 March 1950

Notes

1. See No. 128.
2. See Sharett to Rafael, NG64, 9 March 1950, 130.09/2302/7.
3. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Jr., jurist, member of the U.S. House of Representatives.
4. Giora Josephthal, Director of the Jewish Agency's Department of Absorption.

137. A. Eban (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 13 March 1950

Notes

1. Reference is to the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees.
2. See Vol. 4, No. 220.
3. See *ibid.*, No. 372.
4. Sharett's reply was presumably dispatched in clear and has not been traced. From a later telegram it would appear that he thought it preferable not to initiate a substantive debate on various controversial subjects so as not to enable the Arabs to evade the main issue – direct negotiations. (See Sharett to Eban, telegram NG79, 24 March 1950, 130.09/2302/7.)

138. Y. Shimoni [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan. 13 March 1950

Copy: 130.02/2414/8

Summary

Shimoni refers to relations between Israel and Indonesia. The Indonesian Foreign Minister cordially responded to Israel's recognition of his country.[1] In view of this reaction, the tactics to be used in applying to the Indonesians should be considered with regard to Israel's intentions as to the future ties with Indonesia.

Shimoni proposes the establishment of a full Legation in Indonesia. Although he had omitted this country when submitting the first plan for the ties between Israel and the Asian countries, the situation has now changed and there are many reasons for establishing ties with Indonesia:

(1) India's vexing temporization in establishing diplomatic ties with Israel.

(2) The fact that Indonesia is a Moslem country and the establishment of an Israel Legation there would have great political influence.

(3) The increasing importance of the Far East in world politics.

(4) The fact that Indonesia is a large and densely populated country whose political weight is bound to increase in the future.

(5) Indonesia's economic importance as a source of raw materials for Israel and as an export market.

Shimoni is apprehensive of a direct appeal by Israel to Indonesia to establish a Legation resulting in a negative or evasive answer. He suggests therefore to propose a visit of a "goodwill mission", which appeal would be difficult to reject.[2] A mission of this nature could visit Burma as well.

Notes

1. Muhammed Hatta, the Indonesian Premier and Foreign Minister, has sent Sharett a note of thanks for Israel's recognition of Indonesia (13 January 1950, 130.02/2414/8).
2. Sharett wrote to Hatta on the lines suggested by Shimoni (see Sharett to Hatta, 22 March 1950, 130.02/2414/8). Hatta expressed his thanks for the proposal but requested that the visit of the goodwill mission be postponed to a later date (6 May 1950, *ibid.*). See No. 313.

139. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 16 March 1950

Notes

1. Reference is to an exchange of telegrams on the possible visit to Israel of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General J.L. Collins. Collins was about to leave on an extended tour to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the Americans were sounding Israel on the possibility of its inclusion in his itinerary. Sharett opposed the proposed visit, arguing that it would be devoid of any practical results and would only arouse undesirable internal repercussions and put in question Israel's international policy. Shaul Avigur, Deputy Minister of Defence, also opposed the visit, because he thought it would adversely affect the relations with the Eastern bloc and endanger *aliya* from these countries. (See Sharett to Elath, IW518, 15 March 1950, 130.09/2308/12; IW520, 16 March 1950, 130.09/2308/17.)

No. 139 – Notes (continued)

2. General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces.
3. Rav-Aluf Yigael Yadin, Chief of the General Staff.
4. Emanuel Avidor, Acting Military Attaché in the Israeli Embassy in Washington, May–April 1950.
5. Elath changed his mind later when it turned out that Collins intended to visit only those Middle East countries which had installations and missions of the U.S. armed forces (see Elath to Sharett, 22 March 1950, 130.09/2308/17).

140. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 16 March 1950

Notes

1. No. 136.
2. Nahum Goldmann, member of the Jewish Agency Executive and its representative in the U.S., Chairman of the World Jewish Congress Executive.
3. Abba P. Schwartz, senior official in the International Refugee Organization of the U.N.
4. Seymour Rubin, jurist, Adviser on Foreign Affairs of the American Jewish Committee.
5. David Ginsburg, American jurist.
6. General Lucius D. Clay, formerly (1947–49) Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. forces in Europe and Military Governor of the U.S. zone of Germany.
7. Owen Josephus Roberts, formerly (1930–45) Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
8. Robert P. Patterson, formerly (1945–47) U.S. Secretary of War.
9. Following further consultations and deliberations, Elath cabled that it was definately desirable to request the intervention of the Quakers or some other Christian organization. If this is met with refusal – a private person should be approached, to act under the aegis of a non-Jewish charitable organization. The negotiations should be handled by the Joint Distribution Committee. In the last resort the State Department be approached, but this also should be done by the J.D.C. (See Elath to Sharett, W828, 20 March 1950, 130.09/2308/17.)

141. G. Landauer[1] to M. Sharett. 17 March 1950

Copy: 130.02/2417/1

Summary

Landauer describes the mounting difficulties in the negotiations on Israel's claims from Germany. He is sending him newspaper clippings purporting to show that there are already fairly large organizations in Germany working for non-restitution of Jewish property; that from time to time there are proposals in the local German parliaments calling to put a stop to the restitution of property; that daily one comes up against an increasingly reserved attitude on the part of the German authorities in handling problems related to restitution of property.[2] The occupation authorities also do not approve of these actions.

Landauer therefore suggests to open direct negotiations with the German Government as soon as possible. He believes a representative of the Israeli Government should leave for Bonn no later than the following week.

Notes

1. Georg Landauer, Director of the Jewish Agency Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews, member of the Commission on Claims and Reparations from Germany.
2. The press clippings (on file) have not been printed here.
3. Sharett replied that what had already been decided should now be implemented with no delay, that is – to enter on preliminary negotiations with the Germans in the name of the Government and not to rely on private unauthorized persons (see Sharett to Kaplan, 21 March 1950, 130.02/2417/1).

142. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to E. Kaplan. 19 March 1950

Copy: 130.02/2395/12

Summary

Sharett draws Kaplan's attention to the details of the conversation which took place in Geneva between Eban and Rafael, and the Egyptian representative, Abd al-Mun'im.[1] It appears from this talk that the Egyptians persist in their demand to annex the southern part of the Negev, in particular the city of Eilat, in order to ensure the territorial continuity of the Arab world. There is no doubt that if serious negotiations ever open between Israel and Egypt, this claim will be presented. As both Britain and the United States will be involved in such negotiations, there is some apprehension lest Israel will have to face joint pressure on the part of these countries to make concessions regarding Eilat.

In view of the situation, everything possible must be done to reinforce Israel's hold of the southern Negev. The more Israel increases her settlement, communications and development efforts in this area, the more difficult will it be for the other side to demand its cession. Sharett wishes Kaplan to share his concern regarding this matter and also asks him to allot a sum of IL30,000 for pipes to supply water to Eilat. If this sum is not allotted now, the pipes may no longer be available.

Notes

1. See No. 125.

143. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to E. Elath (Washington). 19 March 1950

Orig.: 93.08/370/29

Summary

Sharett refers to the matter of Israel's recognition by India. He has read Elath's[1] memorandum on Das's[2] talk with B.R. Sen[3] on the delay in extending this recognition,[4] and has already come to terms with the fact that it will not take place in the near future; India's initiative should be

patiently awaited. However, in view of the fact that several Asian countries have recently recognized Israel, he asks Elath's opinion as to whether it might be worthwhile to request Das to raise again the question of the recognition with Sen.

Notes

1. See Elath to the United States Division, 3 March 1950, 130.02/2391/31.
2. Taraknath Das, Indian author and educator, Professor of Public Affairs, New York University.
3. Binay Ranjan Sen, Indian Diplomat, Chargé d'Affaires and Minister in Washington, until March 1950.
4. See Vol. 4, No. 342.

144. A. Eban (Geneva) to M. Sharett and W. Eytan. 21 March 1950

Copy: 93.03/3061/3

Summary

1. The convention of the Trusteeship Council is about to end and he will then return to New York where he is expected to discharge previous commitments and to aid the United Jewish Appeal.

2. It is obvious that the political truce will be a short-lived one and that in June there will be a crisis over Jerusalem. Until then efforts should be made to fulfil America's request, with which their ability to support Israel is bound, to achieve a comprehensive agreement with Jordan. If this proves impossible, an agreement regarding Jerusalem should at least be reached. If this, too, cannot be accomplished, the idea of a small enclave must be seriously considered; even if this is not implemented, due to Jordanian opposition, it would at least remove from Israel the onus of religious and international hostility and pass it on to the Jordanians.

3. The convention of the U.N. Assembly in New York will enable Israel to enlist prominent local elements in her aid and also to pressure the U.S. to more responsible action.

4. Activity in the Latin American countries should be stepped up. If his proposal to invite Moshe Tov to take part in consultations at the Foreign Ministry in Tel Aviv is not adopted,[2] at least his proposed Latin American tour must be approved.

5. The Israeli delegation to the U.N. must be reinforced and reorganized before the June and autumn assemblies. For this it is necessary that Gideon Rafael return to New York. He did an excellent job in Geneva with both the Trusteeship Council and the Conciliation Commission, but now that the tension in the work of both these bodies has lessened, there is no need for a special bureau near them. If genuine negotiations with the Arabs begin in Geneva, it will be necessary to send a special envoy from the Foreign Ministry for this purpose. However, the present state of affairs does not call for Rafael to remain in Geneva.

Notes

1. Henry Montor, Director of the United Jewish Appeal in the United States.
2. Eban had proposed calling Tov for consultations at the Foreign Ministry in connection with the proposed activities in the Latin American countries (see Eban to Eytan, 21 March 1950,

145. C. de Boisanger (Geneva) to G. Rafael (Geneva). 21 March 1950

Notes

1. See No. 114, n. 2.
2. No. 114.
3. See No. 146.

146. G. Rafael (Geneva) to C. de Boisanger (Geneva). 23 March 1950

Notes

1. No. 145.
2. No. 114, n. 2.
3. No. 114.
4. See No. 158, Appendix 1.

147. M.R. Kidron (London) to M. Comay. 23 March 1950

Notes

1. Mordecai Eliash, the Israeli Minister to Britain, passed away in London on 12 March.
2. Untraced, but see No. 77.
3. The phrasing of this sentence in Kidron's report later aroused a controversy – see No. 202.
4. For a full report of the conversation, see file 130.13/2587/9.

148. D. Horowitz (London) to E. Kaplan and M. Sharett. 26 March 1950

149. A. Eban (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 27 March 1950

Notes

1. Eban had dwelt on the necessity of influencing Argentina and the Philippines to abstain in the vote on the Jerusalem Statute: the more numerous the abstentions, the smaller would be the Statute's authority (see Eban to Eytan, 24 March 1950, 130.09/2302/8).

150. The Israel Legation in Buenos Aires to A. Lourie (New York). 27 March 1950

Notes

1. Hipolito Paz, the Argentine Foreign Minister.
2. For full report of the conversation, see 130.02/2443/7.

151. M. Keren (Washington) to M. Sharett. 27 March 1950

Notes

1. Sharett had given Elath information on Rafael's talk with John Kingsley, the Director-General of the I.R.O. Kingsley was eager for his organization to be active in the emigration of the Iraqi Jews, but he wanted first to obtain the consent of the U.S., Britain and France. If this were forthcoming, he would be ready to name a candidate to be chosen by Israel to represent the I.R.O. (See Sharett to Elath, 27 March 1950, 93.01/2202/8.)
2. George Lewis Warren, the U.S. Representative in the I.R.O.
3. Moses A. Leavitt, Executive Vice-Chairman of the American Joint Distribution Committee.
4. Following further inquiries, Warren informed Keren that there was no prospect of the J.D.C. being permitted to operate in Iraq (see Keren to Sharett, W850, 27 March 1950, 130.09/2308/17). See also No. 175.

152. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Geneva). 28 March 1950

Notes

1. Eban immediately replied in the affirmative, but advised to tone down somewhat the opening sentences of the proposed invitation (see Eban to Sharett, telegram UN95, 28 March 1950, 130.09/2302/7).
2. The draft of the invitation was endorsed by a majority in the Government, some of the ministers voicing their apprehension that the invitation might be construed as readiness on Israel's part for additional concessions (see Sharett to Eban, NG87, 30 March 1950, 130.09/2302/70). For the final version sent to the members of the Trusteeship Council, see No. 168.

153. A. Eban (Geneva) to A. Lourie (New York) and E. Elath (Washington). 28 March 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 108.
2. See No. 154.
3. In a personal letter to Lourie, Eban criticized the way Elath had handled the Jerusalem issue, which he contended was routine and unimaginative, his approaches being confined to the lower echelons of the Administration in Washington. Eban thought senior officials in the White House should have been involved in this issue. (The letter, dated 28 March 1950, is filed under 93.03/64/7.)

154. A. Eban (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 28 March 1950

Notes

1. See No. 156.

155. Meeting: N. Goldmann – D. Acheson (Washington, 28 March 1950)

Notes

1. See No. 106.
2. See No. 84 and n. 2 *ibid.*
3. Abba Hillel Silver, American Zionist leader, former Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency Executive.
4. For Goldmann's talk with Acheson in Summer 1946, see *FRUS*, 1946, VII, pp. 679–82.
5. On the situation at the Trusteeship Council, see Editorial Note, p. 108, and also No. 153.
6. See No. 153.

156. G. Rafael (Geneva) to W. Eytan. 29 March 1950

Copy: 130.02/2445/1

Summary

Rafael encloses a copy of the Conciliation Commission's memorandum, a copy of Boisanger's letter concerning the Egyptian proposals regarding the refugees in the Gaza Strip, and the correspondence between the Conciliation Commission and the Egyptian delegation on this issue.

While delivering the memorandum, Boisanger made the following statement: The Conciliation Commission requests that the memorandum be transmitted to the Israeli Government for close perusal. The Commission does not expect a prompt reply, while hoping that Israel will agree to the procedure proposed in the memorandum for opening direct negotiations. The Commission request that the memorandum be kept confidential for the time being. The Chairman of the Commission is planning to visit the Middle East for negotiations with countries in the region, including Israel.

Rafael replied that he would transmit the memorandum to his government. In the mean time he mentioned that Israel was concerned about the situation in the Middle East, affected as it is by the refusal of most of the Arab countries to negotiate and by their accelerated rearmament. Israel is about to submit a memorandum to the Commission on this matter, which, however, should not be considered as a reply to the Conciliation Commission's memorandum. Israel hopes the Arab countries will send qualified representatives authorized to carry on negotiations for peace to the next stage of the discussions.

From all the above it is clear that there is no urgency in replying to the Conciliation Commission's memorandum and to their latest letter concerning Gaza; the reply can wait until Rafael returns to Israel.

Notes

1. See No. 157.
2. See No. 158 and Appendices *ibid.*
3. See Nos. 106 and 114 ff.
4. No. 164.
5. See Eban to Sharett, UN102, 29 March 1950, 130.02/2441/2.

157. Memorandum of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. (Geneva, 29 March 1950)

Notes

1. See No. 156. A similar memorandum was delivered to the Eyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese and Syrian representatives.
2. See No. 54.
3. For Israel's reply, see No. 228.

158. C. de Boisanger (Geneva) to G. Rafael (Geneva). 29 March 1950

Notes

1. See No. 146.
2. See Appendix 1 below.
3. See Appendix 2 below.
4. The proposals had been submitted by Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa at a meeting between the Arab representatives and the Conciliation Commission in New York on 24 October 1949. The Egyptians had proposed that the original inhabitants of the Gaza Strip be permitted to cultivate those lands on the Israeli side of the border which were not cultivated by Israelis; that the original inhabitants of the no-man's-land between Israel and Egypt on the Gaza Strip border be permitted to return to their homes; and that the refugees from the Beersheba region be allowed to return and to work their lands. (See the U.S. Representative at the U.N. to the Secretary of State, 24 October, 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1450–1.)
5. See No. 157.

159. N. Goldmann to D. Acheson (Washington). 29 March 1950

Notes

1. See No. 155.

160. S. Ginossar (Rome) to W. Eytan. 29 March 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2443/7

Summary

Ginossar is dispatching this letter in the wake of Cerulli's visit. Cerulli, today Vice-President of the Oriente Moderno Institute, is half-scholar, half-politician, and is often independently active in the sphere of foreign policy. He is apparently utilized for unofficial missions. On this occasion, too, he defined his mission as being unofficial, but emphasized that he was speaking with full authority.

Cerulli raised two matters. First, he proposed Italian mediation in bringing together the Israeli and Egyptian representatives. Ginossar repeated Israel's stand on direct peace negotiations without mediation. Cerulli replied that the Italians had the same object in mind and that they only sought to help the parties to meet.

Subsequently he came to the main subject of his visit – the Jerusalem issue. Here he offered Italy's mediation between Israel and the Vatican. Ginossar replied that Israel did not have good experience in her contacts with the Vatican, which generally tended to question and interrogate without according any replies. Cerulli answered that he was not aware of any shift in the Vatican's attitude towards serious talks, but if such a change comes to his knowledge he will again get in touch.

Cerulli sought information on Israel's position on the Jerusalem issue. Ginossar gave the usual exposition and also referred to Israel's official proposal: a covenant between the U.N. and Israel. He also mentioned other possibilities which might be considered, such as extraterritoriality for the Holy Places and a small international zone. Cerulli asked whether the idea of extraterritoriality also included places outside Jerusalem to which Ginossar replied that mainly Jerusalem was intended here, and that it was not advisable to create many extraterritorial domains, but he also mentioned in this context the Church of the Annunciation in Nazareth. Ginossar complained that Israel was constantly required to submit answers and proposals while no one came to Israel with concrete proposals acceptable to other parties.

Ginossar's conclusions from the meeting are as follows:

1. Someone in the Italian Government is trying his hand at mediation, perhaps at Zoppi's or even De Gasperi's initiative.
2. His impression is that the Italians have not yet approached Egypt and that they first attempted to sound out Israel.
3. From Cerulli's hints and other information, it would appear that the Vatican is probing in Israel's direction. Their object is probably only to maintain contacts and thus safeguard a favourable attitude towards the Church and its institutions in Israel without entering upon real negotiations – a ploy used by them in the past; the fact that they have involved the Italian Government in the matter makes unlikely any possibility of a more serious intention.
4. Apparently Garreau's visit, announced by Cerulli, is also connected with the Italian initiative and he may possibly intend to go along with the Italians.

Ginossar ends by asking for instructions on how to act if these contacts are renewed.

Notes

1. Shlomo Ginossar, the Israeli Minister to Italy.
2. Dan Avni (Segré), Attaché in the Israeli Legation in Rome.
3. Avraham Kidron, Attaché in the Israeli Legation in Rome.
4. Mohamed Amin Rostem Bey, the Egyptian observer on the Trusteeship Council.
5. See Nos. 115 and 125.
6. Gastone Guidotti, Director-General of the Political Department in the Italian Foreign Ministry.

No. 160 – Notes (continued)

7. Benzion Kadury, Counsellor in the Israeli Legation in Rome.
8. Alcide de Gasperi, the Italian Prime Minister.
9. Ginossar had met de Gasperi on 23 February. Their conversation turned mainly on Italy's refusal to sell to Israel armoured halftracks from the U.S. army surpluses in Italy; they also had a non-committal exchange of views on the Jerusalem issue. (For full report of the conversation, see Ginossar to Eytan, [23] February 1950, 130.10/2515/5.)
10. Filippo Naldi, Italian journalist and editor, a former aquaintance of Weizmann, was then active in sounding out the parties and attempting to mediate between Israel and the Vatican (see Ginossar to Eytan, 29 March 1950, 130.10/2523/17.)
11. See n. 10 above.
12. On Herzog's talks at Rome, see Vol. 4, No. 434.

161. M.R. Kidron (London) to M. Comay. 29 March 1950

Notes

1. See No. 147; Kidron to Comay, 27 March 1950, 130.13/2587/9.
2. Anthony Eden, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Conservative Party.
3. See No. 49.
4. Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister.
5. Herbert Morrison, Vice Premier, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons.
6. Kenneth Younger, Minister of State in the British Foreign Office.
7. Comay disagreed with Kidron's conclusions. He thought a new Minister to Britian and also a military attaché should be appointed with no delay, in order to improve relations. (See Comay to Kidron, 5 April 1950, 130.02/2412/26.)
8. Sharett summoned Helm, the British Minister, on 30 March and expressed harsh criticism of Britain's policy of arms supply and of Bevin's speech in the House of Commons (see Comay to the Israeli Legation in London, IL519, 31 March 1950, 130.09/2318/3).

162. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 30 March 1950

Notes

1. A session of the Arab League took place in Cairo at the end of March and the beginning of April. It was marked by intense opposition to King Abdallah's efforts to arrive at a separate settlement with Israel. The session concluded with a resolution prohibiting the member states from conducting negotiations with Israel on a separate peace or any other settlement and threatening violators with heavy penalties, including expulsion from the League.
2. At their meeting with Rockwell, the Israeli representatives had raised the question of the Arab League conference and obtained assurances that the U.S. representatives in the Arab states were exerting a moderating influence (see Keren to the United States Division, 28 March 1950, W851, 93.01/2202/8).
3. See No. 172.

163. *Note Verbale* by the Government of Israel. ([Tel Aviv], 31 March 1950)

Notes

1. Delivered to the U.S., British, French, Argentine, Australian and Belgian representatives in Israel.

164. Memorandum to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. ([Tel Aviv], 31 March 1950)

Notes

1. See No. 156.
2. This was said at one of the opening meetings of the Conciliation Commission and at a press conference on 30 April 1949 – see Vol. 2, Nos. 517 and 523.
3. See Vol. 4, No. 162.
4. See No. 54.
5. See No. 63 and n. 9 *ibid.*
6. See No. 84.
7. See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 20–21.
8. See *ibid.*, No. 249.
9. See No. 63 and n. 9 *ibid.*
10. See Vol. 4, No. 265.
11. On this see No. 125.

165. A. Eban and G. Rafael (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 31 March 1950

Notes

1. No. 164.
2. Eban had estimated that the Conciliation Commission would oppose making public the memorandum out of fear that this would hamper negotiations with the Arabs, who might claim that the contacts were initiated under pressure of the Israeli memorandum (see Eban to Sharett, 21 March 1950, 130.09/2302/8). The Commission did indeed react in the predicted manner (see Boisanger to Eban, 3 April 1950, 130.02/2441/3).
3. No. 157.

166. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 31 March 1950

Notes

1. Alexandre Parodi, Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry.
2. Vincent Broustrat, Senior Secretary in the French Foreign Ministry. Secretary-General of the French delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.
3. The second part of the letter has been omitted here.

167. E. Halevy (Bucharest) to S. Eliashiv. 31 March 1950

Orig.: 130.11/2503/1

Summary

Halevy reports on the situation of emigration from Rumania. In March 1,700 persons emigrated, April began with the departure of 900 persons. As far as he can tell, a monthly *aliya* of 1,500–1,800 can be expected for a period of several and perhaps many months. However, it is not possible to say anything with certainty and there are some ominous indications: many

obstacles have lately been mounted in the way of submitting applications for *aliya,* and a large sector of close to 25,000 Rumanian citizens, hailing mainly from Bukovina and Bessarabia, which is unable to obtain certification of Rumanian citizenship, is prevented from applying for *aliya.* Halevy does not believe, as Sharett fears, that a maximum quota for emigration from Rumania has been established, but it is likely that the rate of exit has been determined in advance and that it is under pressure from various elements.

Notes

1. Eliashiv had requested detailed information on the immigrants from Rumania, from the aspects of age composition and degree of relationship with inhabitants of Israel, and in particular whether the Rumanians had set an upper limit to the number of emigrants to be allowed to leave (the letter is filed in 130.11/2514/8).
2. This concerned problems of accomodation of the Rumanian Legation in Israel (*ibid.*).
3. Untraced.
4. The enclosures are on file but have not been printed yet.
5. Several paragraphs, dealing with the arrest of Zionist activists in Rumania, have been omitted here.

168. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to O.C.W. Fuhrman (Tel Aviv). 3 April 1950

Notes

1. Osmond C.W. Fuhrman, the Australian Minister to Israel.
2. See No. 152.
3. Similar invitations were sent to the U.N. Secretary-General, the President of the Trusteeship Council, the Soviet Representative to the U.N., and the representatives of the member states on the Trusteeship Council (China and Syria excepted). The invitations were as a rule turned down and the visits did not take place. (See, e.g., McDonald to Sharett, 8 April 1950, 93.08/347/20.)

169. A. Eban (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 3 April 1950

Notes

1. See No. 162 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. No. 157.

170. A. Drapkin (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan. 3 April 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2413/24

Summary

Drapkin discusses Israel–Spain relations. In his opinion, it is essential to determine Israeli policy *vis-à-vis* Spain, to obviate future hasty last-minute decisions. Recent press reports on the possibility of Spain's recognition of Israel, and intensive Spanish propaganda recalling its kind treatment of

Jews during the World War would indicate one of two impending possibilities:

(a) Spain's unilateral recognition of Israel; or

(b) opening of negotiations between the two countries on mutual recognition.

Drapkin reviews Spain's relations with other countries, with the Jewish people and with the State of Israel, concludes that Spain's contention about its treatment of the Jews during the Second World War is well founded, and goes on to assess the implications of the two given alternatives.

Unilateral recognition by Spain would give Israel all the advantages of diplomatic relations without any concomitant obligations. Drapkin, however, thinks that this possibility is far less likely than negotiations on mutual recognition, which would accrue both advantages and disadvantages, as follows:

(a) Advantages –

(1) Spanish pressure on the Vatican for an acceptable solution of the Jerusalem issue;

(2) Similarly on the Jerusalem issue – favourable Spanish influence on some of the Latin American states;

(3) Accomodation in the field of competitive exports;

(4) Safeguards for the Jewish community in Spain and legalization of Zionist activity there.

(b) Disadvantages –

(1) Adverse reaction to government by opposition parties and Israeli public opinion;

(2) criticism by the Eastern bloc and

(3) by liberal world opinion, especially in the anti-Franco Latin American countries;

(4) Weakening of Israel's moral standing at the U.N.

In view of the above, Drapkin recommends:

(1) In the event of unilateral recognition, Israel should merely give formal acknowledgement, with no explicit or implicit commitments, nor even with any particular expressions of gratitude.

(2) It is undesirable to initiate negotiations with Spain.

(3) If Spain takes the initiative, negotiations should be held off pending clarification of Spain's motives.

(4) When the Spanish issue comes up at the U.N., Israel should determine her position in line with the U.S.A.'s: If the latter remains passive – Israel should vote with the liberal countries and in coordination with her Latin American friends; a similar policy is to be followed if the U.S. supports Spain actively but fails to win over France, the Benelux countries, the Scandinavians and the progressive Latin American states; however, should the U.S. turn the vote into an East–West confrontation, then Israel must abstain.

Notes

1. See No. 22.
2. Several paragraphs, dealing with the history of the Spanish issue at the U.N. and with the relations of Spain with various countries, have been omitted here.
3. See No. 22, n. 3.
4. At the votes taken at the U.N. during 1949, Israel opposed Spain's admission to that organization. See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 19–20.
5. For the talks held by the Spanish emissary in Israel in April 1949, see Eytan to Sharett, 24 April 1949, 130.02/2391/28. The Spanish Republican Government-in-exile had simultaneously also approached Israel with a request for recognition (*ibid.*).
6. Several paragraphs, dealing with expected developments at the U.N. touching the Spanish issue, have been omitted here.
7. Untraced.

Editorial Note

United Nations Statute for Jerusalem

The Jerusalem Statute went through the first and second readings at the Trusteeship Council between 14 February and 27 March. A number of amendments were made during the debate in order to bring the Statute up to date in relation to developments in the city since 1948, when the first draft of the Statute was made. The most important amendment, submitted by Belgium, was to the effect that the boundaries of the international zone of Jerusalem would be demarcated by a special commission to be appointed by the Trusteeship Council. The second reading was completed on 27 March, and one of the last articles to be adopted (Article 39) said that "the Statute would come into force on a date to be determined by a resolution of the Trusteeship Council". This article whose practical significance was postponement of the Statute's implementation, was introduced on Israel's initiative, with the aid of the American and French representatives. The Statute was finally adopted on 4 April. A further resolution was adopted afterwards, directing the Chairman of the Trusteeship Council (a) to transmit the text of the Statute to Israel and Jordan; (b) to ask for the cooperation of these two states; (c) to report to the Council on these matters at the next session. (See *TCOR, 4th Year, Sixth Sess.*, 23rd–81st Meetings, 14 February–4 April 1950. See also Eban to Sharett, telegram GN59, 27 March 1950, 130.09/2302/8. For the full text of the Jerusalem Statute, see U.N. Document T592, in 130.02/2443/7.)

171. A. Eban (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 4 April 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.

172. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 5 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 162.
2. Telegram from Sharett to Elath (4 April 1950, 93.01/2202/9) transmitting instructions for the forthcoming talk with Acheson.
3. See No. 161.
4. Russian: "easy does it".

173. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 6 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 157.
2. See No. 187.

174. United States Division [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 7 April 1950

Notes

1. Major Lawrence W. Brady, U.S. Army Attaché in Israel.
2. At a former consultation, with the participation of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the C.G.S., it was resolved that Israel would not supply to the U.S. any military information except in the context of an arms deal (see the United States Division to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, IW546, 29 March 1950, 93.01/2207/6). See also No. 177.
3. Colonel Edwin P. Archibald, Senior U.S. Military Attaché and Air Attaché in Israel.
4. Aryeh Manor, Member of Ministry of Defence supply mission in the U.S.A.

175. M. Keren [Washington] to the United States Division. 7 April 1950

Notes

1. See No. 151.
2. See No. 183.

176. M. Keren [Washington] to the United States Division. 7 April 1950

Notes

1. The United States Division instructed Keren to accept the invitation (see telegram IW573, 10 April 1950, 93.01/2202/9).

177. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 8 April 1950

Notes

1. According to an Associated Press report, the Department of State had decided to reject Israel's requests for arms. Hare denied this report, claiming that no decision had yet been taken. (See Elath to Sharett, telegram 1747, 7 April 1950, 93.08/366/13.)
2. See No. 24.
3. See No. 172.
4. See No. 174 and n. 2 *ibid.*
5. See No. 139.

178. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to Y. Yadin (Tel Aviv). 9 April 1950

Copy: 130.02/2394/3

Summary

Sharett appoints Shiloah Liaison Officer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff in order to maintain direct contact between the two bodies. The General Staff is requested to give immediate notification to the Foreign Ministry, through Shiloah, of any military matter bearing on Israel's foreign policy or possibly affecting her international standing, thus enabling the Foreign Ministry to voice an opinion before it is faced with a *fait accompli.*

179. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 9 April 1950

Notes

1. See Garreau to Sharett, 6 April 1950, 130.02/2443/7. See also Editorial Note, p. 108.
2. See Kahany to Sharett, GN74, 7 April 1950, 130.09/2302/8.
3. Eban proposed that, in order to avoid an unpleasantness on a minor issue, an emissary be sent to Athens to explain that Israel felt obliged to submit a carefully considered and formulated reply, and would therefore prefer not to respond precipitately; when the reply is ready, the Israeli representative will be happy to deliver it to the President of the Trusteeship Council, whether in New York or in Israel. (See Eban to Sharett, telegram X50, 10 April 1950, 130.09/2329/8.) Israel replied formally to Garreau's invitation on 15 April, in a courteous and non-commital manner, the gist being that the Israeli consul in Athens would meet Garreau "in order to pay his respects and explain the position", while Gideon Rafael, who represents Israel at the Trusteeship Council at Geneva would pass on his way through Athens to meet him in person. (See Sharett to Victor Hoo, telegram MH8959, 15 April 1950, 130.02/2443/7.) Consequent on Israel's reply, Garreau cancelled the Athens meeting. See also No. 180 and Editorial Note, pp. 121–2.

180. A. Eban [New York] to A. Cordier (New York). 10 April 1950

Notes

1. Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the U.N.
2. See No. 154.
3. See No. 174.

181. Meeting: M. Sharett – Sir Alexander Knox Helm. (Tel Aviv, 31 March 1950, Document Dated 10 April 1950)

Notes

1. See No. 147.
2. See No. 162.
3. See No. 161.

182. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 11 April 1950

Notes

1. Abraham (Abe) Feinberg, U.S. businessman, active in the United Jewish Appeal.
2. Louis Arthur Johnson, U.S. Secretary of Defense, until September 1950.
3. James H. Burns, Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance.

183. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 11 April 1950

Notes

1. The United States Division had informed the Embassy that the J.D.C.'s refusal to handle the Iraqi Jews' emigration had been expected, and requested the Embassy to continue its efforts to enlist some other international body to that end. Israeli emissaries were meanwhile active in Iraq in mobilizing larger numbers of the Jews for emigration. (See telegram IW575, 11 April 1950, 93/01/2202/9.)
2. The Mossad le'Aliya, a joint organization of the Jewish Agency and the Government of Israel, was in charge of Jewish emigration from the Arab countries and from Eastern Europe.
3. See Kollek's letter to Philip Ehrlich, the Bank of America's legal adviser, 12 April 1950, 130.20/2463/8.
4. Laurence M. Giannini, President of the Bank of America.
5. See the United States Division to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, 16 April 1950, 93.08/377/30.

184. R. Benshalom (Prague) to S. Eliashiv. 11 April 1950

Orig.: 130.11/2493/4

Summary

Benshalom reports on a talk with Benda of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry at a social affair. This senior official, previously cynical and self-confident, now seemed frightened and despondently anxious about his personal future and developments in the international arena.

Benshalom raised two problems: Eliashiv's accreditation as Minister in Prague and renewal of *aliya* from Czechoslovakia. Regarding Eliashiv, Benda thought that Israel had committed a protocolar *faux pas* by failing

to approach the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry through her Legation in Prague, which could lead to several weeks' delay. As to *aliya* – he did not think prospects were good at that moment and suggested that the new Minister raise the matter at his first meeting with President Gottwald. However, Benda foresees a possible change, and a resumption in emigration.

Notes

1. Rafael Benshalom, First Secretary and Chargé d'Affaires at the Israeli Legation in Prague.
2. L. Benda, Director of the West European and Asian Department in the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry.
3. The agreement for Eliashiv's appointment as Minister to Czechoslovakia.
4. Clement Gottwald, the Czechoslovak President and Prime Minister.

185. E. Halevy (Bucharest) to S. Eliashiv. 11 April 1950

Coded Tel. RI304; Recd: 11 April; Inc.: 130.09/2296/9

Summary

Halevy reports that on 9 April, the seventh day of Passover, speeches against *aliya* were made in all the synagogues by order of the Communist Party. The congregations rose up and in several places compelled the speakers to cut short their addresses.

186. Political Consultation. (Tel Aviv, 11–12 April 1950, Document dated 13 April 1950)

Resumé: 130.02/2443/7

Summary

Rafael opened the consultation by reviewing the developments in the Trusteeship Council. He stressed, *inter alia,* that the President of the Council thought the Pope himself led the demand for the full internationalization of Jerusalem.

Sharett then proposed some possible solutions to the Jerusalem issue:

(1) Functional internationalization, that is – international supervision of the Holy Places.

(2) Internationalization of the Christian and Jewish Quarters of the Old City and also of the Cenaculum on Mount Zion, the entire internationalized territory to be contiguous.

(3) Conferring extraterritorial status on the Holy Places, that is, removing them from the sovereignty of the states now controlling Jerusalem and placing them under an international regime; such internationalized areas would not form a contiguous territory.

Sharett stressed that none of his proposals have so far been endorsed by the Government.

A discussion then ensued on the diplomatic steps to be taken in the matter of Jerusalem at the U.N. and in various countries.

Regarding the United States, Kollek proposed that the American public and the Democratic Party be approached with a constructive plan, avoiding the purely negative attitude of criticism of the internationalization proposal. Herzog and Shiloah suggested organizing meetings between Jewish and Catholic persons of note having interests in common, such as leading members of the Democratic Party, and pointing out to them that if no solution is found for the problem of Jerusalem it might become a running sore for both communities.

A discussion in depth was held on the steps to be taken in Catholic countries and in Latin America. The general opinion was that the prospects of influencing these countries were poor; the Arabs were very active in these states and Israel had nothing of value to offer in exchange. However, Drapkin, Director of the Latin American Division, was more optimistic. He observed that the Latin American countries should not be regarded as a monolithic bloc and that diplomatic action in each of these states, according to the prevailing conditions, was justified.

The Foreign Minister summed up by saying that special efforts should be made to disseminate Israel's point of view among the various governments, the members of the Trusteeship and Security Councils, and those states which had not supported the internationalization plan from the beginning. It was resolved to set up a committee to coordinate these efforts and also sub-committees to decide on the appropriate steps to be taken in the Protestant countries, in Asian states and in the Eastern bloc.

Notes

1. Argentina, Colombia and the Dominican Republic. Colombia had the status of an observer at the Trusteeship Council and her mandate was limited to the Somalia issue; she did not take part in the debate on Jerusalem.
2. Ecuador and Cuba.
3. George Weidenfeld was in charge of an extensive propaganda campaign on Jerusalem initiated by the Foreign Ministry, the main elements of which were the publication of a book on the city, the production of a film and the invitation of some 40 influential public figures and clerics for a visit to Jerusalem (for correspondence on this subject see file 93.03/99/59).
4. See No. 201 and n. 4 *ibid.*

187. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 13 April 1950

Notes

1. See No. 173.
2. No. 173.
3. See No. 164, and No. 165 and n. 2 *ibid.*
4. Of the West Bank, under Jordanian control.
5. See No. 188.

188. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 13 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 187.
2. On April 13, at the conclusion of the session of the Political Committee of the Arab League, the Secretary of the League, Azzam Pasha, announced that the Arab states would be prepared to accept the new procedure proposed by the Conciliation Commission for Arab–Israeli negotiations in the framework of joint committees only if Israel permitted all the refugees to return to their former homes and accepted the terms of the U.N. partition resolution of 1947. As a consequence, Israel published on that day the memorandum submitted to the Conciliation Commission – No. 164.
3. See No. 191.

189. M. Keren (Washington) to the United States Division. 13 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 183, n. 1.
2. No. 183.
3. No. 175.

190. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 14 April 1950

Notes

1. See Vol. 4, Appendix D.
2. Document untraced.
3. See No. 193.

191. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 14 April 1950

Notes

1. See No. 188.
2. No. 157.
3. Sharett replied that he accepted Eban's proposed line but that he preferred to reply in writing only after receipt of Boisanger's report on his meetings in Cairo (see Sharett to Eban, Y750, 17 April 1950, 93.01/2202/9).

192. E. Elath (Washington) to the United States Division. 14 April 1950

193. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 16 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 190.
2. See No. 186.
3. For the date of the meeting with McGhee – see No. 199.

194. A. Biran [Jerusalem] to M. Sharett. 16 April 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2447/9

Summary

Biran reports on his meeting with Hamilton Fisher, U.N. Press Officer, who had come to brief him on the Conciliation Commission's talks with the Egyptian authorities in Cairo. According to Fisher, the Commission had been greatly encouraged by these discussions. In the presence of the Egyptian Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister had expressed Egypt's readiness to negotiate with Israel once the latter declared its acceptance in principle of para. 11 of the U.N. resolution of December 1948 regarding the refugees' right to return to their former places of residence.

Biran tried to establish whether Fisher thought the Egyptians were sincere with their declarations to the commission. Fisher felt that the Egyptians genuinely wish to end the state of war and were looking for a face-saving way out. They understand that acceptance of the refugee formula does not mean immediate repatriation but the beginning of a lengthy process of negotiation, perhaps on every individual case. Fisher also got the impression from his talks with high-ranking Egyptian army officers that there was no intention of resuming the war against Israel; this was in contrast to the belligerent mood he found in Damascus and Beirut. On the other hand, while there is an Arab consensus on the effectiveness of the economic embargo on Israel, they are aware that unrestricted use of this weapon might bring about the dissolution of the Arab League.

Biran further reports on his talk with A'amiry, the Jordanian representative, and General Riley, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Observers, in the course of an Israel–Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission meeting. A'amiry, claiming not just a personal opinion but that of the Arabs in general, contended that the Arabs were now prepared to accept the 1947 partition boundaries and that King Abdallah was ready for a settlement. He urged Israel not to make things difficult for the King and not to provoke the other Arab countries. Riley disagreed with A'amiry's assertions.

Notes

1. The General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1948 — see Vol. 4, Appendix A. See also No. 188 and n. 2 *ibid.*
2. Muhammed Adib al A'amiry, Senior Member of the Israel–Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission and member of the Special Committee.
3. General William E. Riley, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Observers in Palestine.
4. Colonel Bennett L. de-Ridder, Chairman of the Israel–Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission.

Editorial Note

U.S.S.R. Change of Policy with Regard to the Jerusalem Question

On 17 April 1950, the Soviet Permanent Representative at the U.N. delivered a note to the U.N. Secretary-General containing a statement on a change in the Soviet position on the status of Jerusalem. The note reads as follows:

I have been instucted by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make the following declaration in connection with the discussion in the Trusteeship Council on the Statute of Jerusalem:

As is known, the U.S.S.R. delegation to the fourth session of the General Assembly voted, in conformity with the stand it took at previous Assembly sessions, for resolution 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949 regarding the establishment of a permanent international regime for Jerusalem, the Trusteeship Council being designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority. The U.S.S.R. delegation maintained this position also during the discussion that followed on the question of Jerusalem.

It has now become clear that the above General Assembly resolution does not satisfy the Arab or Jewish population of either Jerusalem or Palestine as a whole. In these circumstances the Government of the U.S.S.R. does not consider it possible to continue its support of the above-mentioned resolution of the General Assembly. At the same time the Soviet Government feels certain that the United Nations will succeed in finding a solution of the Jerusalem problem acceptable to both the Arab and the Jewish sections of the population of that city.

I would ask you to bring this declaration to the notice of the States Members of the United Nations.

195. M. Sasson (Tel Aviv) to E. Sasson (Ankara). 17 April 1950

Copy: 130.15/2567/15

Summary

Moshe Sasson of the Middle East Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends his father, Eliahu Sasson, Israel's Minister in Ankara, a number of the Division's memoranda which reflect the prevalent opinion about the need for a new outlook on Israel–Arab relations and of a reorganization of the Division's activities.

The first memorandum, dealing with the development of a network of Arab connections in the Middle East, rests on a number of basic assumptions. The last session of the Arab League in Cairo had demonstrated the long-known extent of dissension and conflict among the Arab states. What

had prevented a crisis on this occasion - apart from British and American intervention - had been the Palestinian issue. The Arab states had thus reached a "consensus on a negative basis", that is, on the basis of extreme anti-Israel resolutions.

In view of British and American influence in the Middle East, two lines of activity are consequently suggested: (1) press into action Israel's legations in London and Washington; (2) resume contacts in the Arab countries, encouraging positive trends and undermining the negative; these efforts should be thorough and well coordinated, barring isolated or chance dealings.

Special importance should be attached to Jordan. The King is obviously personally interested in a settlement with Israel, but is having difficulties in this respect. There is internal opposition, although the last elections proved that the Court could prevail. There is opposition by the Arab states, but this paradoxically enables the King to ignore extremist positions. There are also British and U.S. attitudes: the British desire an Israel–Jordan agreement, though not at the cost of breaking up the Arab League. The Americans, on the other hand, are encouraging Abdallah without regard for the Arab League, giving the impression of superficiality - either out of lack of information or a tendency to follow the British.

The following lines should be adopted in order to induce the Jordanians to come to an agreement with Israel:

(1) Transjordanian circles in favour of *rapprochement* should be encouraged.

(2) Proceed similarly in other Arab countries, neutralizing opponents of an agreement, such as the Egyptian Court.

(3) The Americans should be persuaded to promise the Jordanians economic help or moral support at the U.N.

Notes

1. The Appendices have not been brought here.
2. See No. 162.
3. Mohammed Hussein Haykal Pasha, President of the Egyptian Senate.
4. The bureau of the Foreign Ministry's Middle East Division in Paris was active during the second half of 1948 and the beginning of 1949 in collecting information and creating contacts with Arab politicians - see Vol. 2, No. 362.
5. The results of the elections strengthened in general the King's position but also were an indication of the radical attitudes prevalent among the refugees and the inhabitants of the West Bank, especially in Ramallah and in Arab Jerusalem. The assessment in Israel was that basic conditions now existed for the constitution of the peace process initiated by Abdallah, but that the latter would now have to be more alert to the demands of the refugees and the West Bank population. (See Background notes to the Arab Middle East Events, 14 April 1950, 93.18/53/9.)
6. Two paragraphs, dealing with internal and procedural matters touching the Middle East Division, have been omitted here.
7. Ismail Hussein Sherine Bey, an Egyptian Army officer, formerly member of the Egyptian delegation to the armistice talks with Israel.

196. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 18 April 1950

Notes

1. Elath had reported that Hare, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs in the Department of State, had informed him that he was about to accompany Acheson to the foreign ministers' conference in London and requested Elath's assessment of the situation in the Middle East. Elath accordingly asked Sharett for appropriate instruction. (See Elath to Sharett, W919, 13 April 1950, 93.01/2207/1.)
2. See No. 161.
3. See Nos. 194 and 197.

197. M. Kahany (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 18 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 157.
2. See Memorandum for Mr. Sharett's personal information, 18 April 1950, 130.02/2447/9.

198. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in Moscow. 18 April 1950

Coded Tel. IP349; Outg.: 130.09/2325/3

Summary

Eytan refers to Namir's proposed use of the Legation in Moscow as a means to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China.[1] He does not think the suggestion is practical or even desirable at the moment. It is not in Israel's interest to play up the ties between China and the Soviet Union, it being preferable to act through London, when the Chinese embassy is set up there. Eytan requests Namir's reaction to this opinion.[2]

Notes

1. Namir had referred to Eytan's proposal to use the Chinese Embassy in Moscow as a channel for establishing diplomatic relations with China and observed that the Chinese Ambassador conspicuously avoided any contact with representatives of the Western states which had recognized his country nor did he respond to the invitations extended to him by the Israeli Legation (see Eytan to the Israeli Legation in Moscow, IP304, 31 January 1950, 130.09/2325/3; Namir to Eytan, PI440, 16 April 1950, 130.09/2325/4).
2. See No. 284.

199. E. Elath and A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 19 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 190.
2. See No. 193.
3. See A. Eban, Reply to the Trusteeship Council, 21.4.1950, in file 130.02/2443/7. This draft went through several versions until the final one was submitted to the Trusteeship Council – see No. 257.
4. See Vol. 4, Appendix D.

200. E. Elath [Washington] to the United States Division. 19 April 1950

Notes

1. Telegram from the United States Division reporting on an informal talk between Esther Herlitz, the Division's Deputy Director, and Charles McVicker, Third Secretary in the U.S. Embassy in Israel. McVicker had stated that there was no prospect of the U.S. intervening or pressuring the Arab states in what concerned the peace settlements with Israel as her policy in the Middle East was regional in character and she was being in any case accused of a pro-Israeli attitude (see telegram of 19 April 1950, in file 130.09/2308/12).

201. Political Consultation. (Tel Aviv, 17 April 1950, Document Dated 20 April 1950)

Report: 130.02/2443/7

Summary

The Foreign Minister explains that the consultation is designed to formulate Israel's policy on Jerusalem in view of expected developments at the forthcoming session of the Trusteeship Council and the U.N. General Assembly.[1]

Israel must first reply officially and in writing to the Trusteeship Council's resolution on the Jerusalem Statute. The reply will consist of two parts: rejection of the Statute and submission of alternative practical proposals. It is the second part which is of course problematic. The Government has discussed this subject and decided to make a distinction between the wording in the official communication and the instructions to be given to the Israeli representatives for oral negotiations.[2] Israel rejects the principle that the U.N. has any rights or interests over the entire city of Jerusalem, but does accept the principle that the international community has a stake in the Holy Places. Israel has previously proposed solving the problem through international supervision of these places, but will be prepared to give consideration to any other proposed solution provided it pertains solely to the Holy Places. All this should be stated in writing. Instructions to the representatives should leave the door open to discussion of solutions based on extraterritorialization of the Holy Places, such as the proposal raised lately by Abba Eban.[3]

Sharett proposes formation of a committee to define and designate the Holy Places, and the launching of an intensive propaganda campaign in advance of the forthcoming debate.

Notes

1. For a previous consultation see No. 186.
2. See No. 193.
3. See No. 190.
4. The latter half of the document had been omitted here. It contains a detailed discussion on diplomatic and propaganda activities in various countries as worked out by the relevant subcommittees - see No. 186.

202. Meeting: M. Sharett – Sir Alexander Knox Helm. (Tel Aviv, 20 April 1950)

Notes

1. See No. 161.
2. See No. 181.
3. The British Minister was referring to a conversation between Kidron and Strang which took place on 23 March – see No. 147. The Foreign Ministry staff verified the accuracy of this phrasing as reported by Kidron – see Comay to Sharett, 2 May 1950, 130.02/2412/26.
4. See No. 148.
5. See Editorial Note below.

203. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Fischer (Paris). 20 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 197.
2. No. 157.

Editorial Note

Annexation of the Western bank to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

On 24 April, both Houses of Parliament of Jordan adopted a resolution which declared the "complete unity between the two sides of Jordan, eastern and western, and their union into one state which is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan". This resolution, which on the same day was endorsed by the King and the Jordanian Government, was transmitted to the Secretary-General of the U.N.

The Government of Israel, which had previous information of the impending annexation, instructed its representatives abroad to make the following comment:

> This is unilateral step which is no way binds Israel. We are bound to Jordan by armistice agreement and it is our firm policy abide by it meticulously. But this agreement entails no final political settlement, and no final settlement is possible without negotiations and conclusion peace between the two parties. It must therefore be clear that question of status of Arab areas west of Jordan remains open as far as Memisrael [Government of Israel] concerned.

(See Secretary-General of the U.N. to the Foreign Minister of Israel, 27 April 1950, 130.03/2013/15; Eytan to Israeli representatives abroad, 21 April 1950, 93.01/2207/7.)

204. E. Elath [Washington] to M. Sharett. 21 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 196.
2. No. 200, n. 1.
3. Telegram from the United States Division to the Embassy in Washington (20 April 1950, 93.01/2207/7) suggesting that Acheson be supplied when in London with information similar to that contained in No. 196, but that it should emanate from a British personality.
4. See Vol. 4, No. 460.

205. M. Keren [Washington] to the United States Division. 21 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 157.

206. E. Elath [Washington] to M. Sharett. 21 April 1950

207. E. Elath [Washington] to M. Sharett. 21 April 1950

Notes

1. Senator Robert A. Taft (Republican).
2. John Foster Dulles, a senior Republican statesman; from April 1950, Adviser to Secretary of State Acheson.
3. When in Washington, Silver met Taft, Dulles and John Cooper, a former Senator from Kentucky who had shortly before been appointed Republican Adviser to the Department of State. All these promised their help, and Cooper, who was to accompany Acheson on his visit to London, asssured Silver he would keep an eye on developments there. (See Elath to Sharett, telegram W971, 28 April 1950, 93.01/2202/9.)

Editorial Note

Meetings with Garreau in Rome - April 1950

After the projected meeting in Athens has been cancelled (see No. 179 and n. 3 *ibid.*) Garreau came to Rome in the middle of April for a series of talks with officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry and of the Vatican's Secretariat of State. The latter evinced an uncompromising attitude which Garreau thought emanated from the Pope. However, when Garreau later met Pius XII in person he was surprised by the Pope's conciliatory attitude and readiness to accept a "reasonable settlement".

Garreau also talked with the Israeli Minister, Ginossar, and with Rafael. He criticized what he described as Israel's rigid and uncompromising attitude and argued that Israel had erred in not accepting the middle-of-the-

road plan he had put forward. The Israeli representatives invited Garreau for talks in Tel Aviv, but he decided to wait until he had been similarly invited by Jordan. The latter invitation was not forthcoming; following Jordan's annexation of the West Bank (see Editorial Note, p. 120) Garreau announced he was cancelling his visits to both Jordan and Israel. (See Ginossar's letters to the Foreign Minister, 16 April 1950, 21 April 1950, 130.02/2443/7.)

208. Meeting: A. Eban – Y. Malik (New York, 20 April 1950, Document Dated 21 April 1950)

Notes

1. Yacov Malik, the Permanent Soviet Representative at the U.N.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 116.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 108.
4. No. 164.
5. Semen K. Tsarapkin, the Soviet Representative on the Security Council.
6. See No. 168.
7. Ernest A. Gross, member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N.

209. G. Rafael (Paris) to M. Sharett. 22 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 197.
2. See No. 195 *ibid.*
3. See No. 214.

210. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 24 April 1950

Coded Tel. IWA93; Outg.: 130.09/2308/5

Summary

After perusal of Elath's last batch of telegrams,[1] officials of the Division have come to the conclusion that the difficulties Americans are making with respect to arms supply to Israel are unrelated to their demand for information on the I.D.F. or to the problem of Israel's global orientation.[2] The problem lies in their apprehension concerning Israel's policy in the Middle East. Israel should therefore concentrate on: (1) influencing American and British public opinion; (2) persuading all concerned that Israel is not an aggressive nation; (3) explaining the actual ratio of power between Israel and the Arab states; (4) demonstrating the fallacy of British policy in the Middle East and the American compliance with it. In the mean time an American initiative on the question of Israel's Middle East policy should be awaited.[4]

Notes

1. See Nos. 177, 192 and 200.
2. See No. 204.
3. Cf. No. 234.
4. See No. 212.

211. E. Elath [Washington] to the United States Division. 26 April 1950

Notes

1 See No. 204.

212. E. Elath [Washington] to the United States Division. 26 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 210.
2. No. 211.
3. John H. Hilldring, formerly (1946–1947) Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas in Europe and member of the U.S. delegation to the Second Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 1947.
4. Meir Shalit (De Shalit), Assistant Press Attaché in the Israeli Embassy in Washington.

213. Meeting: R. Shiloah and M. Dayan – King Abdallah (Amman, 27 April 1950)

Report: 93.03/3043/13

Summary

The meetings, following a long interruption due to the elections and the formation of a new Cabinet in Jordan, was called by the Israelis, who had learned that the King intended to demand more concessions from Israel in order to satisfy his new Government.

The King appeared to be in a very good mood. He claimed the election results were a personal victory for him, insofar as very few representatives in either House would now oppose a settlement with Israel. His tours around the Kingdom convinced him that there was widespread support for an agreement with Israel. The main opponents had been in the former Cabinet, and this obstacle had now been removed. He is of course aware of the Arab League's intransigence but he fears neither them nor the threat of sanctions. He of course relies on Israeli support, and expects Israeli help in the economic confrontation, should an embargo be declared on him by the Arab League states.

The Israeli representatives thanked the King for his words and congratulated him on his victory, but begged leave to state clearly Israel's reaction to his latest act – annexation of the West Bank to Jordan.[3] The Government of Israel cannot view this step with equanimity, and regards it as a unilateral act not binding on her; future policy to such annexation will largely depend on the nature of the agreement reached between the two state's. The emissaries wanted more detailed information about the expected pace and content of the negotiations. They also requested clarification of the rumours that several Cabinet members, including the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, made their participation in the Government conditional on non-signature of an agreement with Israel, and that the King himself had reneged on several previously agreed on points.

The King vigorously denied these rumours, saying that both his Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister supported his aims loyally. There had been no change in his own position either, and he stood by every single letter of agreed text. He also reiterated his determination not to permit the return of any refugee to Israel, which is why he was devoting special attention to the question of reparations to property owners. In connection with events in the Arab world, he has irrevocably decided to withdraw from the Arab League. The British Minister in Amman agrees and has advised him to prepare the ground thoroughly in his Government. This will take time, and he therefore cannot give an exact date for the commencement of the talks, though he estimates about ten days' time.

In closing, the King raised the problem of increased military tension in the South. Dayan suggested that the King appoint a special representative to discuss a local settlement, and the King concurred.

Notes

1. See No. 130.
2. No. 157.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 120.
4. See No. 195 and n. 5 *ibid.*
5. See No. 162 and n. 1 *ibid.*
6. Sir Alec S. Kirkbride, the British Minister to Jordan.

214. A. Eban and G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 27 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 209.
2. No. 190.
3. Sharett's telegram of 21 April 1950 to the Israeli delegation at the U.N., transmitting the Arabs' reply to the Conciliation Commission's proposals – No. 197 (the telegram is filed under 93.01/2207/7).

215. Meeting: W. Eytan – Sir Alexander Knox Helm (Tel Aviv, 27 April 1950

Notes

1. No. 216.
2. In file 130.02/2457/1.
3. This refers to a passage in the British Government's statement in Parliament to the effect that the Government had no intention of setting up military bases in the areas in Palestine now annexed to Jordan.
4. See No. 213.

216. Sir Alexander Knox Helm (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 27 April 1950.

Notes

1. See No. 215.
2. See No. 218.

217. M. Sasson (Tel Aviv) to E. Sasson (Ankara). 1 May 1950

Copy: 130.15/2568/1

Summary

Moshe Sasson sends his father Eliahu several documents,[2] including a report on his meeting with al-Karmi,[3] to keep the Ankara Legation staff abreast on developments with Jordan.

Following the Jordanian announcement on the annexation of the West Bank, Shiloah and Dayan met King Abdallah.[4] The talk was very cordial. The King expressed understanding of Israel's objections to the annexation and proposed that negotiations on an agreement between the two countries be continued. He contended that opposition to the agreement in Jordan was insignificant. According to reports subsequently reaching Israel, the King had been very satisfied with the meeting.

The following assessments ensued at the Foreign Ministry:

(1) The King stands by his word and is sincerely desirous of an agreement.

(2) The opposition in Parliament is in a minority, though potentially troublesome; the issue however is not likely to be decided in Parliament.

(3) The King has not the foregone support of his Government which may press him to extract more concessions from Israel.

At a subsequent meeting with al-Karmi, the latter told Sasson that the King was still not sure of his Government's support. The King promised to give the Israelis a *note verbale* detailing his efforts to convince his Government. To Sasson's surprise, the *note,* which indeed arrived shortly, con-

tained additional demands, including one for the cession of "Aqaba" – presumably Eilat. Sasson sees the hand of the British in this, and thinks that instead of exerting pressure on his Government, Abdallah himself is being pressed by it. Sasson recommended that the *note* be returned, in the hope that the King would withdraw his new demands, while Israel would try to exert pressure on him through the press and perhaps by other means.

Notes

1. Tuvia Arazi, Press and Commercial Adviser in the Israeli Legation in Turkey, in charge of the consulate in Istanbul.
2. The enclosures have not been traced.
3. Abd al-Ghani al-Karmi, of King Abdallah's entourage.
4. See No. 213.
5. Untraced.
6. Shaukat Aziz al-Saty, King Abdallah's physician and counsellor.
7. One sentence has been omitted here.
9. Several paragraphs have been omitted here.

218. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to Sir Alexander Knox Helm (Tel Aviv). 2 May 1950

Notes

1. See No. 216.
2. Sharett was referring to Bevin's speech in the House of Commons on the relations between Israel and the Arab states (see No. 161) and to a press report according to which a British Government spokesman had said that his Government opposed bilateral peace negotiations in the Middle East and was rather in favour of a settlement between Israel and a united Arab front (see the *Jerusalem Post*, 2 May 1950). This report was denied by the British Legation in Israel (see record of a telephone conversation with Comay, 3 May 1950, 130.02/2412/26). See also No. 221.

219. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 2 May 1950

Notes

1. Chauvel later informed Eban of his Government's favourable reaction to his proposal and asked to see the final draft when completed (see Eban to Sharett, X100, 10 May 1950, 93.01/2202/10).

220. Press Release by the Israel Embassy in Washington. 3 May 1950

221. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to M.R. Kidron (London). 3 May 1950

Notes

1. See No. 218 and n. 2 *ibid.*
2. A full report of the conversation is in file 93.04/36/12.
3. Ernest Davies, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

222. E. Elath (Washington) to the United States Division. 4 May 1950

Notes

1. No. 210.
2. Sharett rejected the implied criticism of the United States division in this telegram, saying that the Foreign Ministry was well aware of the gravity of the situation. He approved of all the actions suggested by Elath, but requested more detailed proposals on points (3) and (5). (See Sharett to Elath, telegram IW641, 7 May 1950, 130.09/2308/12.)

223. E. Elath [Washington] to the United States Division. 4 May 1950

Notes

1. Louis Lipsky, American Zionist, Chairman of the American Zionist Council.
2. Benjamin Browdy, President of the Zionist Organization of America.
3. A body set up to coordinate the activities and public relations of the Zionist organizations in the U.S.
4. For the public relations activity in the U.S. on arms supply to Israel, see correspondence in file 93.08/366/13.

224. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 5 May 1950

Notes

1. Telegram from the United States Division to the Embassy in Washington (3 May 1950, 130.09/2308/12) proposing that political activity through the Department of State concerning the supply of arms be suspended until all possibilities of action through the American Ambassador in Israel are exhausted.
2. The complete memorandum is in file 130.20/2475/8.
3. No. 88.
4. See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 133–5.
5. See the United States Division to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, IW640, 5 May 1950, 93.01/2207/8.

225. E. Elath (Washington) to the United States Division. 5 May 1950

Notes

1. Jacob Blaustein, President of the American Jewish Committee.
2. See No. 223.

226. M. Keren [Washington] to the United States Division. 5 May 1950

Notes

1. John A. Waldo, an official in the Near East Division of the Department of State.
2. Arthur Liverhant, First Secretary in the Israel Embassy in Washington.
3. Reference is to Elath's informal meeting with Major General Lemnitzer, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Aid Affairs. The latter listened with sympathy to an enumeration of Israel's requests, said that he had been informed by Johnson that the Arabs were receiving only "inconsequential" quantities of arms, and was surprised when told that the Arabs had ordered one hundred and ten jet planes. (See Elath to the United States Division, W6, 4 May 1950, 93.01/2207/8.)
4. No. 210.

227. E. Najar (Paris) to W. Eytan. 5 May 1950

Coded Tel.; Recd: 7 May; Inc.: 130.09/2344/6

Summary

Najar has just spoken with Garreau, who said he would prefer to receive Israel's reply in Paris before May 13th;[1] should that be impossible, he would like it in New York by May 20th. He had received no answer so far from King Abdallah.

Garreau recommends that Israel's reply not close the door to a solution based on a small enclave.

Najar also met Schuman, who was very vexed by the Soviets' latest move[2] and by the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan. Schuman has concluded that implementation of the Statute is unfeasible and the only alternatives left are the Israeli solution or the establishment of a small enclave. Meanwhile, however, Schuman continues to toe the uncompromising Vatican line. Parodi, on the other hand, supports the minimalist solution. He thinks extraterritoriality and a special status could meet the needs of the Holy Places, though in case of war between Israel and Jordan only an international enclave could safeguard them. He claims the Vatican and most countries share his opinion. Parodi thinks the new ideas emanating from Israel open prospects for an exchange of views with the Quai d'Orsay.

Najar is awaiting a reply.[4]

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 121–2.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 120.
3. See Najar to Eytan, 7 May 1950, 130.10/2550/8.
4. Eytan gave instructions for Garreau to be informed that Israel's reply would be delivered in New York on 20 May (see his telegram TPA120, 8 May 1950, 130.09/2344/3).

228. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Chairman of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (Geneva). 6 May 1950

Notes

1. No. 157.
2. See No. 232.

229. S. Rosenne [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett. 7 May 1950

Memorandum: 130.02/2418/18

Summary

Rosenne sends Sharett a copy of his legal opinion on the subject of free passage through the Suez Canal,[1] which he summarizes for the sake of convenience:

Israel is legally justified to raise the issue at the Security Council, and demand that the Council refer the matter to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, requesting a ruling on the restrictions placed by Egypt. His opinion is grounded on three facts – the Suez Canal Treaty of 1888, general juridical principles, and the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt.

He has, however, some doubts which do not necessarily arise from legal considerations:

(1) He doubts whether the Security Council, paralysed as it is by the Chinese issue, can deal effectively at this point with the Suez problem.

(2) He fears that Britain, though interested in opening the Canal to oil shipments to Haifa, is even more interested in foreclosing too wide an interpretation of the Suez Canal Treaty which might be to her detriment in case of a widespread international conflict; evidence for this can be adduced in Britain's closure of the Canal to hostile shipping during the two world wars.

If his hypothesis is correct, then Israel's appeal to the Security Council would undoubtedly embarrass Britain. The latter would certainly not openly oppose Israel and might not even be able to prevent a vote on whether to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice, but she certainly could exert influence on the other members of the Council to vote against the application.

In view of the foregoing, Rosenne thinks that Israel's only option is through the Egypt–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. This should be pursued quietly, and after laying the ground by means of intensive diplomatic activity in Washington, in London and at the U.N. Secretariat.[2]

Notes

1. Rosenne's opinion is on file, but has not been printed here.
2. A consultation on Rosenne's opinion took place at the Foreign Ministry. It was resolved not to approach the Security Council for the time being but to submit a complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission to be accompanied by diplomatic efforts in London, Washington and at the U.N. (See Rosenne to Robinson, 23 May 1950, 93.03/3006/1.)

230. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Isreal Embassy in Washington. 9 May 1950

Notes

1. Keren replied that he was in contact on that subject with the Department of State and also with the J.D.C. Both bodies were optimistic and thought it would be possible to transport the immigrants to Israel by air, with a stopover in Cyprus. He later reported that the Cyprus Government had indeed given permission for the stopover, providing all the immigrants would be immediately flown on to Israel and on condition that all the air and ground crews involved would be U.S. citizens. (See telegrams from Keren to the United States Division, W34, W43, 10–12 May 1950, 93.01/2207/8.) See also No. 244.

231. A. Eban and G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 10 May 1950

Notes

1. No. 222.
2. See No. 238.

232. United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (Geneva) to the Government of Israel. 11 May 1950

Notes

1. No. 228.
2. No. 157.
3. See Nos. 236 and 242.

233. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 11 May 1950

Coded Tel. WIA75; Recd: 12 May; Outg.: 130.09/2308/18

Summary

Elath refers to Eban and Rafael's telegram about arms purchases from the U.S.A.[1] He does not think their premises and conclusions stand up to close scrutiny. Israel began trying to obtain arms from the U.S. not for political

but for practical reasons, as some of the arms required were available only from the U.S. Political considerations gained ascendancy only when they appeared likely to prevent arms supply to the Arabs and assure it to Israel.

Elath was aware of some of the dangers pointed out by Eban, but saw no alternative but to go on trying to obtain the arms. In the long run some of the political problems dreaded by Eban could not have been forestalled. From this point of view, the public campaign aroused in the U.S. was a blessing. The point is to make clear to the Americans that peace can be achieved in the Middle East only if, besides their diplomatic activity, they also ensure that Arab military potential does not increase and that Israel is not deprived of arms – subject to British boycott as well as American censure.

Notes

1. No. 231.

234. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to Y. Yadin (Tel Aviv). 12 May 1950

Copy: 130.02/2403/18

Summary

Sharett refers to Yadin's letter[1] regarding the memorandum on arms supply submitted by the Foreign Ministry to the U.S. Embassy. He regrets that there was no prior consultation on this matter with the General Staff, and promises future cooperation in similar cases. The quantities of arms requested in the memorandum were based on the needs of the six divisions allowed by the Armistice agreements for the border areas. The application had been also approved by General Riley. It was endorsed by Shiloah, the Liaison Officer between the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry, and by Haim Herzog, Head of Military Intelligence, and Sharett had presumed that there was General Staff assent as well. He learned only later that the General Staff also wished to take into account the needs of other units stationed in the interior, of the reserves, and of permanent bases, and had accordingly issued instructions for an appropriate redrafting of the application – which he understands has been carried out.

Concerning the request itself, he explains that all available information points to a negative attitude on the part of both the Pentagon and the State Department. In these circumstances, it would be tactically preferable for Israel to present more modest demands, both because they are more likely to be granted, and because, in the event of rejection, Israel could more legitimately claim injustice. Moreover, Sharett is sure that even if only a small shipment in now authorized, the amount could be more easily increased in future.

Notes

1. Yadin protested that the memorandum sent to the American Embassy (No. 224) had been drafted without previous consultation neither with himself nor with the General Staff. He dissociated himself completely from the opinions expressed in the memorandum. (See his letter to Sharett, 7 May 1959, 130.02/2403/18.)

235. E. Elath [Washington] to the United States Division. 12 May 1950

Notes

1. See No. 34 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. Elath's term of office as Ambassador to the U.S.A. was about to end.
3. See No. 59 and n. 3 *ibid.*

236. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to R. Shiloah (Paris). 13 May 1950

Tel. MH9382; Outg.: 130.02/2441/3

Summary

Sharett informs Shiloah, who is on leave in Paris, that the Conciliation Commission has invited Israel to send a delegation to negotiate on the basis of the Commission's communication of 29 March, although Israel's explicit question as to the other side's readiness to enter upon negotiations remained unanswered.[1] Israel cannot accept this invitation. Sharett asks Shiloah to see Palmer and explain to him again Israel's position – which Israel will reconsider in the light of Palmer's reaction. Sharett estimates that the Commission knows well enough that even if Israel takes part in the talks these will not be direct but rather held in parallel, as previously; the Commission's aim is solely to create the appearance of progress.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 232.
2. Shiloah answered that he had met Palmer and Barco who informed him that they do not expect Israel to send a delegation to the meeting unless the Arab countries reply satisfactorily (see his telegram to Eban 17 May 1950, 130.09/2338/9). Eban also advised not to appoint a delegation to the negotiations until the Arabs clarify their position. He suggested that Israel expose publically the deceptive position of the Arabs, citing the Conciliation Commission's memorandum of 29 March (No. 157) and Arab replies. (See Eban to Sharett, X113, 16 May 1950, 130.09/2329/8.) For Israeli reply – see No. 242.

237. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Amir (Brussels). 14 May 1950

Copy: 130.02/2382/13

Summary

Sharett replies to Amir's letter dealing with Israel's international situa-

tion.[1] In general, he agrees with Amir's analysis, though he would personally avoid prognostication and confine himself to stating facts and formulating arguments. He does not however accept Amir's conclusion that Israel has to execute a volte-face in her global policy. There are other considerations overriding those of Amir's, and a comprehensive assessment of Israel's situation and problems dictate adherence to the present line.

Two weighty reasons preclude Israeli departure from a non-aligned policy. The first is Israel's ties with the East European Jewry. Notwithstanding existing difficulties, there is some *aliya* from the Eastern bloc countries; as to the Soviet Union itself, there are indeed hardly any prospects of Jewish emigration from there but this Jewry must not feel it is being abandoned, must not suffer additional blows.

A second consideration is Israel's own internal situation. A minimal amount of internal unity must be preserved in the State's struggle for survival and radical policy shifts should be avoided.

Besides, Sharett cannot see what benefits would accrue to Israel from a pro-Western shift. The State Department's antagonism is not due to Israel's policy of non-alignment but rather to her being a catalyst in the Middle East and to her inability to arrive at a settlement with her neighbours. Arab hostility to Israel is rooted in the refugee and the territorial problems and as long as Israel remains steadfast on these issues there will be no settlement with the Arab states, and no amount of American pressure will help.

Notes

1. Amir proposed that Israel make a general review of its foreign policy in view of the mounting international tension and its growing isolation. He suggested that Israel align itself more closely with the Western bloc and thereby reduce some of the friction's points in its relations with the Arab states. (His letter in file 130.02/2382/13.)

238. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 16 May 1950

Notes

1. No. 231.
2. See No. 234.

239. M.R. Kidron [London] to M. Comay. 16 May 1950

Notes

1. Telegram filed under 130.09/2318/6.
2. See No. 221.
3. See Nos. 246, 247.

240. A. Biran [Jerusalem] to M. Sharett. 17 May 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2431/7

Summary

Biran presses Sharett for permission to launch immediate military action in the Latrun area. Israel has been negotiating for months regarding Mount Scopus and Latrun at the Israel–Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission, her main object being to keep Arabs from entering the no-man's-land in the Latrun enclave. Biran had been repeatedly assured that strict instructions had been issued to this effect and that there were no Arabs in the said area.

As the Jordanians had not responded to Israel's proposals on Latrun, he went personally there and was astounded to find the area between the lines inhabited and extensively tilled by Arabs.

He considers it imperative to save the situation by means of bold military action, whereby Israel will seize the area and harvest the corn sown by the Arabs. Subsequent negotiations would be aimed at obtaining control of at least half of the present no-man's-land. An urgent decision is required, as he understands that the Arabs have already began harvesting the crop.

241. E. Elath [Washington] to M. Sharett. 17 May 1950

Notes

1. Elath reported that a most reliable source at the White House had informed him that on Acheson's initiative Britain and the U.S. agreed to guarantee jointly the existing boundaries in the Middle East. The purpose of the guarantee was to protect Turkey and Iran against Soviet aggression and to prevent the renewal of the Arab–Israeli war. (See Elath to Sharett, 16 May 1950, 93.01/2207/8.)
2. More accurate information on the Three Power declaration on the Middle East reached Israeli representatives in the course of the few next days (see Keren to the United States Division, W68, 19 May 1950, 93.01/2207/8).

242. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. 19 May 1950

Notes

1. No. 232.
2. No. 228.

243. A. Eban [New York] to W.R. Austin (New York). 19 May 1950

Notes

1. Warren Austin, Permanent Representative of the U.S.A. at the U.N.
2. No. 257.
3. See No. 237.

244. M. Keren [Washington] to the United States Division. 19 May 1950

Notes

1. Keren informed that Iraq had consented to make an experimental flight from Baghdad to Lydda via Nicosia. Their only proviso was that the airplane touch ground in a non-Israeli territory before taking off to Lydda. Should this trial flight succeed it is hoped that regular flights would be allowed. (See Keren to the United States Division, 19 May 1950, 93.01/2207/8.)
2. Harlan B. Clark, an official in Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, in charge of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon affairs.
3. The Mossad Le'Aliya, dealing with immigration from Arab and East European countries.

245. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 21 May 1950

Notes

1. Elath answered that he saw no possibility to raise the German question in his farewell meeting with Acheson for the following reasons: it was unusual to raise new isssues in a farewell visit, Acheson was certainly without detailed knowledge in the subject, he himself was not adequately briefed and it was always preferable to start negotiations with the officials handling the matter. Furthermore, any action should be previously coordinated with the Jewish organizations which were already dealing with the subject. (See Elath to Sharett, W80, 25 May 1950, 130.09/2308/18.)

246. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M.R. Kidron (London). 23 May 1950

Notes

1. See No. 239.

247. M.R. Kidron (London) to M. Comay. 24 May 1950

Notes

1. See Nos. 239, 246.
2. Filed under 130.13/2588/1.

248. Ambassador of the United States (Tel Aviv) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 24 May 1950

Notes

1. A similar document was transmitted by the Ministers of Great Britain and France. The document was handed to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25 May – see No. 249.

249. Information to the Israel Missions Abroad. (Tel Aviv, [25 May 1950])[1]

Stenciled copy: 130.02/2449/1

Summary

On May 25, the American Ambassador and the Ministers of Britain and France delivered the Three Power declaration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The British Minister added several remarks orally, emphasizing the importance of the announcement which will undoubtedly be received with gratification by the Government of Israel, the latter having often warned against supply of arms to some of the Arab states. The present announcement is intended to allay Israel's fears. The Minister added that in formulating the declaration, the British Government had also taken into consideration the pledges given to Britain by Israel in its memorandum of 14 October, on the renewal of oil shipments to Haifa.[3] The Minister cited part of the memorandum (for full English text, see Main Volume, p. 343), adding that the Israeli Government had given similar pledges to the U.S. in the memorandum of 13 February.[4]

Following is the Government's reaction to the Three Power declaration, as communicated by the Foreign Ministry spokesman on 25 May:

The Government of Israel notes with satisfaction the opposition of the governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States to the development of an arms race in the Middle East - a danger against which the Government of Israel has consistently warned - and the statement that the supply of arms by the three governments which have made this important declaration is conditional upon an assurance by the purchasing state that it does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state.

The fact, however, that arms and war material have hitherto been supplied to states which have never ceased to threaten the renewal of the war against Israel, and which to this day obstinately refuse to make peace, remains still a source of grave concern. The Government of Israel presumes that today's joint British, French and American declaration signifies the end of the discrimination hitherto practiced in the supply of arms and war materials to countries of the Middle East.

The Government of Israel notes with particular satisfaction that the governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States have, consistent with their character as members of the United Nations, declared their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force in the Middle East. This perfectly reflects the attitude and consistent policy of the Government of Israel, which takes this opportunity of reaffirming its desire for a final peace settlement between Israel and the Arab states, and once again repeats its invitation to each and every Arab

state to enter into immediate negotiations for such a settlement.

It is the unalterable policy of Israel to promote security, relations of friendship and cooperation with all her neighbours, prosperity and stability in the Middle East and peace between all nations.

Notes

1. Document dated: 1 June 1950.
2. Not printed here - see No. 248.
3. For the full text of the memorandum - see Vol. 4, No. 343.
4. No. 88.
5. The final part of the document, incorporating the Prime Minister's address in a political debate held at the Knesset, is not printed here.

250. E. Elath (Washington) to the United States Division. 25 May 1950

Notes

1. See also No. 251.

251. E. Elath (Washington) to the United States Division. 25 May 1950

Notes

1. No. 250.
2. See Vol. 4, No. 460.

252. M.R. Kidron (London) to M. Comay. 25 May 1950

Notes

1. See No. 202, and n. 3 ***ibid.***
2. No. 246.

253. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 26 May 1950

Notes

1. See Nos. 215, 216.

254. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 26 May 1950

255. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 26 May 1950

Notes

1. No. 253.
2. Reference is to the Security Council's debates in August 1949 – See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 and No. 220 *ibid.*
3. The text of the *New York Times* runs as follows: informed officials said agreement should not be interpreted as stimulus to arms shipment to countries engaged in bloody strife before establishment Israel as independent nation. They added rather that agreement should bring about reduction arms to troubled areas by contribution it would make towards stable political situation there. They stressed their hope that this would be ultimate result. (See Eban to Eytan, Telegram 2581, 26 May 1950, 130.09/2328/7.)
4. On the meeting in the Department of Defense see Elath's telegram to the United States Division, W71, 23 May 1950, 130.09/2308/18.

256. E. Najar (Paris) to G. Avner. 26 May 1950

Coded Tel.: 339; Recd: 28 May; Inc.: 130.09/2344/6

Summary

Najar reports on a private conversation with Binoche[1] at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Three Power declaration. It seems that, in order to supervise its implementation, the powers had agreed to submit to one another every month a list of arms sold and requested. Binoche added that the fact that the declaration was formulated outside the U.N. framework shows up that organization's weakness. Najar has been apprised by a private source that the agreement had been reached not through a joint discussion but in bilateral talks: French–American in Paris, and Anglo–American in London. The Egyptian Ambassador in Paris told his friend that following the declaration, the necessary next step is peace with Israel.

Notes

1. Jean André Binoche, Deputy Director in the Africa–Levant Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

257. A. Eban [New York] to R. Garreau: Memorandum on Jerusalem. 26 May 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 108.
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 121–2.
3. Reference is presumably to the invitation dispatched on 3 April 1950 to the member states on the Trusteeship Council, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the President of the Trusteeship Council – see No. 168.

258. E. Halevy (Bucharest) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 27 May 1950

Coded Tel.: RI335; Recd: 28 May; Inc.: 130.09/2296/10

Summary

Halevy reports to Ehud Avriel[1] on the situation of *aliya* in Rumania. The authorities are completing the handling of old applications and hundreds of passports are issued each day. New applications are now being submitted in the provinces as well. The entire press has been enlisted in the campaign against *aliya.* There is an enormous amount of work at the Legation and Halevy requests that Avriel bring with him additional clerical staff.

Notes

1. Ehud Avriel, Minister designate of Israel to Rumania, was about to leave for his place of service.

259. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 28 May 1950

Circular: 130.15/2567/16

Summary

Eytan reports that Israel is about to approach the Iranian Government on an exchange of ministers between the two countries. All the envoys are therefore requested to act in their respective countries, through the Iranian representatives or through any other channels, to accelerate Iran's positive response. Iran currently maintains a special representative in Israel, but Israel has no representative in Teheran.[1] Iran's recognition of Israel evoked negative reactions from the Arab world and from nationalist and religious circles in Iran. Israel has already accommodated Iran by enabling some 160 Iranian refugees to return to Israel and has also restored their property. The establishment of relations will greatly benefit the economy of both countries, and particularly Iran, and will contribute to stability in the Middle East.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 132.

No. 259 – Notes (continued)

2. On 20 June Eliahu Sasson gave his opinion on the relations between Israel and Iran: "I must tell the truth: I am not at all optimistic as to the Iranian intention to grant Israel a recognition *de jure* and to exchange diplomatic representatives with us. The internal situation in Iran nowadays is quite complicated to the effect that any government, even the strongest, would find it difficult to take this step. My opinion is, that Israel should agree to the establishment of a Legation in Teheran and to the nomination of a Special Representative in the status of Safinia. This step had two advantages: (a) it will face the Iranians with a *fait accompli;* (b) it will prepare the ground for the establishment of an official and permanent Legation. The establishment of a Special Representation in a Muslim, fanatic and troublous country such as Iran has a weighty moral and political importance and I consider it as the 'conquest of an outward post' that should not be given up even if it is not entirely satisfactory. I ask you, therefore, to draw the attention of the Minister and the Director-General to my opinion." (See Sasson to Divon, 20 June 1950, 130.15/2567/15.) The above information was also confirmed in a conversation of Eban with N. Entezam, the Iranian Representative at the U.N. (see Eban to Eytan, X194, 21 June 1950, 130.09/2329/9).

260. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 29 May 1950

Notes

1. Eytan suggested to draft a formal reply to the Three Power declaration and to deliver it simultaneously in the three capitals; he asked Eban for his opinion for this move. (See Eytan to Eban, 28 May 1950, 130.09/2377/1.) A similar telegram was dispatched to the Israeli Legations in Paris and London and to the Foreign Minister who was visiting South Africa. See also Nos. 261, 265.

261. M.R. Kidron (London) to W. Eytan. 30 May 1950

Notes

1. See No. 260 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. No. 253.
3. Comay advised not to hail the declaration with too much enthusiasm until Israel was sure of its practical effects as far as arms supply was concerned. If no real change occurs Israel might have to start a new compaign in Great Britain. (See Comay's telegram, 28 May 1950, 130.09/2318/3.)

262. M. Kahany (Geneva) to W. Eytan. 30 May 1950

Notes

1. No. 232.
2. Not printed here. This correspondence deals with Israel's complaint that her reply to the Conciliation Commission, dated 6 June (No. 228), had not been printed *in extenso* in the sixth report of the Conciliation Commission to the U.N. Secretary-General.

263. M. Keren (Washington) to W. Eytan. 31 May 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2382/22

Summary

Keren avails himself of the transition period between the exchange of ambassadors in Washington to dispatch a letter of political and moral stock-taking regarding Israel's non-alignment policy.

In their meetings with the Americans, the embassy officials make every possible effort to highlight the pro-Western aspects of Israel's policy without denying the basic line of non-alignment. This is achieved through emphasizing the ideological similarity between the two countries and the economic, cultural and personal ties between them, Israel's democratic character and so on. This approach has been crowned with some success as in the Three Power declaration, the Jerusalem issue and other instances, but it does not guarantee that there will be no crisis between the two countries, as in 1949.

The efforts of the embassy officials are frustrated by a certain policy adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely playing down, as far as possible, any manifestation of friendship towards the U.S. This line, which Keren refers to as "mathematical neutrality", is demonstrated in two cables sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, instructing the embassy to gloss over, as far as possible, the fact that the treaty presently under discussion by the two countries is known as the "treaty of friendship". Another instance is the cable containing the assumption that the sale of arms by the U.S. will be made conditional upon Israel's participation in the defence of the Middle East against the Soviets and rejecting this stipulation in advance.[4] Keren points out that the U.S. has not made such a demand.

Keren remarks that he neither seeks nor is it his authority to question the non-alignment policy the government has adopted. He is convinced, however, that conjointly with non-alignment, it is possible, and even essential, to emphasize Israel's ideological closeness to the U.S., and use of the word "friendship" should not be shunned. Even now there is a discrepancy between Israel's declared policy and her actions. Although Israel continues to declare her absolute neutrality, in practice she addresses all her demands for support to, and indeed secures it from, only one side. In addition, it is necessary to consider the position of American Jewry; they constitute a tremendous reservoir of friendship and sympathy for Israel which, however, will not survive a basic rift between the two countries.

Keren again stresses that he does not recommend a fundamental change of policy, but rather urges that Israel's spiritual closeness to and economic dependence on the U.S.A. should find greater expression in Israel's foreign policy, a neutral line being at the same time maintained. One of the ways this could be achieved is through better preparation of public opinion in Israel. He regrets that there is no decidedly pro-Western bloc in Israel

which could counteract the pro-Eastern proclivities found among some of the political parties.[5]

Notes

1. See meeting of the Embassy staff on 30 May, dated 6 June 1950, 93.08/376/46.
2. See No. 59.
3. See United States Division to the Embassy in Washington, IW594, 18 April 1950, 93.01/2207/7; IW631, 2 May 1950, 93.01/2202/10.
4. No. 253.
5. See No. 288.

264. C.V. Herzog (Washington) to the United States Division. 31 May 1950

Notes

1. James E. Webb, U.S. Under-Secretary of State.

265. E. Najar (Paris) to W. Eytan. 31 May 1950

Coded Tel. 390; Recd: 1 June; Inc.: 130.09/2344/6

Summary

Najar refers to Eytan's telegram (HK80/42).[1] In France there is as yet no evidence of presssure being exerted on Israel to take a definite stand. He believes that, in addition to the desire to maintain peace and the *status quo,* there are two additional main elements in the Three Power declaration: (1) that the supply of arms be conditional on the maintenance of internal order, self-defence, and on participation in regional defence; (2) that the three powers retain the right of intervention, either within the framework of the U.N. or outside it, for the purpose of maintaining peace. If Israel does not limit her reply to a declaration of intent regarding peace, it will not prove possible to avoid mentioning the matter of regional defence and the powers' right of intervention.

As far as Najar knows, the Arabs' reaction in Paris is that if Israel supports the declaration, it will strengthen the Arabs' claim that the declaration constitutes a pro-Israel move and provides them with a better bargaining position. Should Israel object to the declaration, this will deepen her isolation in the Middle East and generate tension in her relations with the U.S. Even so, Israel still has room for manoeuvring. It can be clarified to the Americans that a reserved stand by Israel will make it easier for the Arabs to accept the declaration, and to the Soviets that if Israel objects to the declaration, this will prompt the Arabs to accept it. In short, circumspection and reserve are the best policy, especially since the Arabs' attitude is not yet known.

If, notwithstanding, Israel is urged to take an official stand, several points must be emphasized in her reply: (1) her desire for peace; (2) the danger inherent in supplying heavy arms to a strife-ridden area; (3) Israel's need of arms for self-defence; (4) the risk entailed in weakening the U.N.'s standing; (5) the danger of stirring up nationalistic feelings in the region; (6) reiteration of Israel's stand that peace in the Middle East will be ensured by direct negotiations and disarmament.

Notes

1. See No. 260 and n. 1 *ibid.*

266. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 1 June 1950

Notes

1. Eban cabled that the Trusteeship Council would convene on 2 June to hear Garreau's report and would then proceed to debate the New Zealand trusteeship territories. The Jerusalem issue would come up again, for a short discussion only, not earlier than 13 June. (See Eban to Eytan, telegram 2506, 1 June 1950, 130.09/2329/9.)
2. No. 297. For France's position, see No. 268.
3. On 31 May a report appeared in the *New York Times* in the name of "well-informed circles" at the Vatican, to the effect that the Church viewed as unsatisfactory Israel's proposals for international supervision of the Holy Places and that it insisted on the city and its surroundings being internationalized and put under the authority of the U.N. Trusteeship Council. The justification for this demand put forward by the informants was that they envisaged a breakdown of the armistice between the Jews and the Arabs and a renewal of hostilities.

267. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 2 June 1950

Notes

1. See report by A. Moissis, the Israeli Consul in Athens, dispatched to the West European Division, 29 May 1950, 130.02/2412/2.
2. The problem of the relations with Greece was discussed between Keren of the Israeli Embassy and Hare of the Department of State, with the participation of Anschuetz, the State Department official in charge of the Greek desk. Keren was promised that the subject would be examined by the U.S. Embassy in Greece. (See Keren to the United States Division, W110, 6 June 1950, 93.01/2207/9.)

268. A. Eban [New York] to W. Eytan. 4 June 1950

Notes

1. Najar had informed Eban that the French might support the Israeli plan if it were submitted by a third party (see Najar's telegram PN183, 4 June 1950, 93.01/2202/11).
2. See also No. 270.

269. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to J. Tsur (Buenos Aires). 4 June 1950

Copy: 130.02/2413/24

Summary

Eytan replies to Tsur's letter concerning relations between Israel and Spain.[1] It is premature, he believes, to decide on the political line to be adopted at the U.N. *vis-à-vis* Spain. Israel's basic approach to Franco's regime has always been clear and it is unlikely that American pressure will cause it to change. In any case, when Israel comes to formulate her final position, the possible effects on Israel–Latin American relations will have to be taken into account. For the time being, Eytan wishes to clarify that there is no objection to maintaining friendly relations between the Israeli legations and the Spanish missions in Buenos Aires and Montevideo. In practice, such good relations are the rule in most of the Western countries in which Israel is represented. The trade relations between Israel and Spain are also growing closer.

As concerns Portugal, Israel has recently brought up the question of Portugal's recognition, and is now awaiting a reply. The sole reason for Portugal not having done so to date lies in the unnormalized relations between Israel and Spain.

Notes

1. Tsur had reported on the attitudes in Latin America concerning the raising of the U.N. ban on Franco's Spain. The two most important countries in the continent – Argentina and Brazil and also Colombia were supporting Spain; Uruguay, which had hitherto been in opposition, would now decide to abstain, and so, most probably, would do also Guatemala and Chile. In view of this, Tsur recommended that Israel review her position on the Spanish issue at the forthcoming U.N. Assembly. (Tsur's letter is in 130.02/2413/24.)

270. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 5 June 1950

Notes

1. Eytan's telegram to Eban (4 June 1950, 93.01/2202/11) containing reports on France's position on the Jerusalem issue – see No. 268 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. Eytan advised the Israeli delegation that steps were being taken along the lines recommended by Eban: Tsur met the Chilean President and Foreign Minister who promised their support, but these promises could not be relied upon for certain; he was about to see the Uruguayan Foreign Minister; Amir sees no prospect of Belgium's changing her position, but the Belgian representative at the U.N. has freedom of action within the limits of his general instructions, and he might possibly be influenced to change his stand. (See Eytan to the Israeli delegation to the U.N., Y845, 12 June 1950, 130.09/2238/10.)

271. M.R. Kidron (London) to M. Avida. 6 June 1950

Notes

1. Mordechai Avida, official in the British Commonwealth Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Kidron attempted to find out whether there was a significant shift in Britain's policy of arms supply by submitting a request for four Meteor 7 trainer jet planes, while making it clear to the British that Israel preferred at the moment to order training planes in the hope that she could purchase fighter aircraft in the future (see Kidron to Comay, 29 May 1950, 130.09/2318/6). The British did not reply to Kidron's request (see Kidron to Avida, IL606, 21 June 1950, 130.09/2318/6).
3. Shalom (Oscar) Ron (Singer), Head of the Ministry of Defence Supply Mission to Europe until mid-1950.
4. The last paragraph, dealing with meetings with the diplomatic correspondents of several British newspapers, has been omitted here.

272. C. de Boisanger (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 8 June 1950

Notes

1. See No. 312.

273. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Heads of Israel Missions Abroad. 9 June 1950

Circular: 93.10/7/2

Summary

Two years after the establishment of the State of Israel, India remains one of the few non-Arab, non-Muslim countries which have not recognized her. Israel had always attributed a special value to India's recognition, due to her prestigious status in Asia. During the past two years, considerable efforts have been invested in making contacts with high-ranking Indian personalities but despite many promises and demonstrations of friendship, India has not yet taken this step.

Now that 60 countries have recognized Israel, recognition by additional ones is no longer a burning issue and Israel has ceased trying to persuade vacillating countries, including India. Moreover, belated recognition is of lesser political and moral weight than that accorded close to the state's establishment.

Nevertheless, it is advisable that Israel's representatives abroad use non-formal meetings with their Indian counterparts to emphasize that India's prestige in Israel's eyes has already suffered as a result of the deferred recognition and any further delay will only result in additional loss of face, particularly in view of the fact that purely Muslim nations, such as Turkey and Iran, have already accorded their recognition and, in practice, maintain diplomatic missions in Israel.

Eytan encloses several documents relating to Israel–India relations.[1]

Notes

1. The enclosures (excerpts from Elath's talk with Nehru of October 1949 – see Vol. 4, No. 342 – and statements by the latter and by officials of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs from the beginning of 1950 on India's ties with Israel have not been printed here.

274. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 12 June 1950

Notes

1. No. 297.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 116.
3. The sentence in brackets is handwritten.

275. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 12 June 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2410/18

Summary

On June 6 Eban met Malik, the Soviet Representative to the U.N. The meeting, which was at Eban's initiative and at which Gideon Rafael was also present, was conducted in a pleasant atmosphere.

Malik commenced by asking what was the significance of the Three Power declaration to which Eban replied that it was twofold, concerning the supply of arms and the prevention of aggressive acts. As for the first, the wording is cautious and qualified, and only the future will tell whether the policy of inequitable arming will come to an end. Israel has requested arms for self-defence only and the criterion mentioned in the declaration regarding participation in the region's defence apparently refers only to those countries which have undertaken strategic assignments linked to the British defence system. The formulation is aimed, therefore, at justifying the supply of heavy armament to Britain's allies in the region, without any commitment to supply Israel with similar munitions. Israel, however, will maintain her previous policy of striving for peace between all nations, a policy which is not subject to change on the basis of any particular country's declaration. In any event, Israel hopes that the powers' declared desire to maintain peace in the Middle East will lead to a more equitable supply of arms to the region.

The formulation of the second element is much clearer and Israel views it with satisfaction, even though there is nothing new in the declaration: already in Summer 1949 all the members of the Security Council undertook to maintain peace in the Middle East.[2] The declaration by the three powers will, however, serve to reinforce the U.N. resolution and perhaps will curb the Arabs' belligerence.

Malik paid close attention to Eban's explanations, nodding assent as Eban emphasized that all the members of the Security Council were duty-bound to act against any breach of the Armistice agreements.

The conversation then turned to the Jerusalem issue. Eban repeated Israel's stand against internationalization of Jerusalem and in support of a special status to be accorded to the Holy Places. Malik inquired whether this proposal would involve the imposition of a political regime on any particular population against its will, and was visibly gratified by the negative reply. At this stage of the conversation Malik refrained from mentioning the Soviet stand on Jerusalem and it was only at the conclusion of the talk that he spoke openly on this subject.

The international situation and the U.N. Secretary-General's latest memorandum[3] were subsequently discussed. Malik spoke movingly and at great length of the Soviet's strong desire for peace and their aversion to war. Eban remarks that Malik spoke in a purely nationalist, Russian vein, and that his statements were devoid of Marxist dialectics and dogma. He believes that Israel will find it very difficult to maintain her independence and withstand the temptation of "total diplomacy", as she is surrounded by enemies hitched to the wheels of a strong outside force which will not allow the Middle East to concentrate on constructive development.

From all this Eban surmises that Malik regards Israel as a small country that is sincerely striving for independence and a quiet, productive existence, but whom strong and influential forces attempt to sweep, with the entire region, into the global struggle. He seemingly believes in Israel's desire not to become involved, but doubts her ability to do so. However, in view of the manifestations of Israel's ideologic independence and her yearning for peace, he considers it worthwhile to launch an informational campaign so that Israel will not become victim to the virulent propaganda (as he sees it) prevalent where concerning the designs of Soviet world policy.

At the conclusion, Eban once again raised the issue of Jerusalem. He dwelt on the Vatican's role and attempted to show the link between its involvement in this affair and its activity in other issues, such as those of Spain, China and Eastern Europe. This line won Malik's sympathy and he assured Eban that the Soviets would support, as far as possible, Israel's position on Jerusalem.

Notes

1. No. 297.
2. See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 133–5.
3. Reference is to the U.N. Secretary-General's memorandum containing proposals for settling the global issues of the international community, including disarmament, economic aid, and protection of human rights. This memorandum was handed personally by Trygve Lie to the heads of the Great Powers and was sent to all the other member states. (See the Secretary-General's letter, 6 June 1950, 130.02/2423/12.) See also No. 280.

276. Memorandum by B. Guriel.[1] (Tel Aviv, 12 June 1950)

Copy: 130.10/2539/1

Summary

Guriel reviews the future of Israel's relations with Germany following his short visit to that country:

1. West Germany constitutes a problem of rapidly and dangerously increasing importance for Europe which will in the near future affect also countries outside Europe, including the Middle East. This development should be taken into account in Israel's security considerations.

2. Germany's political and economic weight in Europe is steadily growing, mainly as a result of the cold war. Germany will thus play an important role in the consolidation of an anti-Soviet Europe, whose political and economic unification is inconceivable without that country.

3. Historically and also as a result of developments following World War II, Germany strives to expand eastwards. Here she is blocked by the Soviet Union and thus will of necessity turn to backward countries outside Europe, mainly in the Middle East, which is the closest arena for Germany's expansion. This trend is already evidenced in the establishment of consulates in Arab countries and in the dispatch of technical scientific and military experts there.

4. There is a danger that West Germany will constitute an anti-Israeli element in the Middle East, not only due to its past and anti-Semitic history but also because of Israel's significance as a progressive country located in the Middle East, possessing technical and intellectual manpower and in confrontation with the Arab countries enjoying German aid and assistance.

5. Israel should be the Jewish people's sole representative versus Germany. She should demand the right to appear in Germany not as seeking reparations for the wrongs of the past, but as one of the victors in the war. The possibility should therefore be examined of dispatching an Israeli military delegation to Germany as part of the occupation powers, not only as a demonstration of Jewish military power, but also to accord to the reparations Germany has to pay the character of an indemnity and not of a donation.

6. An interdepartmental body affiliated with the Foreign Ministry should be established in order to deal with the problem of Germany and to implement Israel's policy in the issue.

Notes

1. Boris Guriel, Director of the Political Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

277. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 13 June 1950

Notes

1. No. 272.
2. No. 157.
3. For Israel's reply to the Conciliation Commission's communication, see No. 312.

278. M. Keren (Washington) to M. Sharett. 13 June 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2394/12

Summary

Keren reverts to the question of Israel's international orientation. There has lately been a shift in Israel's favour in the U.S. Administration, due to the pressure exerted on it by friendly and influential circles. The latter have acted on the implicit assumption that although Israel has formally adopted a position of non-alignment, from the ideological standpoint as well as on the basis of her norms and international connections, she is steadily approaching the West. At the moment, one cannot say whether this shift will lead to full or partial approval of Israel's requests for munitions, but there are indications for cautious optimism.

Against this backround Keren reacts sharply to a report he has received concerning negotiations between Israel and Czechoslovakia on the purchase of light arms. This news will land like a ton of bricks on the U.S. and will lead to cancellation of the licences for purchase of arms which are apparently about to be issued, and will have a destructive effect on U.S. Jewry and on the U.J.A. Acquisition of arms from the East is opposed to the spirit of the Three Power declaration. Keren wishes to delay the Czechoslovak transaction at least until the situation with respect to acquisition of arms from the U.S. clarifies. From the internal Jewish aspect, the Czechoslovak deal should be altogether cancelled. Keren stresses that both Eban and Herzog, the military attaché, agree with him.[1]

Notes

1. Both footnotes were added in the margin by hand.

279. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 14 June 1950

Circular: 93.10/7/2

Summary

Turkey has requested Israel's active support in her efforts to be elected as Egypt's successor on the Security Council. Turkey's representative to the

U.N., who made the request, argued that it is incumbent on Israel, as a Middle Eastern country, to support Turkey in order to emphasize that the Arabs do not have a lien on that region. Israel has accordingly decided to vote for Turkey and also to try and influence other countries to do likewise. Israel is convinced that such a stance will improve her relations with the non-Arab Middle Eastern countries and will result in Turkey's active support of Israel's solution to the Jerusalem issue.

280. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 15 June 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2423/12

Summary

Eban reports on his conversation with U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie concerning the latter's peace campaign in Europe undertaken in spite of the U.S. State Department's indifferent attitude.[1] Acheson had told Lie that the State Department does not entertain great hopes of success for the negotiations with the Soviet Union, and that it has decided to adopt an aggressive policy based mainly on strengthening NATO.

The Secretary-General does not accept this attitude. While in the U.S., he met with a sympathetic response on the part of the public to his intiative. There was an even warmer reaction in the European countries he visited, as well as in the talks he held with the Western foreign ministers, excluding Britain's Bevin who adheres to Acheson's line. Lie refused to relate the results of his talks at the Kremlin, because he has pledged absolute secrecy. He was only willing of say that he encountered in Moscow concealed apprehension of the possibility that the Americans might initiate hostilities, and a deep conviction that such a war would result in the destruction of the Soviet Union and of Europe.

Lie believes that the tough American stance *vis-à-vis* his efforts will eventually soften due to two decisive factors: (1) American public opinion which will fight any tendency to despair of negotiations; (2) the prevailing attitude in the West European countries, where wide circles have begun to fear not only the Soviet Union, but also the results of the "cold war".

In all his talks with Eban, Lie has been assuming that Israel is his true ally in his peace efforts. He believes that disintegration of the U.N. and renewed warfare could result in the annihilation of the remnants of the Jewish people and would jeopardize Israel's existence.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 275 and n. 3 *ibid.*
2. See No. 290.

281. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 15 June 1950

Notes

1. Cf. Nos. 268 and 270.
2. Jules Moch, French Vice-Premier and Minister of the Interior, until April 1950.

282. S. Divon [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett. 16 June 1950

Copy: 130.02/2408/13

Summary

Divon believes that there are no obvious indications that Abdallah has succeeded in overcoming the internal opposition to an agreement with Israel, nor are there any signs that the British actively support such an agreement. The British stance – one of neutrality, or at best sympathetic neutrality – poses difficulties for the King in recruiting support for an agreement with Israel. The King's hopes that following the elections in his country he would win public support for his policy towards Israel, came to nought. Although the King's position was strengthened, the elections had no impact on Jordan's political activity.

283. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 21 June 1950

Notes

1. Sharett replied that he wholly agreed with Eban's opinion (see telegram LS1139, 22 June 1950, 93.03/68/14).

284. A. Levavi (Moscow) to W. Eytan. 21 June 1950

Coded Tel.: PI488; Recd: 22 June; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

The Chinese Chargé d'affaires in Moscow visited Levavi and in accordance with instructions from Peking, asked him whether Israel intended to establish a diplomatic representation in China. Levavi replied that he was not aware of the exact situation, but that several months ago the inclination was to maintain contacts through Moscow.[1] He promised to clarify the situation in Israel and to apprise him of the results.

Subsequently a friendly conversation ensued in which words of mutual esteem were exchanged. Levavi made it clear that Israel strongly desired relations with China and that the cause of the delay in the exchange of representatives is financial. He requests instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 198.
2. In a second telegram Levavi suggested that the Israeli Minister to Moscow be accredited to Peking as a non-resident Minister; he would come to Peking to present his credentials and on other special occasions, and his name would appear on the Chinese diplomatic register. The Chinese, on their part, would be free to do likewise or to open a full legation in Israel. (See Levavi to Eytan, P1490, 22 June 1950, 130.09/2325/4.)
3. See No. 289.

285. A. Eban [New York] to A. Cordier (New York). 22 June 1950

Notes

1. See Eban to Sharett, X193, 21 June 1950, 130.09/2329/9.
2. See No. 307.

286. A. Eban [New York] to J. Ross (New York). 23 June 1950

Notes

1. See No. 257.
2. The document enclosed is on file but has not been printed here.
3. See Main Volume, No. 257, pp. 357–61.
4. See No. 319. Similar letters were sent to the delegations of Britain, Sweden, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, Iceland, Uruguay, Canada, the Netherlands, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Chile.

287. S. Eliashiv (Prague) to W. Eytan. 23 June 1950

Orig.: 130.11/2503/5

Summary

The Jewish community in Czechoslovakia has been considerably stirred up lately on the subject of *aliya.* It is difficult to estimate the number of persons seeking to emigrate, perhaps only several hundred, and possibly more. It is hard to foresee what the authorities' reaction will be. They will presumably deal with the requests on an individual basis, with a favourable bias. *Aliya* will probably begin in the near future and Eliashiv intends to bring up the matter with the Czech President and with the Foreign Minister.

Notes

1. See Eliashiv to the East European Division, 22 June 1950, 130.09/2342/15.
2. One paragraph has been omitted here; it deals with Ben-Gurion's speech in the Knesset, from which lack of gratitude for Czech help during the war of independence could perhaps have been inferred.
3. Yehoshua Shai, Director-General of the Ministry of Immigration.

288. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Keren (Washington). 25 June 1950

Orig.: 93.08/376/46

Summary

Eytan thanks Keren for his letter of 31 May[1] on the relations between Israel and the U.S. He agrees with the general line Keren proposes which, in effect, is the policy successfully adopted by the Embassy during the past year. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should, however, also consider the other side of the question, and in the lack of its restraining hand Israel's foreign policy will gallop full speed towards total identification with the West. It is necessary, therefore, to give occasionally a warning signal, and this what is implied in cable HK/94[2] which deals with Israel's reaction to the Three Power declaration. The entire subject will be discussed in depth at a forthcoming meeting of Israel's ministers[3] and Ambassador Elath will have an opportunity to present in full the viewpoint of the Embassy in Washington.

Notes

1. No. 263.
2. No. 253.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 164.

289. Meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Tel Aviv]. 25 June 1950

Memorandum: 130.02/2385/31

Summary

It was resolved to instruct the Counsellor in the Legation in Moscow to give an affirmative reply to the Chinese Embassy there regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations.[1] The proposal to appoint the Minister to Moscow as the Minister to Peking as well appears logical although the form of the relations should be discussed only after the Chinese have given a positive reply in principle.[3]

The second part of the consultation dealt with Israeli property in Shanghai.

Notes

1. See No. 284.
2. Moshe Bartur, Assistant Director of the Economic Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. At the end of June the Cabinet decided in principle to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Republic but to postpone the implementation until the situation in the Far East cleared up (see Eytan's telegram to the Israeli Legation in Moscow, IP394, 30 June 1950, 130.09/2325/3). See additional documents on this matter in file 130.02/2385/31.

290. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 26 June 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2423/12

Summary

Eytan has read Trygve Lie's letter to Sharett,[1] his ten-point memorandum and Eban's report on his talk with the U.N. Secretary-General.[2] He believes Lie's letter should not be considered a routine circular, but a communication addressed specially to the Israeli Foreign Minister, and it deserves an appropriate reply.

Except for a number of reservations Lie's letter contains no points with which Israel would find it hard to identify wholeheartedly. Eytan feels that Israel has been given an opportunity to make a substantial contribution to the efforts for world-wide peace. Israel's unique position enables her to speak out unequivocally and without hesitation. He suggests that the matter be discussed at the forthcoming conference of envoys abroad.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 275, n. 3.
2. No. 280.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 164.

291. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 26 June 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2441/3

Summary

Eban reports on the present relations with the Conciliation Commission. During the first year of the Commission's existence, Israel's relations with it were not satisfactory, owing to continuous pressure on Israel to make far-reaching concessions in the refugee, the territorial and the Jerusalem issues. This pressure exerted by the Commission was in effect an obstacle to peace, as the Arabs thought they had gained a powerful ally of international standing. Moreover, any conflict with the Commission turned immediately into a confrontation with the U.N. and in particular with the member states of the Commission - the U.S.A., France and Turkey, and thus served to increase the general tension between Israel and the world community.

A certain improvement has taken place lately in the Commission's attitude towards Israel. The demands for unilateral concessions have not been renewed and the Commission has seemingly gone along with Israel's insistence that only direct negotiations free of any preconditions could bring peace nearer, and has even urged the Arabs to accept Israel's viewpoint. The relaxation in tension has been particularly noticeable in the case of the

American representatives, relations with whom are now entirely satisfactory.

Nevertheless, one must not regard these developments as nullifying the dangers inherent in the Commission's very existence. The issues pending between Israel and the Arabs have not been resolved. If and when the Arab states agree to negotiate, the Commission and the countries represented on it will have to deal with all the thorny problems on the agenda, and it is highly doubtful whether the Commission, by its nature, can contribute to the achievement of peace; Eban is afraid it may even do harm to the process.

Eban thus draws the following conclusions:

It is not in Israel's interest to extricate the Commission from the stalemate it has now reached. Should the Commission succeed in making the parties meet for direct negotiations, the dynamics of the process must then result in conflicting proposals by the parties, compromise proposals by the Commission, and pressure by the United States to accept the compromise. It is therefore best to let the Commission stay immobilized, with its ineffectuality evident to the entire world. In the long run, efforts should be made to have this body dissolved, as it cannot be foreseen what harm it may do out of sheer boredom and impatience. It could even be charged with handling the Jerusalem issue...

As there is no prospect of the U.N. or the U.S. proposing on their own initiative that the Commission be dissolved, the only way of this being achieved is by transferring its powers to the Mixed Armistice Commissions. Israel would attain in this way some of her political aims, such as direct and separate negotiations based on the Armistice agreements. The transfer of the Commission's mandate to the Mixed Armistice Commissions would not harm the prestige of the U.N. as these commissions too act under its aegis. Nor would the U.S. suffer, as it would have a hand in the proceedings through General Riley, Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commissions.

Reports have it that General Riley has been thinking along similar lines for some time now. Israel should make efforts to urge the U.N. Secretariat in the same direction.

292. M. Sasson (Tel Aviv) to E. Sasson (Ankara). 27 June 1950

Copy: 130.15/2568/1

Summary

Moshe Sasson reports on the latest developments in the negotiations with King Abdallah. The King invited Shiloah for a talk and informed him that the conditions for negotiations were now more favourable that ever, although there still remain several grave difficulties, mainly the opposition

of several members of his Cabinet. He proposed including two or three ministers in a Jordanian delegation which would discuss all matters remaining unsettled. The King also agreed to Shiloah's proposal that the negotiations be conducted uninterruptedly.

Sasson accordingly sums up the situation: On the face of it, the King has not changed his attitude, though that of his Cabinet ministers is more reserved. The Prime Minister, for example, does not object in principle to an agreement, but makes his consent to and participation in negotiations conditional on the terms of the agreement. As for the British, the impression is once again that they are not interested in an Israeli–Jordanian settlement, but would prefer the talks to continue.

Notes

1. These reports have not been traced, but see Biran's letter to Sharett, 25 June 1950, 130.02/2408/13.
2. The report has not been traced.
3. Several paragraphs have been omitted here.

Editorial Note

Turning Point in the Korean War

In the last week of June there was a reversal on the battlefield in Korea. The Northern forces penetrated the Southern zone on a wide front and advanced to within some 20 km from the capital Seoul; the Southern defence seemed to have crumbled.

The Security Council convened for an emergency meeting on 25 June. Following a short debate, the Council resolved to call for a cease-fire and for the withdrawal of the Northern forces to the 38th parallel, for U.N. supervision of the withdrawal and for all possible efforts to be made by the member states "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities". The Soviet Union absented itself from the debate. The resolution was brought to the knowledge of all the member states.

Following military and political conclusions in Washington, and on the strength of the Security Council's resolution, President Truman announced on 27 June that he had instructed the U.S. Army and Air Force to aid the South Korean forces and to reinforce the American defensive deployment in Formosa and the Philippines.

293. G. Rafael and A. Lourie [New York] to M. Sharett. 28 June 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.
2. Lourie had reported on a telephone conversation he had had with Ross of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. The latter had informed him of the President's announcement on Korea and added that the U.S. was expecting support by the member states of the U.N.; Lourie thought that moral support was intended here. (See Lourie to Eytan, 27 June 1950, 93.01/2202/11.)
3. Abraham H. Feller, Legal Adviser to the U.N.

294. M. Keren [Washington] to the United States Division. 29 June 1950

Notes

1. No. 293.
2. See No. 298 and Editorial Note, pp. 159–60.

295. A. Eban (London) to A. Lourie (New York). 29 June 1950

Notes

1. See No. 293 and n. 2 *ibid.*

296. M. Keren (Washington) to the United States Division. 29 June 1950

Notes

1. See No. 315.

297. E. Avriel (Bucharest) to M. Walter. 29 June 1950

Copy: 130.02/2457/19

Summary

Avriel comes out against the view prevalent in Israel that the continuation of *aliya* from Rumania is out of danger. Something odd and unprecedented happened here. The Rumanian Government decided to permit *aliya* of its own accord and not as the result of negotiations with Israeli representatives. When it realized that the number of applications was very large and included persons in senior positions, it did not revoke its decision but launched an unprecedented campaign of propaganda and intimidation.

It is anybody's guess whether the situation will deteriorate. In the past few weeks there have been several instances of passports being refused or revoked on the eve of departure. There is great apprehension and nervousness. The Israeli representatives have approached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the shipping company asking that Israeli ships also be used in transporting the immigrants.

Notes

1. See Halevy to the East European Division, 29 June 1950, 130.11/2503/1.
2. Several paragraphs, dealing with additional personnel for the Legation, have been omitted here.

298. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 30 June 1950

299. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 30 June 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2423/12

Eytan proposes a solution to the U.S.–Soviet dispute over China, consisting in the absence of any Chinese representative at the U.N., at least for the time being. The next U.N. Assembly had beter convene without the Chinese than without the Russians. The Soviet Union never insisted on the People's Republic of China being represented at the U.N., their demand in the first instance was to oust the Nationalists. Neither is the U.S. insisting at this moment on the sovereignty of the Formosan Government. A solution of this nature will enable the Soviets once again to participate in U.N. institutions. The U.S. will presumably agree to oust the Formosan representative, provided no mainland representatives are accredited.

Eytan suggests three alternatives in the implementation of his proposal:

1. To submit it to the Secretary-General who will then present it to both parties.
2. To submit the proposal simultaneously to the U.S. and to the Soviet Union.
3. To bring it before the British Government which has recognized the Chinese People's Republic and is also the U.S.'s closest ally.[1]

Notes

1. Sharett's response to this proposal has not been traced. The delegation to the U.N. reacted unfavourably; in their opinion, the U.N. Organization was at the moment deeply involved in the Korean crisis and would not take time off to deal with the Chinese representation; on merits, the proposal was inconsistent with the U.N. Charter, and it was besides highly doubtful whether the Soviets would assent to it. (See Lourie and Rafael to Eytan, X223, 30 June 1950, 130.09/2329/9.)

300. A. Lourie (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 30 June 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 156.
2. Lourie had sent a list of the countries announcing their support of the Security Council resolution on Korea and also the text of the Uruguay delegation's statement (see his telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 June 1950, 130.09/2329/9).
3. Telegram untraced. Following the events in Korea and the Security Council's resolution, the Indian Government declared its support of peacemaking in Korea and the Security Council's resolution. It added, however, that it had no intention to change its general foreign policy based on the furtherance of peace and expressed its hope that it would be possible to settle the Korean dispute by means of mediation.

301. M. Keren (New York) to A. Eban (London). 30 June 1950

Notes

1. See No. 293.
2. No. 295.

302. M. Keren (Washington) to M. Sharett. 1 July 1950

Notes

1. Untraced, but reference is presumably to a telegram identical with No. 298.
2. See No. 293.
3. See No. 300 and n. 3 *ibid.*
4. See No. 306.
5. At the beginning of July, David Horowitz was on a visit to the United States to deal with some of Israel's economic problems, including oil supply from the Western hemisphere, an additional loan from the Export–Import Bank, and matters touching the U.J.A. (See Horowitz to Sharett, 14 July 1950, 130.02/2421/5.)

303. M. Keren (Washington) to M. Sharett. 1 July 1950

Notes

1. See No. 302 and n. 1 *ibid.*

Editorial Note

Government's Decision on Korea

On 2 July the Government adopted the following resolution:

The Government of Israel opposes and condemns aggression wherever it may occur and from whatever quarter it may emanate. In ful-

fillment of her clear obligations under the Charter, Israel supports the Security Council in its efforts to put an end to the breach of the peace in Korea and to retore peace in that area. The Government of Israel hopes that the United Nations will continue its endeavours to align all the Great Powers in a common effort for safeguarding the peace of the world.

304. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Keren. 2 July 1950

Notes

1. See No. 306.
2. See Editorial Note above.
3. See No. 293.

305. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 3 July 1950

Notes

1. See Nos. 293, 302.

306. M. Keren [Washington] to the United States Division. 3 July 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.
2. No. 304.
3. No. 117.
4. Jean Benard, First Secretary in the French Embassy in Washington.

307. C. de Boisanger (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 3 July 1950

Notes

1. See No. 285

308. C. de Boisanger (Geneva) to M. Sharett. 4 July 1950

Notes

1. No. 228. (The original date of the letter dispatched from Israel was 6 May, the date of 8 May referring to a following letter, sent by cable, and including two corrections of the original version – see Kahany to the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission, 8 May 1950, 130.02/2441/3.)
2. See Nos. 232 and 262.
3. No. 157.
4. See No. 197.

Editorial Note

Knesset Debate on Korea

Following the Government's statement on Israel's position on the Korean conflict (see Editorial Note above), some of the opposition factions moved for a parliamentary debate on that statement. The debate opened with a speech by the Foreign Minister, who reviewed the developments leading to the hostilities in Korea and explained the Government's considerations in supporting the resolutions adopted by the Security Council. Sharett stressed that by this act Israel had not become a party to the inter-bloc conflict but had only discharged her obligations under the U.N. Charter, contributed to strengthening the authority of this Organization and gave practical effect to her devotion to peace. At the conclusion of the debate which followed the speech, the Government's line was endorsed by a large majority, the right-wing parties joining the coalition. (See Information for Israel Missions Abroad, No. 87, 7 July 1950, 130.20/2498/9; Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Knesset, 4 July 1950, *ibid.*).

309. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 5 July 1950

310. Y. Shimoni [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett. 6 July 1950

Copy: 130.20/2489/9

Summary

Shimoni has some second thoughts on Israel's position on the Korean issue.

(1) The assumption is that Israel's support of the U.N. resolution was intended solely to condemn North Korea's armed invasion of the South, and not as taking a stand in principle on the issue itself.

(2) Israel, as is well known, remained neutral in the conflict prior to the invasion. Shimoni assumes that this stand has not been affected by the last developments, and that as soon as the North Koreans withdraw to the 38th parallel and hostilities cease, Israel will again state her neutrality in the issue.

(3) Without wishing to affect Israel's present policy, the following remarks seem to him relevant to the merits of the case: (a) the partition of Korea was carried out without the inhabitants themselves having any say in the matter; (b) the South Korean regime is corrupt and oppressive; (c) the North Korean regime seems to be more efficient and more acceptable to the people; (d) in the absence of outside intervention, the North Korean forces would have most probably taken over the entire South very rapidly.

(4) Israel's statement at the U.N. and also the speeches of the Prime

Minister and of the Foreign Minister in the Knesset announcing Israel's support of the U.N.'s intervention have overshadowed, in Shimoni's opinion, Israel's basic neutrality in the issue. Israel should, he thinks, stress her neutral stand in announcements and press briefings and in statements to be handed out by Israel's envoys in the Eastern European capitals.[2]

(5) In addition, India's example should be followed in emphasizing that the Korean affair has not affected Israel's position versus Communist China.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 159–60.
2. See No. 305.

311. M. Namir (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 6 July 1950

Coded Tel. PI498; Recd: 7 July; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Namir reports on his meeting with Shchiborin at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He conveyed to the latter the contents of Israel's statement on Korea[1] and also added oral clarifications in accordance with his instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[2] Shchiborin replied that there was an internal contradiction in Israel's stand. In theory Israel supports the U.N. Charter, but in practice she backs the Security Council's resolution which constitutes unilateral armed intervention. Namir replied that Israel had refrained from becoming embroiled in the formal dispute over who was the guilty party in the Korean conflict and that, jointly with all the major powers, she was seeking a political means of restoring peace. He asked Shchiborin to consider the complete text of Israel's statement and not only any particular section. Shchiborin requested an additional translation of the second paragraph of the statement, but then again declared that his opinion remained unchanged. In conclusion he promised to convey the gist of the conversation to his superiors.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 159–60.
2. See No. 305.

312. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to C. de Boisanger (Geneva). 9 July 1950

Notes

1. No. 272.
2. No. 157.
3. No. 228.

313. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Hatta (Djakarta). 9 July 1950

Notes

1. See No. 138 and n. 3 *ibid.*

314. A. Lourie (New York) to M. Sharett. 10 July 1950

Notes

1. In a previous telegram Rafael had reported that both Bunche and Cordier thought the Conciliation Commission should be dissolved and its powers transferred to the Mixed Armistice Commissions, and that this was also the opinion of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. (See telegram to Sharett, X228A, 8 July 1950, 93.01/2202/13.) See also Nos. 283 and 291.
2. At the end of May and the beginning of June, numerous border incidents occurred in the Mount Hebron area owing to infiltrations to Israel territory, mostly with the object of theft or harvesting the crops across the border. The captured infiltrators were as a rule returned to Jordan. In one case, a group of some 120 infiltrators was returned in the region south of the Dead Sea, some of them later complaining that they had been treated brutally and even tortured.

315. O. Gass (Washington) to E. Kaplan. 10 July 1950

Notes

1. Kaplan had reviewed Israel's economic progress in the previous year and the development plans for the future. He stated that Israel had set herself a target of doubling her agricultural produce till the beginning of 1952 and for that a credit of $35 million was necessary. A sum twice as large would be invested from Israel's own resources. (See Kaplan to Gaston, 30 May 1950, 93.03/84/11.)
2. See No. 320.

316. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 13 July 1950

Notes

1. See, for instance, No. 274.
2. No. 257.
3. Following this conversation, and in order to prevent misunderstandings, Sharett requested Fischer to explain to Schuman clearly Israel's position on the Holy Places in Nazareth: Israel was proposing that the arrangement proposed by her for Jerusalem would apply also to the holy sites in Nazareth, namely the Roman Catholic Church of the Annunciation and Joseph's Workshop, on condition that the Vatican consider this settlement as final and waive any further demands. The approach to the Vatican should be made by Schuman. In the event of a refusal, Israel would consider herself discharged of all further responsibility in the matter. (See Sharett to Fischer, TPA159, 10 August 1950, 130.09/2344/3.)
4. See Editorial Note, p. 161.

317. A. Lourie (New York) to M. Sharett. 16 July 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 172–3.
2. Sharett referred to the Secretary-General's appeal at a press conference on 16 July. He stated the matter had not yet been discussed by the Government, but he thought it unlikely that Israel would dispatch armed forces to Korea in view of the fact that she was surrounded by Arab states which still maintained a state of war with her. (See *Davar*, 17 July 1950.) For Israel's official reply, see No. 330.

Editorial Note

Meeting of Israel Ministers Abroad

A conference of the heads of all Israel's missions abroad took place from 17 to 23 July 1950. The participants included also the Foreign Minister, senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, some other senior government officials, the Chief of the General Staff and several senior Army officers, and the Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. The Prime Minister and the Finance Minister addressed the conference.

The two main points on the agenda were: Israel's position in the inter-bloc conflict *vis-à-vis* the Korean crisis and the forthcoming session of the U.N. Assembly, and the problem of the relations with Jewish communities in the Diaspora. Some problems connected with Israel–Arab relations were also discussed, and lectures were given on the country's economic situation and problems of development and absorption of new immigrants. For a full record of the conference see: *Conference of Heads of Missions Abroad,* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, July 1950, also filed under 130.02/2384/15.

318. A. Lourie (New York) to M. Sharett. 17 July 1950

Notes

1. Lourie had reported on his and Rafael's meeting with Cordier on the eve of the latter and Bunche's meeting with U.S. State Department officials and the U.S. delegation to the U.N. The renewal of the peace effort in the Middle East was discussed as well as the transfer of the powers of the Conciliation Commission to the Mixed Armistice Commission (see No. 314). Cordier promised his support on both issues. (See Lourie to Sharett, 14 July 1950, 130.09/2329/9.)
2. Samuel K.C. Kopper, Acting Deputy-Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the U.S. State Department.
3. Untraced.

319. Meeting: A. Lourie - J.C. Ross (New York, 19 July 1950)

Notes

1. See No. 286.
2. No. 257.
3. See No. 318.
4. See No. 317.

320. O. Gass (Washington) to E. Kaplan. 20 July 1950

Notes

1. Walter Charles Sauer, Vice President of the Export-Import Bank, Washington.
2. See No. 315 and n. 1 *ibid.*

321. M. Tov (New York) to A. Eban (Tel Aviv). 21 July 1950

Notes

1. See Tov to Eban, X295, X296, 21 July 1950, 24 July 1950, 93.01/2202/15. Tov listed his talks with various Latin American delegations to the U.N. and stressed that, in spite of expressions of support of Israel's position on the part of delegates to the U.N. he knew there were opposing factors in the countries themselves; it was important therefore that the draft resolution on Jerusalem be submitted by another country, for instance Canada or Sweden. Tov himself should make a round of the Latin American capitals.

322. A. Lourie (New York) to M. Sharett. 24 July 1950

Notes

1. Niles had expressed his anxiety over the wide publicity accorded to Sharett's statement that Israel would not dispatch a military contingent to Korea (see Editorial Note, pp. 172-3). Certain circles had interpreted this statement to mean that Israel was going back on her previously voiced support of the U.N. action in Korea. (See Lourie to Sharett, X281, 18 July 1950, 130.09/2329/9.)
2. Samuel Rosenman, American jurist, formerly (1943-1946) Special Counsellor to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman.

323. M. Keren (Washington) to the United States Division. 27 July 1950

Notes

1. Sharett had requested that it be made clear that the Government of Israel did not have second thoughts concerning her decision on Korea and had no intention whatever of going back on it (see the United States Division to the Delegation to the U.N., 20 July 1950, 130.09/2338/10).
2. Reference is to the State Department's opposition to have the loan from the Export-Import Bank used for improving the water supply system in Jerusalem.

No. 323 – Notes (continued)

3. On 25 July an Israeli fighter plane intercepted a Lebanese aircraft which had encroached on Israel's airspace north of Rosh Pinna. The Lebanese pilot ignored instructions to land in Israel, and in the ensuing chase, which took place partly over Lebanese territory, some of the Lebanese plane's passengers were hit. The Lebanese anouncement stated that two of the passengers had been killed and seven others injured.
4. For a full report of the conversation see file 130.02/2394/20.

324. A. Lourie (New York) to M. Sharett. 27 July 1950

Notes

1. See No. 318.
2. Sir Hubert Gladwyn Jebb, Britain's Permanent Representative at the U.N. from Summer 1950.
3. Yussuf Haykal, Jordanian Minister in Washington; represented Jordan at the Security Council's discussions.
4. Article 8 of the Israel–Jordan Armistice Agreement dealt with the establishment of a special mixed commission for the solution of outstanding problems emanating from that agreement.

325. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 28 July 1950

Copy: 130.02/2408/13

Summary

Eytan reports on his meeting with J. Quimper, the Conciliation Commission's Permanent Representative in Jerusalem. On that morning Quimper had met King Abdallah and now wished to inform the Israelis of his impressions.

In his opinion, there are no prospects of a Jordanian–Israeli agreement in the near future. Abdallah's hands are tied. Those most vehemently opposed to any contacts are Sa'id al-Mufti and Samir al-Rifa'i, who are conducting an energetic campaign against the King's intentions.

It appears that at the moment the sentiments in Jordan are that an understanding with the Egyptians and cooperation with the Arab world are preferable to an agreement with Israel. The prevalent opinion in Jordan is that the Arab world, including Jordan, must utilize the next few years for rearmament and consolidation of Arab unity so as to be able to destroy Israel when the time arrives.

Quimper added that the U.S. and Great Britain also consider the *status quo* as the best possible solution for the time being, which is why they stopped pressuring Jordan some time ago.

Notes

1. Fallah al-Madadiha, Minister of Interior in the Jordanian Government.

326. M. Keren [Washington] to M. Sharett. 28 July 1950

copy: 93.03/64/5

Summary

Keren adds some comments to Lourie's letter on Israel–U.S. relations.[1]

Keren believes that Israel is mistaken in supposing that the Americans demand of her a dramatic once-and-for-all step demonstrating a shift in orientation and abandonment of the non-alignment policy. In his opinion, Israel is faced now by a continuous process demanding recurrent decisions: the decision on Korea created a good impression but now a decision is required on whether Israel's participation in the U.N.'s war effort will be active or nominal; when this is resolved another problem will arise, and so on.

There is seemingly inadequate understanding in Israel of the Americans' sensitiveness regarding the struggle against communism. Statements and acts viewed in Israel as trivial may resound in the U.S. Out of all proportion to their real importance. There is less and less understanding here for the position of countries such as Israel wishing to preserve their independence in thought and deed.

These matters would not be of such concern to the Embassy here were it not for Israel's growing dependence on financial aid from the U.S. If Israel wishes to receive such aid, she must execute a shift in her orientation. Again, a ceremonious declaration is not necessary and it may even create the negative impression of Israel selling her independence for a mess of potage – what is required is the adoption of a new political style and a long-term and consistent policy.

Notes

1. No. 322.
2. *Ibid.*, n. 1.
3. The enclosure has not been traced.
4. Heinz Gruenbaum, Director of the Investment Centre in the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

327. R. Shiloah [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett. 30 July 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2445/1

Summary

Shiloah fears that in the next few months Israel will face a renewed political offensive on the refugee issue.

It would be expedient for Israel to take the initiative in good time in order to rob her enemies of their tactical advantage, by devising a constructive plan for the solution of the refugee problem and submitting it without

delay to the U.S., to Britain and to the U.N. secretariat. Shiloah suggests the following basic lines:

(1) According to the Clapp Group report[1] and other expert opinion, all the refugees can be resettled in the Arab countries if the necessary financial aid is forthcoming and the Arab states agree to the project.

(2) Israel will participate in the creation of a central fund for this project by paying compensation for Arab property in Israel, and will also agree to direct to this fund reparations owed her by the Arab states for war damage.

(3) The Arab states will also undertake to support this project financially, the balance of the money to come from international sources.

(4) Israel's readiness to pay compensation and to waive reparation for war damage is naturally conditional on the resettlement project being actually carried out and also on the readiness of the Arab states to negotiate a peace settlement.

Shiloah remarks that though in reality no one seriously expects the Arab states to pay war reparations to Israel, yet the plan ostensibly contains far-reaching concessions on Israel's part; its submission would thus result in a significant tactical advantage for Israel even if the Arab states reject it and even if the U.N. and the U.S. consider that the proposals do not go far enough.

Notes

1. See No. 34 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. See Editorial Note below.

Editorial Note

Meeting Between the Government of Israel and American Zionist Leaders

A number of leaders of the Zionist movement in the United States and of the United Jewish Appeal arrived in Israel at the end of June 1950 for discussions on the future of the drives for financial aid to Israel. Among the arrivals were Nahum Goldmann, Rose Halprin and Henry Montor, Executive Vice-Chairman of the United Jewish Appeal. During three days the visitors held meetings with officials of the Jewish Agency and with members of the Government in which Abba Eban and Eliahu Elath – who were then on a home visit – also participated. The outcome of the discussions was that about a milliard-and-a-half dollars would be needed by Israel during the next three years for the absorption of from 600,000 to 1,000,000 new immigrants; two thirds of this sum would come from the United States, the Jews there to raise $500,000,000 partly as donations and partly through purchase of bonds, and a similar sum to be forthcoming from U.S. Government sources.

328. Consultation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[1] 1 August 1950

Resumé: 130.10/2539/1

Summary

Germany's international standing has been improving rapidly, as is evident from the following:

(1) Germany is today one of the most important political factors on the world scene. The question on whose side will this state deploy its tremendous industrial and military potential is one of key interest in current international relations.

(2) Germany's economic and industrial recovery has resulted in commercial expansion and a search for foreign markets.

(3) Germany has attained worldwide moral rehabilitation, except in Israel and the Jewish diaspora.

(4) Germany's integration in the Marshall Plan and in the European community has contributed to her importance and her influence.

(5) There is a steady lessening in the influence of the occupation authorities in Germany.

If we except the moral issues, then Israel has the following claims against Germany:

(1) Restitution of Jewish property.

(2) Compensation to victims of Nazi atrocities for physical and mental suffering.

(3) The future of the heirless Jewish property.

(4) The question of communal Jewish property in localities where the Jewish communities have disappeared.

(5) Reparations.

The first two points are more or less covered by legislation adopted in the various states of the Federal Republic. The third and the fourth are being dealt with by the J.R.S.O., a New York corporation representing the Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Agency, the World Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Congress, it is too early to say with what effectiveness.

The problem of reparations is the most difficult one; the following assertions may be made about it:

(1) The claim for reparations will remain valid even if all the other claims are met in full. One has to remember that the legislation touching restitution of private property, compensation for bodily injury and so on, covers only the territory of Germany, and not even always all of Germany, while the question of reparations embraces all the acts of the German Reich perpetrated during the Second World War in Germany and in all the occupied territories. The reparations will be in effect a historical gesture by Germany *vis-à-vis* the Jewish people consisting of a comprehensive payment to be in some proportion to the damage incurred.

(2) Germany's interest in making such a gesture is based on (a) her strong desire to be readmitted to the family of nations; (b) the conviction of some of Germany's leaders that the stigma of Hitlerism will always be an obstacle in their path; (c) the belief of some of Germany's leaders that Jews exert a great deal of influence in certain countries which could obstruct Germany's readmission to the family of nations.

(3) The State of Israel has a right to the reparations not only because it claims to be the only state in the world to represent the entire Jewish people but also because the other nations recognize that claim. This notwithstanding the fact that there are several large Jewish communities outside the State of Israel.

(4) The question whether the Jewish claim has any legal basis cannot be answered by a simple "yes" or "no". A case can be made out for either contention, but in the final analysis the decision does not lie within the province of law but within the province of politics and of goodwill. This, of course, does not free Israel of the necessity of submitting a well-grounded and well-documented formal claim.

(5) If Germany agrees to pay the reparations she will most probably demand guarantees that (a) no other body or person will advance any claims on the same moral or legal grounds, and (b) that resolution of the conflict between Germany and the Jewish people will not serve as a precedent in the case of other bodies laying similar claims.

(6) Restitution of private property concerns individual claimants, and it is difficult to see how the State of Israel can take a hand in this matter.

(7) The state can intervene in claims for compensation for bodily and mental suffering, at least as far a citizens of Israel are concerned.

(8) The question of "transfer" remains open as it is dependent on short-term conditions which cannot be foreseen at this time.

The management of Jewish interests in Germany is at the moment in a completely chaotic state. All manner of individuals, lawyers, various organizations – Jewish and non-Jewish, the Jewish Agency and also the State of Israel – all these are active in Germany and contribute to the disorder, to the detriment of the Jewish interests.

There is a general consensus that this state of affairs must not continue, and that the State of Israel should be given the exclusive right to negotiate with the Germans. Immediate steps should be taken in this direction, both because of what has been said above and also because a special commission of the three Western powers is sitting now in London working on the formulation of a new status for West Germany. Similar steps are presumably being taken to define the relations between East Germany and the Soviet Union.

It is hardly necessary to dwell on Israel's fundamental attitude towards the problem of the relations with Germany. Two points have however to be emphasized: (a) the Jewish people and the State of Israel oppose renewed Jewish settlement in Germany and Jewish investments in Germany and are in favour of severing whatever few ties still remain between that coun-

try and the Jewish people; (b) accordingly, Israel wishes to resolve all those elements of the conflict which are now capable of solution.

The operative conclusions from all that has been said above are as follows:

(1) The State of Israel, in coordination with all the relevant Jewish organizations, should take over the handling of all the Israeli and Jewish claims against Germany.

(2) Israel should follow closely the development in the relations between Germany and the Western powers.

(3) Sporadic meetings and declarations are not enough: long term, persevering and consistent diplomatic activity is necessary here.

(4) A special mission should be therefore dispatched to Germany to deal with all that touches the problem of reparations, emphasis being placed on the provisional nature and limited mandate of this mission.

(5) Cardinal importance should be attached to the choice of the head of this mission.

(6) The following steps should be taken immediately:

(a) the Western powers should be urged to recognize the necessity of an Israeli mission to be accredited to the three High Commissioners in Germany, who are today invested with the authority of conducting Germany's foreign affairs;

(b) similar diplomatic action should be simultaneously directed at the High Commissioners;

(c) letters of credence to the High Commissioners are valid also for German authorities – this will obviate the unpleasant need of presenting letters of credence to the Germans;

(d) simultaneously with the dispatch of the mission to Germany a corresponding department should be set up in the Foreign Ministry.

The participants in the consultation decided unanimously that the present memorandum should be submitted to the Government with a request to discuss urgently the problematics of the relations with Germany.[4]

Notes

1. The following participated in the consultation: J. Robinson, S. Rosenne, B. Guriel, G. Meron, G. Avner, Katriel Katz, M. Bartur, K. Mendelsohn, S. Adler-Rudel.
2. See C. Weizmann to W. Churchill, 22 May 1945, W.A.
3. The Paris Agreement on the division of war reparations from Germany was signed at the beginning of 1946. Article 8 of the agreement dealt with the alotment of part of the reparations to stateless victims of the Nazi regime.
4. An additional consultation on Germany took place on 8 August, with the participation of the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, the Treasurer of the Jewish Agency, and a number of senior government officials. It was resolved to set up a committee headed by Peretz Naphtali to formulate and submit to the Government within a week a detailed draft proposal on the status of the contemplated Israeli mission to Germany and its mandate. In the event of no agreement on a single proposal being reached in the committee, two alternative drafts would be submitted for the Government's approval. The possibility of previous consultation with the Jewish Agency was also raised. (See the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Legal Adviser, 10 August 1950, 130.10/2543/1.) See also No. 366.

329. A. Lourie and G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 2 August 1950

Notes

1. The Soviets renewed their participation in the session of the Security Council at the beginning of August.
2. See Keren to the United States Division (telegram W242, 3 August 1950, 93.01/2202/15), in which the former recommends a positive response to the U.N. Secretary-General's appeal for help, even if only of a symbolic nature.

Editorial Note

United Nations Secretary-General Request for Military Assistance to United Nations Forces in Korea

On 14 July 1950 the Secretary-General of the United Nations cabled to all those Member States which had voiced their support of the Security Council resolution on Korea, asking for effective aid for the U.N. forces. The appeal differed in a number of details from addressee to addressee, but the main points, which were also addressed to Israel, were as follows:

1. "I am informed that the Government of the United States which under the resolution of 7 July 1950 has been given the responsibility for the Unified Command, is now preparing to engage in direct consultations with Governments with regard to the co-ordination of assistance in a general plan for the attainment of the objective set forth in the Security Council resolutions".
2. "I have been advised that the Unified Command (U.S.G.) is in urgent need of additional effective assistance. I should be grateful, therefore, if your Government would consider the possibility of such assistance, including combat forces, particularly ground forces".
3. "Offers of assistance should be communicated to the Secretary-General. In the case of military assistance offers should be communicated to the Secretary-General, in general terms, leaving detailed arrangements for such an agreement between the Government and the United Command (U.S.G.)".

The Foreign Ministry delayed its reply until the responses of some other Member States become known. At a Government meeting on 3 August Sharett reported that several states undertook to dispatch military contingents, others promised non-military aid, and still others gave an evasive reply. He himself proposed that Israel should offer medical aid while explaining that the uncertain situation on her borders did not allow the dispatch of a military contingent.

The ensuing debate was opened by the Prime Minister, who demanded that Israel not limit herself to humanitarian aid and that a military force, even if in purely nominal strength, be dispatched to Korea. In Ben-

Gurion's opinion, the war in Korea was no longer a phase in the cold war between the blocs but the struggle of the United Nations Organization against aggression; Israel, herself a victim of aggression, must not stand idly by. Participation in the war will enhance Israel's image internationally and in the Diaspora. Ben-Gurion proposed that the military contingent be composed of volunteers.

All the members of the Government were unanimous in their opposition to Ben-Gurion's proposal. Sharett was most vigorous in his objections, arguing that public opinion in Israel would be opposed to such a step, that the Army would be thrown into ferment, and that a heavy burden would fall on Israel's international relations. He was also dubious about the standard of behaviour of a unit made up of volunteers necessarily of an adventurous disposition. Sharett opposed further delay or the dispatch of an evasive reply, fearing that these would invite pressures on Israel.

Sharett's original proposal was ultimately adopted, Ben-Gurion, while remarking that the majority should be allowed to make a mistake, joining Sharett in drafting Israel's reply – for which see Main Volume, No. 330. (See Government meeting, 3 August 1950; *SCOR, Fifth Year, Supplement*, June–August 1950, U.N. Document S/1619.)

330. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to T. Lie (New York). 3 August 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above; No. 317.
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 159–60.

331. A. Eban [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett. 4 August 1950

Copy: 130.20/2489/9

Summary

The Security Council's latest debates give rise to grave concern for the democratic world's position in Asia. It appears that the American efforts to block forcibly the spread of communism in this continent have met with opposition, or at least with indifference, on the part of the continent's countries. Though leaders like Nehru and Sukarno presumably oppose the methods of the U.S. rather than its ultimate goal, yet it is difficult to believe that a U.S. military action will succeed in the long run without the co-operation of the region's nations. In view of this, it can be assumed that the U.S. will ultimately be forced to seek a joint *modus operandi* with the Asian nations, and particularly with India. This means that the confrontation lines in Asia have not yet been finally determined. It is unlikely that India will agree to become involved in any Western military operation in

Asia as long as it remains unaccompanied by efforts towards economic development and social progress.

In Eban's opinion, Israel will also have to determine the principles of her Asian policy, a problem far more complex than the Korean issue. He strongly doubts whether Israels first appearance in Asia should be in a military role, one that would not be popular with the leaders of this continent.

Notes

1. Ahmed Sukarno, President of Indonesia.

332. M. Keren (Washington) to M. Sharett. 4 August 1950

Copy: 93.08/376/46

Summary

Keren believes that Israel erred in her reply to Trygve Lie.[1] He refers to the sentence in which Israel expressed her gratification at the Soviet's return to the Security Council, and fears that this might be misconstrued by the Americans as an indication of the distance separating Israel and the U.S. Here in the U.S., the Soviet move is viewed as a trap, or at last as a propaganda measure. In his opinion Israel should have evaded this topic in her reply. In effect, Israel detracted from the propaganda value of the decision to dispatch medical aid to the U.N. forces in Korea. There is an internal contradiction in the reply which can cause embarrassment to Israel's friends and be exploited by her many enemies. There is also the danger that the U.S. will judge Israel by her words while the Soviets will do so by her deeds.

Keren requests to be informed of the reasons behind this formulation. It is not clear to him why the Israeli delegation's request to receive a draft of the reply prior to its being dispatched was ignored.

Notes

1. No. 330.

333. S. Eliashiv (Prague) to W. Eytan. 4 August 1950

Copy: 130.11/2503/5

Summary

Eliashiv, who arrived in Prague several days previously to assume his post, reviews the *aliya* situation in Czechoslovakia. Following his meeting with the Minister of Labour, the authorities decided to allow persons already holding a passport to leave for Israel. This concerns only a small group of

people. On the other hand, there will be difficulties for those who are now first submitting their passport applications.

The leaders of Prague's Jewish community, who are communists, have launched a campaign against *aliya* and against the Palestine Office handling *aliya.* He will not be surprised, if the office is closed down in the near future. The situation is more favourable in Slovakia, where there is understanding between the Jewish community and the Zionists. As is well known, the majority of potential *olim* hail from Slovakia.

Notes

1. See protocol of 3 August 1950, 130.11/2503/5.
2. Zeev Shek, First Secretary in the Israeli Legation in Prague.

334. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Walter. 4 August 1950

Copy: 130.11/2499/2

Summary

A consultation on Rumania took place at the Foreign Ministry on 1 August. The participants were the Foreign Minister, the Director-General of the Ministry, the Minister to Rumania Ehud Avriel, and the Minister to Belgium M. Amir. Three main subjects were discussed: the arrests of the Zionist leaders in Rumania, organizing *aliya* from that country, and staffing the Legation in Bucharest.

(1) The following moves were decided on in reaction to the arrests of the Zionist leaders:

(a) The Hebrew press in Israel will be called on to cover and criticize the happening.

(b) Workers' demonstrations will be organized, and so will perhaps the mass signing of a letter of protest.

(c) Communiques will be released for the foreign press.

(d) Israel's envoys abroad will approach unofficially on the matter their Rumanian colleagues.

(e) A question will be submitted in the Knesset to the Foreign Minister.

(f) The aid will be sought of the Italian communist leader, Togliatti.

Eytan undertakes to organize all the above moves with the aid of the East European Division and the Press Officer of the Foreign Ministry.

(2) In the matter of *aliya,* Avriel reports that the Rumanians are now asking $90 for travel expenses per person instead of $55 as hitherto, but he does not think the new fee is exorbitant. The Legation in Bucharest is instructed to try and have the price reduced if possible but to agree to the higher sum if there is no alternative.

Notes

1. Michael Arnon, Press Officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Two paragraphs have been omitted here.

335. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 5 August 1950

Notes

1. This state of affairs was confirmed at an additional meeting of Kidron with Furlonge of the British Foreign Office. The latter emphasized that no delay and no embargo on arms shipments to Israel originated at the Foreign Office level and that the final decision lay with the Cabinet. (See Kidron to Comay, LI718, 9 August 1950, 130.09/2318/8.)

336. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to E. Kaplan. 6 August 1950

Copy: 130.15/2566/19

Summary

Sharett asks for financial aid to evacuate the tenants of several houses in Haifa which belong to Persian citizens of the Bahai sect and are currently occupied by 15 Jewish families. Israel has permitted the repatriation of some 150 Persian citizens of this sect and Sharett wishes to assist them in order to remove an unnecessary obstacle to the improvement of relations between Israel and Iran.

337. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Lourie (New York). 7 August 1950

Notes

1. Rafael had complained that the delegation to the U.N. was not receiving adequate instructions from the Foreign Office on such important immediate issues as (a) Israel's attitude versus the Conciliation Commission when the latter comes to make its seat in Jerusalem; (b) Israel's position on the negotiations with Jordan; (c) whether Israel should continue her campaigning for peace in the Middle East; (d) whether Israel should embark on a discreet campaign against Egypt's and other Arab states' position in the Korean crisis; (e) whether Israel should be more active in defending the authority of the U.N., not restricting herself to the role of a spectator. (See Rafael to Sharett, X312, 26 July 1950, 93.01/2202/13.)
2. Tevfiq Rüstü Aras, the Turkish Representative on the Conciliation Commission from Summer 1950.
3. These telegrams from Eytan to the Israel Missions abroad (HK91 of 3 July and HK92 of 9 July, 130.09/2377/1) dealt with Egypt's evasive stand on the Korean issue and the possibility of exploiting it for propaganda purposes.

338. A. Eban [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan. 9 August 1950

Copy: 130.10/2550/1

Summary

The previous day Eban met the U.S. representative on the Conciliation Commission Ely Palmer, and these are his impressions from the talk.

(1) Palmer is not particularly keen on the continued existence of the Commission. He tends to agree that the Arab states are exploiting the Commission for their own benefit without them having any serious intention of making peace. On the other hand, he thinks the Department of State is interested in keeping the Commission functioning in order to demonstrate the concern of the U.N. for the Middle East.

(2) The Department of State would prefer to have the debate in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly confined to subjects previously defined, that is the Jerusalem issue and relief for the refugees. Palmer is also of the opinion that relief for the refugees should continue for at least another year. He made a point of stressing that he did not think the Commission should submit to the U.N. Assembly a definitive report which would call for a debate and a resolution concerning the final settlement.

(3) The Commission is due to leave for Egypt shortly to meet the Egyptian Government before the session of the Political Committee of the Arab League. The Commission will formulate its report and decide on its future course of action in light of the talks in Egypt.

(4) Palmer hinted that certain people in the U.N. Secretariat would prefer a single mediator in place of the Commission. To this Eban replied that the fundamental question was whether the Arabs were at all interested in mediation, and suggested that Palmer raise the subject with Mr. Sharett in order to obtain the official Israeli viewpoint. Eban thought, however, that Palmer's real object was to sound out Israel's attitude to the members of the Commission personally and that he was not considering seriously the idea of a single mediator.

(5) On the subject of compensation for the refugees, Palmer said he would continue to urge on Israel to deal with this issue separately, in spite of previous refusals.[1] He thought a settlement of this problem was in Israel's interest, as it would signify a retreat by the Arabs from the demand for repatriation.

(6) Palmer hinted vaguely at an Egyptian plan to transfer refugees from the Gaza Strip to Sinai.

(7) It would appear that Palmer's attitude to Israel was extremely friendly. He should be cultivated socially and drawn still closer.

Notes

1. See No. 312.

339. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 14 August 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2412/29

Summary

Chadwick, the British Chargé d'Affaires, met Eytan in order to find out whether Israel had changed her attitude towards the Conciliation Commission and to state Britains' position on the negotiations between Israel and Jordan.

Chadwick enquired whether a recent article in the *Jerusalem Post,* according to which Israel had retreated from certain concessions proposed previously, reflected the official position.[1] Eytan replied that there was no change in Israel's readiness to negotiate with the Arab states, either directly or through the Conciliation Commission; however, there were strong doubts as to the effectiveness of the conciliation process as a means of achieving a settlement. He pointed in this connection to the example of the situation in Jordan where the King, though interested in an agreement with Israel, was powerless to carry it through owing to strong internal opposition.

Chadwick remarked here that the British Government was well aware of the fact that Israel had been making great efforts for the last four months to advance the negotiations with the Jordanians, and regretted that no progress had been made in this direction. He thought the Jordanians were unwilling to move forward, first, because of the border incidents which they thought proved Israel's ill-will; second, because of Israel's lack of flexibility during the negotiations; and last, because they were afraid that free commercial relations between the two countries would bring about a considerable rise in prices in Jordan.

Chadwick added that the Jordanian Government had now gathered courage and resolved to enter on negotiations with Israel in the framework of the Conciliation Commission; he was instructed to ascertain whether Israel was prepared to co-operate. Eytan replied that Israel was always prepared to negotiate, whether directly of through the Conciliation Commission, but experience had shown that direct negotiations with each Arab state separately had more chances of success.

In conclusion, Eytan requested Chadwick to ascertain whether his Government was willing to use its influence with the Jordanians and urge on them direct negotiations, even if under the aegis of the Conciliation Commission. Chadwick replied that he thought his Government would be willing to do so and that he would refer the question to London.

Notes

1. The article had appeared on 11 August.

340. A. Biran [Jerusalem] to M. Sharett. 15 August 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2431/8

Summary

Biran had occasion to hold a long conversation with Riley, and the following are his impressions.

Riley holds no brief for the Conciliation Commission. His ambition has always been to turn the Mixed Armistice Commissions into political bodies which would settle first the territorial issues, next the refugee problem, and finally establish commercial relations between Israel and the Arab states. When all these have been achieved, a formal peace agreement could be put off indefinitely. He personally cannot see any future in his work should the Conciliation Commission continue to exist after the forthcoming U.N. Assembly.

Concerning the relations with Egypt, Riley argued that the Egyptians saw the refugee problem as central to the peace process. Biran replied to this that the Egyptians' expressed concern for the refugees was hypocritical: their only aim was to make trouble for Israel even at the price of the lives of all the Arabs in Palestine. Riley immediately agreed with this observation, adding that this was in effect the position of all the Arab states: their only object was to extract from Israel an express declaration on her agreement to repatriate the refugees – and the fate of these people themselves was of no concern to them.

Matters touching the armistice with Jordan were also discussed. In Riley's estimation, the Mixed Armistice Commission had achieved a certain success in that it had at least managed to preserve the *status quo* and to prevent deterioration. Biran remarked here that he thought the Armistice Commission should not attempt to deal with matters of momentous importance but should attempt to solve the everyday problems bedeviling the relations between Israel and Jordan – such as implementing Article 8 of the Armistice Agreement in letter and spirit. The possibility existed that Israel would take matters into her own hands and force open the road to Mount Scopus. Riley advised against unilateral action which would only unite all the Arab states against Israel. He suggested that all the issues included in Article 8 be submitted to the Mixed Armistice Commission under his chairmanship, to which Biran replied that this would be practical only if there were a solid basis to the hope that an agreement with Jordan on Article 8 could be achieved before a general settlement between the two countries.

Notes

1. See No. 324 and n. 3 *ibid.*
2. Halusi Khairy, Jordanian statesman, Member of Parliament and Minister in several governments; formerly a high official in the Palestine Mandatory administration.

341. Meeting: M. Sharett – Members of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (Tel Aviv, 17 August 1950)

Notes

1. See No. 157.
2. See No. 262.
3. Paragraph 11 of the General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1948 dealt with the right of the refugees wishing to do so to return to Israel and with Israel's obligation to recompense those of the refugees who chose not to return – See Vol. 4, Appendix A.
4. See No. 324 and n. 3 *ibid.*
5. See Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 20–21.
6. No. 312.
7. See Vol. 4, No. 10.
8. Several paragraphs, dealing with the Commission's timetable and itinerary, have been omitted here.
9. See No. 356.

342. W. Eytan (Jerusalem) to M. Sharett. 17 August 1950

Copy: 130.03/2017/4

Summary

The French Representative on the Conciliation Commission, Boisanger, invited Eytan over for a talk on 15 August. He informed Eytan that the Commission had not yet decided to whom to submit its report. Should the Commission conclude that it had reached a dead end, the report will be submitted to the General Assembly for a renewed debate, for the purpose of issuing new directives to the Commission or for deciding on its dissolution. However, if some hope of making progress is still envisaged, then the report – in this case an interim report – will be submitted to the U.N. Secretary-General. He personally would prefer to submit the report to the Assembly, but, as said, no final decision had yet been taken.

Boisanger continued by giving an account of the Commission's visit to Egypt, where they met the Foreign Minister and discussed with him the refugee problem. Whereas previously the Arabs, led by Egypt, had demanded the unconditional repatriation of the refugees, now the Egyptian Foreign Minister said that if this proved impossible then compensation would have to be discussed. Here Boisanger criticized Israel's stand on the matter of compensation, Israel repeatedly stating that she would not agree to pay reparations even though this demand had never been expressly made and though it was clear that in the final resort the burden would fall on the United States. Similarly the U.N. Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 stated only that compensation would have to be paid to those refugees who are not repatriated to their homes, without mentioning Israel explicitly.

The Commission had also visited Amman, where they met the King, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. The King said in the presence of his ministers that his position on the agreement with Israel was a personal one, and that Jordan's policy would be determined by her government, whose only spokesmen were the ministers. The two ministers said that a precondition to any agreement was the return to the 1947 borders and repatriation of the refugees; however, the British Minister in Amman, Kirkbride, later told the Commission that the Jordanians would be prepared to sign an agreement with Israel if any substantial advantage accrued from it to Jordan.

The Commission would like very much to meet Mr. Ben-Gurion; the new Turkish member, Aras, was particularly keen on this. Eytan thinks that this request should be met.

Notes

1. The last part of this sentence has been omitted here.

343. M. Keren [Washington] to the United States Division. 17 August 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 168.

344. M. Walter [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Legations in Eastern Europe. 17 August 1950

Coded Tel. P62; Outg.: 130.09/2377/1

Summary

Following the Foreign Minister's statement in the Knesset concerning the arrests in Rumania,[1] a briefing was held on 16 August with the participation of the editors of all the periodicals. The press was requested to take up the subject of the situation in Rumania and of the arrests of the Zionist leaders in particular, to write clearly and decisively but in a civilized style, and to pay special attention to the authenticity of their sources. The journalists were warned not to make of this issue an anti-communist campaign and not to criticize the regime on matters unrelated to the Jewish problem. They were also requested to stress Israel's sympathetic attitude to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 334. In reply to a question in the Knesset on 10 August, the Foreign Minister had stated that Israel viewed with regret and with anxiety the arrest of the Zionist leaders and that the Foreign Ministry had no information on the charges preferred by the Rumanian authorities against the detainees. Sharett expressed the hope that those arrested would be released and allowed to emigrate to Israel and stated that the Rumanian Government was aware that the arrests had an undesirable effect on the relations between the two countries. (See *Divrei Ha'knesset* [Knesset Reports], Second Session of the First Knesset, Vol. VI, 10 August 1950, p. 2627.)
2. See also No. 350.

345. A. Biran [Jerusalem] to M. Sharett. 21 August 1950

Copy: 130.02/2447/11

Summary

Biran discussed with Azcárate the resumption of the Special Committee sessions.[1] The latter thought this event boded well for the future, and the impression Biran received was that the activity of the Special Committee was expected to provide a stimulus to the activity of the Conciliation Commission. Biran thus feels confirmed in his opinion that the reconvention of the Special Committee was a tactical ploy designed to embarrass Israel. He recommends that Israel remain passive versus the Committee and at the same time embark on a propaganda campaign listing Israel's past efforts to solve the issues pending between her and Jordan. He also thinks the time has come to revive the demand for implementation of the arrangement arrived at in the Armistice Agreement on free access for Jews to their Holy Places in the Old City.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 341.
2. See also No. 346.

346. A. Biran [Jerusalem] to M. Sharett. 21 August 1950

Orig.: 130.16/2948/7

Summary

Biran reports on his meeting with Nashashibi, the Jordanian member of the Mixed Armistice Commission, at which they discussed the setting up of the Special Committee. Nashashibi, too, sees no basis for the enthusiasm shown by the members of the Conciliation Commission at the establishment of a special Committee. Although King Abdallah did say something to the Conciliation Commission on this subject, he did so only as a matter of courtesy. Nashashibi is unaware of any remarks made by the

Jordanian Prime Minister concerning the Committee. He believes that the prospects of such a Committee will be known only after al-Mulqi's return from Cairo. For instance, if the Arab League decides not to negotiate with Israel, then there will be no purpose to any deliberations by the Special Committee or by the Mixed Armistice Commission.

Biran points out in a footnote that Palmer, who has just returned from Cairo, has reported that Nashashibi is not well briefed on the situation and that Jordan is taking the Special Committee's role seriously.

Notes

1. See No. 345.
2. See additional correspondence in 130.16/2948/7.
3. Hamed Bey Farhan, Jordanian Official, Head of the Jordanian delegation to the Special Committee in 1949.
4. Fawzi al-Mulqi, Jordanian Minister of Defence, until December 1950.
5. Anastas Hanania, Jordanian Minister of Posts and Communications.
6. Shaul Ramati, Rav-seren, Senior Representative in the Israel–Jordan Mixed Armistice Committee.
7. Major Radi Hindawi, Senior Military Officer representing Jordan in the Mixed Armistice Commission.
8. The last sentence was added by hand. In answer to this letter Sharett proposed that Israel advise in writing the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission of her agreement to activate the Special Committee and inquire whether the other party was ready to set a date for the meeting. (See Sharett to Eytan, 22 August 1950, 130.16/1948/7.) See also No. 347.

347. A. Biran [Jerusalem] to M. Sharett. 22 August 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Biran gives his impressions of his meeting with Palmer and Waldo of the Conciliation Commission after their return from Jordan. Biran sought to clarify what was behind the renewed activity of the Special Committee and how the two view the prospects of negotiations, particularly in the light of Nashashibi's scepticism.[1]

Palmer and Waldo said that there has been a significant change in Jordan's stand. Contrary to the past, Jordan's entire cabinet is also in favour of resuming the Committee's sessions. There is now a good chance of renewed negotiations between Israel and Jordan, not only on the basis of understanding between the King and Israeli personalities, but also due to the support of the Jordanian Government. They are aware that Jordan tends at present to coordinate her stance with the Arab League's resolution and that there are persons in Jordan who are totally opposed to negotiations with Israel, but this is the very reason why there are now prospects of reaching an agreement with the aid of the Special Committee, since the Arab League's boycott does not apply to its deliberations.

Biran is sceptical about the prospects of negotiations. His past experience shows that the Jordanians either sought specific local gains (such as harvesting rights, utilization of water sources etc.) or pressed for far-reaching concessions on Israel's part. Israel's approach to the negotiations is that they must be conducted on a basis of absolute equality and that any concession on Israel's part must be matched by a Jordanian one.

Later in the talk the members of the Conciliation Commission again said they viewed the resumption of the Special Committee's sessions as a means of breaking the stalemate in the Conciliation Commission's deliberations.

The conclusion Biran draws from the conversation is that there still exists scepticism and a lack of clarity regarding the implications of Jordan's decision to renew the activity of the Special Committee.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 346.
2. On 29 August the Government of Israel notified General Riley that her representatives on the Special Committee would be Avraham Biran, Jerusalem District Commissioner by authority of the Interior Ministry, and Uriel Heyd, from the Foreign Ministry (see Sharett to Riley, 29 August 1950, 130.16/2448/7).

348. Memorandum by the Division of International Organizations. 22 August 1950[1]

Copy: 93.03/3009/10

Summary

The memorandum reviews the history of the Spanish issue at the United Nations,[2] and submits two alternative stands for Israel to take at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

(1) To continue opposing Spain's admission to the U.N. on the following grounds:

(a) there has been no change in the Spanish regime, which is of a Fascist character and which co-operated with Hitler during the World War.

(b) Israel's abandonment of the oppositionist camp would create a sensation, as Israel's position on this issue is accorded considerable moral significance: if Israel is ready to forget and forgive, all the more reason for others to follow suit.

(2) To abstain – in order not to annoy the Latin American countries.

The memorandum concludes by recommending the first alternative, but stresses that Israel should refrain from any active lobbying. However, should Israel's vote prove to be decisive, the possibility of abstention should be taken into consideration, and public opinion in Israel should be prepared in advance for such an eventuality.

Notes

1. The memorandum was prepared by A. Zippori from the Division of International Organizations in the Foreign Ministry.
2. See No. 170.
3. See No. 269 and n. 1 *ibid.*

349. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 23 August 1950

Notes

1. Richard Ford, Counsellor in the U.S. Embassy in Israel.
2. See No. 345.
3. For report dated 22 August 1950 on the conversation with Ford, see 130.20/2481/3.

350. E. Avriel (Bucharest) to M. Sharett. 23 August 1950

Coded Tel.: 426; Recd: 24 August; Inc.: 130.09/2296/10

Summary

Avriel reports on his meeting with the Rumanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigore Preoteasa. The latter protested against Sharett's statement in the Knesset and against the reports in Israeli press on the arrests in Rumania, which he described as insufferable interference in Rumania's internal affairs.[1] Avriel replied that he would transmit the protest to the Government in Israel, adding that the reactions in Israel reflected the people's feelings touching the arrests and the obstacles being placed in the way of *aliya.* Israel for her part, he said, was ready to come to an agreement and to mutual understanding in all the matters at issue.

Avriel suggests that the campaign against the arrests be toned down and also that some favourable reports be published in the press concerning the *aliya.*[2]

Notes

1. See No. 344 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. In a following telegram, Avriel recommended to keep to a minimum anti-Rumanian reports and to emphasize the positive aspects of the immigration from Rumania. He especially warned against using the reports originating from Rumanian immigrants, which could be construed as exploiting *aliya* for the purpose of slandering Rumania and thus could serve as a pretext for stopping Jewish emigration from that country. (See Avriel to Walter, RI429, 25 August 1950, 130.09/2296/10.)

351. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett. 24 August 1950

Copy: 130.02/2403/12

Summary

The British Chargé d'Affaires Chadwick delivered an *aide-memoire* on the supply of arms to the Middle East (for the English text of this document, see Main Volume, p. 492). To the questions put to him he replied as follows:

(1) The determination of Britain's own needs should not take more than a month.
(2) The significance of the concluding sentence "This decision is of general application"[3] is that Britain would honour orders already approved, but would not consider any new ones.
(3) The Arab Legion is an exception to the above limitation, as it is supplied by a special agreement with the British Government.
(4) Israel will be afforded the possibility of military training in Britain, as promised in the past to the Legation in London.
(5) It is possible that not much in the way of military equipment will be left in stock after the requirements of the Atlantic Pact countries have been met.

Prior to delivering the *aide-mémoire* Chadwick referred to the Israel–Jordan talks and said that his Government was willing to encourage the Jordanians to reach a settlement with Israel but would not adopt a more active line as this should be left to the Conciliation Commission.

Notes

1. See No. 339.
2. See No. 345.
3. See also No. 484.

352. M. Keren [Washington] to the United States Division. 24 August 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 168.
2. See Vol. 4, No. 4 and n. 20 *ibid.*
3. See No. 34 and n. 1 *ibid.*
4. Arthur Z. Gardiner, Special Assistant in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs of the Department of State, adviser on refugee affairs.
5. Untraced.
6. See No. 338.
7. Yehuda H. Levin, Press Counsellor in the Israeli Embassy in Washington.

353. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 25 August 1950

Notes

1. Sir Benegal Narsing Rau, India's Permament Representative at the U.N.
2. See No. 364.
3. See No. 358.
4. Claude de Boisanger, the French Representative on the Conciliation Commission.
5. Aleksander A. Soldatov, the Soviet Representative on the Trusteeship Council.
6. For full report of the conversation, see No. 364.
7. See Editorial Note, p. 161.

354. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 25 August 1950

Notes

1. James H. McGrath, Attorney General of the U.S.
2. Alben William Barkley, Vice President of the U.S.
3. John W. Snyder, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.
4. Senator Herbert Lehman, American statesman; Honorary Vice President of the American Jewish Committee.
5. Philip C. Jessup, American diplomat, Ambassador at Large and Senior Adviser to Secretary of State Acheson.
6. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President of the U.S.
7. Semah Cecil Hyman, Economic Counsellor in the Israeli Embassy in Washington.
8. Edward H. Foley, Under Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury.
9. William M. Martin, U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
10. William M. Boyle, Chairman of the National Committee of the Democratic Party.
11. Bernard M. Baruch, Jewish businessman and Presidential adviser.
12. Telegram from the United States Division to Eban (24 August 1950, 130.09/2338/11), transmitting Ben-Gurion's request for early information on the details of his planned visit to the U.S.
13. See also Nos. 355 and 360.

355. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 25 August 1950

Notes

1. The memorandum has not been traced.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 164.
3. Robert R. Nathan, economist, adviser to the Israeli Embassy in Washington.

356. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 27 August 1950

Notes

1. See No. 341.
2. See No. 345.

357. A. Eban (Washington) to M. Sharett. 29 August 1950

Notes

1. Sharett had expressed his anxiety over what Berry, State Department official, had said at his meeting with Keren and Levin of the Israeli Embassy, on the possibility of territorial compensation on Israel's part. He instructed Eban to explain to the Americans at the first opportunity that such proposals harmed the cause of peace and that the only basis for negotiations with the Arabs was the ethnic and geographic *status quo*. (See Sharett to Eban, IW833, 27 August 1950, 130.09/2308/13.)
2. In a further telegram Sharett suggested employing the American radio and press to spread awareness of the principle that peace in the Middle East was vital for the entire world and that it could be obtained only on the basis of the *status quo*. (See Sharett to Eban, IW838, 28 August 1950, 130.09/2308/13.)

Editorial Note

Sharett's Meeting with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

A further meeting between the Foreign Minister, accompanied by senior officials from his Ministry, and members of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine took place on 30 August (for the first meeting see No. 341). Sharett informed the members of the Commission of the Government's reaction to the Commission's proposals (see *ibid.*, n. 7; No. 356). A general discussion then took place on the Arab refugee problem. The Israelis stressed that any negotiations on the payment of compensation could only take place within the framework of a general settlement of the refugee issue based on the principle of their resettlement in the Arab countries. The members of the Commission replied that, during their tour of the Arab countries they indeed found greater readiness to consider the resettlement of the refugees in their present habitats. This trend was evident in conversations both with the refugees themselves and with Arab leaders, especially when the occasions were of an unofficial nature. Sharett stressed that any agreement between Israel and the Arabs could be implemented only in the context of official and formal discussions at state level. The agreement on exchange of populations made between Turkey and Greece in 1923, in the aftermath of the 1919–1922 Greco–Turkish war, was brought up a number of times during the discussion as an example of a practical solution to the problem of the existence of ethnic minorities; the Israelis referred in this connection to the emigration of Iraq's and Yemen's Jews to Israel. (For the report of the meeting see Information for Israeli Missions Abroad, 6 September 1950, 93.03/3055/12.)

358. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 30 August 1950

Notes

1. Harry Nicolas Howard, Adviser on U.N. Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
2. Untraced, but see report by Eban at the meeting of the Israeli delegation to the U.N., 1 September 1950, 93.03/89/1.
3. See No. 359.
4. Sharett replied that the reply to this argument could be found in the report of his meeting with the Conciliation Commission of 30 August – see Editorial Note above (see Sharett to Eban, IW868, 5 September 1950, 93.01/2202/15). See also Editorial Note, p. 193.

359. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 30 August 1950

Notes

1. No. 358.
2. See No. 321.
3. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, member of the U.S. delegation to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
4. Senator John J. Sparkman, member of the U.S. delegation to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

360. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 30 August 1950

Notes

1. No. 354.
2. Sharett replied that presumably the Prime Minister's and his own statements at the Mapai conference, to the effect that Israel would defend her democratic regime both against attack from outside and from subversion from inside, went unheeded by the U.S. Embassy in Israel. He instructed Eban to cite this remark if the subject were raised by the Americans. (See Sharett to Eban, IW866, 5 September 1950, 130.09/2308/14.)

361. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 31 August 1950

Notes

1. On 25 August the U.S. Embassy in Israel submitted a note to the Foreign Ministry containing what was described as preliminary ideas on the main issues on the agenda of the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, including a list of proposed candidates for the presidency of the Assembly and for vacancies on the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council. Concerning the central issue of the Korean conflict, the note said that the U.S. had under consideration various proposals intended to make more effective the U.N. action in Korea, and when these proposals matured they would be subjects for discussion with the member states. (See Note from the U.S. Embassy, 25 August 1950, 130.20/2476/7.)
2. On 1 September the U.S. Embassy in Israel submitted an additional note on the subject of the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly. One of the items in that note was of particular concern to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in that it envisaged U.S. support of the Arab League's application for the status of a permanent observer at the General Assembly sessions. At a meeting with McVicker it was made clear that the U.S. position on this matter was final. (See Note by the U.S. Embassy, 1 September 1950, 130.20/2476/7; the United States Division to Eban, telegram IW860, 1 September 1950, 130.09/2308/14.) See also No. 374.

362. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 31 August 1950

Circular: 130.02/2413/2

Summary

Eytan instructs Israel's envoys abroad on the attitude to be adopted towards the newly appointed German consular agents. It may be assumed that these consuls will address their Israeli counterparts in writing, informing them of their appointment and of their wish to maintain amicable relations with their colleagues. Such a communication must remain unanswered. Should the German consul write again, telephone or call at the Israeli Consulate, he must be told politely that the Israeli consul cannot meet him as there are no official relations between Israel and Germany. On being introduced to a German representative at a chance meeting or a social occasion, the Israeli consul should shake hands, say a few courteous words and take the first opportunity to break away.

363. A. Eban (Washington) to T. Kollek (Washington). 31 August 1950

Copy: 130.20/2460/5

Summary

Eban makes use of Kollek's trip home to draw the attention of the Prime Minister and of the Foreign Minister to several urgent matters:

(1) A reply is required urgently to his telegram on the American request for military aid;[1] he stresses that, in her present mood, the U.S. will not be satisfied with expressions of solidarity unaccompanied by the promise of a concrete contribution.

(2) An immediate reply is required in the matter of Gass's activities at the Export–Import Bank.

(3) Eban is concerned about the possible results of the Conciliation Commission's activities in New York and Washington in the absence of some give-and-take on Israel's part in matters of *procedure* on the Commission's proposal to conduct talks on compensation for the refugees. He draws attention to his last telegram on this subject.[2]

(4) He will launch a large-scale campaign of meetings and talks in a few weeks' time; particular attention will be paid to American labour leaders.

(5) American Jewish leaders visiting Israel should not be approached on this subject; they should concentrate on what they are responsible for – activity among the Jews.

(6) Eban requests not to be overburdened with tasks at the U.N. as he wishes to devote most of his time to the Embassy.

Notes

1. No. 360.
2. See No. 358.

364. G. Rafael [New York] to M. Sharett. 31 August 1950

Copy: 93.03/71/19

Summary

Rafael reports on a conversation he and Eban had with Malik, the Soviet Permanent Representative at the U.N., at the latter's invitation. Malik opened by enquiring whether British or American influence was on the rise in the Middle East, was briefed on the subject, and seemed surprised to hear that in certain countries, like Egypt, there was competition between the two powers. He also wanted to know what was Israel's position on Turkey's candidacy for the Security Council, and was told that Israel would support it. He was also briefed on the Jerusalem issue but did not repeat his former undertaking to support Israel's stand in this matter.[1] He was sarcastic about the Arab refugee problem, saying it has been artificially created, and observed that the status of a refugee was for the Arab a social and economical betterment compared to his condition before the war.

The conversation then turned to global issues - China and Korea. Malik was not optimistic about the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly. He thought the U.S.A. had hegemony in the U.N. organization, including the Security Council, as two thirds of the member states were under some form or other of American domination. He said the Americans had not studied the Asian problem thoroughly enough and did not understand that a national revolution and a struggle for liberation from social oppression were taking place in that region.

Rafael's impressions from the conversation were as follows:

(1) Malik was very cordial throughout the meeting.

(2) He was enthusiastic about Israel's accomplishments.

(3) Though the Korean conflict was discussed, he did not make any observation about Israel's position on that issue.

(4) Malik, generally cheerful and witty, now seemed downcast and worried.

(5) The Israelis' impression was that the Soviet Union had not yet taken up a definite stand versus the U.N.

Notes

1. See No. 275.
2. Dragoslav Protich, Director of the Department of Security Council Affairs in the U.N. administration.

365. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 31 August 1950

Notes

1. No. 356.
2. In a further telegram Eban stressed that payment of compensation to the refugees was one way of injecting money into the Middle East, including Israel herself, as no one could possibly imagine that Israel herself could bear the whole burden of compensation. In this he was supported, he said, by the entire delegation. (See Eban to Sharett, X402, 1 September 1950, 130.09/2329/9.) Sharett replied that Eban's idea "to discuss this matter with the understanding that implementation must follow peace" had just been debated by the Government but was rejected. Eban's argument in his paragraph (3) had been used by Sharett but to no avail. Nevertheless, the last meeting with the Conciliation Commission (see Editorial Note, p. 188) was amicable and constructive and could possibly begin a new stage of examination of the problem by the Commission, which, however, could take place only after the close of this session of the General Assembly. (See Sharett to Eban, IW865, 5 September 1950, 130.09/2308/14.)

366. P. Naphtali (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett and E. Kaplan. 1 September 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2417/1

Summary

Naphtali submits to Sharett the conclusions of the interdepartmental committee set up to deliberate on future action in respect of compensation claims and the transfer of property from Germany.[1]

(1) A supreme body should be set up by the State of Israel and the Jewish Agency to coordinate the varied and sometimes conflicting activities of the Jewish organizations and individuals dealing with all that concerned restitution of Jewish property and compensation claims from Germany. Representatives of the above organizations should be invited to sit on the new body, which will be located in Jerusalem.

(2) A special mission of the State of Israel, accredited to the Allied High Commissioners, will represent the new supreme body in Germany. The mission's mandate will be restricted to matters of restitution; there will be no political and general diplomatic representation accredited to the German Government.

(3) The said mission will be Israel's sole representative versus the German and the occupation authorities.

(4) Its first and immediate task will be to enter on negotiations for the transfer of DM 75–100 million worth of goods to Israel, which sum constitutes a small part of the total rights of Jewish individuals and organizations to restitution and indemnification.

(5) The supreme body will then decide on additional steps and negotiations, on payments in advance and on global comprehensive arrangements for claims of a special character. The supreme body will also have to decide whether it would be possible and desirable to submit a comprehensive

claim for DM 1,500 million in settlement of the sum total of the due restitution and indemnification. This sum could be defrayed in the course of 3 to 5 years or perhaps by means of German state bonds. The supreme body will be responsible for the division of the sum received among the various claimants.

Dr. Landauer, one of the members of the Committee, proposes that a comprehensive claim for DM 1,500 million be submitted to include all the various categories of the Jewish individual and collective claims. The separate claimants will be organized and the agreement of a majority of them to this comprehensive settlement sought only when the German Government has agreed in principle to the sum demanded.

Notes

1. See No. 328 and n. 4 *ibid.*
2. The High Commissioners for Germany.
3. The last paragraph has been omitted here.

367. M.R. Kidron (London) to M. Comay. 1 September 1950

Notes

1. See No. 351.
2. See No. 388.
3. George Wigg, Parliamentary Private Secretary to British Defence Minister Emanuel Shinwell.

Editorial Note

Transfer of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to New York

On 2 September 1950, the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine announced that the Commission had decided to terminate its sessions in Jerusalem and to resume them in New York on 2 October. The Commission expressed the hope that the Israeli delegation to the U.N. General Assembly would initiate contacts with it in New York. (See Palmer to Sharett, 2 September 1950, 130.02/2441/3.)

368. E. Avriel (Bucharest) to M. Walter. 4 September 1950

Coded Tel. RI440; Recd: 5 September; Inc.: 130.09/2296/10

Summary

(1) The resumption of *aliya* from Rumania came as a surprise, nor are

the reasons for it known. The *volte-face* was not preceded by regular negotiations. Walter's assumption that the angry reactions in Israel did no damage cannot be substantiated – it is quite possible that the rate of emigration would have been higher were it not for the campaign in the Israeli press.

(2) Avriel recommends not to adopt a "tough speech" policy – articles such as the one which appeared in *Haaretz*[3] can only cause harm.

(3) If those opposed to Jewish emigration gain the upper hand, *aliya* will be stopped in the wake of some sensational trial or even without such a pretext.

(4) [.....][6].

(5) Avriel recommends as follows: (a) to leave all doors open; (b) to hold talks on the subject with the Soviet Foreign Minister at Lake Success and with Soviet envoys in various capitals; the Soviets are, after all, the real rulers of Rumania; (c) to hold frequent meetings with the Rumanian Legation in Israel in order to emphasize the seriousness with which Israel regards the continuation of *aliya;* (d) the commercial ties with Rumania should be strengthened; (e) the press campaign against Rumania should be moderated.

Notes

1. Walter had put forth some thoughts and speculations concerning the arrest and trial of the Zionist leaders in Rumania. He thought that these steps, which in his opinion were intended to put a stop to emigration to Israel, were best dealt with by being widely publicized, especially abroad, as the Rumanians have been shown to be sensitive to public opinion. (See Walter to the Israeli Legation in Bucharest, IR276, 29 August 1950, 130.09/2296/8.)
2. Ben-Gurion's speech attacking Rumanian Foreign Minister Ana Pauker – see Vol. 4, No. 393 and n. 1 *ibid.*
3. The report contained information given by newly arrived immigrants from Rumania: in their opinion, the arrests had no political significance; however, they had met with hostile treatment when boarding the ship and on their departure to Israel (see *Haaretz*, 21 August 1950).
4. No. 344.
5. See Vol. 4, No. 378.
6. Paragraph (d) has been omitted here.
7. The organ of the Rumanian Jewish Democratic Committee.
8. See No. 378.

369. E. Elath (London) to M. Sharett. 5 September 1950

370. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 6 September 1950

Notes

1. Abba Eban had that day presented his credentials as Israel's Ambassador to the United States.

371. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 7 September 1950

Coded Tel. IWA873; Outg.: 130.09/2308/14

Summary

Israel's Minister in Ankara, Sasson, was summoned urgently to the Turkish Foreign Minister. The latter requested that Israel use her connections in the American press, in the White House and in the Department of State to further Turkey's candidacy for the Security Council and her admission to the Atlantic Pact. The Foreign Minister explained that the internal situation in his country was unstable and every political failure will be exploited by the Soviets. Success, on the other hand, will reduce the prestige of the Arab states.[1]

Sharett requested Eban to suggest possible steps to be taken in this matter.[2]

Notes

1. For full report on the conversation, which took place on 4 September 1950, see file 130.02/2382/1.
2. Eban replied that Israel was making efforts on Turkey's behalf as candidate for the Security Council, and among other steps was canvassing among the American, British and French delegations to the U.N. He himself was also intending to approach on this matter the editors of the *New York Times* and the *New York Herald Tribune.* As to Turkey's joining the Atlantic Treaty, Israel, in Eban's opinion, should not meddle in this matter. (See Eban to Sharett, W307, 7 September 1950, 93.01/2202/15.)

372. U. Heyd (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 7 September 1950

Memorandum: 130.02/2410/11

Summary

Heyd reviews the development of relations between Iran and Israel. Iran recognized Israel *de facto* in March 1950[1] but no diplomatic relations have so far been instituted. Divon has now left for Teheran to conclude the negotiations.[3]

Normal relations with Iran are of paramount importance as they will create a second breach (after Turkey) in the Islamic front and will help to isolate the Arab states. A legation in Teheran will also aid in contacts with other Moslem countries, as Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Jewish diaspora will benefit, as transfer of the property of Persian Jews (and indirectly also the Jews of Iraq) will become possible. Iran can also serve as a transit station for the Iraqi Jews if direct emigration from there to Israel is stopped.

Several problems connected with the property of Iranian citizens resi-

dent in Israel should be solved in order to facilitate the present negotiations. Bureaucratic red tape should be eliminated in the matter of the property and housing of the repatriated Iranian citizens and a decision should be taken on the repatriation of an additional Iranians.

Notes

1. See No. 132.
2. The note is in file 130.02/2385/2.
3. A telegram from Divon describing his talks in Iran arrived at the beginning of August. In his estimate, there was no prospect whatever of opening a legation in Teheran owing to the Iranian Government's weakness and its internal squabbles and the growing strength of the religious groups in the country. Divon recommended intitiating commercial ties immediately. (See memorandum by Heyd to the Foreign Minister, 7 September 1950, 130.15/2566/19.)
4. Several paragraphs, dealing with property claims by Iranian citizens, residents of Israel, have been omitted here.
5. Paragraph (d), dealing with personal matters, has been omitted here.

373. S. Eliashiv (Budapest) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 7 September 1950

Report: 130.11/2502/15

Summary

Eliashiv reports on a long talk he had with Andor Berey, the Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister. Berey commenced by accusing the Israeli authorities of placing obstacles in the way of the group of 20 emigrants who wanted to return to Hungary. Eliashiv replied that Israel will not restrain by force anybody wishing to leave the country, and that he would see what could be done about this matter. Eliashiv requests the Foreign Ministry staff to solve this problem in order to facilitate the negotiations on *aliya.*[2]

Eliashiv then turned to the problem of *aliya,* using all possible arguments including the fact that the emigration policy of other Eastern European countries was much more liberal. Berey listened attentively though coldly, and said he would transmit all those arguments to his government. In the course of the conversation Berey remarked more than once that he himself was opposed to Jewish emigration from Hungary and that this was not only his own personal opinion.

Notes

1. Mátyás Rákosi, Secretary-General of the Hungarian Communist Party, and Deputy Premier.
2. Walter of the East European Division noted in the margin of the report that the issue of the repatriates to Hungary had been in the mean time settled.

374. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 8 September 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 168.
2. See No. 361 and n. 2 *ibid.*
3. Article 52 of the U.N. Charter deals with the incorporation of regional bodies and agreements in the world peacekeeping process.
4. See the Foreign Ministry to the U.S. Embassy, 8 September 1950, 93.03/3054/26. The U.S. Embassy replied that the gist of the note had been brought to the knowledge of the State Department, which then requested the Israeli Foreign Ministry to be notified that the matter had been taken into consideration and that the U.S. delegation to the U.N. had been instructed to discuss it in detail directly with the Israeli delegation. (See the U.S. Embassy to the Foreign Ministry, 19 September 1950, 93.03/3054/26.)
5. See No. 1 and n. 5 *ibid.* See also No. 381.

375. M. Fischer (Paris) to M. Sharett. 8 September 1950

Notes

1. The first part of the letter deals with the circumstances under which the interview with Schuman was arranged.
2. René Mayer, the French Minister of Justice.
3. See No. 316.

376. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 8 September 1950

Notes

1. See No. 328.
2. See No. 423.

377. Resumé of a Meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 10 September 1950

130.02/2404/9

Summary

The subjects that came up for discussion were those on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly.

(1) *Nominations and elections:*[1] Israel will support the candidacy of the Iranian representative, Nasrollah Entezam, for presidency of the Assembly. The delegation is given a free hand in the elections of chairmen of the principal committees.

Israel will support Turkey for the seat on the Security Council vacated by Lebanon, Norway for the seat vacated by the Netherlands, and presumably

Brazil – as the candidate of the Latin American bloc – for the seat vacated by Cuba.

(2) *Admission of new members:* Israel will stand on the principle of universal admission. If voting takes place separately on each application, then it is doubtful whether the candidacy of Jordan, Austria and South Korea should be supported (North Korea has not so far applied for membership).

(3) *The former Italian colonies:*[2] Israel will support a union or confederation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Israel will not side with the accusations which will probably come up against the U.N. representative in Libya that he was putting obstacles in the way of that country's progress towards independence. Israel will support the trusteeship agreement for Somalia in its present form, objecting to a special debate and to amendments.

(4) *The Greek issue:* Israel will continue to abstain on the merits of the case and will support the continued functioning of UNSCOB As for the humanitarian aspect, Israel will support the efforts to repatriate the Greek children from the Balkan countries and also the appeals to the Greek Government for leniency in respect of the political detainees involved in the guerilla operations.

(5) *Human rights in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria:* Israel will not participate in any demonstrative step or practical measure and will continue to abstain in this issue.

(6) *The fate of the German and Japanese Prisoners-of-War in the Soviet Union:* Israel cannot support the American proposal that this issue be put on the Assembly's agenda as the whole affair looks like an attempt to stigmatize the Soviet Union; furthermore, the Soviet authorities have declared that there were no POW's left within the Soviet Union's borders.

(7) *Control of atomic weapons:* It is proposed to support any resolution banning the use of atomic weapons and calling for their control by an international body, excluding clauses condemning one of the parties. Israel should coordinate her position with countries such as Sweden and India; the decisive consideration, however, must be the attitude of the U.S., if the latter considers all the proposed resolutions hostile to her, then Israel should abstain.

(8) *Trusteeship territories and colonies:* Israel should keep to her traditional line of supporting the progress towards independence of subject territories, but must avoid an open confrontation with any of the colonial powers.

(9) *South-west Africa:* The verdict of the International Court of Justice should be supported, to the effect that South Africa must continue reporting to the United Nations and must accept in principle the supervision of the governing of the territory in question by that body; however, she should not be forced to yield South-west Africa to international trusteeship.

(10) *The problem of the Hindus in South Africa:* Israel should support

the renewed appeal for a round-table conference with the participation of India, South Africa and Pakistan to discuss this issue, but abstain on clauses condemning South Africa or calling for postponing the implementation of the apartheid legislation.

(11) *The Arab League and the U.N.:* Israel must vigorously oppose the Arab proposal calling for a standing invitation to the Secretary-General of the Arab League to participate as an observer in the General Assembly sessions.

(12) *The U.N. Secretary-General's peace proposals:*[3] This should be actively supported as should the holding of a detailed and constructive debate on all its clauses.

(13) *The U.S. proposals to increase the powers of the General Assembly and to circumvent the right of veto at the Security Council:* These proposals have not yet been finally formulated, but Israel has no option but to support these endeavours aimed at revitalizing the United Nations.

(14) *Communist China's admission to the U.N.:* This should be supported while mitigating this stance by supporting at the same time Nationalist China's right to represent Formosa at the U.N.

(15) *The Korean conflict:* The position of the Security Council should be fully supported, while at the same time endorsing the efforts at conciliation and mediation being made by India and other countries. In addition, Israel should favour Korea's unification by means of a free and democratic plebiscite by all her inhabitants, to be held under U.N. supervision, but should oppose the official U.N. seal of approval to be given to the country's forcible unification by American military might: Israel's position is that the U.S. forces should halt at the 38th parallel.

(16) *The Spanish issue:*[4] Spain's rehabilitation within the international community should continue to be opposed.

Notes

1. See No. 361.
2. See Vol. 4, Editorial Note, Companion Volume, pp. 232–3.
3. See No. 290.
4. See No. 348.

378. E. Avriel (Bucharest) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 10 September 1950

Coded Tel. 446; Recd: 11 September; Inc.: 130.09/2296/10

Summary

Avriel suggests that the Foreign Minister take the opportunity of his attendance at the General Assembly to submit to the Russians a general appeal for free emigration of the Jews in Eastern Europe, including those in the Soviet Union. He considers this step necessary in view of the obstacles

being placed in Rumania in the way of emigration, the deteriorating international situation, and the tendency of the Eastern bloc countries to rid themselves of undesirable elements.[3] The Russians should be persuaded that a positive move on their side would gain them a great deal in Jewish and world public opinion.

Notes

1. Sharett had cabled that he had been impressed with Avriel's analysis in No. 368 and requested that he suggest lines for talks with the Soviets according to his paragraph (e) (2); see Sharett to Avriel, IR286, 7 September 1950, 130.09/2296/8).
2. In a speech made on 21 May 1950 at a convention on the 25th anniversary of Kibbutz Afiqim, the Prime Minister had stressed the important contribution of Russia's Jews to Zionism and to the upbuilding of Eretz Israel, and declared that the Jewish people would never surrender the right of every Jew to come to Israel and join its builders (see *Davar*, 23 May 1950).
3. During the last month of 1950 and the first months of 1951, Bulgaria expelled some 250,000 of her citizens of Turkish extraction, who were then admitted by Turkey under protest.

379. Foreign Minister's Bureau [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 11 September 1950

Coded Tel. TNWA2; Inc.: 93.01/2202/15

Summary

There is a distinct possibility that Jordan will submit a complaint to the Security Council about Israel's encroachment on her territory at Naharayim. The facts are as follows: the boundary in that sector was not demarcated in writing in the Armistice Agreement and was only marked out on a map countersigned by both parties.[1] The map shows that a small area east of the Jordan, near Naharayim, lies in Israel's territory. Israel has now ordered this area to be ploughed; the Jordanians, knowing they have no legal case, did not apply to the Mixed Armistice Commission but have gone over its head to the Security Council.[2]

Notes

1. Colonel Ahmad Sidki al-Jundi, commanding a brigade in the Arab Legion, head of Jordan's delegation to the armistice talks with Israel, 1949.
2. See No. 380.

380. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 14 September 1950

Notes

1. See No. 379.
2. Gerald A. Drew, U.S. Minister to Jordan.
3. See U.S. Minister in Amman to the State Department, 9 September 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, V, pp. 993–5.
4. *Ibid.* p. 996.

381. Meeting: M. Comay - J. Chadwick. 14 September 1950

Notes

1. See No. 380.
2. See No. 356.
3. Reference is to the expulsion of a large number of tribesmen of the Azazmeh who had infiltrated from Sinai to the area between Gaza and Auja al-Hafir - see No. 386.
4. See No. 374.
5. Paragraph 5, dealing with the arrangements of British Air Secretary Henderson's visit to Israel, has been omitted here.

382. A. Eban [New York] to T. Lie (New York). 15 September 1950

Notes

1. See Nos. 380 and 381.
2. See Vol. 4, No. 205.
3. See *ibid.*, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 133–5.
4. No. 157.

383. A. Eban [Washington] to W. Eytan. 15 September 1950

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. See No. 370.

Editorial Note

India's Recognition of Israel

On 16 September 1950 the Indian Government recognized Israel, through the exchange of notes between the embassies of the two countries in Washington. Simultaneously, the Indians informed Israel unofficially that they were not planning at the moment to exchange diplomatic representatives owing to financial difficulties and lack of manpower. (See exchange of communications, 16–18 September 1950, 130.02/2457/24; Keren to the United States Division W340, 17 September 1950, 130.09/2308/19.)

384. A. Eban [Washington] to H.E. Gaston (Washington). 18 September 1950

385. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 19 September 1950

386. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 19 September 1950

Notes

1. Eytan had cabled concerning the expulsion of the Azazmeh (see No. 381). Information had reached Israel that the Egyptians were planning retaliatory steps against Egypt's Jews, including the expulsion of 10,000 stateless Jews, should Israel go through with her steps against the Azazmeh (see Eytan to Sharett, Y66, 19 September 1950, 93.01/2202/15).
2. Zalman Liff, Adviser on territorial and development matters in the Prime Minister's Office.
3. Reference is to an Egyptian complaint that Israel was maintaining military forces at Bir Qattar (Ein Netafim) near Ras al-Naqb, several kilometres northwest of Eilat, in violation of the Israel–Egypt armistice agreement. Article 7 and Appendix 2 of that agreement had limited Israel to maintaining near the common border only defensive forces "based on settlements". The demarcation line of the restricted area crossed the length of the Israeli Negev from the north to "the southernmost point of Palestine". Israel and Egypt disagreed on the interpretation of the term "southernmost point", Israel claiming that the meeting point of the common Israel–Egypt boundary on the Red Sea was intended here, this excluding Bir Qattar from the restricted zone; and the Egyptians contending that the point was somewhere on the Red Sea between the Egyptian and Jordanian boundaries – this leaving Bir Qattar within the restricted area. The Israel–Egypt Mixed Armistice Commission accepted the Egyptian stand and instructed Israel to withdraw her forces from Bir Qattar. (See memorandum by Rosenne, 29 August 1950, 130.02/2436/5.)
4. For Ben-Gurion's reaction, see Nos. 392 and 394; in a further telegram Ben-Gurion rejected the deal proposed by Sharett as it constituted a deviation from Israel's previous policy and also opened a door to more Egyptian blackmail (see Eytan to Sharett, Y82, 23 September 1950, 130.09/2338/11).

387. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 19 September 1950

Notes

1. Riley had accused Israel of having expelled some 4,000 Beduin from the Negev to the Sinai and of having evicted about a thousand Arab residents of Majdal over the border to the Gaza Strip. The Beduin accused Israel of having used military units, including armour, and of having afterwards destroyed their tents and belongings. As to what had happened in Majdal, an inquiry by the Israel–Egypt Mixed Armistice Commission recorded the inhabitants as claiming that they had been evicted against their will and that they had been forced so sign statements saying that they were voluntarily moving to Gaza and that they were giving up their rights to their property.

   Israel first expressed her surprise that Riley was drawing conclusions concerning matters which were still under inquiry and under discussion at the Mixed Armistice Commission, which was the only body empowered to establish facts and to place responsibility. Concerning the issue itself, Israel pointed to the deterioration of the security situation in the Negev as expressed in incidents of minelaying, theft and murder. The Beduin in question numbered only several hundred and not thousands, and they all belonged to tribes which had infiltrated to Israel after the Armistice agreement and had been returned to Egypt several times with no opposition by the Egyptians. As to the inhabitants of Majdal, those concerned numbered so far some 500 Arabs who had agreed voluntarily to cross over to Gaza, in coordination with Egyptian army officers. A list of minelaying, infiltration and murder incidents in the Negev from August 1950 was appended to the Israeli statement. (See Information for Israeli Missions Abroad, No. 113, 22 September 1950, 130/02/2453/12.)
2. In a further telegram Sharett suggested the publication of full details on the affairs of the Negev Beduin and the evacuation of the inhabitants of Majdal, including the names and exact number of the tribesman concerned and particulars on the Majdal evictions, including the names of the Egyptian officers who had taken part in the negotiations. See Sharett to Eytan, X429, 20 September 1950, 130.09/2329/9.)

388. E. Elath (London) to E. Shinwell (London). 19 September 1950

Notes

1. Eliahu Elath had submitted his credentials as Israel's Minister to Great Britain on 13 July.
2. See No. 369.
3. See Kidron to Shinwell, 22 August 1950, 93.04/38/12. Kidron's letter dealt only with the acquisition of motorboats (see below), but the file contains also detailed lists of other requests for raw materials and military training.
4. See No. 351.
5. Shinwell replied that it turned out after inquiry that the craft requested by Israel were in effect torpedo-boats; their release was therefore deferred until the entire question of arms supply was examined in the light of Britain's obligations and the international situation. This examination had now been completed and the boats have been released. Israel's other requests were now being studied with dispatch and Shinwell hoped he could have an answer ready soon. (See Shinwell to Elath, 20 September 1950, 93.04/38/12.)

   Elath added in a telegram to Sharett that the fact that it was Shinwell who replied to his letter was a good omen in that it indicated that the matter of arms supply had been transferred from the Foreign Office to the Defence Ministry; all the necessary financial arrangements for the purchase of the boats and for other shipments to be authorized in future should now be made so as not to waste this moment of goodwill on Britain's part. (See Elath to Sharett, telegram E33, 22 September 1950, 93.01/2202/16.)

Editorial Note

Opening of Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly

The Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly opened on 19 September 1950 in Flushing Meadow in New York. The tension between the blocs became evident from the very beginning during the debate on China's representation at the U.N. India's proposal to admit Communist China side by side with Nationalist China was put to the vote and rejected by 33 to 16, with 10 abstentions. Two Soviet proposals to expel Nationalist China and to admit Communist China were also rejected. Subsequently the Assembly adopted a Canadian proposal to set up a special committee to study the problem of Chinese representation.

Following this debate, the Assembly elected as its President for the Session the Iranian representative, Nasrollah Entezam, in preference to Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan.

389. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 20 September 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2384/21

Summary

Sharett communicates his impressions of the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly. There was considerable tension from the very beginning, even before the election of the president, when the argument arose

about the Chinese representation. India's speech, in favour of Communist China, was very impressive, and so was that of Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky, who was, as usual brilliant and witty. In contrast, the American representative was unconvincing and sounded unconvinced himself.

The course the voting took was interesting in itself. The Indian and the Soviet proposals were very similar. The Indian proposal was rejected but the voting ratio had shifted considerably in favour of Communist China. Israel voted with India and ultimately also with the Soviet Union; this last vote was cast after some hesitation, mainly in order not to appear as if it were important with whom rather than for what one was voting. In this vote Israel was the only Western state to side with the Eastern bloc, India, Pakistan and Burma.

Sharett later met Acheson socially and explained that Israel had voted "for a fact, not for fiction". Acheson said he did not wish "to pry into Israel's reasons" and that they would have another opportunity to discuss the matter. Rumour at the U.N. has it that Acheson is fully convinced that the U.S. policy in China is mistaken and that he is executing it practically at the point of a gun.

390. E. Elath (London) to M. Comay. 20 September 1950

Notes

1. See No. 381.

391. Y. Shimoni [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett (New York). 22 September 1950

Orig.: 93.03/3010/5

Summary

Shimoni wishes to acquaint the Foreign Minister with some of his assumptions and conclusions concerning the Israel–India relations,[1] should he meet and negotiate with Indian representatives in the course of the forthcoming Assembly of the U.N.

(1) India's unwillingness to establish new missions abroad is genuine and not tactical and is based on budgetary considerations valid for at least current fiscal year.

(2) India's only diplomatic missions in the Middle East are those in Egypt and Iraq. The ambassador to Egypt is also the minister to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. India may have to consider accrediting her minister in Ankara also to Israel.

(3) Israel may have to compromise on the principle of reciprocity should she wish to open a legation in India.[2]

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 201.
2. See No. 396.

392. D. Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 23 September 1950

Coded Tel. 83; Inc.: 93.01/2202/16

Summary

Ben-Gurion cables to Sharett details on the Azazmeh incident[1] after he had been briefed on it by Dayan.

The Azazmeh tribe of Beduin, some 15,000 strong, is hostile to Israel. They used to live on both sides of the Palestine–Sinai border, two thirds of them in Sinai and a third in Palestine. Following the 1948 war they all fled to Sinai but have since attempted to return several times and have always had to be driven out again. It has always been easy for them to infiltrate over the border because they live in tents and the entire area is uninhabited. They till the land in the wadis and sow wheat and barley.

In the beginning of September, after some of the tribesmen laid a landmine and a man was injured, it was decided to expel them again. No tanks or armoured cars took part in the operation, and only a single light plane was used for reconnaissance over the area. The soldiers, armed with rifles and machine-guns, arrived in jeeps and the Beduin ran away as soon as they saw them coming; in most cases there was no physical contact at all, but where it did happen the soldiers used their arms sparingly and only ten Beduin were killed out of 300 involved. Some thirty tents left in the area were burnt, but most of the crop was left standing.

Similar operations have taken place in the past and the Azazmeh have always come back afterwards. Dayan recommends that a specific arrangement be arrived at with the Egyptians concerning this tribe. He suggests that some 5,000 be allowed to return permanently on condition that the Egyptians undertake not to let any other infiltrate over the border.

Notes

1. See Nos. 386 and 387.
2. Colonel Yigal Allon,. O.C. Southern Command during the War of Independence.
3. Michael Hanegbi, Military Governor of the Negev 1948–1949.
4. See also No. 394.

393. M. Sharett (New York) to D. Ben-Gurion. 24 September 1950

Notes

1. For the record of the discussion held by the Israeli delegation to the U.N. on 24 September 1950, see file 93.03/89/1.

394. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (New York). 24 September 1950

Coded Tel. YA87; Inc.: 93.01/2202/16

Summary

Eytan briefs Sharett on the Azazmeh incident and on the expulsion of the Arab inhabitants of Majdal.[1]

When hostilities in the Negev had ceased some 5,000 Beduin remained on the Israeli side, but their numbers were gradually swelled by tribes and families returning from the southern Negev or from over the border, until they reached some 17,500, including two friendly families from the Azazmeh tribe. All this population registered and were issued identity cards. Other Beduin gathered in the central and southern Negev, coming and going between Egypt and Israel; these were not registered and were not issued papers.

The majority of the Azazmeh tribe fled over the border but used to return from time to time and were always driven back, as was well known to the Egyptians. Israel complained several times to the Mixed Armistice Commission, and the Egyptians then unofficially requested Israel to use strong measures.

If the present Egyptian complaint refers to the hostile Azazmeh, who had penetrated into the sand dunes between Auja and Rafah, then the answer is that these people were never recognized by Israel and they are infiltrators pure and simple. If the Egyptians mean the Beduin from the southern Negev, then Israel's policy regarding these is to accept the *status quo* but to prevent additional infiltration.

The Majdal case is quite different. A number of Arab refugees from other places had concentrated there and the intention was to resettle them in Israel, and indeed 200 of them were given accommodation in Ramle. Lately, for various reasons including the wish to be reunited with their families, economic difficulties and the existence of military rule, the refugees in Majdal decided to move to Gaza, more than a thousand of them leaving between June and September.

On 15 August the matter of the Majdal refugees was discussed at the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Egyptians requested that the relocation of these people be coordinated with them in advance, and accordingly

an additional 500 have so far been met at the border by the Egyptian authorities and taken away on buses.

On being asked later why they had submitted a complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission, the Egyptians replied that they wanted to draw attention in general to the plight of the refugees in the Gaza Strip.

Notes

1. See No 392.

395. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 28 September 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2384/21

Summary

Sharett reports further on the first sessions of the General Assembly.[1]

Following the opening which had been full of drama and tension, the representatives of the two main blocs made their speeches. That of U.S. Secretary of State Acheson was vigorous and full of determination and clearly bore his personal stamp. Vyshinsky's speech, on the other hand, was weak and he sounded very much on the defensive. The speeches of other representatives of the Eastern bloc were similar in tone, that presumably being the official line, either because they were suffering reverses in Korea and were seeking a compromise or for tactical reasons.

Besides the Korean issue, a solution for which is not a present in sight, the most important item on the agenda will be Acheson's proposals for increasing the power of the General Assembly at the expense of the Security Council (in order to neutralize the Soviet power of veto). Sharett had planned at first to express general support for the American proposals, but had second thoughts and decided to limit himself to announcing that the proposals were in Israel's view worthy of serious study and consideration.[3] The British and French also had some reservations on the subject and it is not yet clear what exactly are their intentions.

Israel won an important procedural and moral victory when she succeeded in referring to the Legal Committee the item on according a special status to the Arab League. Israel's proposal[4] caught the Arabs short and they had no alternative but to submit with a good grace. The outcome of the debate in the Legal Committee has to be awaited.[5]

Jacob Robinson's election to the post of Deputy Chairman of the Legal Committee was very gratifying; it can be seen as the first successful step in the efforts to attain for Israel important positions in the organization.

In Sharett's opinion, the delegation to the U.N. is performing very well as a team. He views the lack of acknowledgement of his brief reports as an expression of confidence and readiness to give the delegation a free hand in determining Israel's policies.

Notes

1. See No. 389.
2. Sharett's telegram to Eytan, X433, of 23 September 1950, transmitting the gist of Sharett's intended speech in the General Assembly.
3. For the full text of Sharett's speech see *GAOR, Fifth Session, Plenary*, 286th Meeting, 27 September 1950, pp. 135–7.
4. During a discussion in the General Assembly on the General Committee's recommendations regarding the agenda, Eban proposed not to accept the Committee's suggestion to include the Arab League's request to be accorded an observer status at the U.N. on the agenda, but to hold instead a "full, detailed and revealing discussion on the history, the record and the objectives and the composition of the Arab League" in the Sixth (Legal) Committee. The Egyptian representative said that he had no objection and Eban's suggestion was put to vote and endorsed with a large majority. (See *GAOR, Fifth Session, Plenary*, 285th Meeting, 26th September 1950, pp. 118–9.)
5. The discussion in the Sixth Committee on the Arab League's request took place on 2–5 October. Jacob Robinson, who represented Israel, contended that the Arab League was not a regional organization in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter, but an organization built on racial lines, holding its meetings *in camera*, whose record boasted no contribution to international peace. In the course of the discussion most of the speakers, including the proponents of the resolution to invite the Arab League, contended that the resolution did not in any way imply that the Arab League was or was not a regional organization within the meaing of the Charter and it was finally resolved by a large majority to invite the Secretary-General of the Arab League to attend as an observer the sessions of the General Assembly. (See *GAOR, Fifth Session, Sixth Committee*, 215th–217th Meetings, 2–5 October 1950, pp. 13–36.)

396. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 28 September 1950

Notes

1. The meeting was actually with the Deputy Minister – Balkrishna V. Keskar. See also No. 391.
2. Reference is to Ben-Gurion's projected visit to India – see Sharett to Elath, 12 October 1950, 93.04/37/1
3. Different information was given to Elath in his conversation with the Indian High Commissioner in London. The latter said that delay in implementing diplomatic relations with Israel was caused partly by problems of manpower, but mainly for political reasons – the wish to avoid offending the Arabs. His advice was open first a commercial mission in India and in the mean time to maintain diplomatic relations through Washington and London. (See Elath to Sharett, E39, 12 October 1950, 93.01/2202/17.)

397. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 28 September 1950

398. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 28 September 1950

Notes

1. The Army's autumn manoeuvres involved moving large forces to the Negev, considerably more than permitted by the Armistice agreements. Eytan advised Sharett to draw Ben-Gurion's attention to that fact. (See Eytan to Sharett, Y100, 27 September 1950, 130.09/2338/11.)

399. Meeting: D. Ben-Gurion – A. Henderson (Tel Aviv, 1 October 1950)

Notes

1. Arthur Henderson, British Secretary of State for Air.
2. Admiral Sir John H. Edelsten, Commanding the British Mediterranean Fleet.
3. Arthur Henderson, a Labour leader, Foreign Secretary, 1929–1931.
4. See No. 105.
5. At his meeting with Elath after his return from Israel, Henderson said the visit had left a great impression on him; he praised Ben-Gurion, and said he had reported on his visit to the Cabinet's security committee and also informally to his colleagues in the Cabinet and the party. At the same time he made it clear to Elath that there were at the moment no prospects of supply of jet aircraft to Israel or to any other Middle East country, owing to commitments to NATO. When the situation changed, Israel's status would be similar to that of her neighbours. On the other hand, he will try to expedite the admission of Israel Air Force personnel for training in Britain. (See Elath to Comay, LI925, 1 November 1950, 130.09/2318/8.)

400. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (New York). 2 October 1950

Notes

1. Segan-Aluf Yehoshafat Harkabi, staff officer dealing with the Armistice Commissions.
2. See No. 379.
3. Of the Israel–Jordan Armistice Agreement–see No. 324 and n. 4 *ibid.*
4. See No. 105.
5. See No. 399.
6. See No. 345.
7. Sharett replied that he was entirely in agreement with this step. Though Israel was absolutely in the right in the Naharayim affair, politically in the long run her position was untenable, the more so as it was undermining the argumentation *vis-à-vis* Syria on the paramountcy of the international boundary. (See Sharett to Eytan, X435, 6 October 1950, 130.09/2329/10.)
8. On this meeting, see Biran to Eytan, 4 October 1950, 130.16/2948/7. See also Editorial Note, p. 214.
9. For full report of the conversation, see Eytan to Sharett, 4 October 1950, 93.03/3034/13.

401. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 2 October 1950

Notes

1. Erik Boheman, Swedish Ambassador in Washington, member of the Swedish delegation to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

402. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 2 October 1950

403. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 2 October 1950

Notes

1. See No. 401.
2. Eytan raised this idea in a conversation with Ben-Gurion dealing with all the pending political issues, but received no response (see Eytan to Sharett, Y138, 9 October 1950, 130.09/2338/12).
3. For details of this conversation, see No. 406.

404. S. Bentsur[1] (Budapest) to M. Walter. 2 October 1950

Coded Tel. BU153; Recd: 4 October; Inc.: 130.09/2295/9

Summary

Eliashiv had a talk with Berey and received the impression that the Communist Party was still opposed to Jewish emigration and that the prospects of the negotiations were poor. The meeting with Rákosy did not take place and this can be regarded as a bad sign. Bentsur thinks that in this situation one must not neglect the possibility of securing the *aliya* of several hundred Zionist activists in exchange for the people wishing to return to Hungary. The Minister is of the same opinion and does not think such a deal could endanger the main negotiations on emigration.[4]

Notes

1. Shmuel Bentsur, First Secretary and Consul in the Israeli Legation in Budapest.
2. Walter had referred to the Hungarian proposal to allow the emigration of several hundred Zionist activists in exchange for exit permits from Israel for Hungarian emigrants who wished to return to their country. He advised to reject this proposal and to continue negotiating on the basis of a general demand on principle for free *aliya*. On this – see No. 373.
3. See No. 373.
4. Walter replied that the Hungarian Legation had in the mean time again raised the matter of the *olim* who wished to return to Hungary, stressing that among them were many non-Jews and also children whose parents had remained in Hungary. His advice was to delay negotiations on *aliya* until the Hungarian Legation provided a detailed list of those wishing to return. (See Walter to the Israeli Legation in Budapest, telegram 101, 6 October 1950, 130.09/2295/7.)

405. A. Eban [Washington] to D. Ben-Gurion and E. Kaplan. 3 October 1950

Notes

1. William Rosenwald, Vice Chairman of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.
2. See No. 412.

406. Meeting: S. Bendor[1] – R. Ford (Tel Aviv, 5 October 1950)

Report: 130.02/2403/9

Summary

Ford arrived with a cable from Webb[2] summarizing the latter's talk with Shiloah on the subject of the Arab refugees.

He said he had been instructed to coordinate his position with his British and French colleagues; they had consulted together and had decided to approach the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[3]

Ford then read out the telegram rapidly. Webb's main points were as follows:

(1) Israel has to take a long view and to renounce short-term advantages as in the case of Naharayim and the expulsion of the Majdal Arabs, so as not to destroy the chances of eventual improvement in relations.

(2) A final settlement with the Arabs is important for Israel in times of peace and especially so in view of the possibility of a world war breaking out.

(3) From a persecuted nation, the Jews have become a persecuting nation, and Israel is losing the world's sympathy as a result.

(4) The world community cannot shoulder any longer the burden of the relief for the Arab refugees.

(5) The Department of State has information that the Arabs are prepared to have the refugees resettled outside Israel, and Israel must therefore declare her readiness to contribute to this project.

Shiloah had replied to the above that Israel was prepared to discuss the refugee problem as a first stage of negotiations of a Jewish–Arab settlement, with the understanding that further stages would follow. He also said that the Naharayim incident was a reaction to unimplemented promises by King Abdallah.[4]

Thus far the telegram.

Bendor asked Ford what was then required of him, as Shiloah had replied on the spot to Webb. Ford said that Israel had to yield in the Naharayim affair, at least till a "final settlement" was achieved, and not to rely overmuch on her contacts with Abdallah. To this Bendor replied that Israel was hoping that a new government in Jordan might make a speedy agreement possible.

Ford then turned to the subject of compensation for the refugees and said that Israel should announce her readiness to contribute to the refugees' resettlement. Bendor replied that Israel's counterclaims must not be forgotten; besides, Israel was in a difficult economic situation. Ford said he thought Israel should devote to that end part of the receipts of the United Jewish Appeal.

Notes

1. Shmuel Bendor, Director of the United States Division in the Foreign Ministry from September 1950.
2. John Webb, U.S. Under-Secretary of State.
3. See Webb to the U.S. Embassy in Israel, 30 September 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, V. pp. 1019–20.
4. The report on this conversation was late in reaching the Foreign Ministry (see Report on a Conversation at the Department of State, 12 October 1950, 130.02/2403/13). From the American source (see n. 3 above) it would appear that Shiloah had repeated the usual Israeli position making the solution of the refugee problem contingent on an overall settlement of Israel's relations with the Arab states. He had explained Israel's toughened attitude in the territorial issues (the Naharayim case) as emanating from the failure of the contacts with the Jordanians, and gave as proof the renewal of contacts with King Abdallah in the wake of the Naharayim affair. See also Eytan to Sharett, telegram Y131, 6 October 1950, 130.09/2338/12.

407. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York) and E. Elath (London). 6 October 1950

Notes

1. Cf. No. 369.
2. See No. 400.
3. For full report of the conversation, see file 130.13/2595/8.

408. E. Elath (London) to M. Comay. 6 October 1950

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. See No. 400.
3. See No. 406.

409. S. Bentsur (Budapest) to M. Walter. 7 October 1950

Coded Tel. BU156; Recd: 8 October; Inc.: 130.09/2295/9

Summary

Bentsur reports on his meeting with Berey,[1] at which he complained of the delays in issuing passports to emigrants and of the numerous refusals to grant exit permits. Berey's reply was that the authorities had every right to reject applications for emigration without having to give any explanation. He was prepared to intervene in a small number of cases but could not promise anything. Bentsur's recommendation is not to accept Berey's offer but to deal with every case separately.

The conversation then turned to the *aliya* issue in general. It was agreed that Israel would submit a memorandum on this subject, but Berey stressed at the same time that his Government opposed Jewish emigration

and that his personal opinion was that only very modest demands could possibly be met.

Bentsur was later informed that the Hungarian authorities had held up a group of emigrants about to leave for Israel; he thought this was intended as a threat connected with the Hungarian emigrants wishing to return from Israel, and he requested a second meeting with Berey.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 404.
2. Paragraph (b) dealing with emigrants wishing to return to Hungary, has been omitted here.
3. See Vol. 4, No. 142, where the number of authorized exit permits was given as one thousand; later, however, the quota was raised to 3,000.
4. Bentsur had two more meetings on *aliya* with Berey. At the first meeting Berey informed him that his Government had not reneged on the agreement on emigration but that it wished to postpone its implementation until a solution was found for the emigrants who wished to return to Hungary. At the second meeting Berey said that there had indeed been some progress in that issue, but that he was informed that pressure was still being exerted on these people; Bentsur for his part demanded that the emigrant group's departure for Israel be expedited. (See Bentsur to Walter, No. 160, 11 October 1950; 21 October 1950, 130.09/2295/9.)

410. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (London). 9 October 1950

Notes

1. Emanuel Shinwell, the British Secretary of Defence.
2. After the meeting Elath reported that he had received a great deal of information from Shinwell but that the prospects of obtaining significant amounts of arms from Britain in the near future, were poor, either in the way of a lend-lease agreement or through cash purchase (see Elath to Sharett, E38, 12 October 1950, 93.01/2202/17).

411. A. Eban (New York) to E. Boheman (New York). 10 October 1950

Notes

1. See Vol. 4, Appendix E.

412. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 10 October 1950

Notes

1. See No. 405.

413. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 11 October 1950

Notes

1. Reference is to a draft resolution with amendments submitted by a group of states headed by the U.S., intended to extend the powers of the General Assembly in safeguarding world peace in those cases where the Security Council was unable to do so owing to lack of unanimity — in other words, when the right of veto was exercised. (For the text of the draft resolution and details of the debate, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1950, pp. 181–95.)
2. On this conversation see Elath to Sharett, IL860, 11 October 1950, 130.09/2318/8.
3. Israel's suggestions, as detailed by Sharett in this telegram, were submitted to the First Committee by Eban on 13 October and were included in a draft amendment presented by Israel to the Committee (see *GAOR, Fifth Session, First Committee*, 362nd meeting, 13 October 1950, pp. 115–8).

414. E. Shinwell (London) to E. Elath (London). 11 October 1950

Notes

1. Elath had thanked Shinwell for his intervention in the matter of the torpedo-boats (see No. 388 and n. 5 *ibid.*), but mentioned at the same time that he was awaiting replies to Israel's other requests (letter in 93.04/38/12).

Editorial Note

Meeting of the Special Committee

A meeting of the Special Committee took place on 12 October 1950 at the Mandelbaum Gate. The head of the Jordanian delegation opened by saying that prior to discussing the pending issues agreement had to be reached on the Committee's terms of reference, and its status *vis-à-vis* certain paragraphs in the Israel–Jordan Armistice Agreement had to be clarified. The Israeli representatives opposed this demand and called for a substantive debate then and there. It was ultimately resolved that the Jordanian delegation would consult with its Government and would submit a draft of the terms of reference and of the agenda for consideration by the Government of Israel against the next meeting of the Committee on 26 October. (See Report of the Meeting of the Special Committee, 12 October 1950, 130.16/2948/7).

415. R. Shiloah (New York) to W. Eytan. 12 October 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2413/2

Summary

Shiloah sums up his visit to the States. He was agreeably surprised by the change which had taken place during the last few months in the relations

between the two countries, manifesting itself both in the improved atmosphere and in the attitude to the matters at issue. While Israel had been accused in the not-so-distant past of aggression, obduracy, expansionism and so forth, there was now an attitude of understanding and friendship, the number of pending issues has been greatly reduced, and Israel's good intentions were being taken at face value. This shift can be attributed mainly to Israel's position on the international issues. The American Government has presumably come to the conclusion that in the fundamental controversy between the Western democracies and the popular democratic regimes, Israel was firmly on the Western side. Israel's independent stand on a number of issues has only enhanced her prestige and she is considered a serious and reliable factor in the Middle East. A further cause of the improved relations are the contacts and connections made by the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy in Washington; these have served to dispel the impression that Israel was a strange and benighted country run by a bunch of fanatic politicians and have instead created an image of a civilized country making every effort to establish good relations internationally.

Shiloah does not wish to go again over all the talks he had at the State Department and with McGhee.[1] He repeatedly heard what he had already been told in Israel by the Conciliation Commission, namely, that the only solution to the problem of the refugees was to settle them in the Arab countries and that Israel must make her contribution to that end — not in money, which she does not have, but in declaring her political and moral obligation to pay compensation to the Arab refugees without making it contingent on peace negotiations. The Americans understand Israel's demand to link the talks on the refugee issue with peace negotiations, but they believe that the very decision to discuss compensation will lead to comprehensive peace talks. They also argue that the refugees cannot be supported indefinitely without a constructive plan for their rehabilitation, and such a project cannot be undertaken without Israel's cooperation.

Shiloah thinks Israel should adopt this line. Should the U.S., the U.N., the Conciliation Commission and others agree to such a solution (which would not involve repatriation of the refugees) this would constitute an important political achievement which would also imply their acceptance of the present borders. His thesis is borne out by the fact that in all his conversations the territorial issue was not even hinted at, and he had reason to believe that in their talks with the Arabs the Americans adopt the same line and keep urging them to accept the present territorial reality.

In spite of the improved atmosphere, Shiloah does not wish to paint too rosy a picture. It is a long way from understanding and cordiality to the extension of substantive help. He is not optimistic about the prospects of receiving economic and particularly military aid, as the U.S. is concentrating all her efforts on building up Western Europe, and the Middle East is somewhere in the third rank of priorities. There is a great deal to report on these matters, which he will do on his return to Israel.

Notes

1. See No. 406 and n. 4 *ibid.*

416. Meeting: T. Kollek - B. Berry (Washington, 11 October 1950, Document Dated 13 October 1950)

Report: 130.20/2460/9

Summary

Keren and Rockwell[1] were also present at the meeting, which had originally been intended as a courtesy visit introducing Kollek in his new assignment[2] but which immediately turned to topical matters. Economic affairs were discussed first, in particular the new agricultural loan.[3] To Kollek and Keren's surprise, the Americans did not seem to have any reservations regarding this loan which they apparently considered a matter of secondary importance and felt sure that it would be approved by the Export–Import Bank.

The refugee problem was then raised. Kollek and Keren cautiously intimated to the Americans that Israel might possibly be prepared to accept their proposal and to agree to discuss compensation for the refugees as the first item in comprehensive peace talks.[4] Rockwell wondered how Israel would set about it, and Kollek replied that there was no detailed plan yet; however, in the course of the talks with Jordan, for instance, Israel had proposed to finance the compensation for Arab property owners in Jerusalem by mortgaging that property or putting it up for sale.[5] Obviously, assessing the worth of the property will be a very complicated problem, and it was doubtful whether it could be based on the present inflated prices. Perhaps the guiding lines will be similar to those in the agreement between India and Pakistan, whereby the property was assessed on the basis of the average prices obtaining during a very long period.

The conversation was conducted in an extremely cordial atmosphere, and Keren has the impression that a certain shift has taken place in the relations with the Americans. It was possible that Israel's recent policy on world affairs has begun to bear fruit, her voting at the U.N. on the Korean issue having been viewed here with extreme gratification, in contrast to the negative impression created by the Arab stance. Some influence could also be attributed to Israel's new line on compensation for the refugees and also to the public campaign for aid to Israel which has just been launched.

Notes

1. Of the Department of State. The minutes were taken down by Keren.
2. Kollek was appointed Israel's Minister in Washington in the fall of 1950.
3. See No. 384.
4. See No. 406.
5. See No. 105.

417. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (London). 15 October 1950.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 214.
2. Reference is to Justice Fitzgerald's plan of 1945 to partition Jerusalem along ethnic lines into two local councils with limited autonomy subordinate to a joint council which would administer municipal matters common to both parts of the city.
3. No. 105.
4. Untraced.

418. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett (New York). 15 October 1950

Notes

1. See No. 419.

419. J. Herzog (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (New York). 15 October 1950

Notes

1. See No. 418.
2. One sentence has been omitted here.
3. See A. Jacobus to Trygve Lie, 19 September 1950, 130.02/2443/8.

420. M. Fischer (Paris) to M. Sharett (New York). 16 October 1950

Copy: 130.10/2550/8

Summary

Fischer writes on the French position in the Jerusalem issue:

(1) France will not take the initiative in this matter but will be prepared to support a solution on the basis of the Dutch or the Swedish proposal.[1]

(2) France will make efforts to have appended to the proposals a full list of the Holy Places. They have prepared such a list and Fischer is enclosing a copy.[2]

This line had been adopted by all the important officials at the Quai d'Orsay who are, however, apprehensive of a possible *volte-face* by the Foreign Minister who is due to meet the Pope in Rome.

Notes

1. See Nos. 411 and 454.
2. The list was enclosed with the letter, but has not been included here.
3. René Neuville, the French Consul-General in Jerusalem.
4. Presumably Philippe Benoist of the French delegation to the Conciliation Commission.

421. O. Gass (Washington) to E. Kaplan. 16 October 1950

Notes

1. On 19 October Eban cabled the situation in regard to Israel's loan requests: the President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export–Import Bank have all come out in favour of the grant. The matter was now before the National Advisory Council who were in receipt of the President's recommendation, and Eban was informed that approval of the loan was a matter of days. (See Eban's telegram W401, 19 October 1950, 93.01/2202/15.) It later turned out that the decision had been put off until after the November elections. (See Kaplan to Horowitz, 30 October 1950, 130.09/2308/19.) The loan was ultimately approved at the beginning of December 1950.

Editorial Note

Security Council's Discussions on the Palestine Question

The Security Council dealt with a number of complaints connected with the Palestine issue at a number of meetings which took place on 20 and 30 October and on 6, 13 and 17 November. On the agenda were an Egyptian complaint of 15 September on the expulsion of Arabs from the Negev (U.N. Document S/1790); an Israeli complaint on the blockade against Israeli goods passing through the Suez Canal, and on the Egyptian and Jordanian breaches of procedure as set down in the armistice agreements, obliging the parties to address complaints or claims connected with the agreements to the Mixed Armistice Commissions and not directly to the Security Council; another complaint against Egypt and Jordan in that these states had violated the armistice agreements by threatening publicly and officially to resume their aggression against Israel, and in that Jordan had not implemented those paragraphs of the armistice agreement dealing with Jerusalem (U.N. Document S/1794 of 16 September); a Jordanian complaint of 29 September that Israel had occupied an area in the vicinity of Naharayim. In the course of the debate the Egyptian representative brought up a number of additional complaints on breaches of the armistice along the Israeli border, mentioning in particular the occupation of the point between Bir Qattar and Eilat in March 1949 (see No. 386 and n. 3 *ibid.*).

In the course of the ensuing debate the parties repeated the arguments set forth in the written communications. The Israeli representative announced that his Government would implement the past decision of the Israel–Egypt Mixed Armistice Commission and would withdraw her forces from Bir Qattar. The British representative dwelt on the Suez blockade and gave his opinion that an attempt should first be made to solve this issue within the framework of the armistice agreement, and if this failed – to bring the matter up before the Security Council. The French representative called for the immediate lifting of the blockade.

The debate closed with a vote on a draft proposal submitted by the U.S., Britain and France, in which the Soviet Union and Egypt abstained and all the other members of the Security Council voted in favour. For the text of the resolution see Main Volume, pp. 593–4.

422. Israel Legation in Prague to the East European Division. 20 October 1950

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2342/16

Summary

A visit had been paid to the Chinese ambassador, who expressed his gratification at Israel's voting at the U.N. on the Korean issue and his hope for good relations between the representatives of the Asian countries in Prague. He also showed interest in Israel's problems and asked for informative material.

Editorial Note

Report by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

On 2 September 1950 the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine submitted to the U.N. Secretary-General a comprehensive report on its activities since its inception in January 1949. The report described the negotiations which had taken place between the parties, setting forth the attitudes taken up by the sides as expressed in the exchange of communications between the Commission and the various states. On 23 October the Commission submitted a supplementary report, in which it set out the causes of the stalemate which had ensued in the contacts between Israel and the Arabs and suggested possible lines of action for the future. According to this analysis, the main causes of the lack of progress were the Arabs' deep-rooted opposition to the establishment of the Jewish state in a region they considered their own; a feeling of insecurity on the part of both Israel and the Arabs; and the existence of the armistice agreement, which did bring an end to the warfare but at the same time created the illusion that the present state of absence of actual hostilities could continue for long. In the Commission's opinion, the present situation could not be maintained for a long period, especially in view of the pressing problem of the refugees. The Commission recommended that the General Assembly call on the parties to enter immediately on direct negotiations in which priority would be given to the refugee issue.

(See *Yearbook of the United Nations,* 1950, pp. 321–2; United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Supplementary Report... U.N. Document A/1367/Add.1.)

423. Note by the British Legation (Tel Aviv). 23 October 1950

Notes

1. The note was delivered on 24 October. Similar notes were delivered by the representatives of the United States and France. Eytan wrote in the margin: "This development reinforces – in my opinion – the demand to set up in the Foreign Ministry a special department for German affairs."
2. The Government of Israel discussed the relations with Germany on 30 October. It was resolved to turn down the three Powers' request to terminate the state of war with Germany. See also Nos. 497, 522.

424. *Aide-Mémoire* by the United States Embassy (Tel Aviv). 23 October 1950

Notes

1. See No. 34 and n. 4 *ibid.*
2. Eytan wrote in the margin of the *aide-mémoire:* "Foreign Minister,... It is our opinion that this offer ($100,000) should be accepted and that we should immediately commence working out projects in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Scientific Council, and similar bodies. Does this entail a decision in principle by the Government? If so, would you be prepared to raise this at the next meeting?"

425. M. Walter (Tel Aviv) to S. Eliashiv (New York). 23 October 1950

Copy: 130.11/2493/4

Summary

Walter reports on the situation regarding *aliya* from Rumania and Hungary.

The emigration from Rumania has been proceeding at a rate rapid enough to cause problems of accommodation, and Israel has even asked for a reduction in the number of arrivals during the winter months. The rate has now steadied at some 4000 a month.

The situation in Hungary is quite different. The Hungarians are pressing for the return of a group of some 1200 people who wish to go back to Hungary and are making of it a condition for the continuation of *aliya.* It has been officially explained that administrative problems were in the way and it has also been made clear that the group will not be enabled to return without the intervention of the Foreign Ministry. Walter himself is doubtful whether the deal in the offing – 1200 returnees for 3000 emigrants – is worth while for Israel.[5]

Notes

1. Two sentences, dealing with personnel changes at the Legation in Bucharest, have been omitted here.
2. See No. 409.

No. 425 – Notes (continued)

3. The last part of this sentence has been omitted here.
4. Several paragraphs, dealing with matters touching the Legation in Prague and the appointment of a minister to Bulgaria, have been omitted here.
5. After consulting with the Foreign Minister, Eliashiv gave as his opinion that no difficulties should be put in the way of the returnees and the issue should not be made a subject of negotiations on a *quid pro quo* basis and on increased *aliya* from Hungary (see his letter to Levavi, 26 October 1950, 93.03/75/9).

426. Meeting: A. Eban – G. McGhee (Washington, 24 October 1950)

Orig.: 130.20/2460/9

Summary

The talk commenced with a review of Israel's claims against Germany.[1] Eban then turned to the Jerusalem issue and expressed the hope that the Americans would support the Swedish–Dutch draft.[2] McGhee replied that the U.S.A. would support this and indeed any other proposal supported by Israel and Jordan, but owing to domestic differences of opinion they could not take any overt initiative. Eban tried to convince him that the success of the proposal could perhaps depend on the Americans playing an active part at the U.N., but he remained unmoved.

Notes

1. The first part of the conversation, dealing with reparations from Germany, has been omitted here.
2. See Nos. 411 and 428.
3. See No. 421.
4. See No. 323 and n. 3 *ibid.*

427. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 25 October 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 219.

428. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 25 October 1950

Notes

1. Eytan had asked for an assessment of the situation in the debate on Jerusalem at the U.N. so that he could report on it to the missions abroad (see telegram of 25 October 1950, 130.09/2336/2).
2. Eban had reported on his meeting with the Dutch delegation to the U.N., on their joint initiative with the Swedish delegation, in the matter of Jerusalem (see No. 411). The atmosphere at the meeting was good and there was a genuine desire to come to an understanding. A number of proposed amendments to the draft were discussed, the object of which was to bring it near to the Israeli and Jordanian positions. (See Eban to Eytan, X526, 23 October 1950, 93.01/2202/17.)
3. See Nos. 433 and 454.

429. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 25 October 1950

Notes

1. Subsequent to the Autumn 1949 debate on the Arab refugees problem at the Fourth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, it was resolved to establish the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. The Agency became operative at the beginning of May 1950. Howard Kennedy was named as its Director, having at his side an Advisory Committee composed of the representatives of the U.S., Britain, Turkey and France. Chairmanship of the committee went by rotation, the first Chairman so elected being John Blandford, the U.S. representative.
2. The U.N. General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 — see Vol. 4, Appendix A.
3. See No. 430.

430. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 25 October 1950

Notes

1. No. 429.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 219.
3. On 29 October Eban cabled details of his talk with Golda Meyerson and Kaplan. They both wholeheartedly supported Eban's proposals, but suggested the following additions: (1) the demand should be for a collective and not an individual arrangement; (2) a declaration should be made during the negotiations that Israel had counter-claims, but the negotiations should not be made contingent on discussing the claims of both parties simultaneously. Kaplan added that he was in favour of a quick settlement of the issue on the model of the financial arrangement with Britain, and that he believed Israel could take up the burden. (See Eban to the Foreign Ministry, telegram of 29 October 1950, 130.09/2308/14.)

   The Government endorsed Eban's proposals unanimously except for his article (c) in paragraph 4, in respect of which the opinion prevailed that it was preferable not to be committed in advance to negotiations with the Arab states; the readiness should rather be expressed to discuss the matter with the U.N. bodies. (See Sharett to Eban, telegram Y231, 31 October 1950, 130.09/2338/12; Sharett to Eban, IW951, 29 October 1950, 93.01/2202/15.) See also No. 435.

431. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 26 October 1950

432. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 27 October 1950

Notes

1. See Nos. 433, 454.

433. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 29 October 1950

Notes

1. See Vol. 4, Appendix E.
2. See No. 454.

Editorial Note

Consultation on the Matter of Germany

At the end of October and the beginning of November internal consultations took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the relations with Germany in the immediate future, in view of the developments touching Germany in the international sphere and in view of the need to open negotiations on reparations. As part of these consultations the West European Division asked for the opinions of the ministers and other representatives either residing in Germany or having connection with the problem on the future of the relations between the two countries. The following were the questions asked of the representatives:

(a) What should be the Government's attitude towards Germany in view of the latter's anticipated admission to the family of nations, with Western support? Should the diplomatic ban on Germany be maintained or should the policy be changed, and if the latter – is it a necessary consequence of the political realities?

(b) Does the change of policy towards West Germany also dictate the same change towards East Germany?

(c) What should be the future status of the Israel consulates in Germany?

(d) How should Israel address the problem of reparations – should Germany be approached directly or through the Western allies, and if directly – in what manner?

(e) What should be Israel's attitude towards Germany's admission to international organizations, and how should Israel's representatives abroad conduct themselves towards their German opposites?

(f) What possibilities are there of acting against German penetration of Arab states as an economic and a scientific factor?

For replies to these questions by the Israel representatives abroad, see Nos. 440, 446, 460, and 476; Fischer to Avner, 1 November 1950, 130.10/2539/1.

434. M. Namir (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 30 October 1950

Coded Tel.; Recd: 31 October; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Namir, on the verge of departure from Moscow, submits a report on a number of topics:

(1) At a leave-taking meeting with Gromyko, the latter was particularly cordial, expressed his regret at the termination of Namir's assignment and wished him success in his future career. Political subjects were not raised at the meeting.

(2) Surprise was caused by the absence of a Jewish representative at the All-Soviet Conference for Peace attended by representatives of all the other religions in the Soviet Union; foreign journalists in Moscow thought that this was not accidental.

(3) Reports from the U.N. General Assembly published locally tend to stress the affinity between the Soviet and the Arab attitudes on peace and on several other issues. Criticism is sometimes levied at some detail or other of the Arabs' pronouncements but these are as a general rule reported in a sympathetic vein. The Soviet press describes favourably on numerous occasions the achievements of the Moslem peoples of the Soviet Union. There is no substantial change for the better, on the other hand, in the attitude of the Soviet press towards Israel. While routine vilification has lessened to some extent and Sharett's and Eban's speeches at the Assembly were favourably reported, the wide publicity given to *Kol Ha'am*'s slanderous article on the government crisis is in itself enough to mar Israel's image in Russia in general and among the Jews there in particular; and this, presumably was the main intention.

(4) At his request, Namir was taken to see a kolkhoz, where he found three Jews in the administration, the others being gentiles.

Notes

1. Paragraph (5), dealing with a personal matter, has been omitted here.

435. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 31 October 1950

Notes

1. See No. 430.
2. See also No. 449.

436. A. Eban (New York) to E. Elath (London). 31 October 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 218–19.

437. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 1 November 1950

Coded Tel. YA237; Inc.: 130.09/2338/12

Summary

On that day Israel refused to send up the regular fortnightly convoy to Mt. Scopus after having been advised by the U.N. that the Jordanians

demanded that six armed Jordanian soldiers inspect the convoy on Israeli territory, and also refused transit with the convoy to Israeli civilians. These demands are in contravention of previous agreements, and Eytan accordingly requests that Riley be notified and urged to intervene immediately.[3]

Notes

1. John Bagot Glubb, Chief of the General Staff of the Arab Legion.
2. Brigadier Norman Lash, of the Arab Legion.
3. Following discussions with Riley, the U.N. proposed that the supplies for Mt. Scopus be transported in their own vehicles. The Jordanians agreed to this arrangement, but the I.D.F. local commander rejected it owing to an announcement by the Jordanian representative on the Mixed Armistice Commission that Jordan was fully sovereign and would accept orders from nobody. The proposal was referred to the Prime Minister, who authorized publication of the affair in the press and its referral to the Security Council. (See Eytan to Sharett, Y260, 6 November 1950, 130.09/2338/12.)

438. G. Avner (Tel Aviv) to M. Fischer (Paris). 1 November 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 223.
2. See Kidron to Eytan, LI897, 20 October 1950, 130.09/2318/8; Kidron's report to Eytan, 23 October 1950, 93.08/377/26. Kidron's second telegram has not been traced.
3. Untraced.
4. See draft of memorandum by Robinson of 30 October 1950, 93.02/181/2.

439. R. Shiloah (New York) to W. Eytan. 2 November 1950

Coded Tel. X572; Recd: 3 November; Inc.: 130.09/2329/10

Summary

Shiloah reports on his conversation with Riley, who hopes that the Americans will propose to the Security Council to refer the mutual Israeli and Arab complaints back to the Mixed Armistice Commissions with an appeal to the parties to submit in future to the Commissions' instructions.[1] The Egyptians will manoeuvre to have the resolution include an explicit reference to the Bir Qattar affair but Riley is trying to dissuade them from this.

Shiloah and Eban are both of the opinion that this problem would be solved if Israel could announce that the military forces have been evacuated and a civilian settlement has been set up in Bir Qattar. Riley also thinks that any sort of civilian undertaking is permissible in that area. In this connection Fawzi informed Riley that if Israel evacuates Bir Qattar and also agrees to repatriate some of the Azazmeh, Egypt will recommend to the other Arab states to enter on negotiations on a non-aggression treaty

and on a settlement of the territorial and refugee issues, with the proviso that these will not be considered a formal peace agreement.

The Syrian representative, Zayn al-Din,[2] informed Bunche that in his Government's opinion the time had come for a settlement with Israel; he requested Bunche to arrange for an informal meeting between the Syrians and Egyptians and a member of the American delegation for a preliminary discussion on initiating contacts with Israel.[3]

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 218–219.
2. Farid Zayn al-Din, Syrian diplomat, member of the Syrian delegation to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
3. See No. 447 and n. 3 *ibid.*
4. Paragraph (f), containing brief replies to telegrams sent to Shiloah, has been omitted here.

440. S. Ginossar (Rome) to G. Avner. 2 November 1950

Orig.: 130.10/2539/1

Summary

Ginossar refers to Avner's letter on the relations with post-war Germany,[1] where ethical principles come into conflict with practical considerations. There is no doubt that West Germany is progressing very rapidly towards full recovery from her defeat and will play an important role in Western Europe. The Italians and the French miss no opportunity to stress their positive attitude towards Germany. If Israel maintains her line of total boycott of Germany she will find herself totally isolated. Ginossar thinks that Israel should be led by practical considerations and should join the countries which are aiming at reconciliation with Germany, but this should be done very circumspectly, without creating the impression of jumping to the head of the queue. On one point he has no doubts whatsoever: a decision must be taken immediately. The Germans are at the moment wooing Israel and they are in need of her stamp of rehabilitation, but this situation may change in the very near future and then it would be more difficult to obtain good terms from the Germans and the reparations might also suffer.

Ginossar takes this opportunity to raise the question of relations with Spain. He thinks Israel's boycott of Spain is unnecessary and harmful, as that country has a great deal of influence in Latin America and has also an important role as a Mediterranean state. Here, too, Israel might find herself isolated. Israel has no dearth of enemies and Spain's wooing of Israel will not last for ever.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 223.

Editorial Note

Government Crisis in Israel

During the autumn and winter of 1950 Israel's economic situation worsened. Lack of foreign currency and the failure to curb black marketeering were the main features of the ailing Israeli economy. The Government's attempts to restore confidence by introducing a new economic plan and by abolishing the Ministry of Supply and Rationing were to no avail. On 15 October Prime Minister Ben-Gurion tendered his resignation after having failed to enlist the support of the Religious Front for his economic policy and for personal changes in the Government; the religious parties also raised certain demands connected with religious affairs. Following consultations with all political parties, President Weizmann entrusted Ben-Gurion with the task of establishing a new Government. Protracted negotiations ensued, including an abortive attempt to form a minority Government, at the end of which Ben-Gurion introduced to the Knesset on 1 November a new Government on the same party lines as the previous one. Several personal changes, however, took place, the most important of which was the inclusion of non-partisan Yaacov Geri as Minister of Trade and Industry. The General Zionists and Mapam remained outside the Government.

441. I. Barzilai (Warsaw) to M. Sharett. 2 November 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2446/11

Summary

In a personal letter, Barzilai, Israel's Minister to Poland, explains the reasons for his resignation.

He had been appointed to his present post in the first days of the State's existence, in the midst of Israel's struggle against the feudal invaders and their imperialist masters, a struggle led by a coalition of all the constructive forces in the country.

On their arrival in Poland he and his colleagues were made welcome by the remnants of Polish Jewry and by the Polish public opinion which viewed with admiration and sympathy the courage of a people casting off an imperialist yoke and defending itself against the aggression of reactionary forces.

Acting on the assumption of an essential identity between Israel's struggle for independence and the drive for peace and progress of socialist Poland, he envisaged two principal tasks in his mission: 1) to persuade the Polish authorities to enable the remnant of Poland's Jewry to emigrate to Israel, and 2) to foster economic and cultural relations between the two countries.

The first task met with immediate success: several months after the opening of the Legation, the Polish government enabled young Jewish volunteers to go to Israel and to enlist there.

However, the new Government subsequently formed in Israel without the participation of Mapam, signalled a sharp shift in international policy and concessions to the internal reactionary forces.

In spite of this, the Minister and his colleagues decided not to abandon their posts in the midst of the campaign for *aliya* and the negotiations on a bilateral economic treaty - hoping that the Government would shortly enlarge its basis.

An economic treaty was indeed signed in May 1949, but unhappily it was Israel which did not keep her side of the bargain, only an estimated one third of her obligations being scheduled to be met by the end of 1950.

As to *aliya,* the agreement achieved with the Polish authorities in August 1949 will enable some 25,000 Jews to emigrate to Israel - a much larger number than previously estimated.

Two recent developments, however, cannot be passed over in silence: first, the closing down of the cultural department and the clubhouse of the Legation by order of the Foreign Minister; this was a heavy blow to the local Jewish community as the clubhouse and the bulletin issued by the Legation's cultural department were a source of information and encouragement to the remnants of Poland's Jewry and in particular to those intending to emigrate to Israel, the more so after the liquidation of the Jewish community's public and political life.

Still more serious has been the shift in Israel's policy over the Korean crisis. In his opinion, the Goverment's decisions in this matter constitute an unequivocal move into the Western camp, committing the State to that side in a warring world which includes warmongers, enemies of progress and enemies of Israel.

When he, Barzilai, had been sent to represent Israel in Poland he came in the name of another Government and another policy. For months he had been expecting a change in policy and a change in the Government's composition, and had stayed on even though such change was not forthcoming, motivated both by hope and by a sense of duty to unfinished tasks. Now, the latest developments at the U.N. Assembly and the reestablishment of the previous coalition following the last government crisis have convinced him he had no option but to had in his resignation together with some of his colleagues serving in the Legation.[6]

Notes

1. No. 395.
2. For Israel's stand at the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, see *Information for Missions Abroad.* No. 119, 4 October 1950, 130.02/4364/2.
3. Pinhas Lubianiker (Lavon); since October - Minister of Agriculture.
4. Pinchas Dagan, Second Secretary in the Israel Legation in Warsaw.
5. Israel Kopyt, of the Israel Legation in Warsaw, in charge of immigration affairs.

No. 441 – Notes (continued)

6. In the end of December the Polish press and radio referred to the resignation of Barzilai and his colleagues; according to them the resignation was in protest against Israel's imperialistic policy and her support of the U.S. aggression in Korea (see Niv to Levavi, 1 January 1951, 130.09/2306/4).

442. E. Elath (London) to M. Comay. 3 November 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 218–19.

443. A. Levavi (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 3 November 1950

Coded Tel. IP444; Outg.: 130.09/2325/3

Summary

Sharett had a talk with Vyshinsky, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on *aliya* from the Soviet Union. The latter's reply, though courteous and apologetic, was in the negative. Vyshinsky explained that free emigration was in principle incompatible with the Soviet system. He also intimated that there was no point in the Israeli Foreign Minister's visiting Moscow and that the most suitable place for meetings was the U.N. At the same time he expressed his satisfaction at the renewed *aliya* from Rumania.

444. S. Bendor [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 5 November 1950.

Orig.: 93.08/370/26

Summary

Bendor reports on two matters connected with the armistice agreements.

Mount Scopus[1] – The Hebrew University is exerting pressure on the Foreign Ministry to permit the transfer of some 50,000 volumes from the Library on Mt. Scopus to the University in town. The Army Command object to that as they oppose any change in the existing status: they regard transfer of the books as weakening Israel's demand for free access to Mt. Scopus. The matter is to be decided by the Prime Minister within the next few days.

The Huleh[2] – Surveyors and engineers have been working south of Lake Huleh for several weeks laying the ground for diverting the Jordan at its issue from the lake. The work is being done in the demilitarized zone, a few

metres from the Syrian border. The Syrians have so far shown no reaction. In a matter of two or three weeks hundreds of labourers with mechanized equipment will start digging the channels. In order to prevent a second Naharayim affair, preliminary information is being made available to the diplomatic corps in Israel, stressing that civilian works are permitted in the demilitarized zone.

Notes

1. See No. 437.
2. See No. 385.

Editorial Note

Meeting of the Special Committee

The Israel–Jordan Special Committee met on 6 November 1950 in order to discuss its agenda. The Jordanians proposed an agenda which would include also matters not referred to explicitly in Article 8 of the Israel–Jordan Armistice Agreement, while the Israeli delegation insisted on the Committee's commencing by solving the issues which were specified in the above Article, discussing later the possibility of dealing with other problems. No decision was taken, and it was agreed to meet again on 30 November.

445. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 6 November 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 218–19, No. 386 and n. 3 *ibid.*
2. Shahal – Sherut Halutzi LeIsrael – precursor of Nahal.
3. See also Nos. 447 and 450.

446. E. Ben-Horin [Tel Aviv] to G. Avner. 6 November 1950

Orig.: 130.10/2539/1

Summary

Ben-Horin[1] reviews the relations between Israel and West Germany, attempting to answer some of the questions put to him by Avner,[2] while remaining aware of the confusion prevailing among all concerned.

1. Germany's rapid recovery, which has astonished even those Western countries which had contributed to it, is an unalterable political fact. If Israel maintains her present line of total boycott, she will find herself totally isolated. On the other hand, the possible results of easing the boycott must also be considered. There are no grounds for expecting, Ben-Horin thinks, that easing the boycott will create a more favourable atmosphere for the reparations negotiations. The West increasingly tends to transfer responsibility for this subject to the Germans themselves, while these have a deep-rooted objection to the payment of reparations. All the above pertains to reparations proper and not to restitution of Jewish property in Germany, which latter process is progressing satisfactorily. In other words, change of policy towards Germany would exact a heavy ethical price versus public opinion in Israel and would not affect external developments.

2. Accordingly, Israel's voting in international organizations should in principle be against Germany's admission. At the same time, it should be left to the discretion of Israel's representatives whether to abstain in certain cases, in particular so as not to appear ridiculous or entirely isolated.

3. The attitude towards German consuls and other representatives to be accredited in future to other countries should be in accordance with the Director-General's instructions from the end of August,[4] but here, too, it is suggested that some discretion be left to the local Israeli representatives to avoid giving excessive personal offence.

4. Ben-Horin has no illusions about the practical possibility of preventing the infiltration of German scientists, technicians and economists into Arab countries; this would be a normal and accepted phenomenon in times of peace, and the West could not possibly be persuaded to prevent it now. In any case, if not the Germans then the British or the Americans would come and do the same work.

5. The future of the Consulate is unclear, but in his opinion it should be promoted to the status of a special mission only if a more favourable outcome is envisaged for the reparations negotiations. On the other hand, there is no point in reducing the Consulate's activity now even if the future of the reparations does not look too rosy, as it is doing very useful work in this field.

6. All the above is relevant solely to West Germany. The problem of relations with East Germany is a separate matter and Ben-Horin does not wish to touch upon it at this juncture.

Notes

1. Eliashiv Ben Horin, of the West European Division.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 223.
3. No. 423.
4. No. 362.
5. One paragraph omitted here.

447. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 7 November 1950

Notes

1. No. 445.
2. Eytan had requested Sharett's opinion on paragraphs (d) and (e) in Shiloah's telegram — No. 430 (see his telegram to Sharett, 5 November 1950, 130.09/2338/12).
3. The Foreign Ministry's evaluation of the Egyptian and Syrian compromise proposals was that they were only a ploy to gain concessions from Israel during the debate at the Security Council (see Eytan to Sharett, Y252, 5 November 1950; Y271, 8 November 1950, 130.09/2338/12).

448. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 7 November 1950

Notes

1. See No. 433.
2. Eytan had cabled that King Abdallah had agreed to the passage of immigrants from Iraq through the Mafraq airfield, asking that an Israeli envoy discuss the details with him. Eytan proposed Shiloah for this mission. (See Eytan to Sharett, 7 November 1950, 130.09/2338/12.)
3. See Nos. 519.

449. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 7 November 1950

Tel. MH11558; Outg.: 130.02/2445/1

Summary

Eytan summarizes Israel's stand on the Arab refugee issue as it is to be submitted by Eban to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly:[1]

1. The Assembly should recommend direct negotiations, the refugee issue to be one of the first items on the agenda.

2. Until final rehabilitation of the refugees, the present aid and employment programmes should continue.

3. The Commission of Experts recommended by the Conciliation Commission should participate in the negotiations.

4. Israel will support setting up an Absorption (Reintegration) Fund for resettlement of the refugees.

5. Israel will transfer to that fund moneys awarded as compensation to the refugees.

6. The reports of the Conciliation Commission and of the Kennedy mission should be regarded as expert opinions and should be adopted as such; these reports, according to which repatriation is not feasible, constitute an authoritative basis for the resettlement programmes.

Notes

1. See also No. 435.

450. Y. Yadin (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 8 November 1950

Coded Tel. YA267; Outg.: 130.09/2338/12

Summary

Yadin replies to Sharett's telegram:[1]

1. Bunche's artful manoeuvres should not be taken too seriously.

2. In the matter of the "southernmost tip", Bunche has no document from the Rhodes negotiations with more legal authority than the cease-fire agreement.

3. If Bunche continues with his threats, Shiloah should gird up his loins and tell him that Israel will expose Riley as a liar and will publish the gentlemen's agreement between him and Shiloah which was instrumental in persuading Yadin to yield in the matter of the interpretation to be given to the "southernmost tip".

4. If there is no alternative, the issue should be referred to the International Court of Justice.

5. Whoever pressures Yadin to withdraw from Bir Qattar takes upon himself grave responsibility.

6. Any military withdrawal — even if the place is then occupied by civilian settlers — will endanger Eilat.

7. Yadin stresses that this is his entirely personal reaction to Sharett's telegram.[2]

Notes

1. No. 445.
2. See No. 451.

451. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan and Y. Yadin (Tel Aviv). 8 November 1950

Coded Tel. XA591; Recd: 9 November; 93.01/2202/18

Summary

In reply to Yadin's telegram,[1] Eban summarizes the state of affairs as follows:

1. The Americans have officially advised Israel that they demand implementation of the Commission's resolution on Bir Qattar, but would agree to an arrangement which would leave the Israelis there under some sort of civilian façade.

2. Even if Israel secures the right of appeal to the International Court, the Security Council would demand that the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission be implemented in the interim.

3. The case can be referred to the International Court of Justice only with the Egyptians' consent.

4. If Israel brings up the argument of the "southernmost tip", the Security Council would still give the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission more weight than to that argument.

5. Eban doubts whether Israel would decide to defy the Security Council for the sake of the difference between a military unit and a civilian group or a police station.

6. In his opinion, the solution is for Israel to announce that she accepts the Security Council's decision and that a police station, a meteorological station and a civilian settlement would be set up in the said locality; subsequently, an army unit might be detailed to protect that place.

7. The decision has to be taken with no loss of time.[2]

Notes

1. No. 450.
2. See Nos. 453 and 456.

452. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 8 November 1950

Notes

1. See No. 372.

453. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 9 November 1950

Notes

1. See No. 451.
2. Sharett opposed this suggestion, arguing that the delegation must not, even by implication, announce that Israel was disobeying the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission (see his telegram X595, 9 November 1950, 130.09/2329/10).
3. See No. 444. Eytan cabled that Ben-Gurion insisted on raising the Mt. Scopus issue at the Security Council and expressed his surprise that this had not yet been done. He considered the Jordanian stand a violation of the armistice and of Riley's express orders, one that could lead to a deterioration in the situation. (See Eytan to Sharett, Y273, 9 November 1950, 130.09/2338/12.)

454. M. Sharett (New York) to M. Amir (The Hague) and A. Nissan (Stockholm). 9 November 1950

Orig.: 93.24/283/2

Summary

Sharett is enclosing two documents: the third and latest draft of the Swedish–Dutch resolution;[1] and the same draft as amended by and acceptable to Israel. For enclosures, see Main Volume, pp. 638–43.

The principal amendments are a limitation of the powers of the U.N. Commissioner to preclude excessive intervention on his part in the affairs of the regular administration, and a restriction in the scope of the entire resolution, especially in what pertains to matters extraneous to direct supervision of the Holy Places.

Special attention should be paid to the substitution of the term "religious community" by "religious denomination": this amendment comes to ensure that the U.N. Commissioner's powers should apply solely to what touches the Churches and their institutions and that he should not become a permanent patron of all the sects and minorities in Israel. If this amendment is not accepted, then an effort should be made to include a limiting definition in the preamble to the resolution.

The amended draft has not yet been submitted to the sponsors of the resolution and it serves in the meantime as an internal guide. Discussions with the Dutch and the Swedes on this subject will take place shortly.

Notes

1. This version, bearing the date 20 October 1950, is on file but has not been appended here - see below.

455. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 10 November 1950

Notes

1. See No. 453.

456. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 11 November 1950

Notes

1. No. 451.
2. Eytan had recommended that should the Security Council's decision on Bir Qattar go definitely against Israel, Israel must see to it that this fact is stated explicitly for the record by General Riley. (See Eytan to Sharett, Y275, 9 November 1950, 130.09/2338/12.)
3. Eytan reported that the parties had agreed on the passage of a single convoy to Mount Scopus along the lines suggested in the past by General Riley. It was further agreed that after the convoy's passage, the parties would meet again in order to review arrangements for future convoys. (See Eytan to Sharett, 10 November 1950, 93.03/3007/4.)

457. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 12 November 1950

Notes

1. No. 456.
2. No. 451.
3. No. 455.

458. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 12 November 1950

Notes

1. No. 455.

459. A. Biran [Jerusalem] to W. Eytan. 12 November 1950

Copy: 130.16/2948/7

Summary

Biran reports on the Special Committee's last meeting,[1] which took place on 6 November. It commenced with a profitless argument on the Committee's functions and powers, which took up a whole hour. The Israeli representatives proposed that the Committee issue a general statement to the effect that it was subject to the general Armistice Agreement, but the Jordanians insisted on a special preamble. When asked in this connection what exactly were their expectations of the Committee, they answered with great candour that their main interest was in Article 6 of the Armistice Agreement[3] and in an arrangement which would enable the villagers on the borders of the "Triangle" to till their land lying in Israeli territory. To this Biran replied that Israel's main interest was in implementation of Article 8 and in access to Mt. Scopus in particular. He demanded that this item be put first on the agenda and reminded the Jordanians that Israel had agreed in the past to the villagers gathering their summer harvest and had received nothing in exchange. The Jordanians then proposed that the parties bind themselves not to implement any item until agreement is reached on all the issues.

Biran's conclusion was that Israel would not gain anything from these discussions, but, heeding his instructions, he did not sever the contacts but agreed to a further meeting on 30 November. He suggests that Israel then submit a draft agenda and also decide in advance whether to agree to discuss any other items before Article 8.

In his opinion, the following decisions should be taken:

1. Whether to continue the discussions though being aware of their futility.

2. If Israel intends only to create an impression of continuing discussions, would it not be better to find some pretext for putting off the next meeting?

3. If it is decided to continue with the discussions, an agreed agenda and discussion of the items of interest to the Jordanians will then be unavoidable; in other words, Israel will have to accept that implementation of Article 8 will be bound up with the results of the negotiations on other issues, such as tilling the lands in the "Triangle" or boundary modifications in Jerusalem. This is a question of principle which will have to be resolved in advance.

4. Israel has to decide on a plan regarding her relations with her neighbours; perhaps the best way is to find out from the Jordanians what is of most vital interest to them and whether it is possible to meet them half-way.

Biran requests that a decision on these matters be taken as soon as possible.[4]

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 230.
2. See No. 456, and n. 3 *ibid.*
3. Paragraph 6 of Article 6 dealt with the permission granted to those villagers in the sector previously occupied by the Iraqi army who would be affected by the demarcation of the armistice line between Israel and Jordan, to exercise their full rights in respect of their place of residence, their property and their freedom.
4. On 20 November, the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry convened all the officials of his Ministry handling the Middle East and the armistice affairs, including the Legal Adviser, in order to consult on the line to be adopted concerning the continuance of the sessions of the Special Committee. The consensus was that Israel should not take the initiative in giving the Committee its death-blow and that the sessions should continue even though there were no prospects of success. It was resolved that the Israeli delegation would propose that the agenda of the next session include as the first item the implementation of Article 8, paragraph 2, and as the second item a discussion of "other issues which would be brought up with the agreement of both parties". (See memorandum, 20 November 1950, 130.16/2948/7.) See also No. 482.

460. M. Amir [Brussels] to the West European Division. 13 November 1950

Orig.: 130.10/2539/1

Summary

Amir replies to the Division's letter on the relations with Germany.[1] In his opinion, the line of boycotting Germany, which is admittedly proper, consistent and ethical but at the same time totally futile, should be abandoned. Negotiations should be opened on the establishment of relations, laying stress on the reparations issue. This should be done with no delay, while the Germans are still in need of rehabilitation and are still prepared to pay reparations for their misdeeds. Amir does not belittle the importance of these reparations, as they could be of considerable aid in the upbuilding of Israel. He suggests that feelers should be put out very circumspectly, perhaps through American politicians or public figures, and care should be taken that the achieved agreement should include, besides financial reparations, also an admission to the crimes committed against the Jewish people.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 223.

461. M. Namir (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13 November 1950

Coded Tel. 582; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Namir reports on his leave-taking meeting with Zorin.[1] After formal preliminaries, the latter raised the subject of the international situation, speaking with a great deal of bitterness about the rest of the world which distorted the image of the Soviet Union as regards both her internal aspects and her foreign policy. Some of these distortions were due to lack of information but most were done deliberately and maliciously. The Soviet Union, he said, desperately needed peace to rebuild the ruins of the War and to improve the living conditions of her people. He complained that, even in Israel, a part of the public had been influenced by this attitude. Zorin spoke not as he was wont to, evincing deep feeling, anxiety and sadness.

In his reply, Namir refrained from dwelling on the international situation and confined himself to expressing the hope that the discussions at the U.N. would result in some sort of *modus vivendi.* He seized on Zorin's remark about Israel and complained that, in spite of all efforts, no progress had been achieved in developing cultural and commercial ties between the two countries and that the Soviet press was hostile to Israel. He also repeated the definition of Israel's international policy as one of non-alignment and pointed out that such a policy sometimes caused resentment on one side or the other. Israel, he said, would not abandon this line while the present Government was in power.

Namir's impression was that Zorin's words about the international situation were said deliberately, with the intention of their reaching, through Namir, also Western ears.

Notes

1. Valerian A. Zorin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister.
2. No. 434.

462. A. Eban [New York] to E. Elath (London). 15 November 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 218–19.
2. Muhammed Saleh ed-Din, Egyptian Foreign Minister.

463. E. Elath (London) to M. Comay. 15 November 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 218–19.

464. M. Fischer (Paris) to M. Sharett (New York). 16 November 1950

Notes

1. See No. 454.
2. Different information on the Vatican's position was received from another source (the French delegation to the U.N.), according to which the Pope had agreed to the Dutch–Swedish draft on condition that the preamble be rewritten and the past U.N. resolutions on Jerusalem be referred to, that it be noted that these resolutions could not be implemented, and that it be emphasized that the proposed arrangement was of a temporary nature until a permanent statute for Jerusalem might be adopted. Sharett, who had brought this information, said he was in favour of this solution as it ensured the adoption of the draft resolution and put an end to the conflict between Israel and the Vatican. (See Sharett to the Israel Legation in Rome, NR3, 17 November 1950, 93.01/2202/18.) See also No. 465, and Editorial Note, p. 240.

465. M. Sharett (New York) to M. Fischer (Paris). 17 November 1950

Notes

1. No. 464.
2. *Ibid.*, no. 2.
3. Reference is to France's voting of November 1947 on the resolution on the partition of Palestine, when the decision to support the proposal was taken only at the very last moment and after a great deal of vacillation (See *Documents, December 1947 – May 1948*, No. 1)

466. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 17 November 1950

Notes

1. See No. 454.
2. Sharett replied that Israel would support any action by the Greeks to bolster the independence of the religious communities in Jerusalem, but they should not expect Israel to do their work for them. Concerning the proposed additional clause, he would examine the matter, but he was afraid that any change in the draft might put in question the Pope's support. (See Sharett to Eytan, X623, 20 November 1950, 130.09/2329/10.)

467. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 18 November 1950

Notes

1. See Nos. 454 and 465.

468. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 18 November 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 218–19.
2. Reference is to a decision of the Deputy Chairman of the Egyptian–Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission who endorsed the Israeli claim that the Azazmeh tribesmen were infiltrators who had crossed the Egyptian border into Israel. (See *The Jewish Agency's Digest of Press and Events*, Vol. III, 6 October 1950, p. 64.)

469. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 18 November 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 218–19.
2. See also No. 475.

Editorial Note

Swedish–Dutch Draft Resolution on Jerusalem — Fourth Version

Following further discussions between the initiators of the draft resolution and after the Vatican's conditions for support of the proposal became known (see No. 464), several amendments were made, the principal ones being in the first part of the preamble. This section is brought here, with the amendments in bold type:

The General Assembly
Recognising the unique spiritual and religious interests of the world community in the Holy Land;
Desiring to preserve the peace of Jerusalem;
Considering its resolutions 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 and 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949;
Considering that it has so far not been possible to carry into effect these resolutions with regard to Jerusalem and the Holy Places;
Considering that any further delay in ensuring an international protection of the spiritual and religious interests of the world community in the Holy Land is undesirable and that, therefore, awaiting the establishment of a final statute, it is appropriate to take such measures as will henceforward ensure the respect of those interests;
Having regard to the special Report of the Trusteeship Council regarding the question of an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and Protection of the Holy Places (Document A/1286);

For the full text of this draft, dated 10 November 1950, see file 130.10/2550/3. See also No. 479.

470. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 21 November 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above, and also No. 464 and n. 2 *ibid.*
2. Reference is to articles which had appeared in the *Osservatore Romano* on 14 and 15 November, insisting on internationalization of Jerusalem and calling on the Latin American states to resist the Israeli pressure. (See Eytan to Sharett, Y316, 21 November 1950; Herzog to Sharett, Y315, 21 November 1950, 130.09/2338/12.)

471. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 21 November 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2408/16

Summary

Sharett encloses a memorandum by Shulamith Schwartz[1] on the advisability of forming ties between Israel and certain Lebanese Christian circles, based on two interviews she had with representatives of such a group ("Al-Kataib").[2] Sharett remarks that the authoress's natural enthusiasm has presumably caused her to overestimate the importance and the potentialities of this group, but the memorandum contains many grains of truth and the said group is worthy of some attention on Israel's part. It would seem that these people aim at moving Lebanon from the Pan-Arab sphere to Israel's orbit. Even if this goal is not attainable in the foreseeable future, it would still be worth while to invest some efforts and resources in that group.

There have been contacts in the past with some Lebanese personalities with the same object, but they proved fruitless because no effective force could be found inside Lebanon which could bring this about, Israel's role being restrained to limited aid from outside. If even a part of what appears in the memorandum has a basis in fact then it would seem that such a force has now appeared and efforts should be made to encourage and support it. Sharett proposes a meeting in the U.S.A. between the leader of the group and someone from the Foreign Ministry, perhaps Gideon Rafael. He does not think the time is ripe for his own participation in such a meeting.

Notes

1. Shulamit Schwartz (Nardi), author and editor, Director of Publications of the American Zionist Emergency Council.
2. Shulamit Schwartz had reported on two meetings she had with the head of the "Lebanese Forces" ("Al-Kataib") delegation which was then on a visit to the United States. Her impression had been that these circles formed an important public and military force capable of cooperation with Israel. See Shulamit Schwartz to Sharett, 20 November 1950, 130.02/2408/16.)

472. Meeting: S. Eliashiv — Y. Malik (New York, Document Dated 21 November 1950)

Copy: 93.03/84/21

Summary

In the course of a reception given by the Israeli delegation for the heads of the delegations to the U.N., Eliashiv spoke with Malik, the Soviet Permanent Representative at the U.N., who inquired about developments in the Jerusalem issue and what had happened to the "mysterious" Swedish–Dutch draft resolution.[1] Sharett, who was also present at that part of the conversation, revealed that the Vatican would possibly extend its approval to that draft resolution.

The talk subsequently turned to various matters. Malik expressed his admiration of Israel's achievements and the successful absorption of the immigrants. Eliashiv stressed the importance to Israel of immigration from Eastern Europe to counterbalance the possible effects on the country's cultural level of mass immigration from the Moslem countries. Mention was also made of the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Malik claimed that the Americans had no sense of historical perspective in relation to the U.S.S.R., they did not appreciate the Soviet Union's achievements and forgot the examples in history of the many invasions of Russia which always ended in disaster to the invaders.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 240.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 168, and also No. 412.

473. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 22 November 1950

Notes

1. See No. 454, and also Editorial note, p. 240.

474. M. Fischer (Paris) to M. Sharett (New York). 22 November 1950

Notes

1. No. 464.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 240.

475. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 22 November 1950

Notes

1. See No. 469.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 254.

476. E. K. Livneh[1] (Munich) to the West European Division. 22 November 1950

Orig.: 130.10/2539/1

Summary

Livneh, the Israel consul in Munich, replies to the West European Division concerning the relations between Israel and Germany.[2]

Livneh estimates that Germany is advancing swiftly towards full rehabilitation and independence. This process may not be to Israel's liking, but one has to come to terms with reality and to outline a new policy consistent with the changing situation.

Israel's attitude towards Germany should be determined by three guiding premises, as follows:

(1) Israel has the obligation to rescue the Jewish property remaining in Germany and to receive from that country monetary compensation in order to be able to fulfil the historic duty of upbuilding the State of Israel.

(2) One should avoid leaving vacant a political, economic and scientific niche in Germany's foreign relations which could then be filled by the Arabs.

(3) Germany's geographical location makes her a key to the countries of Eastern Europe and their Jewish communities.

These premises require abandoning the present line of total boycott of Germany and consenting to partial reconciliation with that country. Two important principles must nevertheless be adhered to: first, no diplomatic gesture should be made in advance towards Germany before the German nation has acknowledged its obligations and made a substantive step in the direction of compensating the Jewish people; second, the fundamental question of what sort ot relations should exist between the Germans and the Jews should be put off as far as possible, but at the same time conditions should be created to make an improvement in these relations possible.

Here Livneh puts forward a number of suggestions, such as: the slogan of "collective guilt" should be replaced by the thesis of "collective responsibility"; it should be acknowledged that there were in fact some groups of Germans which had opposed the Nazi regime; the present ban on Germany should not be regarded as absolute and its relaxation should be made

contingent on substantive steps by Germany towards making restitution to the Jewish people. These steps should be made, if at all, very gradually and after due deliberation.

As to the specific questions put forward by the Division, Livneh makes the following replies:

(1) He thinks it improbable that East Germany could be induced to pay compensation or to restore Jewish property; nevertheless, it should be approached in exactly the same way as West Germany.

(2) The status of the Israel consulate in Munich should be preserved.

(3) The possibilities of acting against the German economic and scientific penetration of the Arab states are severely limited.

(4) The present instructions concerning the attitude towards German representatives abroad should be moderated to a certain extent, in order to prevent cases of unnecessary personal affront.

(5) As to the negotiations on reparations, the premise should be that this is primarily a political and not an economic issue which should be taken up with the occupation authorities and the German government with the aim of putting through the necessary legislation in Germany.

Notes

1. Eliahu K. Livneh, Israeli Consul and Immigration Officer in Munich.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 223.
3. John McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner in Germany.

477. Report by Z. Shek (Prague). 22 November 1950

Copy: 130.11/2494/2

Summary

Shek reports on the condition of the Jews in Czechoslovakia and the situation regarding *aliya* from that country. Out of a community of some 16,000, about 3,500 have applied for exit permits. The Czechs have been lately summoning all the applicants to police stations for interrogation to persuade them to withdraw their applications. Most of those summoned, and in particular the elderly who have nothing to lose, stood up to the interrogation well and even engaged the officials in political and ideological arguments. The interrogation has always been conducted with courtesy. It has lately transpired that these proceedings were not initiated by the police but were a result of voluntary action by officials of the Emigration and Passport Department in the context of a general drive for socialist voluntary norms. This information has somewhat relieved the Jews' anxieties. Meanwhile, however, the authorities limit the number of passports issued and the only recipients are the elderly.

Notes

1. The second part of the letter, dealing with the situation of the Jews in Czechoslovakia, has been omitted here.

478. G. Avner (Tel Aviv) to M. Sasson. 23 November 1950

Copy: 130.10/2549/5

Summary

Avner has received Sasson's memorandum on Israel's policy versus the Mixed Armistice Commissions[1] and is taking this opportunity to set down some thoughts and ideas on this subject.

1. The Naharayim incident. Israel erred in raising this issue while the U.N. General Assembly was in session. It was lucky that the maps supported Israel's action, and the Jordanians also blundered, but the appropriate time should always be selected even when right is on Israel's side.

2. The legitimacy of Israel's action did not prevent foreign observers from forming the impression that such incidents were initiated on purpose; the Army is thereby made to appear militant and Israel's pronouncements on her peaceful intentions are put in question.

3. In general, during the last eighteen months Israel has been indulging in activities which did not promote peace with the Jordanians, irritated King Abdallah and created an impression among the Arabs of Israel's aggressiveness. Avner cannot comprehend how such border incidents can be reconciled with the wish for a *rapprochement* with Jordan. The theory that "making life difficult" for Abdallah will force him into an agreement with Israel does not stand up to common sense and has moreover been disproved by the recent developments. All these militant activities (evictions, ploughing up of fields etc.) have only resulted in toughening the Jordanians' attitude and in reports by Western representatives of Israel's aggressiveness.

4. Avner is not suggesting that Israel should waive her rights, but there is a whole list of incidents where her behaviour was obdurate and even cruel even when no advantage could be possibly expected to accrue from the action. [.....][2]

5. Israel will gain support in justified and important cases if she is more flexible in cases perhaps no less important but less vital and with a humanitarian aspect.

6. In short, he advises the following: (a) to examine every proposed action from the aspects of necessity and objective; (b) to select an appropriate opportunity in accordance with the political situation; (c) to take into account not only the end but also the means; (d) to concentrate on vital matters and to compromise in cases of lesser importance and greater complexity; (e) to take into account – as far as possible – humanitarian and "public opinion" aspects.

7. Such a policy would enable Israel both to stand on her rights and to gain sympathy among the Western powers. Though he is no expert on Arab mentality, he thinks that here, too, such an attitude is preferable for improving relations with the neighbours, and with the Jordanians in particular. In any case, an aggressive attitude can only entrench the existing stalemate.

Notes

1. Untraced, but see the running reports on the border occurrences, *What is Happening in the Armistice Commissions* (Hebrew), in file 130.02/2428/1.
2. Several paragraphs, dealing with some of the border events, have been omitted here. They deal, *inter alia*, with the eviction of Wadi Fuqin Arabs, with the ploughing of lands in no-man's-land in the Latrun sector (see No. 240), and with the transfer of infiltrators in the Dead Sea region (see No. 314 and n. 2 *ibid.*).
3. The last sentence was added by hand.

479. M. Sharett (New York) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 24 November 1950

Orig.: 93.02/175/11

Summary

Sharett briefs the Missions on developments in the Jerusalem issue. The Swedes and the Dutch have submitted a fourth version of their draft resolution on Jerusalem,[1] including some of the amendments demanded by Israel, but also a number of modifications originating elsewhere; the most important of these are a new preamble proposed by the French, presumably in coordination with the Vatican, invoking all the previous U.N. resolutions on Jerusalem, and the addition of the words "religious buildings and sites" wherever the term "Holy Places" appears.

An additional meeting with the Swedes and the Dutch has taken place. Though they accepted some of Israel's amendments, there remain some points at issue.[2] An exchange of correspondence on these, with a list of the amendments proposed by Israel, is appended.[3] At the same meeting the Swedes and the Dutch voiced their fears that all their work will be in vain because of opposition by Jordan and by the Vatican to the proposed formula. The Americans are exerting some pressure on Jordan but the situation as regards the Vatican is unclear, and the campaign being conducted by the ecclesiastical press[4] against any compromise deters the Latin American countries from supporting the proposed solution. The Israelis made clear to their interlocutors that Israel's interests would not suffer even if nothing came out of the present efforts, though Israel was in all sincerity desirous of a settlement.

Israel's policy now is to continue the efforts and explore every possibility of arriving at an agreement on the lines of the Swedish–Dutch formula, but

not to identify herself with this initiative both because no-one can tell what form the final version will take and in order not to stigmatize the proposal still more in the eyes of the Arabs and the Vatican. Sharett requests that all the Missions concerned urge their respective governments to accept the amendments proposed by Israel and to continue their efforts to push the resolution through.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 240.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 248.
3. All these documents, which have not been brought here, are on file.
4. See No. 470 and n. 2 *ibid.*, and also No. 481.

480. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 24 November 1950

Notes

1. Containing Riley's reports on his talks with Arab diplomats (see Sharett to Eytan, X629, 21 November 1950, 130.09/2329/10).
2. Mahmud Abu'l Fath, member of the Egyptian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

481. S. Ginossar (Rome) to W. Eytan. 27 November 1950

Copy: 130.02/2381/18

Summary

Ginossar refers to telegrams[1] and reports on French Foreign Minister Schuman's stand[2] on the Jerusalem issue. His information is that the campaign in the Catholic press indicated not readiness to compromise but an intention to thwart or at least render difficult any accommodation. Reports that this time the Pope was not exerting overt pressure on the Catholic countries to vote against the compromise can be presumably explained — according to information received also in Israel — by his not being certain that all or even most of these countries would follow his instructions. The Vatican's present line is therefore to let each country vote "according to its conscience", but to guide this conscience in the "right" direction by means of the press campaign.

Ginossar himself has no reliable information on the attitude of the Pope and of the Vatican State Secretariat. In an attempt to find out more he met the Dutch Minister in Rome, whose impression was that the Vatican preferred to postpone any decision for the time being.

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. See No. 474.

Editorial Note

Swedish–Dutch Draft Resolution on the Jerusalem Question – Fifth version

The fifth version of the draft resolution on Jerusalem was submitted by the Swedish delegation to the Ad Hoc Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on 28 November, after the Dutch delegation had withdrawn its sponsorship of the resolution owing to internal pressures at home. This fifth draft included the addition to the preamble invoking the past U.N. resolutions on Jerusalem and also other amendments worked out in negotiations between the Israeli delegation and those of the Netherlands, Sweden and France. (For the complete text of the draft resolution, see file 130.10/2550/3; see also Editorial Note, pp. 257–8).

482. S. Divon (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan. 28 November 1950

Orig.: 130.16/2948/7

Summary

Divon submits a proposal for the agenda of the Special Committee, drafted after a consultation with the Legal Adviser[1] and based on the latest resolution of the Security Council of 17 November.[2] He expects the Jordanians to refuse to negotiate on the basis of this resolution, and he recommends that this be exploited for propaganda purposes, in exposing the Jordanians' intransigent attitude and their refusal to implement Article 8 of the Armistice Agreement in spite of the Security Council's explicit instructions.[3]

For full English text of the proposal, see Main Volume, pp. 676–677.

Notes

1. See No. 459 and n. 4 *ibid.*
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 218–19.
3. The Director-General approved the proposed statement — *vide* Eytan's handwritten note in the margin, dated 28 November.

483. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 28 November 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 168.

484. Sir Alexander Knox Helm (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan. 29 November 1950

Notes

1. No. 351.

485. S. Ginossar (Rome) to G. Avner. 30 November 1950

Copy: 130.10/2550/5

Summary

On 29 November Ginossar held a conversation with Italian Foreign Minister Sforza. Ginossar opened by defining Italy's attitude in the Jerusalem issue as "sympathetic neutrality towards all the parties while refraining from any action in the matter and in the hope for a settlement which would insure the safety of the Holy Places with the agreement of the parties concerned and without imperilling peace in the Middle East". Sforza agreed with that definition and explained that Italy had to stay on good terms with the Arabs, who had helped them a great deal at the U.N., and had to safeguard her friendship with Israel and with the Jewish people and to protect the interests of the Catholic Church. Ginossar then briefed Sforza on the efforts being made by Sweden and the Netherlands to submit a compromise formula and also on the propaganda campaign against that proposal by the Church.[3] Sforza said he was unaware of any pressure being exerted by the Vatican on Italy in that matter.

Ginossar then turned to economic matters and referred to the positive developments in the bilateral trade between Italy and Israel. On the other hand, there had been no progress on the civil aviation agreement and on the mutual property claims. Sforza said he would take up these matters in a spirit of compromise.

Ginossar next referred to Israel's activity at the U.N. on the Italian Colonies issue[5] and other international problems (Korea, China, the peace-keeping proposals) but Sforza did not react in any tangible way.

Ginossar also mentioned the U.N. resolutions on the refugees and the problem of free passage through the Suez Canal.[6] On this last Sforza responded, saying that the Egyptians were in the wrong, and requested that Israel submit a memorandum on that issue to the Italian Foreign Ministry.

In summary, Ginossar's impression was that Sforza was not well briefed on the Arab–Israeli issues nor was he particularly interested in them. His main interest, it would seem, lies in Western European problems. The talk was very amicable but Ginossar thinks that Sforza had received him only for courtesy's sake; he did not evince any interest in the subjects mentioned, except in the Suez blockade and perhaps somewhat in the Jerusalem issue.

Notes

1. Carlo Gasparini, First Secretary and Consul in the Italian Legation in Israel.
2. Carlo Andrea Soardi, Vice Director-General of the Italian Foreign Ministry.
3. See No. 481.
4. Raimondo Giustiniani, Italian Minister designate to Israel.
5. On the Italian Colonies issue of 1949, see Vol. 4, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 232–3; this problem was again on the agenda of the Fifth Session and was debated in the Ad Hoc Committee. In the case of Eritrea, Israel consistently abstained on all the proposed resolutions, both those for the area's annexation to Abyssinia and the Soviet one calling for immediate independence and withdrawal of the occupation forces. In the case of Libya, Israel voted for the resolution calling for the convention of the Libyan National Assembly before 1 January 1951 and for the establishment of a provisional government before 1 April.
6. See Editorial Note pp. 218–19.
7. See No. 449.
8. See Editorial Note pp. 251–2.

486. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 30 November 1950

Notes

1. The Mixed Armistice Commission had been summoned to deal with the Jordanian complaint according to which Israel had paved and put to use a stretch of road inside Jordanian territory, near the Gharandal police station, to connect with the Eilat highway. Before the Commission had time to convene, the Jordanians occupied the area by force and blocked the passage to Eilat. The road in question was in effect a short detour which had been opened when the main road had become impassable for civilian traffic, and had by then been in use for almost a year.
2. In reply, Sharett asked for clarification on the exact location of the area at issue from the aspects of the armistice demarcation lines and of effective control (see Sharett to Eytan, telegram X670, 2 December 1950, 130.09/2329/10). See also No. 487.

487. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 1 December 1950

Notes

1. See No. 486.
2. See No. 456 and n. 3 *ibid.*

488. A. Biran (Jerusalem) to W. Eytan. 1 December 1950

Copy: 130.16/2948/7

Summary

Biran reports on the meeting of the Special Committee.[1] The Israelis opened by submitting their draft agenda. A discussion then developed on the significance of the Security Council's resolution and of various articles in the Armistice Agreement.[2] The Israelis repeated their demand to discuss first of all implementation of Article 8, while the Jordanians insisted on discussing subjects of interest to them.[3] They subsequently agreed to refer

Israel's draft agenda to their government, and it was then agreed to meet again on 21 December.

Biran remarks that though the Jordanian Government's decision cannot be predicted for certain, it was not out of the question that they would agree to the Israeli draft provided that subjects of special interest to them were included, such as tilling of fields in the "Triangle" and boundary modifications in Jerusalem. There was also the possibility that Jordan would agree to the agenda only to find out what significance Israel attached to the various items, such as free passage on the Latrun and Bethlehem roads. He requests that a decision be taken on Israel's stand with regard to inclusion of additional items in the agenda and with regard to free passage on vital roads.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note p. 230, and also No. 482.
2. See Editorial Note pp. 218–19.
3. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 12 of the Armistice Agreement dealt with the possibility of amending the Armistice Agreement, with or without mutual consent, whether by convening a conference of the two parties or by appeal to the Security Council.

489. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 2 December 1950

Notes

1. *Aluf* Mordechai Makleff, Deputy Chief of Staff.
2. See Nos. 486 and 487. Ben-Gurion was then on a private vacation in Greece.
3. Sharett had cabled that he would have recommended to break through by force if the stretch of road in question had not been in Jordanian territory (see Sharett to Eytan, X667, 1 December 1950, 130.09/2329/10).
4. Eytan explained that sovereignty in the area concerned was difficult to determine because the armistice line was marked on the map with a thick pencil. The Army first thought that the disputed stretch of road was on the Jordanian side, but a later examination raised the possibility of its being inside Israel; only a survey on the spot could give a definitive answer. (See Eytan to Sharett, Y365, 3 December 1950, 130.09/2338/13.)
5. On the night of 2/3 December an armoured patrol of the I.D.F. broke through the barriers put up by the Jordanians on the Eilat road. The Jordanians opened fire and the Israeli force returned it; one Jordanian armoured vehicle went up in flames; there were no casualties on the Israeli side. A cease-fire was achieved through U.N. intervention, and both sides withdrew from the disputed area. (See Eytan to the Israel Missions Abroad, MH11859, 3 December 1950, 130.02/2439/9.)

Editorial Note

United Nations Resolution on Assistance to the Arab Refugees

The Arab refugee problem was discussed in the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly on 1–7 and 27 November. The Committee had before it

the report of the Relief and Works Agency on its activities during the period of 1 May to 15 September 1950 (U.N. Document A/1451). The report painted a gloomy picture of the condition of the refugees, estimated by the Agency at 800,000, and concluded that direct aid should continue and that the works projects should be intensified. The financial estimate for these activities was 50 million dollars for the coming financial year.

At the meeting of 7 November, the U.S., Britain, Turkey and France submitted a joint draft resolution whose main points were the continuation of direct aid to the amount of 20 million dollars and instructions to the Agency to set up a "reintegration fund" which would allocate in the first year $30 million for the absorption of the refugees in the Middle East "through both repatriation and resettlement". At the sponsors' initiative, this draft proposal was referred to the Fifth Committee of the Assembly for formulation of the section dealing with the financing of the aid for the refugees. The proposal was returned to the Ad Hoc Committee after the Fifth Committee had inserted in it Paragraph (8), instructing the President of the General Assembly to set up a negotiating committee of seven or eight members to treat with both member and non-member states on the size of their contributions to the direct aid and to the reintegration fund. Following its endorsement by the Ad Hoc Committee, the proposal was referred to the plenum of the Assembly, where it was adopted by 46 votes, six states abstaining. (See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1950, pp. 323–8.) For the full text of the resolution, see Main Volume, Appendix A.

490. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 3 December 1950

Coded Tel. YA366; Outg.: 130.09/2338/13

Summary

The Iranians have informed Eytan that they were prepared to authorize Heyd's visit on condition that he come in a commercial guise.[1] They suggest the title of "special representative for the development of commercial ties and amicable relations". Eytan recommends rejecting this proposal. Another possibility is to send another person as commercial representative and to continue demanding the status of special representative for Heyd. Eytan requests Sharett's opinion.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 452.
2. Sharett replied that he thought Iran's difficulties should be met with understanding and that the proposed arrangement should be accepted, on condition that the Iranian representative in Israel should bear the same title. He proposed that Uriel Heyd be appointed to the said post in order to emphasize the importance Israel attached to the appointment, with the express reservation that the economic title was only a cover-up for the real function. (See Sharett to Eytan, telegram X693, 8 December 1950, 93.01/2203/2.)

491. Meeting: S. Bendor – M. Fried[1] and O. Troxel[2] (Tel Aviv, 3 December 1950)

Report: 130.02/2422/7

Summary

Fried and Troxel from the U.S. Embassy took part in the meeting. They said that the Department of State was preparing an extensive Grant-in-Aid programme for the 1952 financial year and that Israel was requested to submit her needs. The proposals have to be submitted by 7 December, thus only plans completed in detail could be considered in this context.

Meron replied that Israel had numerous plans, such as enlargement of Haifa port, drainage of Lake Huleh, irrigation of the Negev, reconstruction of the Potash Works and so on, but no particular plan could be submitted without information on the extent of the envisaged aid.

Fried said he had no idea of the extent of the aid, but what was of concern at the moment was only the submission of non-committal information. He suggested that several alternative plans be handed in, with a defined order of priorities, on the assumption that Israel would get a sum of from one to ten million doolars.

Later that day the U.S. Ambassador met Eytan and explained that the entire global sum envisaged was $500,000,000 and that the Middle East, excluding Turkey, Greece and Iran, was allotted $25,000,000. The Ambassador telephoned Eytan the next day and said he should not have given him that information, and requested that it be disregarded.

Notes

1. Milton Fried, Labour Attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Israel.
2. Oliver L. Troxel, Second Secretary in the U.S. Embassy in Israel.
3. Original has in error: "Iraq".

492. E. Elath (London) to M. Comay. 6 December 1950

Notes

1. See No. 489.
2. At the beginning of December there was a government change in Jordan. On 3 December Sa'id al-Mufti's cabinet resigned and one day later Samir al-Rifa'i established a new Government, in which he held the Portfolios of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
3. See No. 480.
4. No. 484.

Editorial Note

United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Palestinian Refugees and on the Prolongation of the Conciliation Commission's Mandate

Simultaneously with discussing the current aid for the Palestinian refugees (see Editorial Note, pp. 251–2) the Ad Hoc Committee also dealt with the long-term solution of the refugee problem and with an overall settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict. These issues took up the sessions from 29 November to 6 December. The Committee had before it the reports of the Conciliation Commission (see Editorial Note, p. 219) and the Chairman of the Commission also appeared before it. Five draft resolutions were laid before the Committee, including two by Israel and Egypt respectively, but only one became the subject of a substantive debate — that submitted jointly by the U.S., Britain, Turkey and France. This proposal called on the parties to enter immediately upon direct negotiations to settle all the pending issues between them and also instructed the Conciliation Commission to establish a bureau to deal, under the Commission's supervision, with all the procedure involved in assessing the worth of the refugees' property and in awarding appropriate compensation. Several amendments to the joint draft resolution were proposed, the most important of which, submitted by China, was to replace the call for "direct negotiations" by one for "negotiations either through the Conciliation Commission or directly"; this amendment was adopted. The joint draft resolution was put to the vote in the Ad Hoc Committee on 6 December and was adopted by a large majority. The voting in the plenum of the General Assembly on 14 December was 48 for, 5 against, and 4 abstentions. (See *Yearbook of the United Nations,* 1950, pp. 328–34.) For the full text of the resolution, see Main Volume, Appendix B.

493. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 7 December 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.

494. S. Eliashiv (New York) to the East European Division. 7 December 1950

Copy: 93.03/75/9

Summary

Eliashiv reports on the latest developments at the U.N.

The refugee issue.[2] This has been finally closed with the resolution adopted at the Ad Hoc Committee. The resolution, though with unfavour-

able implications for Israel, is definitely not a catastrophe. On the positive side may be stressed the failure of the Arabs' attempts to push through an explicit demand for repatriation of the refugees. The Soviet bloc's attitude in the course of the debate was somewhat strange. In their conversations with Eliashiv the Russians and other East European representatives expressed their complete understanding of Israel's position, but during the debates they adopted an entirely passive attitude and at the end they voted against the resolution. Eliashiv thinks the reason was the association of the refugee issue with the Conciliation Comission's report, any reference to the Commission being anathema to the Soviets and their allies.[3]

The Jerusalem issue. This will come up on the agenda today, but only in the form of the Swedish draft proposal.[5] The Soviet delegation is in contact with Eliashiv, is being constantly briefed and is aware of Israel's stand. They will presumably support the Swedish proposal.

Notes

1. See No. 472.
2. See Editorial Notes, pp. 251–2 and 254.
3. In the course of the debate on the report of the Conciliation Commission, the Soviets moved to dissolve the Commission. The motion was put to vote and rejected.
4. See Editorial Note, p. 254.
5. See Editorial Note, pp. 257–8.

495. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 7 December 1950

Notes

1. See No. 496.

496. M. Sharett (New York) to E. Elath (London). 8 December 1950

Notes

1. See No. 495.

497. W. Eytan and S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 8 December 1950

Notes

1. No. 423.
2. See Draft Memorandum on Behalf of the Government of Israel... 30 October 1950, 93.03/74/22.
3. Untraced.
4. Pinhas Rosen, the Minister of Justice.

5. Jacob Geri, Minister of Trade and Industry from October 1950 to October 1951.
6. Sharett replied that he thought the second option the most suitable, with the additional statement that Israel was about to submit a detailed memorandum on her claims from Germany (see Sharett to Eytan, telegram of 11 December 1950, 93.01/2203/2). The matter was again discussed at a meeting of the heads of divisions in the Foreign Ministry, where the consensus was that no formal reply should be given to the note of the Powers and that the submission of the claims against Germany should be considered sufficient. It was resolved to lay the matter before the Government for endorsement of the lines of the reply and for a decision in principle on the initiation of direct contacts with the German authorities, both in the West and in the East. (See Rosenne to Robinson, 13 December 1950, 93.08/344/15.)

Editorial Note

Turning-Point in the Korean War

With the onset of winter a dramatic change occurred on the Korean front. On 24 November the U.N. forces embarked on a large-scale offensive with the aim of achieving a military decision. This offensive encountered unexpected resistance by the Northern army, which had been reinforced by Communist China units. The U.N. offensive collapsed on 26 November and a retreat southwards commenced. Pyong-yang, the Northern capital which had been under U.N. occupation since October, was evacuated on 4 December and the U.N. forces continued to retreat until a defensive line was stabilized north of the 38th parallel.

The deterioration in the military situation in Korea brought about intense political activity. Heavy pressure was exerted on President Truman by members of the Republican party and other groups who demanded more vigorous action in Korea, including the use of atomic weapons. At a press conference on 30 November the President replied to a question on that subject in a manner that implied that the United States was considering the employment of atomic weapons in Korea. The reactions to this among the United States' allies were unfavourable.

British Prime Minister Attlee arrived in the U.S. on 4 December in order to confer with President Truman. A joint declaration was issued on 8 December, to the effect that the U.S. and Britain had no intention of adopting a line of appeasement and rewarding aggression but that they were prepared to enter on negotiations in order to put a stop to hostilities on the basis of a free and independent Korea. The two statesmen also announced that they were still in disagreement over Communist China's representation at the U.N., Britain still insisting on this being effected.

The events in Korea were the subject of debates in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly from 7 to 9 and from 11 to 13 December. Three proposals were laid before the Committee: the first, emanating from the U.S. and her allies, called for denying military aid to North Korea; the second, by the Soviet Union, demanded the evacuation of all foreign forces

from Korea; and the third, submitted by a group of thirteen Asiatic states headed by India, called for appointing a body of three, headed by the President of the U.N. Assembly, to determine the basis on which a cease-fire could be achieved in Korea. This last proposal was adopted in the First Committee by a large majority, only the Soviet bloc voting against. A similar majority was attained when the resolution was put to the vote in the plenum of the General Assembly on 14 December.

498. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 9 December 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.
2. See Memorandum by the Israeli Delegation, *United Nations Policy in Korea*, 11 December 1950, 93.03/3073/4.
3. See No. 500.

Editorial Note

The Jerusalem Question

The report of the Trusteeship Council on the Jerusalem issue, containing the draft of the Statute adopted by the Council in April 1950 (see Editorial Note, p. 108), was the subject of a debate in the Ad Hoc Committee in a series of meetings between 7 and 14 December. At the conclusion, two draft resolutions were submitted to the Committee. The first, submitted by Sweden, was in effect the final version of the Swedish–Dutch draft resolution which had undergone a number of metamorphoses and acquired numerous amendments during the Fifth Session of the General Assembly (see Editorial Note, p. 248, and No. 454). Its substance was the establishment of international supervision of the Holy Places in Jerusalem through a Commissioner responsible to the U.N. General Assembly. The second draft resolution, submitted by Belgium, stated that, as it was not possible to implement the resolution adopted by the Trusteeship Council because of lack of cooperation on the part of the states concerned, a body of four should be appointed to study, in consultation with the Governments in effective control of the Holy Places, with other states and with religious authorities and institutions, the conditions for a settlement which would effectively ensure the protection of the Holy Places and safeguard the religious and spiritual interests in Palestine. This body would submit its report to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly.

In the course of the debate, the U.S., Britain and Uruguay submitted an amendment to the Swedish proposal, which would make of the original, declarative, Section A (see No. 454) the main part of the resolution, with

the addition of several paragraphs dealing mainly with the appointment of a U.N. representative in Jerusalem who would represent the interests of that international body and who would be responsible to the General Assembly.

Neither of the proposals received a majority of the votes. In the case of the Belgian proposal, which was put to the vote first, there were 30 for, 18 against, and 11 abstentions, while the Swedish proposal was not put to the vote at all. More or less the same proportions appeared at the vote taken on 15 December at the plenum, and thus the Belgian proposal was rejected, having failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority. (See *Yearbook of the United Nations,* 1950, pp. 337–41)

499. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 12 December 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.
2. From this sentence Eytan drew the conclusion that the idea of moving the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem was being revived. He asked Sharett for instructions and warned against practical difficulties, such as lack of accommodation, which could make the transfer impracticable for the next year or two. (See his telegram S145 to Sharett, 13 December 1950, 130.09/2336/2.)

500. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 13 December 1950

Notes

1. See No. 498 and n. 2 *ibid.*
2. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, head of Canada's delegation to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
3. Sven H. Grafstrom, the Swedish Permanent Representative at the U.N.

501. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 13 December 1950

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 257–8, and also No. 499.

502. M. Comay [Tel Aviv] to S. Rosenne. 13 December 1950

Notes

1. See No. 503.

503. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to J. Robinson (New York). 13 December 1950

Orig.: 93.03/3006/1

Summary

During the farewell reception for the U.S. Ambassador, Rosenne spoke with General Riley on the Security Council's resolution.[1] The latter said that the main problem, as he saw it, was the Suez Canal. He intended to convene the Special Committee on 10 January in order to give the Egyptian objections a hearing. He doubted whether the Special Committee or even the Mixed Armistice Commission had the power to open the Canal to Israeli shipping. The Commission could only pronounce rulings on this or that issue but could not decide on procedures in the general problem of Egyptian obstruction of shipping in the Canal.[2] Riley stressed that this was his personal opinion, but Rosenne thinks he was quoting the Legal Department of the U.N. Secretariat.

Rosenne is preparing for the debate in the Special Committee. When in London, he intends to consult Professor Lauterpacht[3] and perhaps also officials of the British Foreign Office. He thinks Israel will have to make special efforts to have a favourable resolution passed in the Committee, and Riley's sceptical attitude will not make it any easier. He estimates that the case will be referred back to the Security Council, which will be faced by the alternatives of handing down a political decision or referring the issue to the International Court of Justice. He thinks the first alternative is preferable to Israel, therefore political support among the members of the Security Council should be mobilized.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 257–8.
2. See No. 229 and n. 1 *ibid.* Colonel S.S. Ballantyne, Chairman of the Israel–Egypt Mixed Armistice Commission, ruled in Summer 1949, in the course of a debate on an Israeli complaint, that the issue of passage through the Suez Canal was one of a political nature, and therefore out of the province of the Armistice Commission.
3. Hersch Lauterpacht, Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge.

504. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 14 December 1950

505. T. Kollek (Washington) to the United States Division. 14 December 1950

Orig.: 130.20/2485/1

Summary

Kollek adds details to his telegram on the American Grant-in-Aid.[1] The Department of State intends to submit its proposals to Congress soon and

it therefore requires more information. The plan is to concentrate the aid in two geographical zones — Western Europe and Southeast Asia. The sums allotted in the Point Four programme are to be increased to $87,000,000 and $25,000,000 are to be requested for the Arab refugees — this last is the so-called "Middle East allocation". The State Department also supports the Export–Import Bank's request to increase its capital.

Israel should see to it that, when Congress debates allocations to particular regions, these will include a separate sum for Israel; thus if Southeast Asia is taken over by Communist China, Israel could receive allocations intended originally for that region. As to a loan from the Export–Import Bank, Kollek is not at all certain that the Bank would be prepared to give to Israel additional loans, especially in view of the fact that Israel has no plans involving short-term repayment such as the Bank requires (10–15 years). That is why Kollek had advised in his telegram to ignore the sums specified by the U.S. Ambassador and to submit plans for the sum of $100,000,000, while explaining that these were part of a long-term programme.

Kollek's work in the States is meeting with difficulties because the general picture is not clear: he does not know how much money can be mobilized, on what terms, and how will the loans be repaid. He has therefore come to the conclusion — after consulting with Robert Nathan — that the overall sum in question should be one billion dollars including monies collected through the Bonds issue and the U.J.A. His work also suffers from the fact that Israel has no comprehensive plans, especially in the industrial sector. He is trying to construct — with the aid of the engineer Goldberg — a skeleton scheme which he hopes to send soon to the Mininstry.

Notes

1. See No. 491. In response to the report on the meeting with the U.S. Embassy officials, Kollek had cabled that the aim was to obtain American aid to the amount of $100 million a year for the next three years. The sums mentioned in the meeting should therefore be ignored and the plans to be submitted should be based on the above amount. (See Kollek to the United States Division, W501, 6 December 1950, 93.01/2202/15.)

506. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to B. Locker[1] (Jerusalem). 15 December 1950

Copy: 130.02/2387/4

Summary

Sharett requests Locker to submit to the Jewish Agency Executive the proposal to increase the quota for the immigration of Iraqi Jews, even at the cost of other countries where the Jews are not facing an immediate danger.[2]

The number of Iraqi Jews who have relinquished their Iraqi citizenship and registered for *aliya* is estimated at the very least at 90,000, including some 20,000 who have already emigrated. If this rate of emigration remains constant, tens of thousands of stateless Jews will be left there for

several years awaiting *aliya.* Their fate is both a personal and a political problem. In view of Iraq's hostile attitude, it is not out of the question that Israel will be faced in the near future with the necessity of urgently evacuating tens of thousands of Jews at one go. The Iraqis are already demanding that the rate of emigration be increased, and the British and American representatives in Israel have come up with the same request.

Notes

1. Berl Locker, Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive.
2. Besides the Foreign Ministry officials, also Locker and Adler-Rudel of the Jewish Agency office in London participated in the meeting. The Foreign Ministry people demanded an increased rate of emigration from Iraq; Locker agreed to put the matter before the Coordinating Committee — a body maintaining liaison in matters of *aliya* between the Jewish Agency and the Israel government. (See United States Division to Eytan, 17 December 1950, 130.15/2563/8.)

507. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to the Government Secretary. 17 December 1950

Copy: 130.02/2417/1

Summary

Eytan requests the Secretary to the Cabinet to put on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting the problem of relations with Germany.[1] The specific subjects on which a decision is requested are as follows:

(a) The Note by the three powers on the termination of the state of war with Germany.[2]

This Note states that the three Powers are about to terminate the state of war with Germany and that they hope that Israel too will take all necessary legal steps with the same objective. There are several possible decisions to take in respect of this Note:

1. Not to reply at all.

2. To reply that Israel has taken the content of the Note into consideration.

3. To reply that Israel had never been officially at war with Germany and therefore cannot join the three Powers in the proposed action.

4. To combine in one letter a reply according to (2) or (3) with a renewed statement of Israel's claims from Germany.

5. To send two separate missives, one a reply according to (2) or (3) and the other a statement of Israel's claims.

The Foreign Ministry is interested in using this opportunity for submitting a comprehensive list of claims of the Jewish people against Germany, and for stressing that the Western powers are responsible for Germany's meeting these claims. The Cabinet is requested to

authorize the dispatch of such a communication and also to decide whether and in what form to convey Israel's stand also to East Germany.

(b) A decision in principle whether to initiate contacts with the German authorities with the objective of submitting Israel's claims.

All concerned with the German reparations are unanimous in the opinion that there will be no substantial progress until Israel enters on direct negotiations not only with the occupation authorities but also with the authorities of West and East Germany. The Foreign Ministry suggests that a certain formula for such contacts be sought, which will be limited to matters touching reparations only and will not be construed as general political relations. A special permanent delegation, to deal solely with reparations, can then be dispatched to Germany. Several countries have already taken similar steps and are dealing with *ad hoc* problems through special delegations.

An early decision on this line of action is needed. Delay might force Israel to approach Germany directly if the powers transfer to the Germans the authority to receive such delegations.

Public opinion in Israel will have to be informed of the necessity of contacts with Germany and of their strictly limited significance.[5]

Notes

1. See No. 497.
2. No. 423.
3. See the Legal Adviser to the Foreign Minister, 27 November 1950, 130.10/2539/1.
4. See Meron to the Foreign Minister and the Director-General, 10 December 1950, 130.02/2417/1.
5. See No. 522.

508. S. Bentsur (Budapest) to A. Levavi. 17 December 1950

Orig.: 130.11/2492/22

Summary

Bentsur reports on a series of meetings he had with Berey on *aliya* from Hungary.[1] Bentsur suggested an arrangement for simultaneous repatriation from Israel of those who had changed their minds and Jewish emigration from Hungary to Israel.[2] Berey stressed there was no connection between emigration and repatriation, but was prepared to accept the arrangement. The Israeli proposal that the repatriation should take place after the 3,000 immigrants had left was rejected by Berey, who announced that *aliya* would commence only after he has received a promise that some 120–150 repatriates would leave for Hungary already in December.[7]

Notes

1. See No. 425.
2. See Bentsur to Levavi, BU191, 17 December 1950, 130.09/2295/9.
3. See No. 489.
4. One sentence has been omitted here.
5. Only a draft of this *note verbale* could be found in the Foreign Ministry files – see Benzur to Eliashiv, 17 October 1950, 130.02/2397/20.
5. One paragraph, dealing with commercial matters, has been omitted here.
7. Levavi had cabled that permission had been given for some 150 returnees to leave for Hungary till the end of December and preparations were being made for their embarkation (see his telegram to the Legation in Budapest, 17 December 1950, 130.09/2295/7).
8. Two paragraphs, dealing with administrative matters, have been omitted here.

509. M. Sharett (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 18 December 1950

Notes

1. See No. 496.
2. See also No. 510.
3. Sharett cabled later that when he had mentioned that figure he had no idea that that enormous amount of wheat could feed Israel for seven years (see his telegram to Eytan, W524, 19 December 1950, 130.09/2308/19).

510. M. Sharett [Washington] to W. Eytan. 18 December 1950

Notes

1. No. 509.
2. See Nos. 511 and 517.

511. M. Sharett [Washington] to W. Eytan. 18 December 1950

Notes

1. No. 510.
2. George Lewis Jones, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State from November 1950.
3. Ben-Gurion and Shiloah replied in the negative. The former asked for a prior consultation in Israel, and the latter argued that Israel's policy on this matter was still unclear and that the General Staff should also be consulted. Kaplan replied in the affirmative, explaining that it was preferable to visit London *en route* and not to arrange a special trip. (See Eytan to Sharett, Y424, 22 December 1950, 130.09/2338/13.)

512. Meeting: W. Eytan - General W. Riley (Jerusalem, 18 December 1950)

Report: 130.02/2428/1

Summary

Eytan met Riley before the latter left for Geneva. The talk was entirely unofficial and dealt with several subjects.

(1) Mount Scopus. Eytan referred to his letter on the limitations imposed on the number of visitors to Mount Scopus — not more than 15.[1] Riley explained that he was obliged to decide on a fixed number in order to appease the Jordanian Foreign Minister; if Israel accepts his ruling, he will do all he can to solve the problem of inspection of the convoys to Israel's satisfaction.

(2) Peace talks with Egypt. Riley saw Sherine when he was in Egypt. The latter said Egypt would be prepared to start peace talks if Israel cedes Eilat and its environs, to which Riley replied that there was not the slightest chance of such a concession. Eytan remarked here, that even the concessions on the northern border with Egypt that Israel had been prepared to offer in the course of the Lausanne talks had not elicited any response from Egypt.[2] On the Suez Canal blockade, Sherine told Riley that oil tankers bound for Israel were allowed passage after their captains signed a declaration saying that they were *not* bound for Israel. Riley replied that it was unethical to force people to sign false declarations. Eytan said he did not know of any such arrangement and that he did not believe a word of what Sherine had said.

(3) Employment of refugees in the Gaza Strip in land improvement works in El Arish. Riley had heard of this scheme from Blandford but he thinks nothing will come of it.

(4) Access to the Western Wall. Riley asked for Eytan's opinion on opening access to the Wall through the Dung Gate, to which Eytan replied that Israel had always thought of Zion Gate as the best avenue to the Wall, but would be prepared to consider also the solution proposed by Riley.

Notes

1. See No. 456 and n. 3 *ibid.*
2. See Vol. 4, No. 267.

513. E. Elath (London) to W. Eytan. 18 December 1950

Copy: 130.02/2382/10

Summary

Elath refers to the resignation of Barzilai and other members of the staff of the legation in Warsaw.[1] He considers this occurrence proof of the neces-

sity of setting up a non-political diplomatic service which would not be jolted by every change of government. This particularly applied to second-rank diplomats. As concerned heads of missions, these had to be appointed at present from among political figure, but one should see to it that they have experienced aides at their sides.

Notes

1. See No. 441.

514. M. Keren (Washington) to M. Sharett (New York). 21 December 1950

Notes

1. See No. 509.
2. Richard F. Uhlmann, formerly President of the Chicago Board of Trade, President and Director of the Uhlmann Grain Company.

515. A. Biran (Jerusalem) to W. Eytan. 21 December 1950

Copy: 130.16/2948/7

Summary

Biran wishes to sum up the discussion held the previous day in the Director-General's office on the Israeli delegation's stand at the Special Committee.[1]

(1) The delegation will insist on honouring the Armistice Agreement and thus on discussing in detail its Article 8.

(2) As the Special Committee was set up to extend the framework of the Armistice Agreement, the delegation will not oppose other issues and items submitted by either delegation.

(3) The Israeli delegation will not take a stand on the implementation of any particular item of those discussed.

(4) Concerning Latrun - at a first step the delegation will demand demarcation of the no-man's-land there, and as a second step - conditional on endorsement by the Army G.H.Q. - free passage with no demarcation.

(5) The delegation will offer the Jordanian free passage from Jaffa Gate to Bethlehem. A further concession will be passage to Bethlehem from Damascus Gate - this conditional on endorsement by the Army G.H.Q.

Notes

1. See No. 489.

516. A. Eban (New York) to the United States Divison. 22 December 1950

Notes

1. Gass had reported that the Export–Import Bank had finally authorized agricultural credit for Israel to the amount of $35 million for a period of 15 years (see his telegram to Kaplan, 21 December 1950, 93.01/2202/15).
2. See No. 505.
3. Edward M. Warburg, Chairman of the American United Jewish Appeal.
4. Joseph Schwartz, Director of the J.D.C., Vice-Chairman of the United Jewish Appeal.

517. M. Sharett (New York) to G. C. Marshall. (Washington). 23 December 1950

Notes

1. No. 88.
2. Marshall replied that the relevant officials in the Department of Defense would be happy to continue discussing Israel's requirements with Ambassador Eban and Military Attaché Herzog. He had also sent copies of the memorandom to General Bradley, Chairman of the Munitions Board, and to the three Secretaries of State for the armed services. He remarked, however, that some of Israel's requests were of such a comprehensive nature that the proper forum for their discussion was the Department of State. In conclusion he said that he was well aware of the problems facing Israel and that he viewed with sympathy some of Sharett's proposals, but was certain that Sharett on his part was also aware of the problems confronting the United States at that moment, in particular in the military and industrial spheres, which had a direct relevance to Israel's proposals. (See Marshall to Sharett, 11 January 1951, 93.08/361/8.)

518. M. Keren [Washington] to the United States Division. 27 December 1950

Notes

1. See No. 509.

519. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan. 28 December 1950

Orig.: 130.02/2408/13

Summary

Rafael reports on the cooperation between Israel and Jordan at the U.N. General Assembly.

Jordan was represented at the Security Council at first by Yusuf Haykal, her Minister in Washington, whose unhappy performance there is well known. At a later stage, when Haykal had driven himself into a blind alley, a meeting was arranged between Touqan[1] and Eban. The former begged Israel not to exploit Haykal's failure and agreed to discuss the Naharayim

case in the Mixed Armistice Commission. Eban replied that Israel would agree not to pressure them at the Security Council if they agreed to discuss Article 8 in the Special Committee. That meeting initiated useful cooperation between Touqan and the Israeli delegation, which was particularly fruitful in the Jerusalem issue. Touqan informed the Israelis of what he intended to say in the U.N. and the delegation saw to it that he received suitable support. Touqan had to adopt the routine Arab stand on the refugees but he did not express himself with inordinate extremism.

Following the previous year's tradition, Eban invited Touqan for dinner at the close of the Assembly. Touqan was in an elated mood and he took the credit for the victories in the Jerusalem issue. The following points were raised during the conversation:

(1) Jordan had opposed the Swedish proposal in the version submitted to the Ad Hoc committee and as a result this proposal was rejected.

(2) Eban explained that the Belgian draft resolution had been aimed at Jordan in the first place, the objective of its initiators and supporters (the Vatican) being internationalization of the Old City. Israel took no hand in this scheme because good relations with her neighbours were important to her. Touqan expressed his appreciation of this attitude.

(3) Though Iraq continued to demand publicly the internationalization of Jerusalem, in private conversations they supported Touqan's stand. The Syrians had elected to absent themselves from the Jerusalem debate.

(4) Touqan believes that the Jerusalem issue will find its solution after the signing of the Jordan–Israel peace agreement. He thinks that next year progress will be made towards a settlement. There exists in Jordan public opposition to a settlement which cannot be neutralized overnight and a gesture on Israel's part is needed in order to present the agreement as a victory for Jordan. He did not specify the sort of gesture he had in mind, and even remarked that he knew Israel could not make territorial concessions.

Eban replied that any agreement had to be based on the draft initialled at the beginning of that year. On that basis, Israel would be prepared to pay compensation for several Arab quarters in Jerusalem so that Jordan could build a new quarter in her part of the city. Israel is also prepared to pay compensation for abandoned lands and to allow Jordan free access to Haifa port. He stressed the numerous economic advantages that would accrue to Jordan from an Israeli–Jordanian agreement. Touqan replied that an Israeli–Jordanian agreement would lead the way for a general agreement with the rest of the Arab world as in effect there were no elements of conflict between Israel and these countries.

(5) Touqan asked in what manner Israel envisaged the payment of compensation. He believed a middle way should be found between payments to property owners and mobilization of resources for settlement of the needy masses. The moneys should not be handed over in their entirety to

the governments or to the Reintegration Fund. Eban agreed with these reservations and added that the governments concerned and the Reintegration Fund should solve this problem.

(6) The Jerusalem issue was raised again towards the end of the conversation. Eban spoke of the need to establish firmly the present situation; the world has to be shown that the two countries can ensure the safety of the Holy Places by promulgating appropriate laws. Perhaps some of the arrangements mentioned in the Swedish proposal can be adopted, such as the advisory committee composed of representatives of the various religions, and so on.

Notes

1. Ahmed Bey Touqan, Jordanian representative to the U.N. institutions; from December 1950 — Minister of Education.
2. Fawzi al-Mulqi, former Jordanian Defence Minister, was not included in the new government set up at the beginning of December 1950.
3. Muhammad Fadil al-Jamali, Iraqi Foreign Minister, head of the Iraqi delegation to the U.N.
4. Charles Malik, Lebanese Minister to the U.S., member of the Lebanese delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.
5. One sentence, of personal content, has been omitted.

520. G. Rafael [New York] to R. Shiloah. 28 December 1950

Copy: 93.08/342/17

Summary

Rafael submits some ideas on the relations between Britain and Israel. He has lately been confirmed in his opinion that the problems of the Middle East cannot be solved without friendly and sincere cooperation with Britain. True, the U.S. is a decisive factor in the Western world in the economic and political spheres, but owing to the present international situation its leaders are now entirely immersed in global and strategic affairs, their attention being given mainly to the fortification and armament of Europe and no time and resources being left over for the Middle East. Whatever attention is paid to the Middle East is concentrated on Greece, Turkey and Iran, and in what concerns the other countries their aim is to preserve the stability as far as possible and to guard their own interests, while leaving the other aspects to the experienced British.

Britain has always attached great importance to preserving her status and her influence in the Middle East. There have been many shifts in her policy but the objectives have always remained the same: from support of Egypt she shifted to reliance on Trans-Jordan; from an attempt at uniting all the Arab states in the Arab League she arrived at supporting a grouping of some of the Arab states around the Hashemite dynasty; from the White Paper – to recognition of and cooperation with Israel. In the last resort –

the key to the Middle East's security, in peace and in war, was and remains with Britain.

If one agrees with the above analysis then for the sake of her security and her future Israel has to find a way to cooperate with Britain. Rafael knows that many will find these conclusions heretical and far-fetched, but if Britain knew how to adapt to changes in the Middle East then Israel too must base her policy on the actual balance of power in the region.

In conversations held with Sharett and with some of his colleagues in the delegation to the U.N., Rafael proposed comprehensive and fundamental talks with the British. The first issue on the agenda should be that of the Arab refugees. The British understand that this problem must be solved by resettlement of the refugees in the Arab countries within the framework of an extensive regional development programme, the resources for which have to be mobilized with the aid of the U.S. If Israel succeeds in reaching an understanding on this subject with Britain and then in recruiting financial assistance in the U.S., a tremendous political stumbling block will be removed from her path and the groundwork will be laid for yet more understanding and extensive cooperation with the British.

In view of the above, Rafael supports Sharett's visiting London on his way back from the States.

Notes

1. See No. 511.
2. Untraced.

521. Meeting: W. Eytan - Sir Alexander Knox Helm (Tel Aviv, 28 December 1950)

Report: 130.13/2582/4

Summary

The conversation turned on various subjects. The Minister opened by asking for details of Dayan's visit in Turkey, Eytan explaining that the visit was of an entirely private nature.

Helm then said that Britain had been urging the Jordanians, through her Minister in Amman, to stop wrangling over Article 8 and to commence with all dispatch serious negotiations over a settlement with Israel.

Helm asked what was the truth in the reports about the impending transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem,[1] and warned against such a rash step. He himself had asked London for permission to come to Jerusalem on official business and was told that Britain was now consulting on this matter with France and the U.S.A. There are good prospects of an affirmative answer and he begs not to destroy the whole endeavour with an over-

hasty action. Eytan replied that there was no truth in those reports and that they had already been denied.

Helm then turned to the relations between Britain and Israel in the context of the defence of the Middle East. His information was that things were moving towards Israel's inclusion in these plans, and the press cuttings he had been collecting from the local periodicals said much the same. General Robertson's visit[2] also pointed to the same direction. Eytan did not react to these words.

Towards the end of the conversation Helm asked what Israel was doing to accelerate the immigration from Iraq.[3] Eytan replied that the matter was being dealt with urgently by the Jewish Agency.

Notes

1. See No. 499 and n. 2 *ibid.*
2. See No. 367.
3. See No. 399.
4. Richard Crossman, M.P. (Labour).
5. See No. 506.

522. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to S. Rosenne (London) and J. Robinson (New York). 28 December 1950

Notes

1. See No. 165.
2. Eytan had asked for the opinions of Robinson and Rosenne on the possibility that Israel would declare a state of war with both Germanies: (1) from the legal aspect; (2) from the aspect of Israel's obligations *vis-à-vis* the U.N. Charter; (3) from the aspect of possible practical effects on the compensation and reparations claims; (4) from any other aspect. (See telegram of 28 December 1950, 130.09/2377/1.)
3. Replies to this telegram arrived from both Eban and Robinson. The former argued that, from the political aspect, a declaration of war could have an undesirable effect on the relations with both Germanies, the more so as, legally, Israel was in any case in a state of war with these states as the successor of Mandatory Palestine, and only the Government of Israel could terminate this situation. He recommended to leave matters as they were and to advise the Three Powers that Israel intended to dispatch a mission accredited to the High Commissioners in Germany to negotiate on her claims.

   Robinson listed many reasons why the suggested step would be undesirable, the principal ones being that it would be anachronistic, that it would not profit Israel in any way, and that it would only complicate her relations with the great powers and with the U.N. (See Eban to Eytan, X743, 29 December 1950; Lourie to Eytan, 31 December 1950, 130.09/2329/10.)

   The Government of Israel reviewed the whole issue of relations with Germany on 3 January 1951. It was resolved that the Israeli representatives would approach the central governments of the occupation powers concerning reparations and restitution of Jewish property. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed that Israel deal directly with the occupation authorities in Germany, but this suggestion was rejected by the Government.

523. M. Keren (Washington) to the United States Division. 29 December 1950

Copy: 130.20/2475/1

Summary

Keren reviews the changes in the international standing of the U.S. in the wake of the Korean crisis and their influence on the internal political arena in the States. These changes also naturally affected Israel's standing in the U.S. and influenced the various Israeli schemes for mobilizing economic assistance. Israel's image has improved as a result of her stand in the Korean crisis, but that is not enough. The Americans view everything today through the military prism. Israel will be called upon to answer questions in the immediate military global spheres — on her attitude towards NATO and towards a possible Middle Eastern alliance and towards granting military bases to the Americans, and about her readiness to fight in case of a Soviet invasion, for instance of Iran.

The answers to these questions will be decisive in whether the U.S. will be prepared to extend her aid to Israel. Unfortunately, Israel has so far not given unequivocal answers to these questions, and without them, Keren thinks, Israel cannot hope to receive substantial aid from the Americans. He therefore recommends that Israel's stand on all current political and military issues be thoroughly reexamined and a decision taken one way or the other.

Notes

1. The first part of the letter consists of a review of the changes which had taken place in the past year in the global and strategic standing of the U.S. and an analysis of the resulting shifts in her global policies.
2. Operation "stockpiling" for the storage of food and strategic materials in Israel - see No. 518.

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TO MAIN VOLUME AND COMPANION VOLUME

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References to the principal addressees in this volume – Ben-Gurion, Eban, Elath, Eytan and Sharett – are brought only when they are the authors of documents or when they are mentioned in them.

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* *Abbreviations*

b. – born

n – note

CV – Companion Volume

I.D.F – Israel Defence Forces